ORDER 19.05.2017 This appeal has been filed by the unsuccessful defendants of C.S. No. 28 of 2008 of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Jajpur having suffered from the judgment and decree and further having failed in getting the desired result of either setting those at naught or any such modification thereto by carrying first appeal to the Court of learned District Judge, Jajpur in RFA No. 09 of 2012. 2. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 as the plaintiffs had filed the above noted suit claiming compensation of Rs. 5.00 lakhs from the defendants on account of death of Adikanda Das, the husband of defendant no. 1 and father of defendant nos. 2 to 4 due to electrocution on 4.12.2005 evening. The suit has been decreed directing the defendant-appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 5.00 lakhs to the plaintiff-respondents towards compensation as claimed. The lower appellate Court in the appeal has declined to interfere with the same. 3. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the trial Court. 4. The case of the plaintiffs who are the legal heirs of deceased Adikanda is that Adikanda on that fateful evening was returning from his field carrying a bundle of paddy sheaves overhead. While walking down the way, he somehow came in contact with the live electric wire of 11 K.V. line lying in the path. So Adikanda met instantaneous death due to electrolocution. This being an unnatural death and for no fault on the part of Adikanda, local police receiving the information registered as U.D. G.R. Case No. 295 of 2005. Police held inquest and got the post mortem examination conducted over the dead body by issuing necessary requisition for the same. The plaintiffs claim that the death of Adikanda being on account of negligence on the part of the field officials of defendant no. 1 in-charge of supply of electricity and maintenance of over head electric line, transformers etc., they are entitled to get the compensation from them. The defendants though admit that Adikanda aged about 39 years died due to electrocution having come in contact with the live electric wire lying on the spot, they however shifts the blame entirely upon the staff of Minor Irrigation Department of the State of Odisha. The defendants though admit that Adikanda aged about 39 years died due to electrocution having come in contact with the live electric wire lying on the spot, they however shifts the blame entirely upon the staff of Minor Irrigation Department of the State of Odisha. It is stated that at that time canal in that area was being dug under the supervision of the staffs of said department. Therefore, the staff of the department had cut the overhead electric line in between the two poles and had also drawn out the stay set from the ground. For this, it is said that Adikanda came in contact with live electric wire and met instantaneous that due to electrocution. 5. On such rival pleadings, the trial Court has framed six issues. The Courts below have decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs holding in clear terms that for the said death of Adikanda due to electrocution, the employees of the defendant no.1 cannot wriggle out of the blame. In that view of the matter finally the lower appellate Court taking the age of the deceased to be in between 35 to 40 ;years and assessing his monthly income to be Rs. 4,500/- on consideration of evidence on record and further taking into consideration the size of the family consisting of five members including the deceased by applying multiplier of 16, though it has assessed the compensation at Rs. 6.48 lakhs + Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses + Rs. 2,500/- towards loss of his estate coming to Rs. 6,52,500/-, in view of the claim of compensation of Rs. 5.00 lakhs, it awarded the compensation in full as prayed for. 6. I have heard Mr. R. Acharya, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 3. I have also gone through the judgments of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court. 7. 5.00 lakhs, it awarded the compensation in full as prayed for. 6. I have heard Mr. R. Acharya, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 3. I have also gone through the judgments of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court. 7. Although specifically the memorandum of this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not find mention of the substantial question of law involved as mandated in law yet the learned Counsel for the appellants in a bid to make good the legal deficiency vehemently submits that the Courts below have fallen in grave error both on fact and law by saddling the liability of payment of compensation on account of death of Adikanda upon the defendants, despite overwhelming evidence being there on record to the effect that the staff of the Minor Irrigation Department during the process of digging the canal had caused the mischief of disconnecting the live electric wire between the two electric poles with further removal of stay sets. He submits that the suit as laid thus ought to have been dismissed in the absence of the State and the officials in charge of the local work which was being undertaken by the said department of the State as parties. So it is urged that in their absence the suit ought to have been dismissed and the liability of payment of compensation ought not to have been saddled upon the defendants. He also questions the quantum of compensation in urging that appreciation of evidence by the Courts below in ascertaining the income of the deceased is perverse. According to him, in the absence of positive evidence relating to the income of the deceased, the Courts below should have taken the minimum wage as was then payable to unskilled worker as the income of deceased Adikanda and not more. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that both the Courts below have arrived at the factual finding that the death of Adikanda was on account of negligene on the part of the field officials of defendant no. 1 in-charge of supply for electricity and maintenance of overhead electric wire as well as all other accessories including the transformers on appreciation of evidence that too keeping in view the settled principles of law governing the field. 1 in-charge of supply for electricity and maintenance of overhead electric wire as well as all other accessories including the transformers on appreciation of evidence that too keeping in view the settled principles of law governing the field. According to him the said find being a one finding of fact is not open to be questioned in this second appeal when no such perversity is shown. He thus contends that it is not permissible in law for this Court to reappreciate or reassess the evidence. It is therefore contended that no such substantial question of law arises in the case. 9. The settled position holding the field in such type of claim arising out of the death on account of electrocution by coming in contact with the live electric wire remaining overhead because of its snapping now need to be given a look, first it is profitable to take note of the ratio decided in case of Malay Kumar Ganguly vs. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee: (2009) SCC 221: AIR 2010 SC 1162 . The apex Court considering the meaning of “negligence” has held as follows:- “Negligence is breach of duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a pruduent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence means either subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively careless conduct. It is not an absolute term but is a relative one it is rather a comparative term. In determining whether negligence exists in a particular case, all the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances have to be taken into account. Negligence is strictly nonfeasance and not malfeasance. It is omission to do what the law requires, or failure to do anything in a manner prescribed by law. It is the act which can be treated as negligence without any proof as to the surrounding circumstances, because it is in violation of statute or ordinance or is contrary to dictates of ordinary prudence.” 10. This Court has also elaborately discussed the meaning of ‘negligence’ in case of Uday Gagarai vs. Executive Engineer, Electrical Division and another: 2014 (1) CLR 476. The meaning of ‘negligence’ is said to be the failure of exercise due care expected of a reasonable prudent person. This Court has also elaborately discussed the meaning of ‘negligence’ in case of Uday Gagarai vs. Executive Engineer, Electrical Division and another: 2014 (1) CLR 476. The meaning of ‘negligence’ is said to be the failure of exercise due care expected of a reasonable prudent person. It is a breach of the duty which gives rise to the claim of compensation for consequential damages caused thereby. 11. In Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs. Shail Kumari; (2002)2 SCC 162 it has been held:- “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line…… 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.” 12. In another decision in the case of M.C. Mehta and Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 395 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court following the observations held as under:- “…… where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example in escape of toxic gas the enterprise in strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operae vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands vs. Flecther (supra)….” 13. Next there arises the need to keep in view the position of law regarding the filing of a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the scope of interference. It has been authoritatively held in case of Kondiba Dagadu Kedam vrs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others; (1999) 3 SCC 722 . It has been held that:- “3. After the amendment a second appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case. The appeal is required to be heard on the question so formulated. However, the respondent at the time of the hearing of the appeal has a right to argue that the case in the Court did not involve any substantial question of law. 5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate Court. 5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate Court. it is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 6. xx xx xx xx xx xx The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entire and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law except where such appreciation is found to have resulted a perverse finding. Xx xx xx xx xx xx Where the first appellate Court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India & Anr, v. Ramakrishan Govind Morey, AIR (1976) SC 830 held that whether trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference.” 14. Keeping in view the above legal propositions, it appears in the instant case that no satisfactory evidence stand that the defendants had done everything which could have been done for avoiding the harm so as to wriggle out of the liability in the action. So by applying the said principles when undeniably the maintenance of overhead electric wire is the primary duty of the defendant no. So by applying the said principles when undeniably the maintenance of overhead electric wire is the primary duty of the defendant no. 1 through its employees for any such unfortunate incident occurring on account of coming in contact with the overhead live electric wire lying on the ground, the defendant no. 1 has no escape from the liability in avoiding the claim of compensation. 15. The findings with regard to age and income of the deceased as also the assessment of the compensation at the ultimatum are found to have been arrived at upon critical examination of the evidence. No such perversity surfaces therein. Nothing is shown that either the findings are based on no evidence or some evidence has been overlooked/ignored which if would have been taken into consideration, the finding would have been otherwise. Thus the award compensation as claimed is found to be in consonance with the established legal norms. For the aforesaid discussion and reasons, the submission of learned counsel for the appellants fails. 16. In the result, no substantial question of law is found to be arising here meriting the admission of the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to cost is however passed. Appeal dismissed.