JUDGMENT : Servesh Kumar Gupta, J. As both the appeals titled above have arisen out of the same judgment and order dated 16.5.2003 rendered by the District Judge, Haridwar, hence have been taken up together for adjudication. 2. At the outset, it is pertinent to mention that Appeal No. 34/2003 was admitted at its initial stage, while Appeal No. 48/2003 is still pending even for admission, but considering that the controversy between both the parties (where Nagar Palika Parishad, Haridwar and Haridwar Development Authority are on one side and Mr. Nek Pal as well as Captain Amrendra Singh, who are respondents no. 1 and 3 in each of the appeals, are on the other side) is identical and both these appeals are to be decided on the same substantial questions of law, hence this Second Appeal No. 48/2003 is also admitted for hearing. 3. Since the interest of Kailash Ashram Trust Society was not in controversy, so none turned up on its behalf. It seems that the interest of such respondent (if any) is under the shadow of the interest of rest of the respondents, whose Counsels have been heard at length. 4. It appears that Original Suit No. 10/1999 was initiated on 12.1.1999 by the respondents no. 1 to 3 disclosing the property to be a part of Khasra No. 81, minzumla area 0.233 hectare; Khasra No. 88, minzumla area 0.207 hectare and Khasra No. 91, minzumla area 0.59 hectare in Khata no. 6 and 5, Khewat No. 1 situated in Mauja Bhopatwala Khurd, Pargana Jwalapur, Tehsil and District Haridwar. Later on, an application 354A was moved by the plaintiffs waiving their claim on whole of the property, which they mentioned in Schedule A and, instead, they added the Schedule B, which entailed a plot of land running 703 feet north-south, 122 feet running east-west, situated in Khasra No. 81, 88 and 91 at the said place Bhopatwala Khurd, which as averred was butted and bounded as under: In the east – Property of Dera Baba. In the west – Pawan Dham Road, thereafter Kamal Das Kutia, Prem Prakash and Dashnam Sanyas Ashram, etc. In the south – Sarvanand Ghat Road. In the north – Property of Dera Baba having 16 trees of mangoes, jamun, simbal where also a tinshed on a small yard is located. 5. In the west – Pawan Dham Road, thereafter Kamal Das Kutia, Prem Prakash and Dashnam Sanyas Ashram, etc. In the south – Sarvanand Ghat Road. In the north – Property of Dera Baba having 16 trees of mangoes, jamun, simbal where also a tinshed on a small yard is located. 5. This amendment application was allowed vide order dated 1.8.2002 by the Trial Court. So, it can be said that the suit property does not have any concern as has been disclosed in Schedule ‘A’ and the plaintiffs kept their claim confined only to the property described in Schedule ‘B’, which was later on added by way of seeking the amendment as aforestated. 6. In the suit, the decree of permanent injunction was sought restraining the defendants (appellants herein) not to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs and they should also be restrained not to dispossess them illegally nay the restrainment was also sought against the defendants from interfering in the use of such property by the plaintiffs. 7. The suit was resisted by the defendants, but the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit with costs vide judgment and order dated 11.10.2002. Such judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) was challenged by way of filing the Civil Appeal No. 41/2001 initiated by Nagar Palika Parishad, Haridwar and Civil Appeal No. 42/2002 initiated by Haridwar Development Authority (hereinafter called as the ‘Authority’ for the brevity). Both the appeals were dismissed with costs by the learned District Judge on 16.5.2003 and such judgment has been put to challenge in these second appeals. 8. Since no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission of the appeal on 30.5.2003, hence having heard the matter partially and during the course of arguments, in the presence of learned Counsels of both the parties, this Court confined itself to adjudicate the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the alleged transaction of the disputed property was void ab initio being the violation of Section 7 of Hindu Public Religious Institution (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Act, 1962. 2. Whether the property was owned by Dera Baba Dargah Singh and was of the religious charitable nature. If it is so, whether it could have been transferred by the self claimed manager Jaswinder Singh in the nature and manner it was transferred? 3. 2. Whether the property was owned by Dera Baba Dargah Singh and was of the religious charitable nature. If it is so, whether it could have been transferred by the self claimed manager Jaswinder Singh in the nature and manner it was transferred? 3. Whether both the lower courts have rightly decreed the suit on the basis of Khasra, Khatauni and ‘Kisan Bahi’ which were issued by the revenue officials in favour of the lease holders. 9. At the outset, it would be relevant to determine the nature and the ownership of the property at the time when the two registered perpetual lease deeds dated 29/30.5.1997 were executed by self-claimed Mahant/Manager Jaswinder Singh of Dera Baba Dargah Singh. One lease deed was executed in favour of Mr. Nek Pal, plaintiff no. 1, R/o District Ghaziabad, who has initiated this suit impleading himself as well as his General Power of Attorney Mr. Atul Sharma as the plaintiff no. 2, while the other deed was executed in favour of Captain Amrendra Singh, S/o Maharaja Yadavendra Singh of Patiala, R/o 67-Zor Bagh, New Delhi, who showed himself to be presently resident of Village Bhopatwala, Haridwar at the time of such execution and on his behalf, his “Karkun” (employee/representative) Mr. Baldev Singh Dhillon S/o Jang Singh Dhillon, R/o 52 Gujarat Vihar, Delhi-92 was the second party of such deed. It is amazing and shrouded with suspicion indicating his mischief and malafides that though Captain Amrendra Singh has shown his address to be presently residing in ‘Bhopatwala’ Haridwar (where the subject matter of the suit is located although no specific address disclosed), yet he chosen his Karkun Jang Singh Dhillon R/o Delhi through whom he got the lease deed executed in his favour. And that apart, he further chosen one Shri Chandra Pal Kashyap R/o Ghaziabad in the array of the parties in the plaint to fight this litigation for and on his behalf. The first deed was for the total consideration of rupees fifty thousand and the lessor adverted himself to be the owner having all title rights to transfer the land. Another deed was for the total consideration of rupees four lakhs and the executor of such deed represented himself in the same manner, as above. 10. The first deed was for the total consideration of rupees fifty thousand and the lessor adverted himself to be the owner having all title rights to transfer the land. Another deed was for the total consideration of rupees four lakhs and the executor of such deed represented himself in the same manner, as above. 10. The land, which was the subject matter of the lease, was shown to be residential (in character) covering the area of 4995 square meter, which was 1/4th part of the whole area 19980 square meter, while the another deed was for the area of 4162.40 square meter, i.e. 1.499 hectare, which was part of the total area 19980 square meter and the nature of this land was also shown to be residential in character. 11. It appears that on the basis of these lease deeds, an application was moved to the Tehsildar concerned, who started the case no. 340/97 and 336/97 and passed the orders promptly on 17.7.1997 to mutate the names of the lessees in all the concerning revenue records inasmuch as the revenue book showing the ploughing rights of the land (which is popularly known as the ‘Jot Bahi’ among the farmers) was also issued to these plaintiffs. 12. Having gone through the numerous relevant papers and the pleadings, I feel that this is a glaring and bizarre example that how the attempt has been made to grab a vast public land, which is being used since immemorial times for the religious and charitable purposes and is located at the banks of sacred river Ganges. Such land was the forest and canal land having a large number of trees over there as well as on account of its peculiar location beside the Ganga Canal. With the passage of time and that too almost 80 years back when land settlement came into operation, it was vested in the municipality for the purpose of pilgrims, who used to visit Haridwar in furtherance of their religious sentiments. 13. With the passage of time and that too almost 80 years back when land settlement came into operation, it was vested in the municipality for the purpose of pilgrims, who used to visit Haridwar in furtherance of their religious sentiments. 13. It is useless to go through any other paper, which the plaintiffs have procured on account of their influence and might based on myriad factors, suffice it to say that the certified copy of Sajra (map), which has been issued by the relevant authorities of the Collectorate, District Saharanpur (as the town Haridwar was the territory of that district) and such copy is available as Paper No. 12C-1/1 in the lower court record, is very relevant for just decision of this controversy. It is evident from that Sajra that it displays the position of the year 1934-35, where in the eastern side of Khasra No. 81, 82, 88 and 91 (whereon many religious institutions/Ashrams are situated), there is vast forest and canal land, which with the passage of time was vested in the municipality for the purpose of pilgrims, as aforestated. So, where remains the question of owning this land by any Dera Baba Dargah Singh? If this land was vested in the municipality, then how the so-called (self-claimed) Mahant/Manager of Dera Baba Dargah Singh, posing himself to be the owner of this land, could execute the perpetual lease in favour of the plaintiffs in lieu of nominal cost for this precious land. 14. It can significantly be noted that the certified copy of this authentic government map (Shajra) was applied on 4.8.1998 and having procured the same day from records of Collectorate Saharanpur, it was presented by plaintiffs, and by none others, along with other papers through List 9C-1 at the time of institution of the suit itself on 12.1.1999. Such certified copy of the public document is presumed to be true and admissible in evidence as contemplated in Section 76, 77, 79 and 80 of the Indian Evidence Act. 15. Besides, this map adverts the situation and status of the land in question as it was in the year 1934-35. Such certified copy of the public document is presumed to be true and admissible in evidence as contemplated in Section 76, 77, 79 and 80 of the Indian Evidence Act. 15. Besides, this map adverts the situation and status of the land in question as it was in the year 1934-35. It is thus nearly eighty years old, coming from a government office in as much as from the record room of Collectorate of the District Saharanpur (whereof Haridwar was part), then under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act too its every content is presumed to be true and legitimate. 16. It is quite strange that whosoever the Tehsildar might had been posted in the area at the relevant time, which can be a matter of probe for the purpose of disciplinary action, did not at all and least applied his mind and was pleased to transfer a part of this land (which is also a big chunk of land) in the name of the plaintiffs, who were the residents of Patiala, Ghaziabad and Delhi. 17. I think that in the same manner both the Courts below have not appreciated the controversy at all and without application of their mind, have entered into the futile and useless exercise of survey and the measurement of the land in question by issuing the repeated Commissions for the purpose. This exercise was of no relevance because there was no need at all of any measurement of these two portions of the land which were the part of again a big area because both the lease deeds of forest and canal land could not have been executed by this self-claimed owner Mr. Jaswinder Singh. 18. Even if for a moment, it is accepted that the land belonged to Dera Baba Dargah Singh, then also it was the religious and charitable in nature and by the prohibitions of Section 7 of the Hindu Public Religious Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Act, which was inserted in the Act w.e.f. 18.3.1968, such property could not have been transferred without the written sanctions of the Divisional Commissioner. That apart, if it was a Dera (Waqf) Property then also it could not have been transferred without the permission of District Judge under Section 92 of CPC. 19. That apart, if it was a Dera (Waqf) Property then also it could not have been transferred without the permission of District Judge under Section 92 of CPC. 19. As has been depicted in the lease deed itself that it is a residential land, then how the revenue authorities could assume the jurisdiction to proceed for the mutation in the revenue records because if the property was within the municipal limits and residential in nature, then the competent authority for the purpose of mutation was the authority of the municipality, and not the Tehsildar or the Lekhpal. 20. In view of what has been set forth above, I decide all these substantial questions of law, formulated in these second appeals, in favour of the appellants and hold that the land, in question, or the part of the whole land was never owned by any Dera Baba Dargah Singh, though the nature of the land was religious and charitable in character because it is a trite that the property changes its colour by way of its user. It has been in the evidence in so many words that for decades it was being used for the pilgrims, saints, sages for holding their camps beside the Ganga Canal in the usual days and more particularly when the “Kumbh” falls after every 12 years. 21. My view in this regard is fortified from the evidence of Mr. Kailash Chand Sharma, DW7, who was a nonagenarian at the time of deposition in the Court on 5.7.2002. This witness is the resident of same area and he has deposed in so many words about the nature and the use of this land for several decades in the manner, as have been stated above. All other witnesses are either the interested witnesses of the plaintiffs or if they are the working or retired employees witnesses of the municipality, and their inclination is more to protect the interest of the plaintiffs rather than to protect the interest of the municipality by concealing the truth for the reasons which can be discerned. So, I disbelieve these witnesses except the witness Kailash Chand Sharma, who is age-wise oldest and eldest one who has nurtured the values in his life and could muster the courage to unravel the truth. His evidence could not be impeached in any manner in the cross-examination. 22. So, I disbelieve these witnesses except the witness Kailash Chand Sharma, who is age-wise oldest and eldest one who has nurtured the values in his life and could muster the courage to unravel the truth. His evidence could not be impeached in any manner in the cross-examination. 22. It can also be noted very significantly that in both these claimed lease deeds, the boundary of the property leased out has been disclosed at the end of such deeds. It evinces that in the east there is thoroughfare, while in all the rest directions, viz. west, north and south, there are properties of the first party Dera Baba Dargah Singh. That apart, nothing has been narrated in these lease deeds regarding the length and width of these big plots concerned, while the amendment was sought in the property of Schedule ‘B’ which was added by way of amendment and this Schedule ‘B’ discloses the boundary in the wholly different manner. It evinces that thoroughfare, known as Pawan Dham Road, is situated towards the west; in the east there is property of Dera Baba; in the south there is Sarvanand Ghat Road, while in the north there is property of Dera Baba. It also discloses that on the property situated in the north, there is a small Chabutara having a tinshed. So, it can be inferred that the plaintiffs are not in the least possession of any land or plot in the area wherefor they are seeking the prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession. It is the established position of law that to seek the relief of prohibitory injunction, the plaintiff must be in physical possession of the property concerned. 23. Therefore, I hold that both the Courts below have completely gone wrong in decreeing the suit on the basis of Khasra, Khatauni and ‘Kisan Bahi’, which were issued by the revenue officials in favour of these so-called lease holders for the reasons best known to them. Consequently, I allow both the second appeals and set aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the Courts below and dismiss the suits of the plaintiffs with costs all throughout. 24. Consequently, I allow both the second appeals and set aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the Courts below and dismiss the suits of the plaintiffs with costs all throughout. 24. In exercise of the powers vested in this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, I declare that both these lease deeds are void ab initio and at the same time, I direct that even the Haridwar Development Authority or the Municipality of Haridwar will never allot this land to any person or institution for a long period except permitting its use for the religious and charitable purpose for a short duration in the usual days and during the entire period of “Kumbh” fair whenever organized after periodical intervals in this religiously enriched city of Haridwar. Let the LCR be sent back.