JUDGMENT : P.B. SURESH KUMAR, J. 1. Common issues arise for consideration in these writ petitions and as such, they are disposed of by this common judgment. The parties and documents are referred to in this judgment, unless otherwise mentioned, as they appear in W.P. (C) No. 6871/2017. 2. The petitioners are members of the second respondent, a Co-operative Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (the Act). They were members of the committee of the society also. On 10.02.2017, Ext.P4 notice was issued by the first respondent directing the second petitioner and three other members in the committee of the society to show cause why they shall not be disqualified from holding the office of the member of the committee. It is alleged in Ext.P4 notice that only those persons who are rearing one or more cattle are entitled to hold the office of the member of the committee of the society; that the second petitioner and three others referred to in Ext.P4 notice are not rearing cattle and that therefore they are not entitled to hold the office of the member of the committee. It is also stated in Ext.P4 notice that explanations, if any, shall be furnished by the second petitioner and others within ten days and that if they want an opportunity of hearing, they shall appear before the first respondent on 25.02.2017. According to the second petitioner, though Ext.P4 notice is dated 10.02.2017, the same was dispatched to the second petitioner and others only on 15.02.2017. It is also his case that intimation regarding Ext.P4 notice was received by him from the post office concerned, only on 16.02.2017 and he received the same accordingly, on 17.02.2017. According to the second petitioner, the first respondent, in the circumstances, ought not have passed further orders on Ext.P4 notice, at any rate, before 16.02.2017. It is stated that orders have been passed on Ext.P4 notice contrary to the terms of the notice on 25.02.2017 itself, disqualifying the second petitioner and others from holding the office of the member of the committee of the society. It is stated that orders have been passed on Ext.P4 notice contrary to the terms of the notice on 25.02.2017 itself, disqualifying the second petitioner and others from holding the office of the member of the committee of the society. It is the case of the petitioners that in the light of the order passed on Ext.P4 notice, the committee of the society was removed as per Ext.P6 order under Section 33 of the Act on the ground that the remaining members of the committee do not constitute the quorum for the meeting of the committee. Ext.P6 order is under challenge in W.P. (C) No. 6871 of 2017. 3. W.P. (C) No. 9381/2017 was instituted later by the second petitioner challenging the order passed by the first respondent on Ext.P4 notice. The said order is Ext.P7 in the said writ petition. 4. W.P. (C) No. 8392/2017 is filed by the society, in the meanwhile, alleging that a resolution has been adopted by the committee in office on 25.02.2017 requesting the State Co-operative Election Commission to conduct election for a new committee as its term would expire on 16.05.2017 and that the said resolution is not being acted upon by the Election Commission. The society therefore seeks in the said writ petition appropriate directions to the Election Commission for conduct of election to form a new Committee in the society. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Advocate General for the official respondents. 6. It is not disputed that if Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381 of 2017 is found to be in order, Ext.P6 order would satisfy the requirement of Section 33 of the Act. As such, the learned counsel for the petitioners was asked to address his arguments in that case. 7. 6. It is not disputed that if Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381 of 2017 is found to be in order, Ext.P6 order would satisfy the requirement of Section 33 of the Act. As such, the learned counsel for the petitioners was asked to address his arguments in that case. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on the endorsements on Ext.P5 envelope in which the second petitioner and others have received Ext.P4 notice, contended that Ext.P4 notice has been sent to the second petitioner and others only on 15.02.2017; that they have received the intimation regarding the same only on 16.02.2017; that in the light of the specific provision contained in Ext.P4 notice that they have 10 days time for preferring their objections, orders ought not have been passed before 26.02.2017 and that Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381 of 2017 being one passed on 25.02.2017, the same is unsustainable in law. On merits, the learned counsel contended that the second petitioner is rearing a cow and Ext.R1(b) order which is relied on to disqualify him does not indicate that he is not rearing a cow. According to the learned counsel, the second petitioner pointed out to the Diary Extension Officer, when he inspected his house, that since he is constructing a new cattle shed, the cow is being kept in the house of one of his relatives. It is contended by the learned counsel that in the circumstances, the second petitioner had handed over to the officer the insurance policy in respect of the cow. According to the learned counsel, had the Diary Extension Officer insisted the second petitioner to show the cow, he would have certainly shown the cow to him. 8. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General pointed out that in the light of the specific provision contained in Ext.P4 notice that they will have to appear before the first respondent on 25.02.2017, if the second petitioner and others wanted an opportunity of hearing on Ext.P4 notice, the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that the order on Ext.P4 notice cannot be passed on 25.02.2017 merely for the reason that they have not been granted ten days time for preferring their objections. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, at any rate, since the second petitioner and others have appeared before the first respondent on 25.02.2017, it cannot be said that the order passed on Ext.P4 notice is contrary to the principles of natural justice. On the merits, the learned Additional Advocate General has brought to the notice of this Court, a complaint preferred by the first petitioner himself to the effect that the second petitioner is not rearing any cattle. It is also brought to the notice of this Court by the learned Additional Advocate General that the policy which the second petitioner has handed over to the Diary Extension Officer at the time of his visit was a policy which expired on 12.03.2016. 9. As noticed above, Ext.P4 show cause notice specifically and clearly states that if the second petitioner and others want an opportunity of hearing on Ext.P4 notice, they shall appear before the first respondent on 25.02.2017. Admittedly, the second petitioner and others received Ext.P4 notice before 25.02.2017. The fact that they have appeared before the first respondent on 25.02.2017 is not in dispute. The learned counsel for the second petitioner contended that the second petitioner and others have only sought time on 25.02.2017 in the light of the specific provision in Ext.P4 notice that they are entitled to ten days time for preferring objections and that they have not raised their objections on the said day. The recitals in Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381 of 2017 do not indicate that what is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners is correct. Be that as if may, what is to be examined in a proceedings of this nature is the issue whether orders have been passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice. The petitioners having received Ext.P4 notice well in advance and having appeared before the first respondent on 25.02.2017, they cannot be heard to contend that the proceedings are vitiated for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. 10. Coming to the merits of the matter, Ext.R1(b) report of the Diary Extension Officer is relied on in Ext.P4 notice as also in Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381/2017. The relevant portion concerning the second petitioner reads thus: The Diary Extension Officer has not found any cattle in the house of the second petitioner at the time of his inspection. The relevant portion concerning the second petitioner reads thus: The Diary Extension Officer has not found any cattle in the house of the second petitioner at the time of his inspection. Had the second petitioner been rearing a cow at the relevant time, he could have taken the Diary Extension Officer to the house of his relative and shown the cow to him. He did not adopt the said course. Further, as pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General, Ext.R1 (d) cattle insurance policy was one expired long before the date of inspection. No inference whatsoever can be drawn from such a policy. Above all, Ext.R1(a) is the complaint preferred by none other than the first petitioner herself. In the said complaint, the first petitioner herself states that the second petitioner is not rearing a cow. In the circumstances, I do not find any reason to interfere with Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381 of 2017 and W.P. (C) No. 9381 of 2017, in the circumstances, is dismissed. As noted above, since it is found that Ext.P7 order in W.P. (C) No. 9381/2017 is sustainable, W.P. (C) No. 6871/2017 is also to be dismissed and I do so. 11. The learned counsel for the members of the Administrative Committee in office of the society pointed out that the minutes books and other records of the society have not been handed over by the petitioners yet to the Administrative Committee. In the circumstances, there will be a direction to the Secretary of the Society to hand over the records of the society to the Administrative Committee forthwith. 12. Coming to W.P. (C) No. 8392 of 2017, the case of the society is that a resolution has been adopted by the society on 25.02.2017 requesting the State Co-operative Election Commission to take steps for conduct of election to form a new committee for the Society and that the State Co- operative Election Commission is not acting upon the said resolution. According to the official respondents, since the committee was replaced on 25.02.2017, it had no authority to pass the resolution relied on by the society. Be that as if may, in so far as the elected committee has been replaced, it is obligatory for the official respondents to take steps to form a new elected committee in its place. According to the official respondents, since the committee was replaced on 25.02.2017, it had no authority to pass the resolution relied on by the society. Be that as if may, in so far as the elected committee has been replaced, it is obligatory for the official respondents to take steps to form a new elected committee in its place. In the said view of the matter, I deem it appropriate to dispose of the said writ petition directing the Administrative Committee in office in the society to take a resolution within a week from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment requesting the State Co-operative Election Commission to conduct election in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules. Needless to say that the State Co-operative Election Commission shall conduct the election to form a new committee at the earliest, at any rate, within sixty days from the date of resolution.