JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K.Rath, J. 1. Plaintiffs are the appellants against a confirming judgment in a suit for declaration of right, title and interest and permanent injunction. 2. Brahmananda Jena, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant nos.1(a) to 1(k), and appellant no.2 as plaintiffs instituted Title Suit No.118 of 1992 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Berhampur. The case of the plaintiffs is that one Udayanath Jena was in possession of the suit schedule land for more than 60 years. It is the Paramboke land of Udayanath. At the time of acquisition of the suit land, Udayanath dug a water channel for taking water to his other land. In course of time, the channel was not used by him. He reclaimed the suit land and made fit for cultivation since 1940. He raised paddy crops over the same. He used to pay rent since 1940. The revenue authorities recognized him and prepared ‘Adangal’ in his favour showing possession over the suit land. While the matter stood thus, Udayanath passed away from the mortal world leaving behind two sons, namely, Brahmananda and Arjuna, elder brother of plaintiff no.1 and father of plaintiff no.2. After death of his father, plaintiffs remained in possession over the suit land and paid rent to the Government. The settlement operation in the area, where the land falls, started. The settlement authorities proposed to record the suit land in the name of the Irrigation Department-defendant no.2. The plaintiffs filed Objection Case No.276 of 1971 before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Berhampur. The report submitted by the R.I in the said case clearly shows that the family of the plaintiffs perfected title in the year 1971 being in possession for more than 30 years. The report further reveals that there was no existence of Khama (Nala) over the suit land. The Assistant Settlement Officer rejected the claim of the plaintiffs on 9.7.1973 and recorded the land in the name of defendant no.2 with a note of forcible possession of the plaintiffs. In the year 1974, there was a partition between the family of the plaintiffs by means of registered deed. The suit land had been allotted equally between the plaintiffs. Since it was not settled in their favour, they used to claim the suit land jointly and appropriate usufructs equally. PLC No.394 of 1976 was started against Bikram, son of plaintiff no.1. The suit land had been allotted equally between the plaintiffs. Since it was not settled in their favour, they used to claim the suit land jointly and appropriate usufructs equally. PLC No.394 of 1976 was started against Bikram, son of plaintiff no.1. A prayer was made for settlement of the land in favour of Jena family. Since the suit land was recorded in the name of defendant no.2, the revenue authorities threatened to evict them from the land forcibly. Having no alternative, Bikram applied for lease of the suit land in his favour. While the matter stood thus, the Tahasildar, Berhampur initiated L.E Case No.322 of 1978. The report of the R.I was called for. The R.I submitted the report stating that the suit land had been recorded as Canal in the ROR. Defendant no.2 had not relinquished the suit land in favour of the Revenue Department. Since the Revenue Department had not taken possession of the land, it had no jurisdiction to lease out the same in favour of any person. In the said case, the Tahasildar, Berhampur sent a letter to defendant no.2 on 21.6.1979 seeking clarification as to whether the suit land belongs to the department or not. The plaintiffs prayed, inter alia, for settlement of the suit land. But then, the Tahasildar expressed his inability. Aggrieved by the final order, plaintiff no.2 initiated L.E Case No.14 of 1979 before the S.D.O., Berhampur. The case was remanded to the Tahasildar for disposal in accordance with law. Thereafter, no notice had been issued to them. It was further pleaded that adjacent to the north of the land, a pani Nala is running which is called ‘Gui Nala’. The same was not a perennial source of water. The water flows from the hill through that Nala. Several persons of the area had converted their cultivable land to house sites. Some persons to facilitate the purchasers tried to make culvert over Pani Nala. The Tahasildar allowed one Prafulla Mahakuda for making culvert over the plot. The plaintiffs filed objection being Misc. Case No.7 of 1992 before the Tahasildar. After making spot visit, the Tahasildar cancelled the order and submitted the case to the S.D.O., Berhampur for confirmation. The Tahasildar had no jurisdiction to accord permission for construction of culvert over the suit land. The Tahasildar allowed one Prafulla Mahakuda for making culvert over the plot. The plaintiffs filed objection being Misc. Case No.7 of 1992 before the Tahasildar. After making spot visit, the Tahasildar cancelled the order and submitted the case to the S.D.O., Berhampur for confirmation. The Tahasildar had no jurisdiction to accord permission for construction of culvert over the suit land. The Tahasildar as a temporary measure leased out the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs till finalisation of the settlement in their favour. He threatened the plaintiffs to lease out the suit land in favour of the third party. The plaintiffs had taken lease only to keep their possession in tact till finalisation of L.E.A No.14 of 1979. It was further pleaded that the plaintiffs are in possession over the suit land peacefully, continuously and openly to the knowledge of the defendants and as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. They had approached defendants for settlement of the land in their favour, but no action had been taken. Finally, notice was issued under Section 80 CPC requesting for settlement of the land in their favour. With this factual scenario, they instituted the suit seeking reliefs mentioned supra. 3. Defendants filed written statement-cum-counter claim. The case of the defendants is that the suit land is not the Paramboke land of Udayanath. Paramboke land belongs to the State. Udayanath had not dug any canal or reclaimed the same. No rent had been paid by the parties to the State in respect of the suit land. Entries made in the record-of-right and village map are correct. The objection raised before the settlement authority had been rightly rejected. The report of the Revenue Inspector cannot create right in favour of the plaintiffs. The ROR was finally published. At no point of time the plaintiffs had cultivated the suit land. Any partition between them is illegal and void. Prior to 1976, the suit land was leased out to different persons as the same was lying vacant. The same was done with a view to temporary utilisation till finally required for the canal or any other public utility purposes. In the year 1976, Bikram knew fully well about the status of the land. He had taken lease of the suit land as a lessee. His right is confined to the principles of lease only. The same was done with a view to temporary utilisation till finally required for the canal or any other public utility purposes. In the year 1976, Bikram knew fully well about the status of the land. He had taken lease of the suit land as a lessee. His right is confined to the principles of lease only. The Tahasildar, Berhampur never suggested for initiating any proceeding under the provision of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act (in short, “the OPLE Act”). However, on the application of Arjuna Jena, Rural Lease Case No.322 of 1978 was initiated. Subsequently, the case was dropped. The suit land belongs to the Irrigation Department under the direct management of the Revenue Department. Thus the lease granted by the Revenue Department cannot be questioned. The canal is being maintained by the State Government and the same is required for public utility service. It was further pleaded that the suit land being a surplus land, the same is reserved for further development of the irrigation work. Pursuant to the instruction of the Government, the suit land was being leased out on yearly basis to different landless persons for cultivation. In the year 1991-92, Bikram Jena son of plaintiff no.1 took lease of the land and paid lease amount. The same was terminated after expiry of the lease period on 31.3.1992. Prior to the termination of the lease period, the lessee vacated possession of the suit land in the month of December, 1991 after harvesting paddy crops. It was found that the lessee suppressed the fact and posing himself to be the landless person had managed to take lease of the suit land to which he was not entitled to. In view of the interim order passed by the court, the defendants sustained loss of revenue. The plaintiffs filed the written statement to the counter claim denying the assertions. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court has framed six issues, out of which issue nos.1 to 3 are pivotal. The same are – “1. Whether the plaintiff is in continuous possession of the suit land since last 55 years ? 2. Whether the entries of ROR in respect of the suit land is correct, valid and binding on the plaintiffs ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs perfected their title over the suit land by way of adverse possession ? 5. The same are – “1. Whether the plaintiff is in continuous possession of the suit land since last 55 years ? 2. Whether the entries of ROR in respect of the suit land is correct, valid and binding on the plaintiffs ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs perfected their title over the suit land by way of adverse possession ? 5. To prove the case, the plaintiffs had examined four witnesses and on their behalf, seventeen documents had been exhibited. The defendants had neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 6. Learned trial court, on an anatomy of the pleadings and evidence, came to hold that though plaintiffs claimed that they are in possession of the suit land for the last 55 years, but from Ext.9/a and 9/b it is evident that the suit land was leased out to the son of the plaintiff no.1 for a period of one year. P.W.1 deposed that the land in question was Paramboke. Certified copy of the record-ofright, vide Exts.16 and 17 would show that the land had been recorded in the name of the Government. The plaintiff participated in the settlement proceeding. Though the land was recorded in the name of the Government, the plaintiffs had not challenged the same. Rather a petition was filed before the Tahasildar in RLC No.332 of 1978 to settle the land in their favour. The same was rejected by the Tahasildar, since there was no provision to settle the land. It further held that the plaintiffs had not perfected title by way of adverse possession. Held so, learned trial court dismissed the suit. The unsuccessful plaintiffs filed Title Appeal No.58 of 1995 before the learned District Judge, Berhampur, which was subsequently transferred to the learned 2nd Addl. District Judge, Berhampur and re-numbered as Title Appeal No.11 of 1997. Learned appellate court, on a vivid analysis of the materials on record, came to hold that the plaintiffs had pleaded that the suit land is Paramboke land of Udayanath Jena. If Udayanath was the owner of the suit land, question of claiming title or adverse possession does not arise since owner cannot claim adverse possession against himself. Under Section 5(a) of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951 (in short, the OEA Act”), Paramboke land vested in the State free from all encumbrances and intermediary had no interest over the same. If Udayanath was the owner of the suit land, question of claiming title or adverse possession does not arise since owner cannot claim adverse possession against himself. Under Section 5(a) of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951 (in short, the OEA Act”), Paramboke land vested in the State free from all encumbrances and intermediary had no interest over the same. After vesting of the estate, the Government became absolute owner of the land. It further held that the plaintiffs had admitted the suit land as Paramboke land, that means all the villagers including Udayanath had the right to use the suit land and the nature of the same is communal. The date of entry into the suit land had not been mentioned. Since plaintiffs had taken the lease of the suit land, they accepted the ownership of the Government. Held so, learned appellate court dismissed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the second appeal, the appellant no.1 died, where after his legal representatives have been brought on record. 7. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos.(a) and (b). The same are - “(a) Whether ‘Paramboke Land’ is liable to be vested with the State Government without any encumbrance or whether the person in possession has occupancy right over ‘Paramboke Land’ ? (b) Ext.2 is the Adangal of the year 1957 which is after vesting and it indicates that the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest was in possession for at least 10 years prior to the recording. Adangal is South Indian Revenue Term used under Madras Tenancy Act, the meaning of which an account showing the cultivator in the village. Whether courts below have considered this Ext.2 in its proper perspective ?” 8. Heard Mr. Baibaswata Panigrahi, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Swayumbhu Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the respondents. 9. Mr. Panigrahi, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that Udayanath, father of plaintiff no.1 had vast landed property in village Ambapua. Adjoining to his land, there was a strip of land classified as ‘Paramboke’. The same was used for drawing water to his land. He made the land fit for cultivation and raised paddy crops. Since 1940, Udayanath remained in possession of the suit land openly, peacefully and with hostile animus to the knowledge of the defendants till his death. Adjoining to his land, there was a strip of land classified as ‘Paramboke’. The same was used for drawing water to his land. He made the land fit for cultivation and raised paddy crops. Since 1940, Udayanath remained in possession of the suit land openly, peacefully and with hostile animus to the knowledge of the defendants till his death. Thereafter, the plaintiffs were in possession of the same. The Government having admitted the possession of the plaintiffs and their predecessors from 1947 under Ext.2, they have acquired title by way of adverse possession. He further submitted that after coming into operation of the OEA Act, the land vested in the State. Consequent upon vesting, the State became the absolute owner of the suit land. The Revenue Department of the State Government had admitted the possession of the plaintiffs in the year 1957. Ext.2 clearly shows possession of the plaintiffs since 1947. Thus the starting point of adverse possession was from the year 1947 and not 1940. The settlement authority had admitted the possession of the plaintiffs from 1941. Ext.3 series, revenue receipts, would show that the possession of the land by the plaintiffs and his family. The report of the R.I. in RLC No.322 of 1978 marked as Exts.6 and 7 would show that the suit land had been recorded in the name of the Irrigation Department without any basis. The letter of the Tahasildar vide Ext.10 shows that the suit land does not belong to the Irrigation Department. RLC No.322 of 1978 was closed with an observation to start a case under the OPLE Act. Against the order passed in RLC No.322 of 1978, the plaintiffs had preferred LEA No.14 of 1979 before the Sub-Collector, Berhampur. On 18.5.1981, the Sub-Collector directed the Tahasildar to dispose of the application of the plaintiffs, but then no order was passed by the Tahasildar to settle the land in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had perfected title by remaining in possession of the suit land since 1940 before lease was granted in favour of Bikram Jena. The recordof- right had been wrongly recorded in favour of the Irrigation Department. But then, the lease had been granted by the Revenue Department. Therefore, the same is illegal. The suit land had not delivered to the lessee. Though the suit land had been categorized as Paramboke, but the same was lost by efflux of time. The recordof- right had been wrongly recorded in favour of the Irrigation Department. But then, the lease had been granted by the Revenue Department. Therefore, the same is illegal. The suit land had not delivered to the lessee. Though the suit land had been categorized as Paramboke, but the same was lost by efflux of time. The plaintiffs as landholders claimed ryotwari patta. He further submitted that the description of the land for which the plaintiffs applied for patta as Paramboke is no doubt a relevant factor, but the same is not a conclusive factor to decide the issue when the plaintiffs are entitled to a ryotwari patta. Placing reliance on the enquiry report of the Addl. Tahasildar, Berhampur, Ext.13, he submitted that the Government had clearly admitted the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land for more than 30 years. The Government had no right to evict a person who is in possession of the Government land for more than 30 years under Section 8A of the OPLE Act. 10. Per contra, Mr. Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the respondents, submitted that the suit land had been recorded as Gramakantha Poramboke. Under Section 2(b) of the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962, (hereinafter referred to as “the OGLS Act”) Gramakantha Poramboke land in the ex-Madras area has been defined as Government land. The area of the suit land was under the jurisdiction of Madras Presidency. The word ‘Parambok’ is not defined in the Madras Land Estate Act which governed the land revenue law in the State. Referring to Section 4 of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957, (in short “the KLC Act”) he submitted that Paramboke shall mean and include unassessed lands which are properties of the Government reserved for public purposes or for the communal use of villagers. The same includes banks of rivers, irrigation and drainage channels, canals, tanks, lakes, backwaters and water courses. Since the word ‘Paramboke’ has not been defined in the OGLS Act, this Court can refer to the definition of the same in the KLC Act. He further submitted that under Section 5 of the OEA Act the suit land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The State Government is the paramount owner of the land. The date of entry into the suit land had not been mentioned. Adverse possession is a mixed question of fact and law. He further submitted that under Section 5 of the OEA Act the suit land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The State Government is the paramount owner of the land. The date of entry into the suit land had not been mentioned. Adverse possession is a mixed question of fact and law. Mere possession is not suffice. Plaintiffs had not substantiated the plea of adverse possession. The plaintiffs were inducted as a lessee under the State. He further submitted that the concurrent findings of the courts below are not liable to be interfered with in the second appeal, since there is no perversity in the same. He further submitted that annual statement of occupation and cultivation of land is known as ‘Adangal’ which reflects name of the cultivator who actually cultivates the land. The same is not the record-of-right. The status of the land is Paramboke. There is no pleading or evidence as to how Udayanath was holding the land and under which capacity. 11. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the apex Court observed as under :- "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period." The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period." The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” (Emphasis laid) 12. On the anvil of the decision cited supra, the instant appeal may be examined. The assertion of the plaintiffs that Udayanath Jena, father of plaintiff no.1 and grand-father of plaintiff no.2 was in possession of the suit schedule land for more than 55 years. Udayanath reclaimed the suit land and made fit for cultivation since 1940. He raised paddy crops. He used to pay rent. The revenue authorities recognized him and prepared ‘Adangal’ in his favour. After his death, the plaintiffs are in possession of the land openly, peacefully and with hostile animus to the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiffs further pleaded that they had filed objection case before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Berhampur on 8.6.1972. The same was rejected on 9.7.1973. The R.I report shows that the family of the plaintiffs had perfected title in the year 1971. It was further pleaded that in PLC No.394 of 1976, Bikram Jena son of plaintiff no.1 prayed, inter alia, to settle the land in the name of the family. Defendant no.2 threatened the plaintiffs to evict them from the suit land forcibly. The Tahasildar, Berhampur leased out the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs as temporary measure till finalisation of the settlement. The plaintiffs had taken the lease only to keep their possession in tact but their hopes shattered. The plea of the plaintiffs is mutually destructive. They assert their title by way of adverse possession, but then son of plaintiff no.1 applied for lease of the land in favour of the family. The plaintiffs had taken the lease only to keep their possession in tact but their hopes shattered. The plea of the plaintiffs is mutually destructive. They assert their title by way of adverse possession, but then son of plaintiff no.1 applied for lease of the land in favour of the family. Thus they admit the title of the defendants. The element of hostile animus is absent. Further, the date of entry into the suit land has not been mentioned. After coming into operation of the OEA Act, the suit land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Reliance placed on ‘Adangal’ is totally misplaced. Recording of possession in the name of the person is not suffice, unless the plaintiffs plead or prove the conclusive requirement of adverse possession and the classical requirements of adverse possession nec vi, nec clam, nec precario are pleaded and proved as held by the Privy Council in the Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 Privy Council 23. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 13. As a sequel to the above discussion, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.