Lala @ Rajkumar S/o Nakchhed v. State of Chhattisgarh
2017-09-26
PRITINKER DIWAKER, RAM PRASANNA SHARMA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Pritinker Diwaker, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated 15.09.2011 passed by the Sessions Judge, Korba in S.T. No.93/2009 convicting the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC') and sentencing them to undergo R.I. for life and fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional RI for 1 year. 2. In the present case name of the deceased is Kandrupa, who was son-in-law of Leela Bai. Appellant No.1 and 2 are son and daughter-in-law of Leela Bai respectively. 3. As per the prosecution case, on 24.04.2009, some quarrel took place between deceased Kandrupa and his mother-in-law Leela Bai in which Leela Bai was beaten by deceased. On 25.04.2009 at about 2.30 pm, accused/appellant Lala @ Rajkumar (A-1) and Chandrika Bai (A-2) carrying axe and knife respectively in their hands caused several injuries on vital parts of the body of deceased as a result of which he died. On 25.04.2009 at 3.20 pm, FIR (Ex.P/2) was lodged by Dulari Bai (PW/1), eye-witness to the incident, under Section 302/34 of IPC against the accused/appellants. Immediately thereafter at 3.30 pm, merg intimation (Ex.P/1) was recorded at the instance of PW/1. On the same day, inquest on the body of deceased was conducted vide Ex.P/11 and body was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by Dr. Deepak Singh Raj (PW/10) who gave his report Ex.P/15 noticing following injuries:- (i) Incised wound in the size of 6 x 3 x muscle deep transversely placed over right side of neck. (ii) Incised wound over right steroidal mastoid upto left mastoid process. (iii) Incised wound in the size of 6 x 3 x piercing upper jaw from right of nose upto teeth margin with breakage of upper left incisors. (iv) Incised wound in the size of 4 x 1 x bone deep over right cheek. (v) Incised wound of 3 x 1/2 x bone deep with J shape below lower lip and chin just below and lateral to right side of mouth. (vi) Incised wound in the size of 4 x 1 x 2 over left arm. Injury No. i, ii, iii were fatal in nature caused by hard and sharp object and injury No. iv, v and vi were grievous in nature caused by hard and sharp object.
(vi) Incised wound in the size of 4 x 1 x 2 over left arm. Injury No. i, ii, iii were fatal in nature caused by hard and sharp object and injury No. iv, v and vi were grievous in nature caused by hard and sharp object. The doctor has opined that cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to injuries over major vessels of neck and the death was homicidal in nature. In the course of investigation, on 26.04.2009 itself, memorandum of accused/appellant No.1 was recorded vide Ex.P/3 and on his disclosure statement, one axe was seized from his possession vide Ex.P/6. On the same day, memorandum of accused/appellant No.2 was recorded vide Ex.P/4 and based on which one knife was seized vide Ex.P/5. Seized articles were sent for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory from where report of Ex.P/22 was received. As per report of FSL, blood was found on both the seized weapons, however, there is no serological report confirming the origin of blood group. 4. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused/appellants under Section 302/34 of the IPC and the trial Court framed the charge against the accused/appellants under Section 302 alternatively under Section 302/34 IPC. 5. So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses. Statements of accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. In defence, Shankh Dhar Jaiswal (DW/1) and Shani Arora (DW/2) were also examined to substantial its case. 6. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record, by the impugned judgment convicted & sentenced the accused/appellants as described above. 7. Learned counsel for the accused/appellants submits: That present is a case of solitary eye-witness Dulari Bai (PW/1) and she being the aunt of the deceased is an interested witness, has falsely implicated the appellants. That in a case of solitary eye-witness, the Court is required to see his/her version minutely and if any contradiction or omission is there, the benefit of doubt has to be extended to the accused. That there is no corroboration to the testimony of PW/1 which makes her evidence reliable and untrustworthy.
That in a case of solitary eye-witness, the Court is required to see his/her version minutely and if any contradiction or omission is there, the benefit of doubt has to be extended to the accused. That there is no corroboration to the testimony of PW/1 which makes her evidence reliable and untrustworthy. That PW/1 saw the incident from 100 yards and considering the spot map, it is apparent that under no circumstance PW/1 could have seen the incident. While referring the spot map, it has been argued that the position of road and the house are as such from where the incident could not have been seen from 100 yards. That a day prior to the incident, deceased Kandrupa had beaten Leela Bai, mother of appellant No.1 and it appears that the appellant was annoyed because of the said incident and under sudden and grave provocation, they appear to have caused some injuries to the deceased resulting his unfortunate death. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, the act attributed to the appellants would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and at best they are liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC. That the appellants are in jail for the last 8 years and, therefore, after converting their conviction into Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC, their sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone by them. 8. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment learned counsel for the State submits that;- conviction of accused/appellants is strictly in accordance with law and there is no illegality or infirmity in the same warranting interference by this Court. PW/1 appears to be very natural witness and she saw the entire incident. It has been argued that merely PW/1 being relative of the deceased, her testimony cannot be doubted and discarded. As regards the position of the eye-witness and place of occurrence, relevant questions have not been put to PW/1 or even PW/5-Patwari and, therefore, at this stage, the appellants cannot get any benefit. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Dulari Bai (PW/1) is in relation to deceased Kandrupa.
As regards the position of the eye-witness and place of occurrence, relevant questions have not been put to PW/1 or even PW/5-Patwari and, therefore, at this stage, the appellants cannot get any benefit. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Dulari Bai (PW/1) is in relation to deceased Kandrupa. She has stated that on the date of incident at about 10.00 am, the deceased came to her house and had informed that there was some quarrel between him and his mother-in-law Leela Bai in which he had beaten her. She has further stated that in the afternoon, accused/appellants came to her house and started searching the deceased. On being asked as to why they are searching for deceased, they informed her that deceased had beaten Leela Bai as a result of which she sustained 20 stitches on her head and thereafter the accused persons left her house. This witness had also stated that she followed the accused persons who were carrying axe and knife in their hands, and saw them causing injuries by axe and knife on the vital parts of the body of deceased. She has further stated that appellant No.2 also caused several knife injuries on the body of deceased as a result of which deceased fell down and, thereafter, the accused/appellants fled away from the spot. She states that at her instance FIR (Ex.P/2) and merg intimation (Ex.P/1) have been recorded. In cross-examination, she remained firm and nothing could be elicited from her which, in any manner, may help to the accused persons. 11. Chandan Sahis (PW/2), witness to memorandum (Ex.P/3 and P/4) of accused/appellants and seizure of axe (Ex.P/5) and knife (Ex.P/6), has turned hostile. Rakesh Singh (PW/3)-Constable, Subhash Singh (PW/4)-Inspector and Narendra Kumar Lahre (PW/7)-Constable, helped in the investigation. Sewak Ram Pandey (PW/5) is Patwari who prepared spot map Ex.P/9. Fulchand Sahis (PW/6) is a witness to inquest Ex.P/11, seizure of bloodstained soil and plain soil from the spot vide Ex.P/12. Shanta Ram (PW/8) is a person in whose house the incident took place and body of deceased was lying. He is also a witness to memorandum of the accused/appellants (Ex.P/3 & P/4) and seizure thereof (Ex.P/5 and P/6), has turned hostile. Sajan Sahis (PW/9) is hearsay witness. Dr.
Shanta Ram (PW/8) is a person in whose house the incident took place and body of deceased was lying. He is also a witness to memorandum of the accused/appellants (Ex.P/3 & P/4) and seizure thereof (Ex.P/5 and P/6), has turned hostile. Sajan Sahis (PW/9) is hearsay witness. Dr. Deepak Singh Raj (PW/10) is the person who conducted post-mortem examination over the body of deceased and opined that cause of death was shock & hemorrhage due to injuries over major vessels of neck and the death was homicidal in nature. This witness had examined the weapons seized at the instance of accused/appellants and opined that the injuries noticed on the person of deceased Kandrupa could be caused by these weapons. M.R. Mahanand (PW/11)-Investigating Officer has duly supported the prosecution case. Sarwan Sahis (PW/12), Babali (PW/13), Geeta (PW/14) and Bahartin Bai (PW/15) have turned hostile. Shankhadhar Jaiswal (DW/1) has stated that a day prior to the incident i.e. on 24.04.2009, some quarrel took place between mother of appellant No.1 and the deceased. On 25.04.2009, the accused persons had come to lodge the report and on the same day i.e. on 25.04.2009 he had sent them to hospital for medical examination where they remained till 1.30 in the afternoon. Shani Arora (DW/2) has not stated anything specific in favour of the appellants. 12. Present is the case where the conviction of accused/appellants is solely based on the evidence of solitary eye-witness to the occurrence i.e. Dulari Bai (PW-1), aunt of the deceased. Since the sole eye witness is a close relative being aunt of the deceased, therefore, before proceeding further, something should be said about the position of law with respect of appreciation of evidence of interested witness, related witness and solitary witness. 13. The law relating to evidence of solitary eye witness has been discussed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. It has been consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of single witness provided his evidence has a ring of truth and the same is cogent, credible and trustworthy. In Vithal Pundalik Zendge v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2009 SC 1110 , the Supreme Court while dealing with a murder case where the prosecution had relied upon the solitary testimony of an eye witness, observed as under:- "6.
In Vithal Pundalik Zendge v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2009 SC 1110 , the Supreme Court while dealing with a murder case where the prosecution had relied upon the solitary testimony of an eye witness, observed as under:- "6. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the ‘Evidence Act’) the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established: (1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. (3)Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. 7. Therefore, there is no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated." In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court also referred to the judgment in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras reported in 1957 Cri.L.J 1000. The relevant portion is quoted as under: "11. ... Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation.
(2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses." 14. In Jagdish Prasad v. State of MP reported 1994 Cri.L.J 1106, the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise." 15. In State of Gujarat v. Naginbhai Dhulabhai Patel reported in AIR 1983 SC 839 it has been held by the Supreme Court that the mere fact that the witnesses were relations or interested would not by itself be sufficient to discard their evidence straight-way unless it is proved that their evidence suffers from serious infirmities which raises considerable doubt in the mind of the court. 16. It is also well settled that evidence of interested witnesses cannot be discarded on the sole ground of interestedness, but their evidence should be subjected to a close scrutiny. Interested witnesses are not necessarily false witnesses. Evidence of interested witness cannot be equated with that of a tainted witness.
16. It is also well settled that evidence of interested witnesses cannot be discarded on the sole ground of interestedness, but their evidence should be subjected to a close scrutiny. Interested witnesses are not necessarily false witnesses. Evidence of interested witness cannot be equated with that of a tainted witness. There is no absolute rule that the evidence of an interested witness cannot be accepted without corroboration. Simply because an eye witness happens to be the son of the deceased, his evidence cannot be discarded if his testimony is otherwise acceptable. "Related" is not equivalent to "interested". A witness may be called "interested" only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be 'interested'. For that, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki reported in (1981) 2 SCC 752 may be seen. 17. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act enshrines the well recognized maxim that "evidence has to be weighed not counted". The matter thus depends upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of evidence even of a single witness whose testimony has either to be accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entirely reliable there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even, as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of accused may be established by the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of case for the prosecution. 18. Keeping the above principles in mind, statement of the sole eye witness namely Dulari Bai (PW-1) is being examined. Perusal of the evidence of PW-1 goes to show that she has categorically described the incident in detail. She has deposed that on the date of incident at 10.00 am, deceased Kandrupa had come to her and informed that some quarrel took place between the deceased and Leela Bai, mother of appellant No.1, thereafter, deceased went to Shanta's house.
Perusal of the evidence of PW-1 goes to show that she has categorically described the incident in detail. She has deposed that on the date of incident at 10.00 am, deceased Kandrupa had come to her and informed that some quarrel took place between the deceased and Leela Bai, mother of appellant No.1, thereafter, deceased went to Shanta's house. When this witness was exercising her routine work, accused/appellants came to her house and started searching the deceased. On being asked as to why they were searching the deceased, they informed her that deceased had beaten Leela Bai as a result of which she sustained 20 stitches, and thereafter, accused/appellants left her house. PW/1 followed the accused/appellants and saw appellant No.1 assaulting the deceased on his face, neck, chest and back by axe and appellant No.2 assaulting the deceased on his vital parts by knife. PW/1 has further deposed that she lodged the FIR and merg. This witness had been cross-examined at length but the defence has not been able to point out any contradiction of a material nature in her deposition which makes this witness unbelievable or unreliable. The manner of occurrence and the weapons used, as described by PW-1 finds support from the medical evidence as the post-mortem report (Ex.P/15) proved by the prosecution clearly show that the deceased received as many as six grievous injuries on his body, all were ante mortem in nature and caused by hard & sharp object. The Investigating Officer made request to Dr. Deepak Singh Raj (PW-10) to have his opinion regarding use of weapons recovered at the instance of accused/appellants. The doctor examined those weapons and opined vide his reports (Ex.P-16) that injuries present on the person of deceased could be possible with the weapons seized from possession of accused/ appellants. 19. True it is that the statement of solitary eye witness is to be examined carefully and cautiously. The conviction can be based only on the solitary testimony of the witness provided it inspires full confidence of the Court. In the present case, statement of solitary eye witness PW/1 appears to be trustworthy and inspires full confidence of this Court and we have no reason to disbelieve her statement. Further, merely because the eye-witness is relative of the deceased, his/her statement cannot be discarded per se only on this ground.
In the present case, statement of solitary eye witness PW/1 appears to be trustworthy and inspires full confidence of this Court and we have no reason to disbelieve her statement. Further, merely because the eye-witness is relative of the deceased, his/her statement cannot be discarded per se only on this ground. Apart from the above statement of the PW/1, on the memorandum (Ex.P/3) of accused/appellant No.1, axe has been seized under Ex.P/6, and on the memorandum (Ex.P/4) of appellant No.2, knife was seized under Ex.P/5 and as per FSL report (Ex.P/22), blood has been found on it, however, there is no serological report on record to confirm origin of blood group. Admittedly, the prosecution has failed to produce the serological report but, in our view, that would not provide a handle to the defence to attack the prosecution case. No doubt, it would have been better if the investigating officer would have sent the blood stained articles to the Serologist for chemical examination. However, the said omission on the part of the investigating officer is not a flaw of that type so as to invite the consequence of jettisoning the sworn testimony of the eye-witness. 20. That apart, the weapons seized from the accused/appellants were sent for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P/22), weapons seized at the instance of accused/appellants found to be stained with blood. The questions in this regard were put to accused/appellants during recording of their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., but except vague denial, they said nothing more. Thus, the above fact of recovery of the bloodstained weapons on being pointed out by the accused/appellants is an additional link to prove their guilt. 21. Coming to the next argument advanced by counsel for the accused/appellants regarding witnessing the incident from a distance of 100 yards by PW-1, witness to the incident. It is relevant to note here that no such question has been put to eye-witness or Patwari in this respect and in absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be presumed that PW/1 could not have seen the incident. Considering the facts of case and more particularly, the unchallenged statement of the eye-witness and Patwari, we do not find any substance in the argument of counsel for the appellants that for want of distance, the witness could not have seen the incident. 22.
Considering the facts of case and more particularly, the unchallenged statement of the eye-witness and Patwari, we do not find any substance in the argument of counsel for the appellants that for want of distance, the witness could not have seen the incident. 22. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we are not in agreement with the submission of counsel for the appellant that the case of the accused/appellants would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC because it is clear from the evidence that the accused with premeditated mind was searching for the deceased to take avenge. They were armed with deadly weapon like axe and knife, as many as six incised wounds were caused to the deceased on various parts of his body including neck and according to postmortem report (Ex.P/15), the cause of death was also shock and hemorrhage due to injuries over major vessels of neck and the death was homicidal in nature. Thus, it is clear that the accused/appellants have not only acted in a cruel manner but also they have taken undue advantage of the situation and being so, it is apparent that they had not only intention to cause death of the deceased but also knowledge that injuries inflicted by them would sure to result in the death of the deceased. Hence, under no circumstance their case would fall within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. 23. Thus, the cumulative effect of the above is that evidence of Dulari Bai (PW-1) is truthful, reliable and inspires confidence. She has narrated the incident in a most natural way and the manner in which she has narrated the incident, inspires confidence of this Court. Thus, all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the accused/appellants stand rejected and no interference is called for with the findings of guilt and conviction recorded by the trial Judge relying upon the solitary evidence of Dulari Bai (PW-1). 24. Accordingly, the appeal being without substance is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed as such. The accused/appellants are reported to be in jail and, therefore, no further order regarding their arrest etc. is needed.