ORDER : B.A. Patil, J. 1. This petition is filed by the State assailing the order dated 13.1.2015 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bidar in Crl. R.P. No. 52/2014. 2. Brief facts leading to the case are that evidence of P.W. 6 was recorded on 11.11.2010 by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC-II Court, Bidar in Criminal Case No. 340/2009, wherein she has deposed supporting the case of the prosecution and thereafter the case was adjourned. During the course of cross-examination, she has denied the suggestions made by defence counsel. Later, when she was recalled for further examination on 8.6.2011 she took 'U' turn and admitted the suggestions made by the defence counsel reversing the evidence which has been given on 11.11.2010. In this behalf, the Court below took the cognizance for having given the false evidence before the Court and criminal proceedings were initiated against her in C.C. No. 578/2014. Thereafter, respondent filed an application under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. for discharge and the same came to be rejected on 8.9.2014. Being aggrieved by such order, respondent herein filed a revision petition before the District Court, Bidar. The learned District and Sessions Judge, Bidar, by the impugned order, allowed the petition by discharging the accused-respondent herein. 3. I have heard the learned HCGP for the petitioner-State and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused. 4. It is contended by the learned HCGP that the respondent-accused has taken 'U' turn fully to the evidence which has been deposed by her in her examination-in-chief when she has been cross-examined. He has further contended that witness turning hostile is a major disturbing factor faced by the Criminal Courts because of various reasons especially in high profile cases. If same is allowed, the people will carry the impression that mighty and power can always get away from the clutches of law, thereby eroding the people's faith in the system. He has also contended that prima facie offence under Section 193 of IPC has been made out by the prosecution. He has further contended that there are no faults and procedural mistakes while filing the complaint to take action against P.W. 6-respondent herein. The Court below ought not to have allowed the petition and discharged the respondent-accused. 5. He has also contended that prima facie offence under Section 193 of IPC has been made out by the prosecution. He has further contended that there are no faults and procedural mistakes while filing the complaint to take action against P.W. 6-respondent herein. The Court below ought not to have allowed the petition and discharged the respondent-accused. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-accused has vehemently argued and contended that the testimony given by P.W. 6 nowhere discloses her intention to give false evidence. It is also contended that the judgment of the learned Magistrate does not make any observation with regard to eradication of evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interest of justice it was expedient that P.W. 6 be prosecuted. In the absence of such material, no proceedings can be continued under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. Keeping in view the said aspect the Court below has allowed the petition. The impugned order is just and proper and as such the same is liable to be confirmed. On these grounds, he prays for dismissal of the petition. 6. Before discussing the points in issue, I feel it just and necessary to quote Section 340 of Cr.P.C. and Section 193 of IPC, which read thus:- "Section 340 of Cr.P.C.-Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195-(1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before such magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf (4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section 195." "Section 193 of IPC: Punishment for false evidence.-Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine, and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine." 7. As per Section 340 of Cr.P.C., the Court can act either on the application or by suo moto to take action against perjury, but before taking such action, the Court is required to consider and hold a preliminary enquiry and thereafter to order for taking the cognizance. By close reading of the said provisions of law, it enlightens that the Court cannot straight away proceed to issue either summons or notice to take action against the person who has given a false evidence before the Court. In that light, if I peruse the records of the trial Court, no where it reveals that before proceeding, the Court has held an enquiry and recorded the finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice to take action against the said person. In the absence of such finding by the Court below, the Court cannot proceed against the said witness either under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. or Section 193 of IPC. In the absence of such finding by the Court below, the Court cannot proceed against the said witness either under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. or Section 193 of IPC. When prosecution cannot be launched as a matter of routine in a mechanical way without following the procedure laid down under the aforesaid Sections, then under such circumstances, the proceedings initiated against the said witness is not justifiable. Leave apart this, if we peruse the judgment in C.C. No. 340/2009, the learned Judge has referred to the evidence of P.W. 6 and in paragraphs-24 and 25 he has observed that she has given a false evidence. He has also observed that as per Section 340 of Cr.P.C. the Court is vested with the responsibility to direct initiation of the proceedings against a person who has given a false evidence before the Court on oath. He has further observed that P.W. 6 after having taken oath has given a false evidence in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of it being used to help the accused. But nowhere it has been observed that she has intentionally given a false evidence and it is expedient in the interest of justice that the said witness has to be prosecuted. In that light, the complaint which has been filed also does not satisfy the procedure to be followed by the Court before initiation of action under the aforesaid provisions of law. 8. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, if I peruse the impugned order, the learned District Judge on considering the abovesaid aspect has rightly allowed the revision petition by setting aside the impugned order of the First Additional JMFC, Bidar, dated 8.9.2014 and discharging the accused. Petitioner has not made out any substantial ground so as to interfere with the order of the trial Court and the same needs to be confirmed. Hence, petition fails and accordingly the same stands dismissed.