JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. A short question though intricate which arises for consideration in the present writ petition is as to whether a Collector, while purportedly exercising his powers under Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can declare a property as an “escheat” property? It is this order, which has been passed by the Collector, Haridwar on 01.09.2005 is put to challenge in this writ petition. 2. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner (Dera Baba Dargah Singh) is a registered Waqf under the Waqf Act and its registration dates back to 08.04.1926 and it was a ^^oDQ+ukek vyy vkSykn** . The registration of the waqf has been placed on record by the learned counsel for the petitioner by virtue of the supplementary affidavit, which is not denied, and is taken on record today. 3. Heard Mr. Pankaj Purohit, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State/Collector. He contended that the property which was initially in the possession and vested with Mr. Dharmanand, who is said to have died intestate and as such in the absence of there being any heirs succeeding his estates, the property would vest with the State government, in the light of the provisions contained under Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and thus as per his contention the property would be an “escheat” property, as declared by the Collector was absolutely justified, and he vehemently supporting the order of Collector. 4. On the contrary, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the property was a Waqf property, which was given to Dharmanand as a lisencee to occupy the premises and to use it for the purpose of Dera and on his death it will not have any affect so far as the estates or succession of the property is concerned because it will continue to be the property vested with the Waqf as described in the khewat No. 1 the revenue record of rights. Be that as it may. Without entering into the factual matrix, this Court is confining itself to the competence of the Collector as to whether he could have declared the property as to be an “escheat” property or not while exercising powers u/S 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 5. Be that as it may. Without entering into the factual matrix, this Court is confining itself to the competence of the Collector as to whether he could have declared the property as to be an “escheat” property or not while exercising powers u/S 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 5. The controversy pertaining to that aspect has traveled from one of the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court which was also affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court whereby the Collector’s orders under Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act was upheld the order of Collector vesting the property to states as “escheat” property. The same was put to challenge before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3878 of 2009 – Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust Thr. Velji Devshi Patel Vs. Collector, Haridwar & Ors. 6. In the said case, the appellant/petitioner before that Court had claimed themselves to be a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, whereas in the instant case, the petitioner herein claimed to be a registered Waqf as “Alal Aulad” as registered on 08.04.1923. One of the question which would also be an important issue to be considered, though was not a controversy in the earlier litigation as settled upto the Hon’ble Apex Court is as to whether a property which is vested in a registered Trust or a registered Waqf, whether the provisions of Section 29 would be attracted or not as upon their registration, they acquire the states of being a juristic person and having right to sue and being sued independently irrespective of its constituents. 7. This Court feels that since the petitioner in its registration as waqf takes the status of being a body constituted and registered under a statute, it becomes a juristic person and there ought not be any issue pertaining to intestatement because the status of the trust or a society or a waqf does not cease its life till the body itself is dissolved in accordance with the provision of the Act under which it is created. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the Collector could not be an adjudicator of his own rights, which is based on the Broom’s Legal Maxims : NEMO DEBET ESSEE JUDEX IN PROPRIA SUA CAUSA. (12 Rep. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the Collector could not be an adjudicator of his own rights, which is based on the Broom’s Legal Maxims : NEMO DEBET ESSEE JUDEX IN PROPRIA SUA CAUSA. (12 Rep. 114.) – No man can be judge in his own cause, that no one can be judge for his own cause as it has an impact on fair decision representing the state’s interest and that is why the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the issue which is identical in nature, had framed certain issues for example; (i) As to whether the Collector’s order was without jurisdiction as he could not have assumed the powers of Civil Court and adjudicate the rights and vest the property to the State under Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; (ii) As to whether in a case where the government is claiming a rival title by declaration of a property as to be an “escheat’ property under Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, the Collector being the representative of the State can act as a Judge for his own cause in that capacity as the representative of the state and protector of state’s interest; (iii) Whenever there arise controversy pertaining to the heir-ship of a property and its impact vis-à-vis the provisions contained under Section 29, the competence to determine the same could only be vested with Civil Court or Administrator General under Administrative General Act, 1963 and not the Collector. Further in this case few other questions too would be emerging are that as to whether: (iv) The provision of Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act would apply to a body created under an Act, which does not have a biological death, and is a juristic person, till it only ceases to exist by operator of law and its asserts are settled as per law or system prevailing against them by custom and usages. (v) As to whether the succession in relation to property vested with registered Dergah could be governed by provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 9. (v) As to whether the succession in relation to property vested with registered Dergah could be governed by provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which embodies the provisions of declaration of property as to be an “escheat’ property, it imbibes in it the fundamental principle too pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Court so as to ensure that a complete justice is rendered to a party in lis whose property is to be declared as an “escheat” property. On interpretation of the language of Section 29, it is only attracted when a “person” in whose name the property stands recorded dies. “Dies” here would mean a natural death wherein in testament of heirs is contemplated. As already observed above, since the petitioner is a waqf has got a legal status under a statute and the petitioner cannot be equated to as to be an individual persona, who could die, except when the death in such case which is caused by law and further as to whether the succession in relation to property vested with registered Dergah could be governed by provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In that eventuality, as a matter of fact in the instant case, the provisions of Section 29 ought not to have attracted at all. 10. No doubt that in accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as a consequence of the provisions of the said Act the property devolves upon the Government but still before taking over the property, it has to ensure as to whether there exists a successor/heir of the deceased owner, who has died intestate. Since the State as a consequence taking over of the property takes over its all obligations and liabilities but simultaneously it has to consider a rival or preferential heir of the deceased as before taking over a conclusion has to be arrived at by the Collector, which is not contemplated under the said provision. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the impact of Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in a judgment reported in 1992 (Suppl.) (3) SCC 108 in State of Punjab Vs. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the impact of Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in a judgment reported in 1992 (Suppl.) (3) SCC 108 in State of Punjab Vs. Balwant Singh, has held that Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 only comes into operation when there is a failure of there being an heir of the deceased owner, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that such a failure means that there has had to be a total absence of any heir of the person dying intestate. Taking over of a property as an “escheat” property, the heavy burden is casted upon the person, who asserts the absence of an heir, qualified to succeed to the estate of an individual, who has died intestate. Hence, before a property is taken over, it has to be established beyond doubt that there exists no heir and as and when the heir exists, what would be his status vis-à-vis the provisions contained under Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 12. An identical view, which was dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court yet again in another judgment has reported in 1983 (3) SCC 118 - State of Bihar Vs. Radha Krishna Singh. It has been held out in the said judgment in its para 272 “it is well settled that where a claim of an escheat is put forwarded by the government, the onus lies heavily on the appellant to prove the absence of any heir of the respondent anywhere in the world. Normally, the Court frowns on the estate being taken by the escheat unless the essential conditions for the escheat are fully and completely satisfied. Further, before the plea of escheat can be entertained, there must be a public notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant anywhere in the country or for that matter in the world, he may come forward to contest the claim of the State. …(and further)……………Even if they succeed in showing that the plaintiffs were not the nearest reversioners of the property, it does not follow as a logical corollary that the failure of the heir, the claim would lead to an irresistible inference that there is no other heir who could at any time come forward to claim the property.” 13. …(and further)……………Even if they succeed in showing that the plaintiffs were not the nearest reversioners of the property, it does not follow as a logical corollary that the failure of the heir, the claim would lead to an irresistible inference that there is no other heir who could at any time come forward to claim the property.” 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment delivered on 22.09.2017 in the case of Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram (Supra) has dealt with the impact of the Mulla’s Hindu Law as referred by its 22nd edition page 1260-1261 wherein the Mulla’s Hindu Law has scrutinized the concept of an escheat property in the following manner :- “Where the Crown or Government claims by escheat, the onus lies on it to show that the owner of the estate died without heirs. An estate taken by escheat is subject to the trusts, charges and legal obligations (if any) previously affecting the estate, e.g., mortgages and other encumbrances. The section rules that in case of failure of all the heirs recognized under the Act, on the death of the owner intestate, his or her property devolves on the Governmetn. The Government takes the property subject to all legal obligations and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject if the property had devolved upon the heir by succession. The word ‘failure’ used in the section is very clear and indicative of the fact that there must be a absence of heirs of the intestate.” 14. Thus, on an overall scrutiny, the structure behind the stipulations of an escheat property is that the founder or his line of heirs are extinct and the States which receives the dedicated property is subject to a trust and cannot be taken it as to be a property which is stood vested as a secular property belonging to the State and that is why the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 stipulates “State shall take the property subject to all the obligation and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject.” 15. Whenever the controversy arises about the principle governing the succession of waqf, trust, endowment succession would be regulated by custom and usages, in its absence by the law of the statute under which it is registered or created. Whenever the controversy arises about the principle governing the succession of waqf, trust, endowment succession would be regulated by custom and usages, in its absence by the law of the statute under which it is registered or created. As held by AIR 1954 SC 606 in Mahand Sital Das v Sant Ram in its para 10, which reads as under:- “10. In the appeal before us the contentions raised by the parties primarily centre round the point as to whether after the death of Kishore Das, the plaintiff or Defendant 3 acquired the rights of Mahant in regard to the Thakardwara in dispute. The law is well settled that succession to Mahantship of a Man or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment. As the Judicial Committee laid down [Vide Genda puri v. Chhatar Puri, 13 IA 100, 105] in one of the many cases on this point, “in determining who is entitled to succeed as Mohunt, the only law to be observed is to be found in the custom and practice, which must be proved by testimony, and the claimant must show that he is entitled according to the custom to recover the office and the land and property belonging to it……..Mere infirmity of the title of the defendant, who is in possession, will not help the plaintiff”. 16. As far as the State of Uttarakhand is concerned, the terminology of Collector has been defined under Section 14 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and the same is reproduced hereunder:- “14. Collector of the district. – The State Government shall appoint in each district an officer who shall be the Collector of the district, and who shall throughout his district, exercise all the powers and discharge all the duties conferred and imposed on a Collector by this Act or any other law for the time being in force.” 17. Under the General Clauses Act, 1897, Collector has been defined under Section 3(11) as under:- “(11) “Collector” shall mean, in a Presidency-town, the Collector of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be, and elsewhere the chief officer-in-charge of the revenue-administration of a district;” 18. Under the General Clauses Act, 1897, Collector has been defined under Section 3(11) as under:- “(11) “Collector” shall mean, in a Presidency-town, the Collector of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be, and elsewhere the chief officer-in-charge of the revenue-administration of a district;” 18. Similarly under the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 as applicable to State of Uttarakhand under Section 35 of Reorganization Act under Section 4(9) Collector has been defined as under:- “(9) “Collector” shall mean the chief officer in charge of the revenue administration of a district, and shall include a Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent, Dehra Dun;” 19. On simple literal interpretation, he is head of the district, who is in-charge of the district revenue administration. Restricting his powers for revenue administration, no adjudicatory powers has been vested in him by virtue of which he could be held to be competent to decide question of title, when there is a conflicting claims which are to be adjudicated. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment rendered in Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram (Supra) in its para 20 held as under: “20. The basic issue which has to be addressed in the light of the above principles is whether the Collector had jurisdiction to decide a question of title by assuming to himself the power of an adjudicatory forum. The order of the Collector indicates that the issue as to whether the property would vest in the state government as a result of a failure of heirs within the meaning of Section 29 was a seriously disputed issue turning upon an adjudication of conflicting claims. In the process of determining the issue purportedly under Section 29, the Collector has adjudicated upon various factual matters………(and further)………… Section 29, it may be noted, embodies a principle but does not provide a procedural mechanism for adjudication upon disputed questions. The canvas of the controversy before the Court is an abundant indication of matters which were seriously in dispute. ………(and further)……………Such a matter could not have been adjudicated upon by the Collector by assuming to himself a jurisdiction which is not conferred upon him by law pertaining to establishment of law of death, presumption of death or heirship.” 20. The canvas of the controversy before the Court is an abundant indication of matters which were seriously in dispute. ………(and further)……………Such a matter could not have been adjudicated upon by the Collector by assuming to himself a jurisdiction which is not conferred upon him by law pertaining to establishment of law of death, presumption of death or heirship.” 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further traveled on the controversy and in its para No. 21 has held that the Collector is an administrative authority of the State and he cannot adjudicate upon the matters which involves determining of the title or involving a civil dispute, because if he is conferred with the powers to decide the question of the title it would be an absolute destruction of the rule of law and thus he can exercise only such powers which are lawfully vested in him and he cannot inter into upon adjudicating the private disputes except where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is taken away either expressly or necessary implications by the State. Para 21 of the said judgment is quoted herein below:- “21. The principle that the law does not readily accept a claim to escheat and that the onus rests heavily on the person who asserts that an individual has died intestate, leaving no legal heir, qualified to succeed to the property, is founded on a sound rationale. Escheat is a doctrine which recognizes the state as a paramount sovereign in whom property would vest only upon a clear and established case of a failure of heirs. The principle is based on the norm that in a society governed by the rule of law, the court will not presume that private titles are overridden in favour of the state, in the absence of a clear case being made out on the basis of a governing statutory provision. To allow administrative authorities of the state – including the Collector, as in the present case – to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the rule of law. The Collector is an officer of the state. He can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers upon him to enter upon private disputes. To allow administrative authorities of the state – including the Collector, as in the present case – to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the rule of law. The Collector is an officer of the state. He can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers upon him to enter upon private disputes. In contrast, a civil court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters involving civil disputes except where the jurisdiction of the court is taken away, either expressly or by necessary implication, by statute. In holding that the Collector acted without jurisdiction in the present case, it is not necessary for the court to go as far as to validate the title which is claimed by the petitioner to the property. The court is not called upon to decide whether the possession claimed by the trust of over forty-five years is backed by a credible title. The essential point is that such an adjudicatory function could not have been arrogated to himself by the Collector. Adjudication on titles must follow recourse to the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” 21. The definition of Collector as literally dealt in dictionaries, the Cambridge dictionary defines it to be “a person who is in charge of local Government in a particular town area of the country.” British dictionary defines Collector as to be “the head of District Administration in India.” 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that in such type of an eventuality the rights of the parties if at all it exists could be decided only by invoking the provisions of Administrators - General Act, 1963 or by way of filing of a regular suit. Para No. 22 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “22. We may at this stage also advert to the provisions of the Administrators – General Act, 1963. The Act provides for the appointment of persons who are vested with the powers of an Administrator General. Section 2(a) defines the expression ‘assets’ thus : “(a) "assets" means all the property, movable and immovable, of a deceased person, which is chargeable with and applicable to the payment of his debts and legacies, or available for distribution among his heirs and next of-kin”. The Administrator General is notified under Section 3. Section 2(a) defines the expression ‘assets’ thus : “(a) "assets" means all the property, movable and immovable, of a deceased person, which is chargeable with and applicable to the payment of his debts and legacies, or available for distribution among his heirs and next of-kin”. The Administrator General is notified under Section 3. Section 7 allows for the grant of letters of administration by the High Court to the Administrator General of the state, unless they are granted to the next of kin of the deceased. Section 7 reads as follows : “7. Administrator-General entitled to letters of administration, unless granted to next-of kin :- Any letters of administration granted by the High Court shall be granted to the Administrator-General of the State unless they are granted to the next-of-kin of the deceased.” Section 9 empowers the Administrator General to apply to the High Court for the administration of estates in specified circumstances : “9. Right of Administrator-General to apply for administration of estates :- (1) If- (a) any person has died leaving within any State assets exceeding rupees ten lakhs in value, and (b) (whether the obtaining of probate of his will or letters of administration to his estate is or is not obligatory), no person to whom any court would have jurisdiction to commit administration of such assets has, within one month after his death, applied in such State for such probate, or letters of administration, and (c) (in cases where the obtaining of such probate or letters of administration is not obligatory under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925) , no person has taken other proceedings for the protection of the estate, the Administrator-General of the State in which such assets are, may, subject to any rules made by the State Government, within a reasonable time after he has had notice of the death of such person, and of his having left such assets, take such proceedings as may be necessary to obtain from the High Court letters of administration of the estate of such person. (2) The Administrator-General shall not take proceedings under this section unless he is satisfied, that there is apprehension of misappropriation, deterioration or waste of such assets if such proceedings are not taken by him or that such proceedings are otherwise necessary for the protection of the assets.” The Administrator General is statutorily empowered to move the High Court to protect the assets or estate of a deceased from dissipation. Section 10 empowers the Administrator General to move the High Court to collect and take possession of the assets of a deceased person where there is imminent danger of misappropriation, deterioration or waste of assets : “10. Power of Administrator-General to collect and hold assets where immediate action is required :- (1) Whenever any person has died leaving assets within any State exceeding rupees ten lakhs in value, and the High Court for that State is satisfied that there is imminent danger of misappropriation, deterioration or waste of such assets, requiring immediate action, the High Court may, upon the application of the Administrator-General or of any person interested in such assets or in the due administration thereof, forthwith direct the Administrator-General – (a) to collect and take possession of such assets, and (b) to hold, deposit, realise, sell or invest the same according to the directions of the High Court, and, in default of any such directions, according to the provisions of this Act so far as the same are applicable to such assets. (2) Any order of the High Court under sub-section (1) shall entitle the Administrator General- (a) to maintain any suit or proceeding for the recovery of such assets; (b) if he thinks fit, to apply for letters of administration of the estate of such deceased person; (c) to retain out of the assets of the estate any fees chargeable under rules made under this Act; and (d) to reimburse himself for all payments made by him to respect of such assets which a private administrator might lawfully have made.” Under Section 11, the High Court is empowered to grant probate or letters of administration to any other person who appears and establishes his claim : “11. Grant of probate or letters of administration to person appearing in the course of proceedings taken by Administrator-General :- If, in the course of proceedings to obtain letters of administration under the provisions of Section 9 or Section 10, - (a) any person appears and establishes his claim- (i) to probate of the will of the deceased; or (ii) to letters of administration as next-of-kin of the deceased, and gives such security as may be required of him by law; or (b) any person satisfies the High Court that he has taken and is prosecuting with due diligence other proceedings for the protection of the estate, the case being one in which the obtaining of such probate or letters of administration is not obligatory under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925); or (c) the High Court is satisfied that there is no apprehension of misappropriation, deterioration, or waste of the assets and that the grant of letters of administration in such proceedings is not otherwise necessary for the protection of the assets; the High Court shall – (1) in the case mentioned in clause (a), grant probate of the will or letters of administration accordingly; (2) in the case mentioned in clause (b) or clause (c), drop the proceedings; and (3) in all the cases award to the Administrator-General the costs of any proceedings taken by him under those sections to be paid out of the estate as part of the testamentary or intestate expenses thereof.” Section 12 postulates those eventualities in which administration can be granted to the Administrator General : “12. Grant of administration to Administrator-General in certain cases :- If, in the course of proceedings to obtain letters of administration under the provisions of Section 9 or Section 10, and within such period as to the High Court seems reasonable, no person appears and establishes his claim to probate of a will, or to a grant of letters of administration as next-of kin of the deceased, or satisfies the High Court that he has taken and is prosecuting with due diligence other proceedings for the protection of the estate, the case being one in which the obtaining of such probate or letters of administration is not obligatory under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), and the High Court is satisfied that there is apprehension of misappropriation, deterioration, or waste of the assets or that the grant of letters of administration in such proceedings is otherwise necessary for the protection of the assets; or if a person who has established his claim to a grant of letters of administration as next-of-kin of the deceased fails to give such security as may be required of him by law; the High Court may grant letters of administration to the Administrator-General.” Under Section 14, the grant of letters of administration to the Administrator General can be revoked where an executor or next of kin of a deceased establishes a claim to probate or letters of administration in preference to the Administrator General : “14. Recall of Administrator-General's administration and grant of probate etc., to executor or next-of-kin :- If an executor or next-of-kin of the deceased, who has not been personally served with a citation or who has not had notice thereof in time to appear pursuant thereto, establishes to the satisfaction of the High Court a claim to probate of will or to letters of administration in preference to the Administrator-General, any letters of administration granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act to the Administrator-General : (a) shall be revoked, if a will of the deceased is proved in the State; (b) may be revoked, in other cases, if an application for that purpose is made within six months after the grant to the Administrator-General and the High Court is satisfied that there has been no unreasonable delay in making the application, or in transmitting the authority under which the application is made; and probate or letters of administration may be granted to such executor or next-of-kin as the case may be.” The effect of the grant of probate or letters of administration is provided by Section 20(1) which reads thus : “20. Effect of probate or letters granted to Administrator-General :- (1) Probate or letters of administration granted by the High Court to the Administrator-General of any State shall have effect over all the assets of the deceased throughout India and shall be conclusive as to the representative title against all debtors of the deceased and all persons holding such assets, and shall afford full indemnity to all debtors paying their debts and all persons delivering up such assets to such Administrator-General.” 23. The fact that in the instant case the trust has been managing the affairs of the waqf since 1926, the fact which has not been controverted, appropriate recourse for taking over of the property could be by virtue of regular suit and not on the dictates of the Collector, who unilaterally that to without due process of law and in derogation of Article 14 read with Article 300-A exercises his unfettered powers for declaring property as an escheat property, and he cannot assume the power to decide a question of title without even holding a summary proceedings such an action would be arbitrary and illegal. This Court is of a considered view that in any proceedings which involves a complicated question of determination of title, more particularly in the circumstances of the present case, it would be unsafe and catastrophic too to vest exclusive power on Collector, who lacs judicious acumen to examine vital issues of determining of rights. 24. No other point has been preferred by any counsel. 25. In view of the precedent of the Hon’ble Apex Court holding that the Collector cannot exercise the powers under Section 29 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for the purposes of declaration of a property as an “escheat” property, the impugned order dated 01.09.2005, passed by Collector in Case No. 15 of 2003-04 lacks competence and hence it is quashed. The writ petition is allowed without prejudicing the rights of the respondent to have an appropriate recourse available to them in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court.