JUDGMENT : Samapti Chatterjee, J. 1. The issues to be determined in the present writ petition are :- "(i) Whether the concerned municipal authority has any power under West Bengal Municipal Act to issue the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 thereby directing the petitioners to stop work on the dictate and mandate of Kotrung Municipal Corporation ? (ii) Whether the Kolkata Municipal Corporation being a different statutory body under separate acts could dictate the Uttarpara Kotrung Municipality to restrain the petitioner from carrying on the construction work when admittedly the Uttarpara Kotrung Municipality is governed by West Bengal Municipal Act and not by Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act?" 2. The petitioners' case in a nutshell is as follows :- "The petitioner purchased the first plot of land measuring about 10 Bighas and 6 Chataks situated at various plot numbers Khatian numbers in Mouza Matrung Uttarpara under Uttarpara Kotrung Municipality by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated 26th June, 2006 from the vendors mentioned therein. Subsequently, the land was mutated by the BLRO, Serampore. Further, L.R. Khatians were issued in favour of the petitioners namely M/s. RDB Ltd. Pursuant to that on 22nd December, 2006 the classification of the land was issued by the BL and LRO Hooghly. Furthermore, the Government of West Bengal accepted the revenue from the petitioners also. The concerned Kotrung Municipality granted sanctioned plan on 6th July, 2007 for construction of 14 residential blocks (286 residential flats) and one commercial block. The construction was complete. The said Municipality thereafter issued completion certificate on 2nd December, 2010. On the basis of the completion certificate issued by the concerned Municipality the flats/commercial spaces were handed over to various purchasers and most of them were registered and mutated in their own names. It is also revealed that the petitioners purchased a second plot of land on 14th September, 2010 measuring 44 cottas 1 chataks 15 sq.f by a registered deed of conveyance adjacent to the first plot of land. The concerned Kotrung Municipality mutated the second plot of land and recorded the name of the petitioner No. 1 in assessment book. Pursuant to an application made by the erstwhile owners, the Government of West Bengal permitted the re-classification of the land under Section 4C of the West Bengal land Reforms Act. The concerned Kotrung Municipality mutated the second plot of land and recorded the name of the petitioner No. 1 in assessment book. Pursuant to an application made by the erstwhile owners, the Government of West Bengal permitted the re-classification of the land under Section 4C of the West Bengal land Reforms Act. It is also on record that despite application made by the petitioners the mutation by BL & BLRO, Serampore has not been recorded in respect of the second plot though rent for the said plot of land were accepted from the erstwhile owners. The Municipality after amalgamating both the first and second plots of land and re-numbering the premises to 9K, G.T. Road sanctioned a residential building plan comprises of three blocks in respect of the second plot. When the construction of the residential flats of the second plot were about to be completed the Municipality by the impugned letter dated 1st October, 2013 intimated the petitioners that as per instruction of the municipal corporation the Chairperson asked the petitioners to stop the construction work at KMC land at Mouza Kotrung J.L No. 8 comprising R.S. Dag Nos. 3563, 3564, 7352, 3677, 3678, 3686, 3687, 3688, 374, 4541, 4542, 3689, 3669 and 3670 in respect of Khatian No. 1773 until further orders. Accordingly, thereafter the petitioners have stopped any further construction work thereafter." Submissions of the Learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties 3. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that it is evident from C.S record of rights of the Dag numbers that the names of various Zamindars were recorded and also the same were occupied by various persons who were the predecessors-in-interest of the vendors. Mr. Mukherjee further strongly argued that it is clear from the C.S record, R.S record and subsequent L.R Record that the name of the owners/recorded tenants being the predecessor-in-interest of the vendors from whom the petitioners purchased the said land, their names were recorded in those government record. Mr. Mukherjee further strongly submitted that none of the records like C.S.,R.S record and L.R shows that name of the KMC was ever been recorded. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that it is the case of the KMC that the KMC is the owner of the said plot of land. 4. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee further strongly submitted that none of the records like C.S.,R.S record and L.R shows that name of the KMC was ever been recorded. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that it is the case of the KMC that the KMC is the owner of the said plot of land. 4. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners strongly argued that the concerned Municipality being a statutory body could not issue the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 on the basis of the dictate of Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 5. Mr. Mukherjee referred to Section 220 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 to say that the Chairman of the respondent Municipality has been empowered to stop unauthorised construction. Section 220 of the said West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 is quoted below :- "Section 220-Power of Chairman to stop unauthorised construction.-(1) In any case in which the erection of a building or any other work connected therewith has been commenced or is being carried on unlawfully, the Chairman may, by written notice, require the owner or the person carrying on such erection or unlawful work to discontinue the same forthwith, pending further proceedings as respects such unauthorised construction. (2) If any notice issued under sub-section (1) is not duly complied with, the Chairman may, with the assistance of the police or any employee of the Municipality, if necessary, take such steps as he may deem fit to stop the continuance of the unlawful work. (3) If it appears to the Chairman that it is necessary, in order to prevent the continuation of the unlawful work, to depute any police or employee of the Municipality to watch the premises, the cost of providing the same shall be borne by the person to whom the said notice was addressed." 6. Mr. Mukherjee strongly submitted that unfortunately in the present case Municipal authority without taking recourse to Section 220 of the said Municipal Act, being dictated by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, issued the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 which is bad in law. In support of his contention that the respondent Municipality should not act on the dictate of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Mr. In support of his contention that the respondent Municipality should not act on the dictate of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Mr. Mukherjee relied on 79 CWN 883 Paragraph-12 (Scotts (P) Ltd. & Ors v. Corporation of Calcutta & Ors) which is quoted below :- "Para-12-In the case of Naniuddin Bepari v. The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners, Dacca, 40 C.W.N. 17, R.C. Mitter J. observed at pp.18-19 as follows :- "It is a fundamental principle of law that a natural person has the capacity to do all lawful things unless his capacity has been curtailed by some rule of law. It is equally a fundamental principle that in the case of a statutory corporation it is just the other way. The Corporation has no power to do anything unless those powers are conferred on it by the statute which creates it. In the Municipal Act of 1884, I do not find any power given to the Municipality to allow the use of a public thoroughfare from day to day for any other purposes than a public pathway. It has no doubt the power to divert a road and if it diverts it, a portion of the old road which is no longer necessary to be used as a road is land for all intents and purposes and as I have stated, the Municipality can deal with that land, which is no longer used as road, under the provisions of sec. 34" 7. Mr. Mukherjee further emphasized his argument that if the power is conferred upon the authority then he can only exercise the power as prescribed under the statute and not in any other manner. On the point of "Acting Upon Dictation". Mr. Mukherjee also relied on DE SMITH'S Judicial Review of Administrative Action Page-309. Some portion is quoted below :- "Acting under Dictation-An authority entrusted with a discretion must not, in the purported exercise of its discretion, act under the dictation of another body or person. In at least two modern Commonwealth cases licensing bodies were found to have taken decisions on the instructions of the heads of government who were prompted by extraneous motives. In at least two modern Commonwealth cases licensing bodies were found to have taken decisions on the instructions of the heads of government who were prompted by extraneous motives. But, as less colourful cases illustrate, it is enough to show that a decision which ought to have been based on the exercise of independent judgment was dictated by those not entrusted with the power to decide, although it remains a question of fact whether the repository of discretion abdicated it in the face of external pressure. And it is immaterial that the external authority has not sought to impose its policy. For instance, where a local authority, in assessing compensation for loss of office, erroneously made certain deductions because it thought it was obliged to do so having regard to the practice followed in such cases by the Treasury (to which an appeal lay from its decisions), mandamus issued to compel it to determine the claim according to law." On the same point Mr. Mukherjee also relied on Administrative Law by William Wade page 320 which is extracted below :- "Power in the wrong hands-Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority may share its power with someone else, or may allow someone else to dictate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting to their wishes or instructions. The effect then is that the discretion conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void." Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the legal dictum on "Acting Upon Dictation" has been reiterated in catena of Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on decisions reported in (i) 2004 (2) SCC 65 Paragraph-26 (Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia And Others) (ii) 2011 (5) SCC 435 Paragraphs-26 to 28 (B.R Surendranath Singh v. Deptt. of Mines & Geology) 8. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the decision taken by the Chairperson vide impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 is illegal, ultra vires and void. 9. Mr. of Mines & Geology) 8. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the decision taken by the Chairperson vide impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 is illegal, ultra vires and void. 9. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that the Chairperson of the said Municipality could have exercised his power conferred under Section 220 of the said West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 but issued the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 at the dictation of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, which is patently illegal. 10. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the purported grounds taken in the order impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 11. Mr. Mukherjee further vehemently argued that the respondent authority has no power to improve the impugned order by taking additional grounds in the affidavit to support the same In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on an Hon'ble Apex Court decision reported in AIR 1978 (SC) 851 Paragraph-8 (Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others). 12. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that it is evident inter alia from C.S record that since 1936, then R.S record 1956 and LR Record 1985-86 that the petitioners predecessor was the owner of the land and the petitioners purchased the said land from those predecessor but not from Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 13. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that said plots of land was never recorded in any Records of Right in favour of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 14. Mr. Mukherjee further vehemently argued that Kolkata Municipal Corporation went before the BLLR behind the back of the petitioners predecessor and surreptitiously got the title changed in their name. He further contended that the Corporation cannot decide the title. The Corporation should have approached the competent Court of law to decide title in its favour. But in the present case unfortunately the Corporation changed the title in its favour by approaching BLLR behind the back of the petitioners predecessor which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on a decision reported in 1997 (1) CHN 156 Paragraphs-8, 9 and 13 (K.G. Patel & Co. v. Smt. Chandra Devi Bothra & Ors) which are quoted below:- "Para-8-It was submitted that from the deed of conveyance dated 8.11.1951 it would appear that the appellant merely purchased the structure belonging to the Bejoy Timber & Co. Mukherjee relied on a decision reported in 1997 (1) CHN 156 Paragraphs-8, 9 and 13 (K.G. Patel & Co. v. Smt. Chandra Devi Bothra & Ors) which are quoted below:- "Para-8-It was submitted that from the deed of conveyance dated 8.11.1951 it would appear that the appellant merely purchased the structure belonging to the Bejoy Timber & Co. It was submitted that vacant land would govern the nature of the lease and relying on the decision in Santilata De v. Saraju Bala Devi and Ors reported in 60 CWN 642 and Annapurna Seal v. Tincowrie Dutt & Anr reported in 66 CWN 338. It has been contended that the provisions of the Thika Tenancy Act have no application in relation to a vacant land. Para-9-It was further submitted, that it is a settled principle of law that a disputed question of title cannot be gone into in a mutation proceeding and in support of his aforementioned submission reliance has been placed on Sheo Dulari Devi v. Smt. Nageshra Kuer and Anr. Reported in AIR 1977 Pat 86 Venode Kumar Jalan v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors reported in 1987 (1) CLT 333 and J. Hiralal v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore and ors reported in AIR 1982 Kant 137. Para-13-The question as to whether the nature of the property in view of the transaction entered into by various persons would be governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act or Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act would be a serious question, which as has been conceded to by the learned Counsel of all the parties cannot be gone into by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation." 15. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the Corporation cannot be a Judge of his own cause. On that point Mr. Mukherjee relied on a decision reported in 1998 (3) CLT 51 Paragraph-10 (Jolly Begum & Ors v. State of West Bengal & Ors). Mr. Mukherjee also relied on one Hon'ble Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1987 (SC) 1359 Paragraphs-7 and 8 (State of Karnataka v. Rameswara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli) which are quoted below.:- "Para-7-On a consideration of the matter we find ourselves unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Iyengar. Mr. Mukherjee also relied on one Hon'ble Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1987 (SC) 1359 Paragraphs-7 and 8 (State of Karnataka v. Rameswara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli) which are quoted below.:- "Para-7-On a consideration of the matter we find ourselves unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Iyengar. The terms of Clause 12 do not afford scope for a liberal construction being made regarding the powers of the Deputy Commissioner to adjudicate upon a disputed question of breach as well as to assess the damages arising from the breach. The crucial words in clause 12 are "and for any breach of conditions set forth hereinbefore, the first party shall be liable to pay damages to the second party as may be assessed by the second party". On a plain reading of the words it is clear that the right of the second party to assess damages would arise only if the breach of conditions is admitted or if no issue is made of it. If it was the intention of the parties that the officer acting on behalf of the State was also entitled to adjudicate upon a dispute regarding the breach of conditions the wording of clause 12 would have been entirely different. It cannot also be argued that a right to adjudicate upon an issue relating to a breach of conditions of the contract would flow from or is inhered in the right conferred to assess the damages arising from a breach of conditions. The power to assess damages, as pointed out by the Full Bench, is a subsidiary and consequential power and not the primary power. Even assuming for argument's sake that the terms of clause 12 afford scope for being construed as empowering the officer of the State to decide upon the question of breach as well as assess the quantum of damages, we do not think that adjudication by the officer regarding the breach of the contract can be sustained under law because a party to the agreement cannot be an arbiter in his own cause. Interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. Interests of justice and equity require that where a party to a contract disputes the committing of any breach of conditions the adjudication should be by an independent person or body and not by the other party to the contract. The position will, however, be different where there is no dispute or there is consensus between the contracting parties regarding the breach of conditions. In such a case the officer of the State, even though a party to the contract will be well within his rights in assessing the damages occasioned by the breach in view of the specific terms of clause 12. Para-8-We are, therefore, in agreement with the view of the Full Bench that the powers of the State under an agreement entered into by it with a private person providing for assessment of damages for breach of conditions and recovery of the damages will stand confined only to those cases where the breach of conditions is admitted or it is not disputed." 16. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that one cannot decide its damages against other owners, it should be decided by the appropriate authority or the forum. 17. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the concerned Municipality not only mutated that land in the name of the petitioners but also accepted the rent which clearly recognised the right of the parties. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on 1980 (2) CLJ 1. 18. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that more than 50 years the plots involved in the present proceeding were not in possession of the Corporation. Furthermore, neither the Corporation claimed any entitlement to the said plot against the predecessors in interest of the petitioner nor the Kolkata Municipal Corporation is in possession of the said land in question. 19. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that KMC have never sought to interfere with possession, occupation and enjoyment of the predecessor in interest of the petitioners. Therefore, no suit lies in evicting the petitioners since it is barred by law of limitation. 19. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that KMC have never sought to interfere with possession, occupation and enjoyment of the predecessor in interest of the petitioners. Therefore, no suit lies in evicting the petitioners since it is barred by law of limitation. In support of his contention he relied on Schedule 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and also Section 27 of Limitation Act, 1963 which are quoted below :- "Schedule 112 of The Limitation act, 1963 Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run Any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government Thirty years When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person. Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963-Extinguishment of right to property.-At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." 20. Mr. Mukherjee further emphasized that recorded owners as intermediaries acquire statutory title under Section 6(2) of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 as well as under Section 4(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. 21. Before parting with the argument Mr. Mukherjee reiterated that the Chairperson of the concerned Municipality has no authority to issue the impugned letter dated 1st October, 2013 on the dictate of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. Therefore, the impugned letter dated 1st October, 2013 issued by the Chairperson of Uttarpara Kotrung Municipality, Uttarpara, Dist-Hooghly should be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. 22. Per contra, Mr. Alok Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing for the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) submitted that the present writ petition is a pre-matured one as by the impugned order nothing has been decided finally by the said Municipality against the petitioner which constituted any cause of action to the petitioners to approach before this Hon'ble Court for quashing of the said letter. 23. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that since it is pointed out before the concerned Municipality by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation that the said land belongs to the KMC, the said Municipality just issued the impugned notice to the petitioners. 24. Mr. 23. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that since it is pointed out before the concerned Municipality by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation that the said land belongs to the KMC, the said Municipality just issued the impugned notice to the petitioners. 24. Mr. Ghosh further strongly argued that the petitioners are under obligation to appear before the Municipality instead of challenging the same in the Court of law. 25. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that under Section 217 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 the Board of Councilors have been empowered to cancel the material misrepresentation by the applicant. Section 217 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 is quoted below :- "Section 217- Power to Board of Councillors to cancel permission on the ground of material misrepresentation by applicant.- If, at any time, sanction or provisional sanction to erect any building has been given and the Board of Councillors is satisfied that such sanction was given in consequence of any material misrepresentation or fraudulent statement contained in the plans, elevation sections of specifications or land or any material particulars submitted in respect of such building, it may cancel such sanction, and any work done thereunder shall be deemed to have been done without sanction." 26. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the petitioners cannot invite the Court to decide the title thereby taking the impugned notice as an instrument or weapon. He further contended that there is no illegality or infirmity to direct one Government body to other Government wing to take action against one who by practicing fraud obtained permission of construction on the basis of material misrepresentation. 27. Mr. Ghosh further argued that the second plot is measuring of 44 Kottas and in respect of second plot of land mutation has not been granted till date by the Municipality. 28. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that the Municipality was informed by the KMC regarding this fact that the KMC is the owner of the said property. In support of his contention Mr. Ghosh relied on Paragraph-4 of the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the respondent No. 3 Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 29. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that it is evident from the record that the plots of land measuring about 450 bighas in R.S. Khatian No. 1773, J.L. No. 8 under Mouza Kotrung and R.S Khatian No. 4775, under Mouza-Kotrung, J.L. No. 7 P.S. Uttarpara, District-Hooghly belong to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 29. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that it is evident from the record that the plots of land measuring about 450 bighas in R.S. Khatian No. 1773, J.L. No. 8 under Mouza Kotrung and R.S Khatian No. 4775, under Mouza-Kotrung, J.L. No. 7 P.S. Uttarpara, District-Hooghly belong to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. Initially that property had been vested to the corporation by the Crown as Lakhiraj property. Sometime in November, 1926 the Corporation had leased out about 360 bighas out of the said estate for a period of 10 years to one Kishorimohan Banerjee who took the possession of the land on self same date though the registered leased deed was executed on 24th April, 1929 and the period of lease expired on 31st October, 1936. The said lessee Kishorimohan Banerjee divided the land into several plots and retained only 2/5th of area in his possession. M/s. Seth Sugnichand Sundar Das & Company also became the sub-lessee of about 45 bighas of land under said Kishorimohan Banerjee. The said M/s. Seth Sugnichand Sundar Das & Company thereafter let out the entire parcel of 45 bighas to one Girija Prasad Pal by two instruments dated 9th December, 1942 and 12th January, 1944. 30. Mr. Ghosh further contended that lease in favour of the Kishorimohan Banerjee was terminated by the corporation by the notice dated 26th September, 1947. The corporation also filed the Title Suit No. 478 of 1947 for possession. Since the original lessee Kishorimohan died his heirs were made party defendants in the said suit. During the pendency of the said suit a negotiations were entered by the parties for a compromise and thereafter on 12th December, 1949 a compromise petition was filed in that suit. Several sub-lessees were made parties to the suit and a decree for possession was passed not only against the Kishorimohan but also the sub-lessees. Thereafter sometime in April 15, 1951 the corporation filed Execution Case No. 15 of 1951 for the execution of decree. In that execution application several sub-lessees including said Girija Prasad Pal were made parties and on 26th April, 1959 notice was issued to show cause why the decree should not be executed against them. Thereafter sometime in April 15, 1951 the corporation filed Execution Case No. 15 of 1951 for the execution of decree. In that execution application several sub-lessees including said Girija Prasad Pal were made parties and on 26th April, 1959 notice was issued to show cause why the decree should not be executed against them. On receipt of such notice said Girija Prasad Pal disclaimed any interest in the property by alleging that on 30th October, 1948 he transferred his right title and interest in favour of Reliance Development & Engineering Ltd. However, the said Girija Prasad Pal as the managing agent and director of that company filed an objection petition to the execution on 22nd May, 1951. Since the corporation had not sought recovery of possession against that company the objection raised on its behalf was dismissed by the Executing Court and that order was confirmed in the appeal by the High Court on 29th January, 1952. The corporation sought to execute the decree and the said Girija Prasad Pal was made a party in the said application. But the Girija Prasad Pal knowing fully well that he was liable to be evicted under the decree for possession obtained by the corporation against the Banerjee he therefore the said Pal took shelter behind Reliance Development and Engineering Ltd. Unfortunately, on 30th May, 1955 the appeal was disposed of by the Division Bench. Against that said Girija Prasad Pal through the said company asked for a certificate of fitness for appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court but the same was declined on February, 1958. Thereafter said Girija Prasad Pal filed the Title Suit No. 185 of 1958 before the Ld. Munsif, Serampore for declaration of the compromise decree in Title Suit No. 78 of 1947 obtained by the corporation was fraudulent and collusive and the same was not binding on the plaintiff. The Hon'ble High Court upon elaborate consideration of the contentions of the parties held that there was neither any fraud nor collusion practised in obtaining decree and it was valid and legally executable so far as the subject matter was concerned. Ultimately the dispute raised in Title Suit No. 185 of 1958 finally came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1160 of 1967 filed by the said Girija Prasad Pal. Ultimately the dispute raised in Title Suit No. 185 of 1958 finally came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1160 of 1967 filed by the said Girija Prasad Pal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the plaintiff Girija Prasad Pal was liable to be evicted in execution of the decree in Title Suit No. 78 of 1947 although the suit as filed was barred by limitation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that appeal was liable to be dismissed on merit. The Judgment was delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 18th August, 1971 was reported in AIR 1972 SC 2391 (Girija Prasad Paul v. The Corporation of Calcutta and Others). In the year 1998 the corporation filed an application for correction of R.S record of rights in its favour before the Revenue Officer and Sub Divisional Land and Land Reforms Officer, Serampore, Hooghly on the basis of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 1160 of 1967. On such application the Revenue Officer and SDL and LRO Serampore, Hooghly had initiated proceedings under Section 47 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act read with Section 6 (i) (h) of the said Act. Section 6 (i) (h) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act 1953 is quoted below :- "Section 6 (i) (h) - Where the intermediary is a local authority,-land held by such authority, notwithstanding such land or any part thereof may have been let out by such authority: Provided that where any land which has been let out by any local authority is retained by such authority under this clause, no person holding such land shall have any right of occupancy therein, and every such person shall be bound to deliver possession of the land to the local authority when required by it for its purposes." Finally on 3rd August, 1998 an order was passed. In the said order it was held that the final record of rights published under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act was prepared erroneously and as such it was expedient to correct the finally published record of rights. Therefore, it was ordered that entry and interest of lessee in respect of the finally published record of rights as mentioned in Schedule A of the proceedings stood eliminated by operation of Section 47 read with Section 6 (i) (h) of the said Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. Therefore, it was ordered that entry and interest of lessee in respect of the finally published record of rights as mentioned in Schedule A of the proceedings stood eliminated by operation of Section 47 read with Section 6 (i) (h) of the said Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. In support of his contention under Section 6(i) (h) Mr. Ghosh relied on decisions reported in 1997 (2) CLJ 452 Paragraphs-13 to 27 (Bijoy Kr. Gupta & Ors v. State & Ors) and also 1997 (1) CLJ Paragraphs-5, 13, and 14 (Nirmalendu Chakrabarty & Ors v. State of West Bengal & Ors) which are quoted below :- "Para-5- On or about 12.2.1954 the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act came into force. The Sens were recorded as 'Dakhali Madhya Satwa' whereas the Corporation of Calcutta was recorded as intermediary/proprietor. In the sub-ordinate Khatians of Khatian No. 184 the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners were shown as Raiyats Sthitiban. The Sens preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree passed in the aforementioned Title Suit No. 70 of 1933 and in appeal the said Suit was compromised, in terms whereof a fresh lease was granted in their favour for a period of 20 years with an option to renew the lease. As against the recording of the names of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners as Raiyats Sthitiban, Corporation of Calcutta filed objection on 7.5.1958 purported to be under Section 44 (2a) of the said Act and the said objection was allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer. One of the tenants preferred an appeal against the said order before the Tribunal which was registered as E.A. Appeal No. 44 of 1953 and by a judgment dated 20th November, 1963 the said appeal was allowed directing that the Record of Rights could not have been corrected except upon initiation of a proceeding under Section 45A of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. Para-13-It was submitted that the interest of the petitioner having been eliminated, taking recourse to the provision of Section 47 of the said Act cannot be said to be illegal inasmuch as all the under tenanted khatians merged with Khatian No. 183 i.e. Khatian of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. Para-13-It was submitted that the interest of the petitioner having been eliminated, taking recourse to the provision of Section 47 of the said Act cannot be said to be illegal inasmuch as all the under tenanted khatians merged with Khatian No. 183 i.e. Khatian of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. It was further submitted that in the Mouza in question leases had been granted for setting up various projects including the construction of Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industries for setting up of a Craft Village and all such work will be held up unless the writ applications as presented are dismissed. Para-14-The West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, was enacted to provide for the Acquisition of estates and rights of this intermediaries therein and certain rights of raiyats and under raiyats and all the rights of certain other persons in lands comprised in estates. By reason of Section 4 of the said Act upon a notification made in that regard, all estates and rights of every intermediaries in each such estate situated in any district or part of a district specified in the notification was to vest in the State free from all incumbrances. Section 5 deals with the effect of notification Section 6 enjoins right upon the intermediary to retain certain lands situated therein with effect from the date of vesting Clause (h) of sub section (1) of Section 6 reads this:- "Rights of intermediary to retain certain lands. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 and 5 an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting....... (h) Where the intermediary is a local authority,-land held by such authority, notwithstanding such land or any part thereof may have been let out by such authority: Provided that where any land which has been let out by any local authority is retained by such authority under this clause, no person holding such land shall have any right of occupancy therein, and every such person shall be bound to deliver possession of the land to the local authority when required by it for its purposes." 31. Mr. Mr. Ghosh further contended that the Khatians of lessee and sub lessee mentioned in Schedule A had merged with Khatina No. 1773 of Mouza Kotrung J.L. No. 8 and opened Khatian No. 4775 of Mouza Konnagar J.L. No. 7 both of P.S-Uttarpara was opened in favour of the corporation under Government of West Bengal. 32. Mr. Ghosh further highlighted that simultaneously another proceeding under Section 50(f) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act was initiated wherein an order was passed on 10th August, 1998. 33. Mr. Ghosh further contended that from the order dated 10th August, 1998 passed in said case No. 1 of 1998 it was dictated that there were certain serious error in respect of the plot number as mentioned in the land schedule being part of the said order. It also appeared from the land schedule that the plots of land under Mouza -Konnagar, R.S Khatian No. 4775 are surprisingly missing. It further appeared that several plots of Mouza Kotrung have either been wrongly recorded or have been recorded in the name of some interested persons instead of Kolkata Corporation. Therefore Mr. Ghosh submitted that since the corporation is the owner of the said land therefore the petitioners have been rightly asked by the Chairperson of the Kotrung Municipality to stop the construction work and appear before the respondent Municipality. 34. Mr. Ghosh further contended that mutation of the property does not create any right or title over the property as has been claimed by the petitioners in the present case. In support of his contention Mr. Ghosh relied on an Hon'ble Apex Court decision reported in 1996 (6) SCC 223 (Sawarni (SMT) v. Inder Kaur (SMT) And Others). 35. In conclusion Mr. Ghosh submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 as nothing has been decided by the impugned letter which deserves interference by this Hon'ble Court. 36. Mr. Dipak Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the Uttarpara Kotrung Municipality adopting the submissions advanced by Mr. Ghosh learned Advocate appearing for the Kolkata Municipal Corporation submitted that the Chairperson of the concerned Municipality only issued the impugned letter dated 1st October, 2013 to appear before the said Municipality so that the Municipality on the basis of the KMC's claim can decide the matter after holding a hearing. 37. Mr. Ghosh learned Advocate appearing for the Kolkata Municipal Corporation submitted that the Chairperson of the concerned Municipality only issued the impugned letter dated 1st October, 2013 to appear before the said Municipality so that the Municipality on the basis of the KMC's claim can decide the matter after holding a hearing. 37. Mr. Dipak Mukherjee further contended that the present writ petition is pre-matured one since nothing has been decided by the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 which deserves interference of this Hon'ble Court. 38. Mr. Mukherjee before parting with his argument vehemently submitted that this writ petition should be dismissed as pre-matured one. Decisions with reasons 39. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned Advocates, perusing the records and also considering the decisions cited above by the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties I find that the petitioners predecessor's name has been recorded in the C.S record published by the authority on 9th December, 1936. Not only that in the R.S Record as well as BL and BLRO Records also the petitioners' predecessor's name has been appearing. Significantly in those records nowhere the name of the KMC has been appearing as the landlord of the said plots. 40. It is also not evident from the record that in the eviction suit filed before the learned Court below at Serampore, Hooghly the plot of the land claimed by the KMC was included. It is not out of place to mention here that the order dated 3rd August, 1998 by the BL and BLRO Serampore thereby recording the KMC's name was passed without giving a notice to the predecessor or superior landlord of the petitioners. On the contrary it is evident from the record that all along petitioners' predecessor's name had been recorded as the landlord/intermediaries. It is also evident from the C.S Record 1936, R.S Record 1956 and BLRO Record 1985-86 as well as the deed of conveyance that the petitioners purchased the said land from their predecessor and not from the KMC. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to mention that KMC went to the BLRO behind the back of the predecessor of the petitioners to get the record of right changed in its name. Court cannot shut its eyes on the fact that pursuant to the records of rights conversion of the said land was allowed by the concerned Kotrung Municipality. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to mention that KMC went to the BLRO behind the back of the predecessor of the petitioners to get the record of right changed in its name. Court cannot shut its eyes on the fact that pursuant to the records of rights conversion of the said land was allowed by the concerned Kotrung Municipality. Furthermore, plan was also sanctioned in favour of the petitioners by the said Kotrung Municipality. On the basis of such sanctioned plan already construction has been completed and all the flat owners have registered their flats by the competent authority. Furthermore, they are in possession and enjoyment of their respective flats. It is also evident not only the land has been mutated in favour of the petitioners, thereafter the respective flat owners paid the rent which was also accepted by the said Kotrung Municipality. It is also evident from record that in C.S Record published after 1926 there also the KMC's name has not been recorded against such plots of land. In my considered view even if it is accepted that the KMC's name has been recorded in the BLRO Record that record does not create any title in favour of the KMC. Title to the property is created only by deed of conveyance and not by recording of name in the BLRO Record. 41. In view of the narrations above, in my opinion the Municipality has no authority to direct the petitioners to stop work by issuing the impugned order dated 1st October, 2013 being dictated by the KMC. The Kotrung Municipality being a statutory body should act on the basis of the law laid down under the said West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 and not at the dictate of KMC. Curiously enough the power provided under Section 220 of the said Act to issue notice to stop unauthorised construction has not been exercised. The said Municipality has no other recognised in law to issue the impugned order. Court has no scope or occasion to disbelieve any registered instrument unless it is upset by any competent Court of law. 42. Therefore, in my opinion, the impugned notice dated 1st October, 2013 issued by the Chairperson cannot be sustained in the eye of law as well as the facts and circumstances of the case. 43. Accordingly the notice dated 1st October, 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside. 42. Therefore, in my opinion, the impugned notice dated 1st October, 2013 issued by the Chairperson cannot be sustained in the eye of law as well as the facts and circumstances of the case. 43. Accordingly the notice dated 1st October, 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent No. 1 and 2 are directed to forthwith allow the petitioners to recommence, continue and complete the work of construction at the said property in accordance with the sanction building plan. 44. Now I would deal with the decisions relied on by Mr. Ghosh. From Bijoy Kr. Gupta & Ors case (supra) it is evident neither the petitioners nor his predecessors were made party in the said suit. The case of Nirmalendu Chakrabarty & Ors (supra) has no manner of application as in the present case the petitioners rested their title upon of the deed of conveyance and also the occupational right over the property as it is recorded in favour of the predecessors as well as the petitioners also. Not only that conversion of the said land was also done by the said authority. Furthermore the petitioners' name have been mutated by the concerned Municipality and building plan was sanctioned in favour of the petitioners. The case of Sawarni (SMT) (supra) is also not applicable in the present case in hand as the record of right is not a document for title it is only the right of the possession. 45. In fine, in my considered view this writ petition stands allowed without any order as to costs. 46. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties after fulfilling all the formalities. Later, On 07.07.2017 After delivery of the judgment, Mr. Alok Kr. Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing for the Corporation prays for stay of operation of the impugned order. Such prayer is considered and rejected.