JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—This second appeal is by the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted a suit for permanent injunction for demolition of a wall against the respondents. His suit was dismissed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the said order, he preferred an appeal which was also dismissed. 2. The plaintiff’s case, as mentioned in the plaint, is that the plaintiff and some of the defendants are descendents of a common ancestor Ramcharan Shukla. The dispute arose between the parties in respect of Plot No. 297/1 (for short, “the suit property”). It is stated that the defendant No. 6 Ishnarain had one-third share in the suit property and the share of the plaintiff’s father Jaynarain was two-third. After the death of Jaynarain his sons Pratap Narain, Chandrabhushan and the plaintiff have two-third share. It is stated that the plaintiff, respondent No. 6 and his brothers are seerdar of the suit property. The brothers of the plaintiff, namely, Pratap Narain and Chandrabhushan have deposited ten times lagaan in respect of 4/9 share and have got bhumidhari certificate. Thus, their share was separated in respect of their share (4/9 share). The plaintiff and the defendant No. 6 were the co-sharers in respect of remaing portion. The plaintiff has further stated that there was a partition among the plaintiff, his brothers and the defendant No. 6. In respect of the said partition Pratap Narain and Chandrabhushan have got their share towards south and the plaintiff got his share in respect of 9 dismal towards east and the defendant No. 6 got his share towards the west side. The plaintiff is in possession of his share. Chandrabhushan has transferred his share to the wife of Pratap Narain. Pratap Narain and his wife have transferred about 2 dismal land to Ishnarain, the defendant No. 6. 3. Later, Ishnarain had sold the said property to Rajesh and Sangeeta and there is no dispute regarding the said property. Pratap Narain, who got 9 dismal share, has also transferred it to defendant Nos. 13 and 14. 4. The cause of action arose in August, 1993 regarding the area shown in the plaint map ‘P.Q.M.N.’ when the defendants refused to get the suit property measured and claimed that the defendant No. 6 has transferred the suit property in their favour and forcibly tried to raise the construction over the suit property. 5. 13 and 14. 4. The cause of action arose in August, 1993 regarding the area shown in the plaint map ‘P.Q.M.N.’ when the defendants refused to get the suit property measured and claimed that the defendant No. 6 has transferred the suit property in their favour and forcibly tried to raise the construction over the suit property. 5. The defendants contested the suit by filing their separate W.S.. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 took the stand that the suit property No. 297/1 area 93 are was owned by Ishnarain, and the defendant No. 6 has executed sale-deed on 4.5.1993 in their favour in respect of 1210 square feet. The names of vendees have been mutated in the revenue records. After the the sale-deed they have raised an eight feet boundary wall and the plaintiff has no concern with the said land. 6. The defendant Nos. 6 and 7 in their W.S. have denied the plaintiff’s case. Their stand is that the suit property is within the limit of Nagar Palika Parishad, where the zamindari in the municipal limit was abolished on 1.7.1965. The suit property was the ancestral property and their common ancestor Ramcharan Shukla was the owner of the said property and after his death an oral family partition had taken place among defendant No. 6 and his cousin Harinarain and Jaynarain. According to the said partition one-third share was allotted to Beni Madhav. The share of Beni Madhav was given to defendant No. 6 and other half share to Harinarain and Jaynarain. The total shares of the respective parties have been mentioned in the W.S. 7. It is also stated that the defendant No. 6 has transferred some portion 2-3/8 in favour of the defendant No. 1 by sale-deed dated 4.5.1993 and 5 dismal area was transferred by him on 31.3.1983 to the defendant No. 10. Now the vendees are in possession as bhumidhar and they have raised construction also. Rest portion 13-1/8 is of the defendant No. 6. The defendant No. 6 is in possession of remaining 4 dismal of the land. 8. It is stated that under the master plan the appropriate authority has sanctioned the map for the construction thus the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are legally authorized to raise the construction in terms of the sanctioned map. The defendant No. 6 is in possession of remaining 4 dismal of the land. 8. It is stated that under the master plan the appropriate authority has sanctioned the map for the construction thus the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are legally authorized to raise the construction in terms of the sanctioned map. They have filed additional W.S. also wherein they have stated that they have raised the construction before filing the suit. 9. The trial Court received the evidence and framed twelve issues. The issue No. 4 was framed in respect of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 10. The trial Court found that the plaintiff has failed to prove that Plot No. 297 was a joint Hindu family property during the life of Sri Ramcharan Shukla or it was a self acquired property of Beni Madhav as alleged by the plaintiff. It had noticed that the plaintiff has not filed any document prior to 1929. The plaintiff has also not filed any document to indicate that already Beni Madhav has become the owner of the said property. The Court had disbelieved the oral statement of P.W.-1. The P.W.-1 born after the death of Beni Madhav, therefore, he could not satisfy about his personal knowledge which was not based on any document. On the other hand the trial Court found that the plea taken by the defendants that the suit property was a joint family partition during their ancestor Ramcharan and in support of their plea they have filed a judgment dated 27.7.1966 passed in Suit No. 30 of 1964 (56Ga). In the said suit while deciding the issue No. 1 the Court had recorded a finding that there was no private partition of the suit property and it was a joint Hindu family partition. 11. The trial Court has also referred the judgment of another Suit No. 459 of 1992 (90Ga), Exhibit-3. The said suit was filed by Brijbhushan. In the plaint it was stated that after the death of Harinarain there was a partition among Brijbhushan and the defendant No. 2 therein (defendant No. 6 of this suit). On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the trial Court came to conclusion that the suit property was not self acquired property of Beni Madhav but they have inherited it from their father Ramcharan. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the trial Court came to conclusion that the suit property was not self acquired property of Beni Madhav but they have inherited it from their father Ramcharan. The Court had disbelieved the stand of the plaintiff that the family of Ramcharan was not a joint family. 12. The trial Court had found that it was a common case that the plaintiff and the defendants had seerdar rights and in respect of seer land the personal law would not be applicable. The Court further found that the suit property is an agricultural land and the share of co-sharers cannot be determined in the Civil Court. Hence, unless the share is determined, there is a bar under Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, hence, the suit is not cognizable by the Civil Court. Accordingly, the suit has been dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction. 13. The appellate Court has affirmed the findings of the trial Court. The appellate Court has held that the plaintiff’s brothers Chandrabhushan and Pratap Narain are bhumidhar. It has noted that in respect of their right the Board of Revenue has passed an order (Paper No. 177-Ga). The appellate Court has also referred the judgment of the Civil Suit No. 30 of 1964 dated 27.7.1966 while deciding the issue No. 1. The Court has recorded a finding that there was no partition among the parties. The appellate Court has further found that unless the shares of the parties are determined by the competent Court, the Civil Court cannot declare the share of each co-sharer in the said land. It has also referred the order of the Tehsildar under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act dated 30.7.1990 wherein the parties were directed to get appropriate order under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act. The said order has attained finality but the parties did not get declaration under Section 229-B of the Act in respect of their share and instead of filing the suit under Section 229-B the plaintiff has instituted this suit hence the appellate Court has affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts below have failed to consider that the main relief sought in the suit was for demolition and injunction hence the suit was not maintainable. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts below have failed to consider that the main relief sought in the suit was for demolition and injunction hence the suit was not maintainable. Next, he submitted that both the Courts below have passed the judgments by misreading the evidence and thus recorded a perverse finding. 15. Sri D.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents submits that from the pleadings of the plaint and the evidence it was evident that there was serious cloud over the title of the plaintiff and unless there was declaration of the right by the revenue Court over a bhumidhari land, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. 16. I have heard Sri Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Sri Ved Prakash Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri D.K. Srivastava, learned Advocate who has put in appearance on behalf of the caveator. 17. Learned counsel for the parties have not cited any judgment in their favour. 18. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 19. It is a common ground that the suit property is an agricultural land. The parties claim that they were the seerdar of the suit property. From the genealogy of the parties which has been mentioned in the suit it was clear that Ramcharan Shukla was a common ancestor. Ramcharan Shukla had three sons: Ramkishun, Laxminarain and Beni Madhav. The plaintiff according to the genealogy mentioned in the plaint is grandson of Laxminarain Shukla. Laxminarain had two sons Hari Narain and Jainarain. The plaintiff is the son of Jainarain. He has two other brothers Pratap Naraina and Chandrabhushan. He has impleaded the sons of his brother Pratap Narain, namely, Ashok Kumar and Sanjay Shukla as defendant Nos. 8 and 9. 20. The parties have filed a large number of documentary evidences. Among those evidences there are some judgments of the Civil Court and the order of the Tehsildar. 21. One of the issues raised before the Court below was that whether the property was owned by the common ancestor Ramcharan Shukla, who was admittedly father of Ramkishun Shukla, Laxminarain Shukla (grandfather of the plaintiff) and Beni Madhav. Both the Courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff has not filed any document to establish that it was a self acquired property of Beni Madhav. Both the Courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff has not filed any document to establish that it was a self acquired property of Beni Madhav. Moreover, the claim of the plaintiff that there was a family settlement among the co-sharers in respect of the suit property has also not been established. Both the Courts below have referred the judgment of Civil Suit No. 30/1964, Ishnarain v. Pratapnarain dated 22.7.1966. While deciding the said suit the Civil Court has recorded a finding that there was no partition among the parties. 22. There was another Suit No. 459/1992 wherein no specific finding with regard to share of the parties has been determined. Both the Courts below, in my view, have rightly referred the order under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act dated 30.7.1990, wherein they were directed to get their share declared under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, but the plaintiff without taking recourse to the remedy in the revenue Court instituted this suit. 23. The law regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the revenue Court has been considered in unbroken line of decisions. The Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ram and another v. Ist Additional Distt. Judge and others, (2001) 3 SCC 24 , has affirmed the judgment of this Court in Ram Padarath v. Second Additional District Judge, 1989 RD 21 (All) (FB). The Supreme Court has held as under: “7. On analysis of the decisions cited above, we are of the opinion that where a recorded tenure holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the Civil Court for cancellation of sale-deed having been obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the revenue Court, reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale-deed by filing a suit in the Civil Court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale-deed by filing a suit in the Civil Court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the revenue Court, as the sale-deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession.” 24. The Supreme Court has followed this decision in the case of Kamla Prasad and others v. Krishna Kant Pathak and others, 2007(2) AWC 1764 (SC) and held as under: “12. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties, in our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants deserves to be accepted. So far as abadi land is concerned, the trial Court held that Civil Court had jurisdiction and the said decision has become final. But as far as agricultural land is concerned, in our opinion, the trial Court as well as appellate Court were right in coming to the conclusion that only revenue Court could have entertained the suit on two grounds. Firstly, the case of the plaintiff himself in the plaint was that he was not the sole owner of the property and defendant Nos. 10 to 12 who were proforma defendants, had also right, title and interest therein. He had also stated in the plaint that though in the Revenue Record, only his name had appeared but defendant Nos. 10 to 12 have also right in the property. In our opinion, both the Courts below were right in holding that such a question can be decided by a revenue Court in a suit instituted under Section 229B of the Act. The said section reads thus: “229B. Declaratory suit by person claiming to be an asami of a holding or part thereof.(1) Any person claiming to be an asami of a holding or any part thereof, whether exclusively or jointly with any other person, may sue the landholder for a declaration of his rights as asami in such holding or part, as the case may be. (2) In any suit under sub-section (1) any other person claiming to hold as asami under the landholder shall be impleaded as defendant. (2) In any suit under sub-section (1) any other person claiming to hold as asami under the landholder shall be impleaded as defendant. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall mutatis mutandis apply to a suit by a person claiming to be a bhumidhar, with the amendment that for the word ‘landholder’ the words “the State Government and the Gaon Sabha” are substituted therein.” 25. These decisions leave no scope for any doubt that the issue raise in the present suit can be dcided by the Revenue Court only. Both the Courts below have applied correct principle of law having due regard to the facts of the case. In the light of above disscussion, it is demonstrably clear that Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore, in my opinion, the view taken by both the Courts below is justified and legal. No interference is called for under Section 100 C.P.C. 26. The second appeal lacks merits hence it is dismissed. 27. No order as to costs.