Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mh. Rahman, Son of Md. Saheb
2017-05-17
SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This is an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, directed against the judgment and order dated 30.08.2016, of the learned Member MACT, Kohima, passed in MAC Case No. 2/2011. 2. Heard Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the appellant. None appears on behalf of the respondents. Though, notice was published in two local newspapers namely, the Nagaland Post and the Eastern Mirror on two consecutive days. 3. Facts leading to the appeal briefly stated are as follows; On 20.08.2010, the respondent No. 1, Md. Rahman while driving a Mini Bus bearing registration No. NLH-2645 belonging to the respondent No.2 met an accident near High School Junction Petrol Pump, Kohima due to break failure of the vehicle and sustained injuries over his body, therefore, he was evacuated to Naga Hospital where he was admitted and treated for compound facture of right patella tibia till 28.08.2010. Inspite of the treatment, the respondent No.1 suffered 100% disablement of his right leg, therefore, loss his earning capacity and his job of a driver. Having suffered such disablement due to used of vehicle he filed a petition before the learned Member MACT, Kohima under section 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 claiming compensation amount of Rs. 12,10,000/- from the respondent No. 2 and the Insurance Company namely, the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., the present appellant with which the owner of the vehicle had a Insurance Policy No. 32220/31/2010/556 with liability coverage of basic 3rd party, Add: LL Paid Driver, Conductor, Cleaner R-IMT-40 etc. 4. The learned Tribunal, after taking evidence and after having heard the parties passed the impugned judgment and award dated 30.08.2016, wherein the respondent No. 1 was awarded Rs. 6,20,000/- and the respondent/Insurance Company i.e. the appellant was directed to pay the same. Being aggrieved, the appellant has come to this Court by filing the present appeal. 5. The main point of appeal raised by the appellant through his learned counsel Mr. B. Devnath is that the respondent No.1 is not entitled to award/compensation under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 rather, he should have exercised his option under section 167 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and approach the Tribunal under Motor Vehicle Act under section 163A or approach the learned Commissioner under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 which is now known as employees Compensation Act, 1923. Mr.
Mr. B. Devnath further submits that a claim under section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act has to be supported with evidence which would go to prove that the evident occurred due to negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle which met the accident or in other words the act which caused the accident was negligent act of within the driver or the owner. But in the case of the petitioner he is the driver of the vehicle which met the accident and caused physical injuries on himself. The respondents/claimants is himself the tortfeasor in the accident as such not entitle to claim compensation under section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. -versus- Meena Variyal and Others reported in (2007) 5 SCC 428 , particularly, the words underlined at paragraph-27 of the same. The contents of the paragraphs are reproduced here below:- “27. We think that the law laid down in Minu B. Mehta & Anr. Vs. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan & Anr. (supra) was accepted by the legislature while enacting the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by introducing Section 163A of the Act providing for payment of compensation notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force that the owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be, and in a claim made under sub-section (1) of Section 163A of the Act, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned. Therefore, the victim of an accident or his dependants have an option either to proceed under Section 166 of the Act or under Section 163A of the Act. Once they approach the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned.
Once they approach the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they proceed under Section 163A of the Act, the compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon the victim or his dependants to establish any negligence or default on the part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle”. The learned counsel also cited judgment of this High Court passed in the case of United Insurance Co. Ltd. -versus- H. Lalhmingliana and Another reported in 2006 (2) GLT 538, particularly, the words underlined at paragraph-47. The same is reproduced here below:- “47. Now, turning to the question as to whether it is permissible for a Tribunal to allow a claimant to amend his application from the one made under section 166 to an application under section 163A, what needs to be noted is that the foundation for making an application in both the proceedings are fundamentally different, for, while in an application under section 166, fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident must be proved, the proof of such fault is dispensed with, when an application is made under section 163A. Thus, as already indicated hereinabove, the legislature has provided a claimant with two different schemes for claiming compensation. While the accident itself gives cause of action for relaxation of compensation under section 163A, the cause of action for sustaining a claim under section 166 is not merely the accident, but a tortitious act of failing to take care, which the owner or the driver of the vehicle owes to the injured or the deceased as the case may be. However, in either case the foundation for the claim is the accident, for, even in a claim made under section 166, the accident forms an integral and inseverable part of the cause of action. This apart, the MV Act is a benevolent legislation and, hence, this enactment needs to be liberally construed. Construed thus, it is abundantly clear that the cause of action in both the proceedings, namely the proceeding under section 166 and 163A are not wholly alien to each other inasmuch as at the root of both the claims lies the accident.
This apart, the MV Act is a benevolent legislation and, hence, this enactment needs to be liberally construed. Construed thus, it is abundantly clear that the cause of action in both the proceedings, namely the proceeding under section 166 and 163A are not wholly alien to each other inasmuch as at the root of both the claims lies the accident. Whether in a given case the Court shall permit the amendment of a proceeding under section 166 to one under section 163A is a question, which would depend on the facts of the given case, for, there may be case where the injured or the deceased does not fall in the limited income group of Rs. 40,000/- per annum, if a claimant does not fall in the income group of persons for whom the provisions of section 163A are incorporated, the Tribunal may decline to allow the amendment of the proceeding under section 166 to one under section 163A.” 6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the provisions of section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act, which has been elaborately explained by Mr. B. Devnath and which is supported by the judgments cited above, this Court agrees with the submission of the learned counsel that the case of the respondents/claimants is not covered by section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. He should either approach the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 or approach the Tribunal MACT under section 163A of the same. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 of the learned Tribunal is quashed and set aside. Send back the Tribunal record.