JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. Appellants are the respondents in the writ petition. The father of the writ petitioner was an employee of the appellant-bank and was working on the post of Guard in the appellant-bank. He passed away while in service, on 09.02.2005. The mother of the writ-petitioner filed an application requesting for employment under the compassionate appointment scheme prevailing in the bank vide application dated 25.02.2005. The application stood rejected by order dated 24.09.2005. It is feeling aggrieved by the same that the Writ Petition (S/S) No. 182 of 2007, from which the present appeal arises, was filed. The writ petition was filed on 15.03.2007. 2. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, set-aside the order rejecting the representation and directed that the application of the writ petitioner be considered in accordance with the scheme for appointment under the compassionate appointment scheme. The learned Single Judge did not find favour with the finding by the appellant-bank that the existing scheme providing for compassionate appointment has been replaced by a new scheme, which came into force on 04.08.2005. The learned Single Judge took the view that the appellant-bank has not explained what steps it has taken pursuant to the application dated 25.02.2005. Moreover, the learned Single Judge also took the view that apart from three persons, who have been given appointment, which is sought to be explained by the appellant-bank by stating that, in those cases, persons have died in the year 1998 and 2001, five more persons have been given appointment after 04.08.2005. Lastly, the learned Single Judge has reasoned that in this case the death took place on 09.02.2005. The application was of 25.02.2005. The scheme applicable was the scheme which provided for compassionate appointment. The new scheme came into force only on 04.08.2005. Therefore, there was a right with the writ petitioner to have his application considered in accordance with the scheme, which was prevailing at that point of time. 3. We heard Mr. D.S. Patni, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. M.S. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for the writ-petitioner/respondent no. 1. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants would fault the judgment of the learned Single Judge by pointing out that the reasoning is in the teeth of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State Bank of India and another Vs. M.S. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for the writ-petitioner/respondent no. 1. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants would fault the judgment of the learned Single Judge by pointing out that the reasoning is in the teeth of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State Bank of India and another Vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 and in the matter of MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 . He would next submit that the Court may also take notice that though the application was rejected on 24.09.2005, the writ petition was filed only after two years. He would submit that the new scheme clearly declares that all pending applications, as on the date, will fall to be decided in terms of the new scheme, which purports to provide for financial benefits; rather than a compassionate appointment. It is, accordingly, that application dated 25.02.2005 was dealt with under the new scheme. 5. On the other hand, Mr. M.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the writ petitioner would submit that the case at hand deserves consideration under the earlier scheme both in law and in facts. He would submit that the deceased employee left behind him his widow, two sons and two daughters; out of them, one daughter is married. He also has a case at the bar that one of the daughters is a handicapped person. He would also submit that, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, five persons have been given appointment after 04.08.2005. He would further point out that 121 applications have been favorably considered and have been given compassionate appointment details of which he has produced in the form of affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge. Lastly, he would seek to draw support from the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Canara Bank and another Vs. M. Mahesh Kumar, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 . 6. We may notice the facts of the decision rendered in the matter of State Bank of India and another Vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 . The bank was, in fact, the appellant in the said case also. The father of the respondent in the said case was employed as a Messenger. He died on 01.10.2004. Respondent’s mother made applications on 06.06.2005 and 14.06.2005. Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 . The bank was, in fact, the appellant in the said case also. The father of the respondent in the said case was employed as a Messenger. He died on 01.10.2004. Respondent’s mother made applications on 06.06.2005 and 14.06.2005. When the applications were being processed and verified, the new scheme, which is relied on by the appellant in this case also, namely, the scheme for payment of ex-gratia lump sum amount came into force w.e.f. 04.08.2005. The Hon’ble Apex Court has relied on clause 14 and 15 in paragraph 3. The very same clauses are apparently applicable in this case also, which read as follows: “3. Clauses 14 and 15 of the new scheme relevant for our purpose are extracted below: “14. Date of effect of the Scheme and disposal of pending applications:........Applications pending under the Compassionate Appointment Scheme as on the date on which this new Scheme is approved by the Executive Committee of the Central Board will be dealt with in accordance with the new Scheme for payment of ex-gratia lumpsum amount provided they fulfill all the terms and conditions of this Scheme. 15. Miscellaneous provisions of the Scheme * * * (vi) With effect from the date the “SBI Scheme for Payment of Ex-gratia Lump sum Amount” comes into force the Bank’s scheme of compassionate appointments shall be deemed abolished/withdrawn and no request for compassionate appointment shall be entertained or considered by the Bank under any circumstance.” 7. It is important to notice paragraphs 9, 10 & 11 besides the law, which can be treated as contained in paragraphs 12 & 13. Same read as under: “9. Normally, the three basic requirements to claim appointment under any scheme for compassionate appointment are: (i) an application by a dependent family member of the deceased employee; (ii) fulfillment of the eligibility criteria prescribed under the scheme, for compassionate appointment; and (iii) availability of posts, for making such appointment. If a scheme provides for automatic appointment to a specified family member, on the death of any employee, without any of the aforesaid requirements, it can be said that the scheme creates a right in favour of the family member for appointment on the date of death of the employee. In such an event the scheme in force at the time of death would apply. 10. In such an event the scheme in force at the time of death would apply. 10. On the other hand if a scheme provides that on the death of an employee, if a dependent family member is entitled to appointment merely on making of an application, whether any vacancy exists or not, and without the need to fulfill any eligibility criteria, then the scheme creates a right in favour of the applicant, on making the application and the scheme that was in force at the time when the application for compassionate appointment was filed, will apply. But such schemes are rare and in fact, virtually nil. 11. Normal schemes contemplate compassionate appointment on an application by a dependent family member, subject to the applicant fulfilling the prescribed eligibility requirements, and subject to availability of a vacancy for making the appointment. Under many schemes, the applicant has only a right to be considered for appointment against a specified quota, even if he fulfils all the eligibility criteria; and the selection is made of the most deserving among the several competing applicants, to the limited quota of posts available. In all these schemes there is a need to verify the eligibility and antecedents of the applicant or the financial capacity of the family. There is also a need for the applicant to wait in a queue for a vacancy to arise, or for a selection committee to assess the comparative need of a large number of applicants so as to fill a limited number of earmarked vacancies. 12. Obviously, therefore, there can be no immediate or automatic appointment merely on an application. Several circumstances having a bearing on eligibility, and financial condition, upto the date of consideration may have to be taken into account. As none of the applicants under the scheme has a vested right, the scheme that is in force when the application is actually considered, and not the scheme that was in force earlier when the application was made, will be applicable. 13. Further where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. 13. Further where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. As compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, the employer may wind up the scheme or modify the scheme at any time depending upon its policies, financial capacity and availability of posts.” 8. Finally, we may notice paragraphs 20 & 21. Same read as under: “20. The respondent was not entitled to be considered for compassionate appointment. The High Court was not justified in quashing the communication dated 31.1.2006 or in directing reconsideration of the case of the respondent for compassionate appointment. 21. We therefore allow this appeal in part as follows: (i) The orders of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench are set aside. (ii) The respondent and/or his family may file a fresh application under the new scheme, as directed by the Bank in its letter dated 31.1.2006. (iii) The appellant Bank is directed to process such application under the new scheme, if and when made, and pay the lump sum ex gratia amount due in terms of that scheme, to the beneficiaries, within four months of the receipt of the application.” 9. This judgment came to be considered and also followed in the judgment in the matter of MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 . The appellant therein was another bank. The facts have been set out in paragraph 2 of the said judgment, which reads as follows: “2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that: the father of the respondent who was working as a Class III employee with the appellant Bank died on 19.4.2006 while in harness. The respondent applied for compassionate appointment on 12.5.2006. During the pendency of the application filed by the respondent, a new scheme dated 12.6.2006 came into force with effect from 6.10.2006. Clause 14 thereof provides that all applications pending on the date of commencement of the scheme shall be considered for grant of ex-gratia payment to the family instead of compassionate appointment.” 10. There also, the Court, after dealing with the concept of vested and vested right, followed the judgment in Rajkumar’s case (Supra) and also the Court directed, as follows: “17. There also, the Court, after dealing with the concept of vested and vested right, followed the judgment in Rajkumar’s case (Supra) and also the Court directed, as follows: “17. The respondent may apply for consideration of his case under the new scheme and the appellant shall consider his case strictly in accordance with Clause 14 of the said new scheme within a period of three months from the date of receiving of application. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of. ” 11. The next judgment, we must notice, is the judgment, which is sought to be distinguished by the appellants and relied on by the petitioner, namely, Canara Bank and another Vs. M. Mahesh Kumar, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 . The father of the respondent therein, while working as a Clerk in the appellant-bank, died on 10.10.1998. Application was made under the scheme dated 08.05.1993 in time. It was rejected on 30.06.1999 on the ground that no indigence existed. Subsequently, a new scheme was brought into force, which provided for only ex-gratia payment in lieu of compassionate appointment. Still later, in 2014, the said scheme stood superseded and the scheme for compassionate appointment stood revived. As on the date of the judgment, the Court took note of the fact that the scheme in force is one to provide compassionate appointment. The writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the High Court, which quashed the exhibit against him and directed to re-consider the claim of the respondent. The Division Bench upheld the order. It is, in such circumstances, the matter had come to be dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court, inter alia, took the view as follows: “17. Applying these principles to the case in hand, as discussed earlier, respondent’s father died on 10.10.1998 while he was serving as a clerk in the appellant-bank and the respondent applied timely for compassionate appointment as per the scheme ‘Dying in Harness Scheme’ dated 8.05.1993 which was in force at that time. The appellant-bank rejected the respondent’s claim on 30.06.1999 recording that there are no indigent circumstances for providing employment to the respondent. Again on 7.11.2001, the appellant-bank sought for particulars in connection with the issue of respondent’s employment. The appellant-bank rejected the respondent’s claim on 30.06.1999 recording that there are no indigent circumstances for providing employment to the respondent. Again on 7.11.2001, the appellant-bank sought for particulars in connection with the issue of respondent’s employment. In the light of the principles laid down in the above decisions, the cause of action to be considered for compassionate appointment arose when the Circular No.154/1993 dated 8.05.1993 was in force. Thus, as per the judgment referred in Jaspal Kaur’s case, the claim cannot be decided as per 2005 Scheme providing for ex-gratia payment. The Circular dated 14.2.2005 being an administrative or executive order cannot have retrospective effect so as to take away the right accrued to the respondent as per circular of 1993. 18. It is also pertinent to note that 2005 Scheme providing only for ex-gratia payment in lieu of compassionate appointment stands superseded by the 2014 Scheme which has revived the scheme providing for compassionate appointment. As on date, now the scheme in force is to provide compassionate appointment. Under these circumstances, the appellant-bank is not justified in contending that the application for compassionate appointment of the respondent cannot be considered in view of passage of time.” 12. As far as the pleading in the writ petition is concerned, we may notice that the writ-petitioner has stated, inter alia, as follows: “5. That the mother of the petitioner send so many reminders to concerned authority in respect of compassionate appointment but till today no action has been taken by the respondents authority in respect of the compassionate appointment and repeatedly the respondents authority apprising to the petitioner’s mother to give her consent for ex-gracia lum-sum amount. 6. That the respondent authority has informed to the mother of the petitioner the bank has started a new policy w.e.f. 4th august 2005, therefore kindly give your consent for ex-gracia lum sum amount instead of compassionate appointment but the mother of the petitioner requested to the respondent authority that the father of the petitioner was died on 9th February 2005, therefore, the petitioner may be appointed on the compassionate ground in the office of the respondents. 13. Thereafter, the petitioner proceeds to refer to the communications of the year 1986. We notice that there is no specific allegation that the bank has sat over the application or that it acted in a manner so as to defeat the claim of the petitioner. 13. Thereafter, the petitioner proceeds to refer to the communications of the year 1986. We notice that there is no specific allegation that the bank has sat over the application or that it acted in a manner so as to defeat the claim of the petitioner. In fact, it is not in dispute that the petition was filed only on 15.03.2007, almost after two years of the rejection; but, we would not rest our decision on the basis of the so alleged delay in filing the writ petition. We would think that the appellant is entitled to succeed on the basis of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State Bank of India and another Vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 as followed in the matter of MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 . 14. No doubt, we notice that in the judgment reported in (2010) 11 SCC 661 , the application was moved in June, 2005. The scheme came into force on 04.08.2005; whereas, in this case, the application was filed on 25.02.2005. There is a gap of nearly three months; but, we must pose ourselves a question, whether under the scheme, which existed prior to the scheme dated 04.08.2005, was there any time limit within which the application has to be processed? What was the nature of the scheme? Was it a scheme, which contemplated allowing the application of the dependent of the employee on the mere death or was it a scheme, which require a consideration of various aspects? 15. It cannot be in the region of dispute that the scheme, which prevailed prior to it being substituted on 04.08.2005, was a scheme, which indeed contemplated fairly elaborate processing of the application. The scheme, in fact, contemplates, according to the appellant, reckoning the financial condition with reference to various aspects. We also scanned, no doubt, in vain the counter affidavit for any whisper as to what action was taken on the application. Even in the Appeal Memorandum, there was no such case that application was processed or an attempt was made to process it. We also scanned, no doubt, in vain the counter affidavit for any whisper as to what action was taken on the application. Even in the Appeal Memorandum, there was no such case that application was processed or an attempt was made to process it. This does go against the appellant as found by the learned Single Judge; but, even so having regard to the facts of this case and having regard to the close proximity within which the new scheme came into force, we would think that the legal principle having been settled in the decisions, which are relied on by the appellant, it may not be appropriate to direct consideration of the application of the writ petitioner under the earlier scheme. There is clearly no vested right to have the application considered under the earlier scheme. Then, we have to take the scheme, which came into force on 04.08.2005, as it is. In the absence of any specific plea that the application was not being processed or there was any malafides and having regard to the fact that after 04.08.2005, no pending application could be considered under the earlier scheme, though, the application was rejected only on 24.09.2005, the time ran out clearly on 04.08.2005, which is the date on which the new scheme was brought into force. 16. Regarding three persons being appointed, it is a definite case of the bank that in the cases of all the persons, who were appointed, their parents had passed away in 1998 and 2001. Five others are alleged to have been given appointments. There also the stand of the appellant to be noted is that a decision was taken in their cases prior to 04.08.2005, even though the orders may have been issued after 04.08.2005. We are not posted with the details as to when the death occurred in those cases; when the applications were made. Without having their material details, we cannot possibly contemplate rendering a finding based on any discrimination, as such, between the petitioner and the said persons. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Canara Bank and another Vs. M. Mahesh Kumar, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 appears to turn on the special facts of the said case. The death took place in the year 1993, the application was immediately moved and it was rejected in 1999. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Canara Bank and another Vs. M. Mahesh Kumar, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 appears to turn on the special facts of the said case. The death took place in the year 1993, the application was immediately moved and it was rejected in 1999. The new scheme came into force some time in 2005, by which the financial help was to be given in place of appointment under the Dying-In-Harness Scheme. Still later, in 2014, the Dying-In-Harness Scheme was revived. Since, it was a case where the application was moved and was rejected, which was set-aside by the Court and the Court had directed to re-consider the same under the scheme, we would think that the writ petitioner may not be in a position to derive any support from the same. It is true that the Court had observed that there is a right to have the application considered under the earlier scheme, particularly, noting that the scheme for appointment under the Dying-In-Harness Scheme had been revived and it had come back to life. In such circumstances, we may not be justified in rejecting the Appeal on the basis of the said judgment. 17. Therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge may not be sustainable. At the same time, we would think that the case of the respondent must be considered in terms of the scheme brought into force on 04.08.2005. 18. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned Single Judge will stand set-aside. But, we direct that if the application is made within a period of two months for claiming the benefit of the scheme brought into force on 04.08.2005, the same will be considered sympathetically and appropriate decision will be taken within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the application. 19. The Appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. 20. There will be no order as to costs.