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2017 DIGILAW 589 (KER)

ANILKUMAR S/O SREEDHARAN v. SAHIDA D/O SOMAN

2017-03-27

A.M.SHAFFIQUE, K.RAMAKRISHNAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.M. SHAFFIQUE, J. 1. This appeal is filed against the order in IA Nos. 845 and 846 of 2013 of the Family Court, Attingal by which the applications were dismissed and the appellant has approached this Court by filing the above appeal. Parties are referred to as shown in the appeal memorandum. 2. OP No. 406/2011 was filed by the respondent for dissolution of marriage and an ex-parte decree was passed on 29.9.2012. IA No. 845/2013 was filed to set aside ex-parte decree and IA No. 846/2013 was filed to condone delay of 196 days in filing the above application to set aside ex-parte order. In the affidavit filed in support of the above application, appellant contended that he was residing at Kannur in connection with his employment and he was not aware of the filing of the petition. 3. The respondent objected to the above application and contended that there is no valid explanation to set aside the ex-parte decree which has been filed only for the purpose of extracting money from her. 4. The Family Court considered the application and observed that ex-parte order was effected after making a paper publication. The order sheet would show that the notice issued by post was returned un-served. Thereafter, publication was made in Desabhimani Daily dated 8.6.2012 in the address of the husband in the original petition, which is shown as Kavuvila Veedu, Mullaram Kode, Ottur Village, Vadaserykonam P.O. Varkala, whereas in the petitions filed by him, his address is shown as Amruthamgamaya, Thachode Desom, Chemmaruthy Village which is the address of his wife. It is observed that in the marriage certificate produced as Ext.A1 and in the original petition, the address of the husband and wife was different. It is after going through the materials on record, the Family Court observed that there was no justification in filing the petition mentioning the address as that of his wife and there is no explanation for giving a different address in the vakalath and in the petitions. Hence, it was found that there was no bona-fides in the statement that he was unaware of the proceedings. Further, the application to set aside ex-parte decree was filed after two years of filing of the original petition on the ground of desertion. According to the respondent, husband deserted on 18.9.2009. Hence, it was found that there was no bona-fides in the statement that he was unaware of the proceedings. Further, the application to set aside ex-parte decree was filed after two years of filing of the original petition on the ground of desertion. According to the respondent, husband deserted on 18.9.2009. The Family Court further observed that though there was no desertion as claimed, the petition was allowed on the ground of cruelty. It is further found that the appellant did not enquire about his wife for more than two years after filing the original petition, which itself is found to be a reason for not condoning the delay of 196 days. Though it is contended that he was working at Kannur, the fact that he had not contacted his wife for more than two years itself is a reason which cannot be taken for granted. Accordingly, the delay petition was dismissed and consequently the application to set aside ex-parte decree was also dismissed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no proper service of notice and the notice was effected by paper publication and that too in a Daily which does not have much circulation in the area. Therefore, the Family Court ought to have condoned the delay of 196 days and the ex-parte decree ought to have been set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that after the decree had been passed, respondent had remarried and is living separately. Further, notice could not be served since the whereabouts of the appellant was not known and therefore the only manner in which service of notice could be effected was by way of substituted service, by paper publication. In so far as the respondent had complied with all requirements under the statute for effecting service of notice, there is no reason why the appellant cannot appear, nor seek for setting aside the ex-parte decree immediately thereafter. Even the delay is not satisfactorily explained. It is also contended that the Family Court was justified in arriving at the findings as stated above. 7. The short question to be considered in the above appeal is whether there was justification on the part of the Family Court to have rejected an application to condone delay of 196 days and the application to set aside ex-parte decree. It is also contended that the Family Court was justified in arriving at the findings as stated above. 7. The short question to be considered in the above appeal is whether there was justification on the part of the Family Court to have rejected an application to condone delay of 196 days and the application to set aside ex-parte decree. Apparently, the notice could not be served on the appellant and as per Order V Rule 20 of Code of Civil Procedure, substituted service is permissible by the Court, where it is satisfied that there is reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. Substituted service can be done by affixture in some conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant is known to have last resided. The Court can also order service of notice by advertisement in a news paper which has circulation in the locality in which the defendant is last known to have actually and voluntarily resided. Effect of substituted service is stipulated under Order V Rule 20(2), which reads as under: "(2) Effect of substituted service: Service substituted by order of the Court shall be effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally." 8. Once substituted service had been ordered by the Court and it has been taken, one cannot contend for the position that he was not served with any notice and substituted service is one method of service of notice as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is for the appellant to explain why he did not appear even after service of notice as contemplated under Order V Rule 20. The only reason stated by the appellant is that he was at Kannur during the relevant time. But it is to be noticed and as rightly pointed out by the Family Court that there is no explanation from the part of the appellant under what circumstances he was keeping away from his matrimonial home or from the respondent for more than two years. If he was having any contact with the respondent, he would have definitely known about the pendency of the case or the result thereof. 9. If he was having any contact with the respondent, he would have definitely known about the pendency of the case or the result thereof. 9. Further, as rightly found out by the Family Court, the appellant had given the address of the respondent herself in the petitions in order to indicate that they are residing in the same address whereas factually it was totally incorrect. If he was residing in the same address, there was no reason that the notice was not served on him and there is no explanation forthcoming in regard to difference in the address shown in the original petition as well as the address shown in the interlocutory applications filed by the appellant. 10. In the light of the aforesaid facts, when it is assumed that there was proper service of notice by substituted service on the appellant, and the further fact that there had been change in circumstances and the respondent had remarried, it is all the more unnecessary for this Court to interfere with the order passed by the Family Court. Accordingly, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned orders. Mat. Appeal is dismissed.