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2017 DIGILAW 597 (RAJ)

Shyopat Ram Bansal v. Shivbhagwan S/o Shri Kishan Lal

2017-02-17

SANGEET LODHA

body2017
ORDER : Mr. Sangeet Lodha, J. 1. This petition is directed against order dated 17.5.16 passed by Rent Tribunal, Sri Ganganagar, in Rent Case No.61/07, whereby an application preferred on behalf of the petitioner/tenant under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC seeking leave to amend the reply, stands rejected. 2. The respondent filed a petition seeking petitioner’s eviction from a commercial premises, on the ground of bona fide requirement in terms of the provisions of Section 9 (i) of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001( for short “the Act”) . It is averred in the petition that the respondent requires the premises to establish a Computer Centre therein by his son Manoj Kumar. 3. The petition is being contested by the petitioner by filing a reply thereto. The matter is posted for the respondent’s evidence. At this stage, the petitioner preferred an application seeking leave to amend the reply to the petition stating that the respondent’s son Manoj Kumar is engaged in business of import of Power Tools and Hardware Machinery from China and thus, need of the premises as pleaded is not bona fide. The basis for the amendment sought for was disclosed in terms that the friend of the petitioner operating a Marriage Bureau has received the bio data of the respondent’s son wherein this fact is disclosed. 4. The application stands rejected by the Rent Tribunal. Hence, this petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the amendment sought for substantially affects the bona fide requirement of the premises as pleaded by the respondent and therefore, the Rent Tribunal has seriously erred in rejecting the application preferred by the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that at the stage of deciding the application seeking leave to amend the reply, the Rent Tribunal should not have entered into the merits of the amendment and thus, the order impugned deserves to be set aside. In support of the contention, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Andhra Bank v. ABN AMRO Bank N.V. & Ors.”, (2007) 6 SCC 167 and a decision of this court in the matter of “Martin & Harris Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajendra Mehta & Ors.”, 2013(2) DNJ (Raj.)912. 6. 6. On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the order impugned passed by the Rent Tribunal contending that the facts sought to be incorporated were without any basis, which in no manner suggestive of the fact that the bona fide requirement of the premises as pleaded stands extinguished and therefore, the order of the Rent Tribunal in rejecting the application preferred by the petitioner cannot be faulted with. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 8. Undoubtedly, the Rent Tribunal is empowered to allow either party to alter or amend its pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. But then, normally, the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date of suit or legal proceedings were instituted but the subsequent development which have bearing on right to relief claimed by the party, such subsequent events may be permitted to be brought on record by way of amendment of the pleadings. However, the power conferred under Order 6, Rule 17 is discretionary and has to be exercised judicially on consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. It is true that the question with regard to the merit of the amendment sought is generally not gone into by the court while deciding the application seeking leave to amend the pleadings. But then, the question with regard to amendment of reply in petition for eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity, where the bona fide requirement is alleged to have become extinct on account of subsequent developments has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this court in the various decisions. 10. 10. In “Gaya Prasad v. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava”, 2001(1) RCJ, 522(SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed : “The crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps the utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in out litigative slow process system subsists. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in out litigative slow process system subsists. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. It is pernicious, and unjust to shut the door before the applicant just on the eye of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In “Pratap Rai Tanwani & Anr. v. Uttam Chand & Anr.”, (2004) 8 SCC, 490, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed : “7. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.” (emphasis added) 12. In “Legal Representatives of Abdulla v. Priyambda Sharma”, 2013(2) WLC(Raj.), 175, this court observed: “8. ……………... The well settled legal position is that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for the business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Neither tenant nor court can advice the landlord how he should adjust himself and satisfy his requirement in some other way. ……………... The well settled legal position is that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for the business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Neither tenant nor court can advice the landlord how he should adjust himself and satisfy his requirement in some other way. In the present case also the appellant is not legally entitled to say that as the adjoining shop has been vacated and after renovation of it and construction of basement, the respondent has started business of readymade garments in it. It is not required for her to got the suit shop also and after further renovation and reconstruction of both the shops to start the business indicated by her in the plaint. In this regard, the well settled legal position is also that if it is found that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession that by itself would not be sufficient to negative the landlord’s requirement shown for tenanted premises but in such a situation it is expected from the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not sufficient and suitable for the purpose for which he required the tenanted premises. Whether the vacant premises available to the landlord is sufficient and suitable for his requirement or not will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case but mere being in possession of a vacant premises cannot negative the need shown by the landlord. Suitability of alternative accommodation available with the landlord has to be seen from convenience of the landlord and on the basis of totality of circumstances including profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background of the landlord. The normal rule is that any litigation or a suit or an original proceeding is to be tried in all stages on the cause of action and the rights and obligations of the parties are to be adjudicated upon, as they obtained or existing on the date of commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception that the Court may take notice of the subsequent events of facts or law which may have happened since the commencement of the lis and grant relief to the parties on the basis of altered condition which have a material beaning on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief. This rule is to be applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances has become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. In such a case, the Court must take a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of the fact and law to mould the relief. Such consideration of subsequent events or developments must be taken when they had a material impact on those rights and obligations. The well settled legal position is also that the crucial date for deciding bonafides of the need shown by the landlord is the date of the suit/petition and it must also continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of decree of the final court but at the same time if during the pendency of the litigation subsequent developments and events happen and the landlord comes into, a possession of vacant premises which is suitable and sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the landlord that events or development may be taken note of to adjudge the bona fide and reasonability of the need shown by the landlord. Such subsequent developments and events are to be taken note only when the need of the landlord can be shown to be completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the landlord should have been completely vanished by such subsequent events. In the present case, it cannot be said that the initial requirement shown by the respondent for the suit shop has been completely vanished merely by the reason that in the adjoining shop some business has been started by the respondent as it cannot be expected from the respondent to sit idle till the shop is vacated. Merely by the reason that in the waiting period the respondent after renovating the vacated shop and construction of basement has started some business bona fide and reasonability of the requirement show for the suit shop cannot be adjudged to be negatived.’ (emphasis added) 13. Merely by the reason that in the waiting period the respondent after renovating the vacated shop and construction of basement has started some business bona fide and reasonability of the requirement show for the suit shop cannot be adjudged to be negatived.’ (emphasis added) 13. Thus, upshot of the various decisions of the Apex Court and this court is that if the subsequent events sought to be brought on record by way of amendment of the pleadings are of such nature that the bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord stands completely eclipsed, then, only such amendment which is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issue with regard to bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord can be allowed by the courts at any stage of the proceedings. 14. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be noticed that in the instance case, the bona fide requirement of the premises is pleaded in terms that premises is required for the son of first respondent for establishing Computer Centre. It is not even the case sought to be set out by way of amendment that the respondent has acquired possession of suitable accommodation to meet the requirement as pleaded. Even the averments sought to be incorporated not suggestive of the fact that the respondent’s son has started business of import of Power Tools and Hardware Machinery from China in any alternative accommodation having become available during the pendency of the petition. That apart, the amendment is sought for by the petitioner without any substantial basis, solely on the ground that such information is disclosed in bio data of the respondent’s son alleged to have been given to the friend of the petitioner, who is operating Marriage Bureau. The amendment sought for is not supported by any material on record. In the considered opinion of this court, on the basis of the facts sought to be incorporated by way of amendment, in no manner, it could be inferred that the bona fide requirement of the premises as pleaded stands totally eclipsed. 15. The amendment sought for is not supported by any material on record. In the considered opinion of this court, on the basis of the facts sought to be incorporated by way of amendment, in no manner, it could be inferred that the bona fide requirement of the premises as pleaded stands totally eclipsed. 15. In this view of the matter, in the backdrop of position of law settled as above, in the considered opinion of this court, the judicial discretion exercised by the Rent Tribunal in declining the amendment sought for, does not warrant any interference by this court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the result, the petition fails, it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.