JUDGMENT : 1. Sonika Singh Chauhan (hereafter the victim) suffered multiple injuries in a car crash at the dead hour of night on Rashbehari Avenue in South Kolkata on April 29, 2017. She was seated next to her friend who was driving the car (WB12C/9755). Ultimately, the victim succumbed to her injuries. Tollygunge P.S. FIR No. 109 of 2017 dated April 29, 2017 under sections 279/338/427/304A, Indian Penal Code (hereafter the IPC) was registered, wherein the victim’s friend was named as an accused (hereafter the petitioner). Since the FIR was registered for alleged commission of bailable offences, the petitioner surrendered before the relevant magistrate on May 5, 2017 and obtained bail on condition that he would cooperate with the investigating officer. While he was on bail, investigation of the FIR progressed. On the basis of the materials collected in course of investigation, the investigating officer submitted a prayer before the relevant magistrate on May 30, 2017 for incorporating section 304, IPC in the array of offences instead of section 304A thereof. Such prayer was made based on statements of witnesses recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter the Cr.P.C.) and forensic report to the effect that the petitioner was under the influence of alcohol on the fateful night and the car driven by him was speeding at 93 km/hour at the time of the crash, respectively. Anticipating arrest, the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before this Court. The application was received by the department on June 5, 2017. Although, the advocate-on-record for the petitioner wished the application to be listed on June 6, 2017, the same was not listed because of the system presently being followed by this Bench of listing of applications filed in the course of a particular month in the following month’s combined list. 2. The application ought to have been listed in the monthly combined list for July, 2017, which was published on July 3, 2017. While all the applications filed during June, 2017 were listed in the July monthly list, this application was not listed. On July 3, 2017 itself, the fact that the application had not been listed was brought to our notice by Mr. Mazumder, learned advocate for the petitioner. Considering the number assigned to the application, it was observed by this Bench that it would be considered after item no. On July 3, 2017 itself, the fact that the application had not been listed was brought to our notice by Mr. Mazumder, learned advocate for the petitioner. Considering the number assigned to the application, it was observed by this Bench that it would be considered after item no. 792 of the monthly list is called on for consideration. On an enquiry being made by this Bench regarding the reason for non-listing of the application in the July monthly list, the bench clerk showed photocopy of the draft list. It appeared therefrom that although the number assigned by the department to the application together with its cause-title was printed in the draft list, the same had mysteriously been struck off by a straight horizontal line. The bench clerk denied having drawn the horizontal line but did not rule out the possibility of the same being the handiwork of some mischievous mind after it left his hands. Accordingly, this Bench thought of making appropriate direction in regard thereto at the time of consideration of the application on merits. 3. Since there was a likelihood of the application being called on for consideration on July 6, 2017, the same was listed under the heading ‘To Be Mentioned’ with an appropriate noting that it would be called on after item no. 792. At the commencement of court proceedings, Mr. Sekhar Kumar Basu, learned senior advocate appeared for the petitioner and had requested for early hearing of the application to which this Bench had reiterated that it could be called on only after item no. 792. At such point of time, Mr. Rudradipta Nandy, learned advocate for the State and Mr. Debasis Roy, learned advocate for the de facto complainant were present. It was on the request of Mr. Basu, and agreed to by all the parties, that this Bench had fixed July 13, 2017 as the date for consideration of the application. 4. In this factual backdrop, in the late hours of July 6, 2017 itself, the petitioner was arrested and taken into custody. The following morning, Mr. Basu mentioned the application and brought the fact of the petitioner’s arrest to the notice of this Bench. Since learned advocates for the State and the de facto complainant were not present, this Bench observed that they ought to be put on notice and Mr. The following morning, Mr. Basu mentioned the application and brought the fact of the petitioner’s arrest to the notice of this Bench. Since learned advocates for the State and the de facto complainant were not present, this Bench observed that they ought to be put on notice and Mr. Basu was granted liberty to mention the application at 2 p.m. once again. 5. The learned advocates for the State and the de facto complainant were present, after they were put on notice, at 2 p.m. Since the application was not on the list of July 7, 2017, we verbally directed its enlistment on July 11, 2017 “For Orders”. 6. Mr. Basu vehemently urged that overzealousness on the part of the investigating agency to render this application infructuous, is clear as crystal. This Bench having fixed July 13, 2017 as the date for consideration of the application on merits and there being no effort worth the name on the part of the investigating agency to secure the arrest of the petitioner till such time the Bench had fixed a specific date, such arrest smacks of highhandedness and an attempt to overreach the Court. Mr. Basu further contended that the petitioner, while on bail, had all along cooperated with the investigating officer and there could be no reason whatsoever to arrest the petitioner on July 6, 2017, other than rendering the application for anticipatory bail ineffective. It was also submitted by Mr. Basu that if the Bench had declined the prayer of the petitioner, he would have accepted the judgment and allowed law to take its own course; but the overzealousness is too inexplicably overt, particularly when the police agency is certain that the car crash was only an accident. 7. A supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner pleading post-arrest events. It was brought to the notice of the Bench by Mr. Basu that in the forwarding memo too, prepared by the investigating officer, the incident of car crash has been referred to as an “accident’. 8. Mr. Basu, accordingly, prayed that the officers concerned ought to be taken to task for defeating the Court’s endeavour to consider the application on merits on July 13, 2017. 9. Mr. Basu that in the forwarding memo too, prepared by the investigating officer, the incident of car crash has been referred to as an “accident’. 8. Mr. Basu, accordingly, prayed that the officers concerned ought to be taken to task for defeating the Court’s endeavour to consider the application on merits on July 13, 2017. 9. Mr. Saswata Gopal Mukherjee, learned Public Prosecutor contended that mere pendency of an application for anticipatory bail does not operate as a bar for the investigating officer to arrest an accused, if the circumstances so require. In fact, in several cases arrests of accused during pendency of their applications for anticipatory bail are effected without even informing the Court and this is not a special case where any deviation has occasioned. According to Mr. Mukherjee, although the petitioner after being released on bail met the investigating officer on a couple of occasions but thereafter he was craftily dodging such officer. It was submitted that the petitioner did not share his contact details but provided his father’s cell phone details. When called, the police were informed that the petitioner was not available. Repeated raids at the petitioner’s residence proved abortive. The condition of bail that the petitioner would cooperate with the investigating officer, thus, stood violated. The police was on the lookout for the petitioner and it was on the basis of the constant surveillance that was being maintained that he could finally be arrested in the late hours of July 6, 2017. His custodial interrogation, Mr. Mukherjee submitted, was required to take investigation of the F.I.R. to its logical conclusion. There being no order of this Bench restraining the investigating officer to arrest the petitioner, Mr. Mukherjee contended that such arrest cannot be branded illegal. 10. Mr. Roy supported the submission of the public prosecutor and submitted that the application having become infructuous with the arrest of the petitioner, the same may be disposed of granting liberty to him to pursue his remedy in accordance with law. 11. The victim was a model, whereas the accused petitioner is an actor. The accident and the incidents thereafter, have created a state of consternation. A reel-life hero happens to be at the centre-stage of the controversy. A promising model having passed away at a very young age, it is quite but natural that the victim’s family members and well-wishers are anxious so that the truth is unearthed. The accident and the incidents thereafter, have created a state of consternation. A reel-life hero happens to be at the centre-stage of the controversy. A promising model having passed away at a very young age, it is quite but natural that the victim’s family members and well-wishers are anxious so that the truth is unearthed. The petitioner, on his part, has claimed that he was neither drunk nor speeding on the fateful day and the car crash is an accident. The media has contributed generously in giving wide coverage of how in its perception the accident occurred as well as the post-accident incidents, referred to above, and what members of the public, having close association with the victim and the petitioner, expect to happen in course of investigation as well as trial. Even after the arrest of the petitioner, such coverage has not abated. The way the petitioner is spending his life in custody is being widely reported, daily. This Bench having taken note thereof would venture to remind the media that whatever be the contents of the telecast or report, the same have severe ramifications on the public mind. That an accused is innocent unless proved guilty is a legal presumption, which should not be destroyed at the very threshold through a process of media trial particularly when investigation is yet to be concluded. Notwithstanding the freedom that the media enjoys, this Bench requests the media to be more cautious and responsible and desist from making any intrusion that would affect the administration of justice. Be that as it may. 12. The apprehension of the petitioner that he is likely to be arrested, no longer survives in view of his recent arrest. Mr. Roy is justified in his submission that nothing survives for decision on the application. However, the narrative of events post filing of this application necessitate viewing the prosecution case in the proper perspective because Mr. Basu has prayed for appropriate strictures being passed against the officers of the police force instrumental in rendering the application infructuous. 13. According to the prosecution, the petitioner was drunk and driving the car at a very high speed when it crashed leading to the tragic death of the victim. This conclusion has been reached after thorough investigation, based on statements of witnesses recorded under sections 161 and 164, Cr.P.C. as well as opinions of experts. 13. According to the prosecution, the petitioner was drunk and driving the car at a very high speed when it crashed leading to the tragic death of the victim. This conclusion has been reached after thorough investigation, based on statements of witnesses recorded under sections 161 and 164, Cr.P.C. as well as opinions of experts. Filing of this application was necessitated because the petitioner was aware of the investigating agency chasing him for further interrogation to unravel the exact reason that resulted in the accident but somehow or the other, he was successful in giving the investigating officer the slip. In course of the constant surveillance, the petitioner’s whereabouts could be traced and he was accordingly put under arrest. This claim of the prosecution has to be examined in the light of the relevant statutory provisions. 14. Sub-section (1) of section 438 of the Cr.P.C., as it appears in the Central statute, has been amended by the legislature of this State. Section 438, as is applicable to this State, has an additional subsection in (1A). Sub-sections (1) and (1A) of section 438 of the Cr.P.C. read as under: “(1) (a) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail: Provided that the mere fact that a person has applied to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section shall not, in the absence of any order by that Court, be a bar to the apprehension of such person, or the detention of such person in custody, by an officer-in-charge of a police station. (b) The High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, shall dispose of an application for a direction under this subsection within thirty days of the date of such application: Provided that where the apprehended accusation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years, no final order shall be made on such application without giving the State not less than seven days’ notice to present its case. (c) If any person is arrested and detained in custody by an officer-in-charge of a police station before the disposal of the application of such person for a direction under this sub-section, the release of such person on bail by a Court having jurisdiction, pending such disposal, shall be subject to the provisions of section 437. (1A) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained elsewhere in this act or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority.” 15. The will of the people is manifest in the proviso to clause (a) of subsection (1) that pendency of an application for anticipatory bail would not grant any immunity to the accused applicant from being arrested. The statute also requires an application for anticipatory bail to be disposed of within 30 (thirty) days of the same being filed. If one proceeds by the terms of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), the action of the investigating officer in arresting the petitioner upon expiry of 30 (thirty) days of filing of the application is certainly defensible, although he need not have waited for 30 (thirty) days to lapse. 16. However, the question that emerges bearing in mind fixation of an agreed date for hearing is, should the investigating officer be admonished for not waiting for the outcome of the application? Since this Bench had fixed July 13, 2017 as the date for consideration of the application in the presence of all the learned advocates and not a semblance of hint was given in regard to the immediate need to arrest the petitioner, it would have been perfectly desirable if the investigating officer instead of acting hastily informed the Court of what he intended to do. Absence of any submission from the side of Mr. Nandy must have provided a sense of assurance to Mr. Basu that the investigating officer awaits the outcome of the application and hence, no immediate protection is required for the petitioner; and, as such, it was not claimed. This is a factor that definitely supports Mr. Basu’s claim. 17. At the same time, the points argued by Mr. Mukherjee cannot simply be brushed aside. Basu that the investigating officer awaits the outcome of the application and hence, no immediate protection is required for the petitioner; and, as such, it was not claimed. This is a factor that definitely supports Mr. Basu’s claim. 17. At the same time, the points argued by Mr. Mukherjee cannot simply be brushed aside. This Bench cannot ignore that the relevant statute confers a discretionary power on the investigating officer to secure the arrest of an accused, there is no bar to arresting an accused when his application for anticipatory bail is pending, and such application had not been disposed of within 30 (thirty) days of being filed. Drawing from judicial experience, this Bench records its acceptance of the submission of Mr. Mukherjee that several applications for anticipatory bail are rendered infructuous by reason of arrest of the applicant accused during its pendency and, therefore, this is not an exceptional case. On consideration thereof, this Bench is inclined to the view that the investigating officer cannot be held to have exercised his discretion in such a manner that would prick the Court’s conscience and render him susceptible to an admonition from this Bench. After all, the investigating officer may be right in thinking that there being no restraining order he was justified in arresting the petitioner. If a public authority proceeds to abide by the law strictly, does he make himself liable to admonition? The answer must be in the negative. No stricture is, thus, called for. 18. The merits of the controversy need not be examined, for, this Bench is of the further view that expressing any opinion one way or the other might prejudice the case of the petitioner as well as the State in proceedings before the relevant court. 19. The petitioner having been arrested, this application has indeed been rendered infructuous. It stands disposed of as such. It is made abundantly clear that the magistrate shall decide the issues arising before him strictly in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation made hereinabove. 20. There is one other important aspect that needs deliberation. 19. The petitioner having been arrested, this application has indeed been rendered infructuous. It stands disposed of as such. It is made abundantly clear that the magistrate shall decide the issues arising before him strictly in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation made hereinabove. 20. There is one other important aspect that needs deliberation. In view of clause (b), sub-section (1) of section 438, as applicable to this State, this Bench owes an explanation to the people in general and all those applicants accused in particular, who lost their personal liberty by reason of arrests being effected within 30 (thirty) days of filing of their applications for anticipatory bail before this Court without the same being disposed of (notwithstanding the well-settled legal position that time-frames for completing an exercise given in a statute, without indication of the consequences of a default, have been construed as directory). The decision of the coordinate Bench reported in 1993 (1) CHN 264 (Jyoti Kumar Pathak v. Khudan Chand & ors.) may be referred to in this connection where the relevant provision requiring disposal within 30 (thirty) days has been held to be directory in nature. That does not, however, mean that there should not be any attempt at all for compliance of the provision. Every effort ought to be made for disposal within 30 (thirty) days but non-disposal would neither render the application as lapsed nor would the Court be denuded of the power to grant the prayer for anticipatory bail even after 30 (thirty) days of filing thereof if arrest has not been effected by that date. 21. However, such deliberation has to be prefaced, as of necessity, by highlighting a very major problem that the oldest High Court of the country is encountering. The time is now ripe for speaking our mind out or else this premier institution, which has stood tall despite several odds, would gradually cease to lose its efficacy. The bar and the litigant public have been tolerant so long, but this Bench cannot remain a silent spectator waiting for the inevitable ire to explode. 22. It is does not require one to be super intelligent to make the right guess. It is the problem of dearth of adequate number of Judges in this Court. The bar and the litigant public have been tolerant so long, but this Bench cannot remain a silent spectator waiting for the inevitable ire to explode. 22. It is does not require one to be super intelligent to make the right guess. It is the problem of dearth of adequate number of Judges in this Court. It has continued from yester-years and assumed the character of a perpetual concern, which the powers that be having the wherewithal to address and resolve have neglected by their various shades of authoritarianism. 23. The sanctioned strength of Judges in this Court is 72 (seventy-two). Till a couple of years back, the sanctioned strength was 58 (fiftyeight). Today, this Court has a functional strength of 34 (thirty-four) Judges only. The present functional strength is, therefore, a little less than 50% of the sanctioned strength. During the first six months of this year, 4 (four) Judges have already retired. In course of the next month 3 (three) Judges and by November 8, 2017, another 4 (four) Judges including the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice would lay down office. In February next, 3 (three) more Judges would retire. If no Judge is appointed by February 11, 2018, the vacancy would rise to nearly 66%. 24. As a result of the huge vacancies existing as on date, there has been substantial increase in burden of judicial and administrative work to be discharged and the Judges have to maintain a fair and fine balance while dealing with matters assigned to them. To cite an instance, each Division Bench/Single Bench for want of adequate number of Judges, is now required to deal with matters of two/three other Benches apart from their own determination. Faced with such situation, the time for dealing with matters pertaining to specific subjects has to be rationed so that one particular subject does not get undue preference over others. Naturally, time management has now become a key factor in the process of judging. The large number of vacancies have even necessitated Judges of this Court having nearly 11 (eleven) years’ experience and presiding over Division Benches to answer the call of the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice and agree to sit singly for the purpose of disposing of Single Bench matters. Other Judges have also not lagged behind. Their commitment to the cause of the judiciary has been commendable. Other Judges have also not lagged behind. Their commitment to the cause of the judiciary has been commendable. Working at less than 50% strength, disposal of proceedings in this Court have been quite high in the sense that it is comparable with disposals of High Courts functioning with greater strength of Judges. Nonetheless, it cannot to be doubted that whatever is being achieved is far below the expectations of the litigants. 25. To handle the mounting arrears of cases in all the Courts, various high-power committees have been formed. Notable among these are the National Court Management Systems and the Arrears Committees. The Judges of High Courts as part of such committees formulate policies for being implemented in right earnest to bring down the arrears. One of the basic reasons for the mounting arrears had been identified to be the low judge-population ratio. The sanctioned strength of all High Courts was increased by 25% pursuant to a recommendation of the NCMS Committee. It is unfortunate that so far as this Court is concerned, even the sanctioned strength prior to such recommendation [i.e. 58 (fifty-eight)] was never achieved, not to speak of the 25% increase. The maximum number of Judges this Court had, in its more than 150 (one hundred fifty) years of existence, was 50 (fifty) on October 30, 2013. In between that date and October 22, 2014, i.e. when the next appointment came to be made, 12 (twelve) Judges retired and 1 (one) Hon’ble Chief Justice was elevated to the Supreme Court. Thus, it is seen that in no time the functional strength came down to 37 (thirty-seven) from 50 (fifty) within a year’s time. 26. Incidentally, the last appointment of a member of the bar as a Judge in this Court was way back on October 22, 2014. Since then although 9 (nine) Judges have been elevated from the judicial service, 9 (nine) Judges elevated from the bar and 4 (four) Judges elevated from the judicial service have demitted office on retirement and 3 (three) other Judges have been elevated as Hon’ble Chief Justices of other High Courts. Although 3 (three) Judges from other High Courts were appointed in this Court on transfer, the judicial and administrative powers of one such Judge were withdrawn on the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court last February. 27. Although 3 (three) Judges from other High Courts were appointed in this Court on transfer, the judicial and administrative powers of one such Judge were withdrawn on the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court last February. 27. It is axiomatic that dates of retirement of Judges are known to all concerned well in advance. The need to commence the process of appointment of Judges with some degree of urgency so that vacancies caused due to retirement of sitting Judges are filled up simultaneously or soon thereafter, has been emphasised by successive Hon’ble Chief Justices of India and is also inevitably a topic for discussion in any meeting that is convened for exploring ways and means to reduce the mounting arrears. The minutes of such discussions remain on paper, for, seldom are they translated into quick action. It is unfortunate that the requirements of this Court have been neglected over such a long period of time despite everyone concerned being aware of its depleted Judge strength and consequent precarious condition. 28. Can the nation think of the Lok Sabha in a functional state with half of its elected members? Similarly, can Legislative Assemblies function at half-strength? The answer cannot be in the affirmative. The Lok Sabha and/or the Legislative Assemblies are important Constitutional entities and it would be a disgrace for the largest democracy of the world if elections were not conducted on time. Even though an election process may apparently be tainted, it is by judicial verdicts stressing on non-interference prior to completion of the election process and subject to result of any election petition that is presented before the appropriate forum that returned candidates fill up seats in the House/Assemblies. Again, does one find the bureaucracy functioning years after years without sufficient personnel? No time is spared in making the necessary appointments at the right time to ensure its smooth functioning. This Bench is thus left to wonder as to why only in respect of filling up of vacancies in the High Courts, which are also high Constitutional authorities, there is such a brazen apathy and indifference of the political executive. In our Constitutional scheme, the superior judiciary is regarded as the sentinel on the qui vive being the protectors and enforcers of fundamental rights of the people of the country. In our Constitutional scheme, the superior judiciary is regarded as the sentinel on the qui vive being the protectors and enforcers of fundamental rights of the people of the country. The ‘judiciary’ is also a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, obliged to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people. Given the fact that persons accused of offences are losing their liberty prior to the Court that they have approached hearing their plea for protecting their individual liberty because of dearth of adequate member of Judges, the inexplicable continued attitude of apathy and indifference in appointment of Judges is hardly tolerable. 29. Judicial notice can be taken of appointment of Judges in nearly 10 (ten) High Courts over the past 3/4 months and presently no other High Court in the country having sanctioned strength in excess of 60 (sixty) has such a low percentage of Judges as this Court. Information from reliable sources reveals that names of 7 (seven) members of the Bar have been recommended by the Collegium of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the Central Government for elevating them as Judges. Such names were recommended along with names recommended for elevation of Judges of other High Courts long time back. While the functional strength of the other High Courts has increased by the day, filling up of vacancies in this Court remains a distant dream. Apart from anything else, courtesy demands that the Hon’ble the Chief Justice is informed of what stalls appointment of Judges in this Court so that optimum utilization of available resources can be achieved, to the extent possible. There would, however, be no reason to feel elated should appointment of 7 (seven) or some more Judges happen in the near future, for, that may not bring about any substantial change in the functional strength because of the ensuing retirements. The situation in this Court would remain what it is now. Alarming as it were, immediate action is called for to appoint maximum number of Judges to prevent the justice delivery system from collapsing, which seems to be imminent. The fundamental right of access to justice would be a far cry for the people of West Bengal if this impasse were to continue. 30. Alarming as it were, immediate action is called for to appoint maximum number of Judges to prevent the justice delivery system from collapsing, which seems to be imminent. The fundamental right of access to justice would be a far cry for the people of West Bengal if this impasse were to continue. 30. In a democratic polity where the rule of law is dominant, the independence of the judiciary is regarded as a basic structure of the Constitution, right to life and personal liberty is so precious for all and facilitating proper functioning of the High Court is a Constitutional necessity imposing a non-negotiable obligation on all the stakeholders to appoint Judges and thereby fill up vacancies with utmost expedition so that access to justice becomes a reality, rendering a particular High Court ineffective by adopting a step-motherly attitude cannot but draw the frown of a civilised society. In such grave and ominous situation, this Bench expresses hope and trust that the authorities wielding power would spare a thought for this Court and take immediate ameliorative measures so as to prevent the system from collapsing with the ensuing retirement of 7 (seven) more Judges by early November, 2017 and 3 (three) more by early February, 2018. 31. This Bench is of the opinion that the concerns expressed in this order (from paragraphs 20 to 32) should reach the Hon’ble Law Minister of the Union immediately so that the matter relating to appointment of Judges in this Court is given topmost priority. The Registrar General shall do the needful without wasting any time. 32. The politeness of this Bench may not be understood as weakness on its part to be firm. It is made clear that continued silence of the Central Government in the matter of appointment of Judges in the near future despite the concerns expressed in this order, would certainly be viewed seriously as interference in the course of administration of justice and followed by appropriate action as authorized in law. 33. Adverting attention to the case at hand, the petitioner ought to be told that it was due to circumstances beyond the control of this Bench that disabled it from abiding by the time-limit specified in sub-section (1) of section 438, Cr.P.C., albeit the same being directory in nature. 33. Adverting attention to the case at hand, the petitioner ought to be told that it was due to circumstances beyond the control of this Bench that disabled it from abiding by the time-limit specified in sub-section (1) of section 438, Cr.P.C., albeit the same being directory in nature. Over and above this, an unscheduled cease-work call given by the members of the bar in early June added to the misery of all the litigants including the petitioner. Had the learned advocates not stayed away from work with the request to the Court not to pass any adverse order in the absence of a party to the litigation and bearing in mind the pace at which the list has been called on till this date, consideration and disposal of the petitioner’s application within 30 (thirty) days of it being filed would have been a distinct possibility. It is thus his fortune that is to be blamed. 34. Before parting, this Bench directs the Registrar General to initiate an enquiry for finding out the culprit responsible for non-listing of this application in the July monthly list. In the event the Registrar General is in a position to prima facie fix culpability, appropriate departmental action and/or criminal prosecution shall follow in accordance with law.