ORDER : 1. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the writ petitioners in this batch of writ petitions called in question the order dated 16-6-2016 (Annexure P-1) by which the respective petitioners have been dismissed from service finding that their appointment is illegal and irregular and which has been challenged as unsustainable and contrary to law. 2. Essential facts necessary to decide the legality and otherwise of the impugned order states as under:- (2.1) The Chief Medical and Health Officer, Raipur on 13-6-2012 issued an advertisement inviting applications for appointment on various posts for three districts namely, Raipur, Baloda Bazaar and Gariyaband, out of which we are concerned with only District Baloda Bazaar where the advertisement was issued for the posts of AG-3, Driver, Male Health Worker, Female Health Worker, Pharmacist Grade-II, Class-IV Employees, Ward Boy, Aaya, Ward Boy/Aaya, Washer-man, Chowkidar, Peon/Ward Boy and Sweeper, total 143 posts. Pursuant to the said advertisement, applications were received and a District Selection Committee was constituted to recommend the names of selected candidates for appointment in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Public Health and Family Welfare Department Non-Ministerial (related to the Directorate of Health Services) Class-III Service Recruitment Rules, 1989 (for short, 'the Rules of 1989'), but the District Selection Committee selected and appointed 272 candidates against 143 sanctioned and advertised posts. Thereafter, a complaint was made to the Collector, Baloda Bazaar as well as to Hon'ble the Chief Minister of the State that the entire appointment is illegal and unadvertised posts have been filed and further posts have been added after the date of advertisement and even for unadvertised posts appointments have been made and, therefore, the entire appointment deserves to be set aside. (2.2) Preliminary enquiry was conducted by the In-charge Divisional Programme Officer and report was submitted to the Divisional Joint Director, Health Services and thereafter, on 9-10-2015 by letter No.291, the Director, Heath Services issued a direction to the Collector, Baloda Bazaar to set aside the illegal appointments and the Director by letter No.293 dated 9-10-2015 further directed the CMHO, Baloda Bazaar to set aside the illegal appointments against which W.P.(S) No.3879/2015 was filed before this Court. However, the said letter dated 9-10-2015 was withdrawn by the Director, Health Services by letter dated 17-11-2015. However, the said letter dated 9-10-2015 was withdrawn by the Director, Health Services by letter dated 17-11-2015. Pursuant to the letter No.291 dated 9-10-2015, the Collector constituted a committee consisting of Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Baloda Bazaar; Joint Collector, Baloda Bazaar; and District Treasury Officer, Baloda Bazaar for enquiring the matter. The said committee submitted its report on 29-2-2016 holding that against the advertised posts of 143 for 13 categories, 272 posts have been filled up for 18 categories. Thereafter, show cause notice was issued by the CMHO, Baloda Bazaar to all the respective petitioners on 21-12-2015 which was replied by the respective petitioners on 5-1-2016 and considering the reply, on 16-6-2016, the order of dismissal from service has been passed. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the CHMO, this batch of writ petitions have been filed. 3. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, leading the arguments on behalf of the petitioners would submit as under:- (3.1) The petitioners were appointed on the respective posts after following the due procedure of law. Not only this, the petitioners' services were later-on regularised and, therefore, once they are appointed in accordance with the rules, they cannot be terminated without affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and without conducting departmental enquiry as per applicable rules and as such, the order of dismissal from service without affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and without departmental enquiry is unsustainable and bad in law. (3.2) The impugned order passed by the CMHO only on the basis of direction issued by the Collector, who is neither disciplinary authority nor appointing authority of the petitioners, is unsustainable and bad in law. The impugned order has been passed by the CMHO at the direction and dictation of the superior authority. (3.3) No reasons have been assigned in the order passed by the CMHO and without applying its mind while dismissing the services of the petitioners the CMHO has terminated the services of the petitioners that too on the mere direction and dictation of the Collector, Baloda Bazaar. (3.4) The alleged show cause notices issued to the petitioners were a mere eyewash to complete the formality, as on the basis of enquiry report conducted beyond the back of the petitioners, decision to dismiss the petitioners from service had already been taken. (3.4) The alleged show cause notices issued to the petitioners were a mere eyewash to complete the formality, as on the basis of enquiry report conducted beyond the back of the petitioners, decision to dismiss the petitioners from service had already been taken. Therefore, no real opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioners, as such, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 4. Mr. Neelkanth Malaviya, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, would submit that the show cause notice issued to the petitioners was not in accordance with the rules, as the petitioners have acquired the status of regular employee, therefore, regular departmental enquiry ought to have been instituted against them and only after completion of departmental enquiry, the petitioners could have been dismissed from service and major penalty could have been imposed. Neither opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioners nor regular departmental enquiry was conducted against them and at the belated stage, after forming an opinion, the show cause notice has been given to the petitioners. He relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of K.I. Shephard and others v. Union of India and others, (1987) 4 SCC 431 and H.L. Trehan and others v. Union of India and others, (1989) 1 SCC 764 . 5. Mr. Sandeep Dubey, learned counsel for the respective petitioners, would submit that the show cause notice was not specific and on the basis of reply, no order was passed and those persons who are not named in the selection list by the District Selection Committee are still working. Learned counsel filed application along with documents obtained under the Right to Information Act, 2005 which would go to show that they were not appointed in accordance with law, yet they are working on the same posts. Therefore, the petitioners are working on the authority of law and those candidates who are not named in the select list are working without having been selected in accordance with law and rules. Thus, this will be a case of pick and choose and as such the writ petitions deserve to be allowed. 6. Mr. Therefore, the petitioners are working on the authority of law and those candidates who are not named in the select list are working without having been selected in accordance with law and rules. Thus, this will be a case of pick and choose and as such the writ petitions deserve to be allowed. 6. Mr. Raghavendra Pradhan, learned counsel for the respective petitioners, would submit that the petitioners having been appointed on the vacant posts can be dismissed only by following the rules applicable (the Rules of 1989) and due to dismissal from service, they are disqualified for future employment. He would further submit that the order impugned has been passed on the dictate of the Director, Health Services without following the procedure of law and therefore it is liable to be set aside. 7. Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, Mr. Anil Singh Rajput and Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, would reiterate the submissions what has been argued herein-above by Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel, which has been noted herein-above. 8. Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State/respondents, would submit that only 143 posts of 13 categories were notified by the advertisement whereas, the CMHO appointed 272 candidates and after due enquiry, 121 candidates have been dismissed from service. It is a case where the allegations of mass irregularity have been levelled and established and huge number of ineligible candidates were selected and appointed thereafter. He would further submit that the principles of natural justice have been complied with and the petitioners were given show cause notice and they have submitted reply and thereafter, they have been dismissed from service upon due application of mind. The petitioners were appointed in accordance with the rules applicable in case of Class-III employees i.e. the Chhattisgarh Public Health and Family Welfare Department Non-Ministerial (related to the Directorate of Health Services) Class-III Service Recruitment Rules, 1989. He would also submit that the aforesaid Rules of 1989 would apply in case of Class-III employees, whereas for Class-IV employees separate rules of 1989 would apply. He would also submit that the aforesaid Rules of 1989 would apply in case of Class-III employees, whereas for Class-IV employees separate rules of 1989 would apply. The petitioners having been appointed in excess of advertised posts cannot be said to be appointed in accordance with the rules and their names were not included in the list recommended by the District Selection Committee, they were added beyond the back by the CMHO, therefore, their appointment has rightly been recalled by the appointing authority CMHO and as such, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also gone through the material available on record with great care and caution. 10. The question for consideration is whether the appointing authority is justified in setting aside/revoking the appointment of 121 employees out of which these petitioners have filed these writ petitions in batch. 11. Advertisement for recruitment on the posts of Assistant Grade-3, Driver, Male Health Worker, Female Health Worker, Pharmacist Grade-II, Class-IV Employees, Ward Boy, Aaya, Ward Boy/Aaya, Washer-man, Chowkidar, Peon/Ward Boy and Sweeper for District Baloda Bazaar was advertised on 13-6-2012. Details of the posts advertised, total 143, are as under:- ftyk cykSsnkcktkj] NŒxŒ vkjf{kr vkfj{kr dz inuke dqy fjDr in la[;k vukjf{kr vtk- vttk vfio ;ksx 1- lgk;d xzsM&3 26 13 4 6 3 26 2- Okkgu pkyd 5 2 1 1 1 5 3- iq:"k LokLFk; dk;ZdrkZ 40 21 6 8 5 40 4- Ekfgyk LokLF; dk;ZdrkZ 30 15 5 6 4 30 5- QkeZflLV xzsM&2 7 3 1 2 1 7 6- PkrqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh 2 1 0 1 0 2 7- CkkMZ C;k; 2 1 0 1 0 2 8- vk;k 11 5 2 3 1 11 9- OkkMZ C;k;@vk;k 3 2 0 1 0 3 10- /kksch 4 2 1 1 0 4 11- PkSkdhnkj 4 2 1 1 0 4 12- Hk`R;@okMZ C;k; 4 2 1 1 0 4 13- Lohij 5 2 1 1 1 5 12. It is not in dispute that appointment for the said posts is governed by the Chhattisgarh Public Health and Family Welfare Department Non-Ministerial (related to the Directorate of Health Services) Class-III Service Recruitment Rules, 1989. In the said Rules, methods of recruitment is provided in Rule 6. It is not in dispute that appointment for the said posts is governed by the Chhattisgarh Public Health and Family Welfare Department Non-Ministerial (related to the Directorate of Health Services) Class-III Service Recruitment Rules, 1989. In the said Rules, methods of recruitment is provided in Rule 6. Rule 3 provides that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961, these rules shall apply to every member of the service. Direct recruitment by selection is one of the methods of recruitment. Rule 7 states that all appointments to the vacancies arising in any category or post in the service after the commencement of these rules shall be made by the appointing authority and no such appointments shall be made except after selection by one of the methods of recruitment specified in rule 6. Conditions of eligibility of direct recruits is prescribed in Rule 8. Under Rule 10, the committee's decision about the eligibility of candidates has been made final. Under Rule 11, selection for recruitment to the service has to be held at such intervals as the appointing authority may determine from time to time. Rule 12 provides that the committee shall forward to the appointing authority a list arranged in order of merit of the candidates who may have qualified by such standards as may be determined by the committee. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 12 provides that subject to the provisions of these rules and the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961, candidates shall be considered for appointment to the available vacancies from the list in the order in which their names appear in the list. Rule 16 provides for select list and states that the appointing authority shall consider the list prepared by the Committee and unless it considers any change necessary approved the list. Rule 17 provides for appointment in the service form the select list and states that appointments of the persons included in the list of the posts borne on the cadre of the service shall follow the order in which the names of such persons appear in the select list. Rule 17 provides for appointment in the service form the select list and states that appointments of the persons included in the list of the posts borne on the cadre of the service shall follow the order in which the names of such persons appear in the select list. Rule 20 provides for relaxation and states that nothing contained in these rules shall be construed as to limit or abridge the powers of the Governor to deal with the case of any person to whom these rules apply, in such a manner as may appear to him to be just and equitable. 13. As stated above, in accordance with the Rules, 143 posts were advertised and after due process, selection process was completed on 8-3-2013 and the committee finalised and recommended the names of selected candidates (in Baloda Bazaar to which we are concerned) under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1989. Appointments were required to be made only of 143 advertised posts. 14. It is the case of the State Government that the Collector, Baloda Bazaar received series of complaints in writing alleging that in the selection process of 2014-15, mass illegalities and irregularities have been committed by the appointing authority while appointing and appointment has been made over and above the advertisement which was issued for various posts. Persons whose names were not included in the select list have been appointed and even appointments were made for the posts which have not been advertised. The matter was got enquired by the Joint Director, Health Services, Raipur and he submitted report before the Director, Health Services and irregularities in the selection process were found. After preliminary enquiry by the Joint Director, Health Services, the Joint Director submitted report to the Director, Health Services who in turn, directed the Collector, Baloda Bazaar to initiate enquiry and conclude the same and upon enquiry, it revealed that though pursuant to the advertisement dated 13-6-2012, 143 posts were advertised, but the then CMHO not only filled 143 posts but filled 272 posts and appointed 129 persons without any authority of law. Thereafter, on 9-10-2015, the Director, Health Services directed the CMHO, Baloda Bazaar to cancel all the appointments made in pursuance to the advertisement dated 13-6-2012. Thereafter, on 9-10-2015, the Director, Health Services directed the CMHO, Baloda Bazaar to cancel all the appointments made in pursuance to the advertisement dated 13-6-2012. In the meanwhile, on 27-10-2015, the Collector, appointed three-members committee of Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Baloda Bazaar; Joint Collector, Baloda Bazaar; and District Treasury Officer, Baloda Bazaar to examine the matter and submit report. Subsequently, on 17-11-2015, the Director, Health Services, passed order cancelling the order dated 9-10-2015 whereby he ordered to cancel all illegal appointments, which was lateron withdrawn, as it was passed without giving opportunity of hearing as the writ petitions were filed before this Court. After receipt of the copy of enquiry, the CMHO issued show cause notices to all the candidates, the petitioners herein, to submit their reply and the candidates submitted reply before the enquiry committee in due time and after considering the submissions made by the petitioners in writing, the CMHO on 21-12-2015 issued notices to the petitioners and sought their reply which was submitted by the petitioners on 5-1-2016 and thereafter, the impugned order dated 16-6-2016 was passed. In the enquiry by the enquiry committee, it was found that in each of the grades, the CMHO had appointed 16 more candidates of Pharmacist Grade-II, Class-IV – 11, Ward Boy – 22, Aaya – 10, Chowkidar – 4, Peon / Ward Boy – 13, Sweeper – 10, Female Health Worker – 2, Male Health Worker – 9 and Driver – 4, total 101 posts, and further found that 20 posts being that of Dresser Grade-II – 7, OT Attendant – 6, Mens Servant – 2, Cook – 3, Dark Room Assistant – 1 and Lab Assistant – 1, total 20 candidates in addition to the advertised posts were appointed for which neither the District Level Committee has made recommendations nor any advertisement was issued by public notification. Thus, total 121 posts were filled-up by making appointment in which neither the District Level Committee has made recommendations as per the Rules of 1989 nor any advertisement was issued, as such they were over and above the advertised posts. 15. The question would be whether the CMHO is justified in including the additional posts for recruitment over and above the number of vacancies advertised / notified and making the appointment on those posts after the selection process is over. 16. 15. The question would be whether the CMHO is justified in including the additional posts for recruitment over and above the number of vacancies advertised / notified and making the appointment on those posts after the selection process is over. 16. It is well settled law that any appointment in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void. It would be a nullity. (See Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 ). 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667 has held that there was no power in the State under Article 162 of the Constitution to make appointments and even if there was any such power, no appointment could be made in contravention of statutory rules. 18. In the matter of Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela, (2006) 2 SCC 482 the Supreme Court has held that a regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 19. It is quite apparent that 101 posts over and above the advertised posts were filled by making illegal appointment for which there was no recommendation by the District Selection Committee under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1989 and for 20 posts, even no advertisement was issued by the CMHO for filling-up of those posts. 20. Law in this regard is very much well settled. It has been held that filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be violative of the fundamental rights granted under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (See Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 84 Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineer Assn. v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. (See Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 84 Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineer Assn. v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union, 1986, (1994) 1 SCC 126 Prem Singh v. Haryana SEB, (1996) 4 SCC 319 Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 8 SCC 488 and Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta, (1998) 3 SCC 45 .) 21. In the matter of Rakhi Ray and others v. High Court of Delhi and others, (2010) 2 SCC 637 Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the earlier decisions on the point and clearly held that appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction, being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, thus, a nullity, inexecutable and unenforceable in law and held in paragraph 12 as under:- “12. In view of above, the law can be summarised to the effect that any appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction, being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, thus, a nullity, in-executable and unenforceable in law. In case the vacancies notified stand filled up, the process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list, etc. cannot be used as a reservoir, to fill up the vacancy which comes into existence after the issuance of notification/advertisement. The unexhausted select list/waiting list becomes meaningless and cannot be pressed in service any more.” 22. The law laid-down in Rakhi Ray (supra) has been followed with approval by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. K. Lakshmi v. State of Kerala, (2012) 3 SCR 581. The aforesaid decision has been followed and it has been held that appointment to an additional post would deprive candidates who were not eligible for appointment to the post on the last date of submission of the applications mentioned in the advertisement and who became eligible for appointment thereafter or the opportunity of being considered for such appointment. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the report state as under:- “15. The legal position regarding the power of the Government to fill up vacancies that are not notified is settled by several decisions of this Court. Mr. Rao relied upon some of those decisions to which we shall briefly refer. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the report state as under:- “15. The legal position regarding the power of the Government to fill up vacancies that are not notified is settled by several decisions of this Court. Mr. Rao relied upon some of those decisions to which we shall briefly refer. In Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 2 SCC 637 , this Court declared that the vacancies could not be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies would amount to denial of equal opportunity to eligible candidates violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. This Court observed: "It is settled law that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India." 16. In Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 377 also this Court held that appointment to an additional post would deprive candidates who were not eligible for appointment to the post on the last date of submission of the applications mentioned in the advertisement and who became eligible for appointment thereafter or the opportunity of being considered for such appointment. This Court observed: "The appointment on the additional posts on the basis of such selection and recommendation would deprive candidates who were not eligible for appointment to the posts on the last date for submission of applications mentioned in the advertisement and who became eligible for appointment thereafter, of the opportunity of being considered for appointment on the additional posts." 17. In State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 this Court held that the Government had no constraint to make appointments either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence. In State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 this Court held that the Government had no constraint to make appointments either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence. So, also this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 UPSC v. Gaurav Dwivedi, (1999) 5 SCC 180 All India SC & ST Employees' Association v. A. Arthur Jeen, (2001) 6 SCC 380 and Food Corporation of India v. Bhanu Lodh, (2005) 3 SCC 618 held that mere inclusion of a name in the select list for appointment does not create a right to appointment even against existing vacancies and the State has no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. 18. In the light of the above pronouncements the power vested in the Government under Rule 39 (supra) could not have been invoked for filling up the vacancies which had not been advertised and which had occurred after the issue of the initial advertisement much less could that be done for purposes of protecting the service of someone who had found a place in the merit list on account of additional marks given to him and who was bound to lose that place by reasons of the judgment of the Court. 19. The upshot of the above discussion is that the number of vacancies notified for recruitment remained limited to six and did not get increased to ten as the condition precedent for such increase had failed not only because no decision was taken by the Government to invoke its power under Rule 39 but also because even if a decision had been taken the same would have had no effect in the face of the judgment in Jayachandran's case. Besides the power vested in the Government was not exercisable so as to utilise subsequent vacancies for the purpose of saving someone who had no legitimate right to continue even after being removed from the merit list.” 23. Very recently, in the matter of State of Orissa v. Sasmita Pattnaik, AIR 2017 SC 1418 the Supreme Court has held that filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be violative of the fundamental rights granted under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Very recently, in the matter of State of Orissa v. Sasmita Pattnaik, AIR 2017 SC 1418 the Supreme Court has held that filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be violative of the fundamental rights granted under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 14 and 17 as under:- “14. In the circumstances, in the absence of any statutory authority or justification either for Respondent No.2 or the appellant herein to create a Select List far in excess of the number of vacancies advertised, such a Select List, in our opinion, is unsustainable as it is contrary to the stipulation in Rule 9 that “The list so prepared by the Commission shall be equal to the number of vacancies notified.” Any claim based on such a legally untenable Select List by anyone of the members included therein seeking appointment to any post beyond the notified number of posts is absolutely untenable in law. 17. Apart from the logical inconsistency of the first stipulation i.e. there cannot be any more successful candidates remaining in the list once the list of successful candidates has been exhausted, the prescription of the rule that vacancies occurring after the recruitment process could be filled up by the candidates who applied (and participated in the recruitment process) for the posts existing on the date of the notification is clearly unconstitutional. (See State of U.P. and others v. Rajkumar Sharma and others, (2006) 3 SCC 330 paragraph 13.)” 24. Thus, the appointment of 101 candidates including the petitioners herein who were appointed over and above the number of vacancies advertised is clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and further 20 candidates / petitioners who were appointed even without issuance of advertisement is also clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, such an appointment of the petitioners can appropriately be called as “illegal appointment” contrary to and in violation of the Rules of 1989 and would be void and illegal. 25. In this regard, a decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2006) 11 SCC 356 is quite relevant as well as pertinent. 25. In this regard, a decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and others v. State of Punjab and others, (2006) 11 SCC 356 is quite relevant as well as pertinent. The Supreme Court has held that appointment made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would be void and it would be a nullity. The Supreme Court observed that if the finding is arrived that selection process was tainted and illegality was committed while making selection, such an appointment would be illegal. Paragraphs 41 and 42 of the report read as follows:- “41. If the services of the appointees who had put in few years of service were terminated, compliance with three principles at the hands of the State was imperative viz. (1) to establish satisfaction in regard to the sufficiency of the materials collected so as to enable the State to arrive at its satisfaction that the selection process was tainted; (2) to determine the question that the illegalities committed go to the root of the matter which vitiate the entire selection process. Such satisfaction as also the sufficiency of materials were required to be gathered by reason of a thorough investigation in a fair and transparent manner; (3) whether the sufficient material present enabled the State to arrive at a satisfaction that the officers in majority have been found to be part of the fraudulent purpose or the system itself was corrupt. 42. Once such findings were arrived at, all appointments traceable to the officers concerned could be cancelled. But admittedly, although there had been serious imputations against Shri Sidhu being at the helm of the affairs of the Commission, all decisions made by the Commission during his tenure are yet to be set aside. We do not intend to enter into the said controversy as we were informed at the Bar that the High Court itself is in seisin of the matter. We may, however, note that Mr. Dwivedi in his usual frankness stated that there may not be any answer to that query.” 26. We do not intend to enter into the said controversy as we were informed at the Bar that the High Court itself is in seisin of the matter. We may, however, note that Mr. Dwivedi in his usual frankness stated that there may not be any answer to that query.” 26. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rakesh Kumar Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others, (2013) 11 SCC 58 has clearly held that the court has no obligation to protect an illegal appointment, extraordinary power should be used to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. Paragraph 23 of the report reads as under:- “23. There is no obligation on the court to protect an illegal appointment. Extraordinary power of the court should be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. Usurpation of a post by an ineligible candidate in any circumstance is impermissible. The process of verification and notice of termination in the instant case followed within a very short proximity of the appointment and was not delayed at all so as to even remotely give rise to an expectancy of continuance.” 27. Likewise, in the matter of Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic) and others, (2006) 7 SCC 558 the Supreme Court held as under: - “10. Admittedly, the enquiry was also initiated against the appellant when he was on probation. It is well-settled principle of law that if the probationer is dismissed/terminated during the period of probation no opportunity is required to be given and, therefore, the question of violation of principle of natural justice does not arise in the given facts of this case.” 28. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. O. Chakradhar, (2002) 3 SCC 146 has held that where the allegations of illegalities and irregularities or corruption or discrimination or nepotism in conducting a selection is alleged, in appropriate case, the employer may not be required to adhere to the principles of natural justice. 29. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. O. Chakradhar, (2002) 3 SCC 146 has held that where the allegations of illegalities and irregularities or corruption or discrimination or nepotism in conducting a selection is alleged, in appropriate case, the employer may not be required to adhere to the principles of natural justice. 29. Reverting back to the facts of the case, it is quite apparent that in the instant case, the CMHO has issued notices to the petitioners and the petitioners have filed detailed reply and after consideration of detailed reply, the impugned order revoking their appointment has been passed. It is not the case where the principles of natural justice have not been observed, but it is true that no charge-sheet has been issued which was not required, as the petitioners were not appointed in accordance with the rules because for 101 posts they were appointed over and above the advertised posts and as far as 20 other petitioners/candidates are concerned, the posts on which they were appointed were not advertised. Once it is found that it is a case of illegal appointment and they were not the legally appointed persons, regular departmental enquiry was not required to be instituted and conducted for revoking the appointment of those candidates/petitioners herein. 30. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that some persons appointed so are still working, therefore, the petitioners are also entitled to continue. It is well-settled law that no writ can be issued to perpetuate the illegality. 31. In the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioners' appointment was clearly illegal for two reasons, (1) 101 posts filled-up are over and above the advertised posts; and (2) 20 candidates were filled-up on the posts, without even issuance of any advertisement inviting applications, which was clearly in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Supreme Court in Umadevi (3)'s case (supra) and as such, such appointment is not only void, but it is a nullity. Therefore, the learned CMHO is absolutely justified in revoking their appointment after affording opportunity of hearing. However, the CMHO while revoking their appointment should not have directed to dismiss their services, rather he could have revoked their order of appointment. Therefore, the order impugned dismissing the services of the petitioners is hereby modified. Therefore, the learned CMHO is absolutely justified in revoking their appointment after affording opportunity of hearing. However, the CMHO while revoking their appointment should not have directed to dismiss their services, rather he could have revoked their order of appointment. Therefore, the order impugned dismissing the services of the petitioners is hereby modified. It is held that the appointment of the petitioners is hereby revoked/cancelled, however, the said cancellation/revocation of their appointment would not be a bar for their future employment, if any. 32. As a fallout and consequence of aforesaid discussion, the writ petitions are dismissed subject to the aforesaid modification that the appointment of the petitioners would stand cancelled and the effect of cancellation of appointment would be without any stigma on the petitioners and they will be entitled to apply for employment, if any, in future. No order as to costs.