JUDGMENT : The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) impugn Exhibit P1 order passed by the Additional Bench of Income Tax Settlement Commission, Chennai [for brevity "Settlement Commission"] in the above writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The objection is with respect to the refusal of the Settlement Commission to make any additions on the basis of the entries in the Cash Flow Statement [CFS]; of the alleged advances taken by the assesse, coming to a whooping amount of Rs.4,13,52,150/-. The computation of income made by the Settlement Commission on the assessee comes to only less than Rs.65,00,000/-. 2. The assessee-respondent raises a preliminary objection that the Commissioner of Income Tax is not entitled to file a writ petition challenging the order of the Settlement Commission going by the scheme of Chapter XIX A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [for brevity "the Act"], being a statutory authority under the Act. The specific contention raised is based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail v. Spl. Director, Enforcement Directorate and Another [ 2007 (8) SCC 254 ]. The argument is that a specific authorisation from the Government of India is required to file a writ petition against such order of the Settlement Commission; which only the Government of India could have assailed and not the authorities constituted under the Act. The Commissioner being an adjudicating-authority under the Act, could not have challenged the order passed by the Settlement Commission. The further contention is based on the conclusive nature of the orders passed by the Settlement Commission as has been specified by Section 245-I, for which reliance is placed on Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal and Others [ 2007 (8) SCC 418 ]. 3. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Department, however, would draw a distinction as to the facts and the respective material provisions of law, in this case and Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail. It is also contended that Dhampur Sugar has not in any manner restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and has merely made observations with regard to the manner in which such jurisdiction has to be exercised. Specifically on point is Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I.Tripathi and Others [1993) 201 ITR 611], argues the Department. 4. Mohtesham Mohd. Specifically on point is Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I.Tripathi and Others [1993) 201 ITR 611], argues the Department. 4. Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail was a case in which the adjudicating authority had at the first instance imposed a penalty under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 [for brevity "FERA"], for contravention of its provisions; with respect to foreign remittances made. The appellant was successful in the first appeal, which order was challenged before the High Court under Article 226, by the adjudicating authority itself. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the writ petition was filed by the adjudicating authority who was specifically conferred with powers to adjudicate cases of contravention of any of the provisions of the statute. Section 54 of FERA, which provided for an appeal to the High Court, specifically by Explanation (ii) provided for the appeal to be filed in the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent ordinarily resides or carries on business, where the Central Government is the aggrieved party. The notification relied on by the Department before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to sustain the writ petition before the High Court was one which authorised an officer to enforce the provisions of the Act and specifically empowered such officer to adjudicate upon the dispute. There was also no notification pointed out as to any empowerment or authorisation with respect to filing of an appeal on behalf of the Central Government. The material provisions so noticed are distinctively different from that in the present case. 5. The writ petition is not filed from an order passed by the petitioner herein, who per-chance happens to be also an adjudicatory authority under the Act. Chapter XIXA provides for a totally different scheme of assessment, which all the same has to be made under the provisions of the Act. The Commissioner normally would have, by himself or an authorised officer, made the assessment pursuant to the search conducted under Section 132 of the Act. But the assessee chose to approach the Settlement Commission, disclosing the undisclosed income revealed on the search and inspection; which is permissible under Section XIXA of the Act. Hence the scheme and procedure under that Chapter has to be first understood. 6. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brij Lal v. CIT [ (2011) 1 SCC 1 ] held that "assessment in law is different from assessment by way of settlemnent" (sic. Hence the scheme and procedure under that Chapter has to be first understood. 6. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brij Lal v. CIT [ (2011) 1 SCC 1 ] held that "assessment in law is different from assessment by way of settlemnent" (sic. - para 23). All the same, it was held that from a reading of the provisions of Section 245C and Section 245D it is clear that the various provisions of the Act and the concepts of self-assessment, assessment, regular assessment and computation of total income have been engrafted in Chapter XIX-A. Hence, the assessment by settlement as contemplated under Chapter XIX-A though different from a regular assessment as otherwise provided in the IT Act, has to be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act itself. The Settlement Commission would be regulated by various provisions of the Act in making such assessment by way of settlement. 7. Section 245D(1) is the stage at which the Settlement Commission decides as to whether the application filed by an assessee is to be proceeded with. Sub-section (3) of Section 245D speaks of calling for the records from the Commissioner when the Settlement Commission decides to proceed on the application filed by the assessee. The said sub-section also confers power on the Settlement Commission to direct the Commissioner to make or cause to be made such further enquiry or investigation and furnish a report on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case. The Commissioner, on such direction, is also obliged to furnish a report within a period of ninety days of the receipt of the communication from the Settlement Commission; failing which the Settlement Commission could proceed with the application even without such report, as empowered under the proviso. Sub-section (4) empowers the Settlement Commission to pass such order, as it thinks fit, on the matters covered by the application and any other matter relating to the case not covered by the application, but referred to in the report of the Commissioner, after examination of the records and the report of the Commissioner and also affording an opportunity of hearing to the applicant and to the Commissioner. 8. Chapter XIXA is a code by itself and the Settlement Commission is the authority empowered to pass the order of assessment. 8. Chapter XIXA is a code by itself and the Settlement Commission is the authority empowered to pass the order of assessment. The Commissioner does not have any adjudicatory power under Chapter XIXA and the role is more adversarial. The Commissioner is entitled to make a report on the matters specified in the application and even those not specified therein, on which the Settlement Commission is also empowered to pass orders as it deems fit; but, as is seen from sub-section (4) of Section 245D "in accordance with the provisions of this Act". The Commissioner, on such reasoning, is entitled to move a writ petition before this Court, since the report filed by the Commissioner before the Settlement Commission in the application filed by the assessee is not in the nature of an adjudication, which, under Chapter XIXA, is a power conferred on the Settlement Commission. 9. The further contention with respect to the conclusiveness obviously cannot oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. Dhampur Sugar specifically held that "statutory finality" does not oust the jurisdiction of a High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution". More in point is Jyotendrasinhji, wherein the finality of orders passed by the Settlement Commission under Chapter XIXA itself came up for consideration. The "finality" was found to be not a bar to writ jurisdiction of the High Court or Special Leave jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The scope of judicial review was held to be restricted to considering whether the order is contrary to any provision of the IT Act, apart from grounds of bias, fraud or malice. In the present case, the only contention raised is the non-consideration of the report and the provision relating to assessment having not been adverted to with respect to the advances from others, as seen from the CFS. 10. The advances from other sources originally shown at Rs.3,54,59,150/- in the CFSs were revised to Rs.4,13,52,150/-. It is pertinent that the report of the Commissioner had merely been referred to and the contention with respect to the advances said to have been obtained from others was accepted by the Settlement Commission without any discussion. As is evident from the report no details of the creditors; who are said to have advanced the loans, as per the CFS, was revealed by the petitioner. As is evident from the report no details of the creditors; who are said to have advanced the loans, as per the CFS, was revealed by the petitioner. In this context, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Om Prakash Mittal [ (2005) 273 ITR 326 ] assumes relevance. Om Prakash Mittal was a case in which the assessee claimed to have received an amount of Rs.1.5 crores on 31.03.1985, by way of loans from seven persons, in cash. After the order of the Settlement Commission was passed, in which the contention of advances was accepted, an application was filed by the Commissioner pointing out certain misrepresentations; which was refused to be entertained by the Commission finding that there is no power of review conferred on the Commission. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the Commission had missed the true scope and ambit of Section 245D(6) and if the Commissioner was able to establish that the order of the Commission was obtained on misrepresentation of facts, then it was open to the Commission to decide the issue and the same would not lead to any review of the earlier orders. It was also categorically held so: "Further the conclusions of the Commission regarding the genuineness of the loan transactions were arrived at without indicating reasons. It only referred to the respective stands and the submissions of the assessee's counsel. That was not the proper way to deal with the matter". 11. The manner in which the Settlement Commission dealt with the claim of advances is seen at page 5, paragraph 5, of Exhibit P1: "5. Advances from others: Advances from others shown at Rs.3,54,59,150/- in the original CFSs have been revised to Rs.4,13,52,150/-. The AR pointed out that the details of these loans were available in the seized records and that the relevant Promissory Notes were also seized during the course of search. Rate of interest on these loans is also mentioned in the seized records. Further, the confirmation letters from the creditors have also been filed before the Addl. DIT. The applicant pointed out that the relevant details are available at pages 39, 70, 80, 308, 392 and 402 of APB. 5.1. The CIT in Rule-9 report stated that the details of the loan creditors were not furnished. Hence, the creditworthiness of the loan cannot be verified. 5.2. DIT. The applicant pointed out that the relevant details are available at pages 39, 70, 80, 308, 392 and 402 of APB. 5.1. The CIT in Rule-9 report stated that the details of the loan creditors were not furnished. Hence, the creditworthiness of the loan cannot be verified. 5.2. The learned A/R stated that the details of the loans and repayments were available in various seized records such as AM83, AM85, AM89, BM12, BM23, PQ31, AM4, AM17, AM46 etc. He also pointed out that seized record of M68 contained a number of discharged promissory notes in respect of loans taken and repaid. He submitted that the details available in the seized records have been considered to quantify the loan taken and interest paid on the loans has been taken as outflow. 5.3. We have considered the submissions and we are of the view that no addition is called for on this account". 12. The manner in which additions have been refused to be made, is without any reasoning especially when the Commissioner of Income Tax had specifically, in his report, stated that the details of the creditors were not furnished and there was no manner in which the credit-worthiness of the said persons could be verified. The loans if not proved have to be computed as total income and additions made in a normal assessment, which principle regulates the Settlement Commission too. 13. On the above reasoning, it has to be held that the Settlement Commission had not properly considered the issue of addition or the genuineness of claim of advances from others. To that extent, Exhibit P1 order would stand set aside and the matter is remanded to the Settlement Commission for consideration of the particular aspect which this Court has interfered with. The writ petition would stand allowed. No costs.