Taksal Hotel Private Limited v. Radha Krishan Mathur
2017-08-11
TASHI RABSTAN
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This is an application seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against respondents for non-compliance and disobedience of order dated 21st November 2014, passed in APOWP no.28/2014 in OWP no.1132/2013 titled M dated, pursuant whereto, 45 days’ time was given to respondent no.1 to publish the already approved Byelaws of Cantonment Board, Jammu, that, according to petitioner, was not published, to the apparent disadvantage and detriment of petitioner. Petitioner’s averment in application on hand is that writ petition titled M/s Taksal Hotel Pvt Limited v. Union of India and others, previously filed before this Court, was registered as OWP no.1132/2013, and disposed of vide order dated 25th October 2013, directing respondents to publish fresh byelaws as approved by Jammu Cantonment Board within a period of one month from the date copy of the order was made available to respondent no.1. It is contended that aforesaid order became subject matter of LPA no.01/2014, which, however, was dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 27th January 2014. Special Leave Petitions are said to have been filed before the Supreme Court of India, in which petitioner before the Supreme Court, was permitted to file an application before this Court for extension of time to publish fresh byelaws already approved by Jammu Cantonment Board. It is averred in the application that learned counsel for present petitioner extended assurance that contempt matter would not be pressed pending before this Court in the interregnum. Subsequently, respondent is said to have preferred an application before this Court for extension of time to publish fresh byelaws as approved by Jammu Cantonment Board, to which detailed objections were filed. Petitioner also asserts that on 21st November 2014, after hearing counsel for parties, this Court passed an order, granting 45 days’ time for compliance, i.e. to ensure publishing of approved Byelaws as directed by judgment dated 25th October 2013. As stated by petitioner, 45 days have already come to an end on 4th January 2015 and to the knowledge of petitioner, respondent has not implemented the directions of this Court passed on 21st November 2015 and byelaws have not been published, perpetuating petitioner’s grievances with added enormity. It is maintained that respondents have subjected petitioner to unprecedented hardship and harassment by their inaction to deal with the matter and petitioner has been subjected to huge financial losses in the face of inaction of respondents. 2.
It is maintained that respondents have subjected petitioner to unprecedented hardship and harassment by their inaction to deal with the matter and petitioner has been subjected to huge financial losses in the face of inaction of respondents. 2. On 15th May 2015, an application, by respondent, was filed for placing on record Supplementary Affidavit. Respondent, in Supplementary Affidavit, avers that application, being MP no.09/2014, was filed for deferring contempt proceedings in view of observations of the Supreme Court in SLP no.3862/2014, issued vide order dated 22nd April 2014, which is pending before this Court. Respondent contends that the Draft Building Byelaws, prepared by Cantonment Board for publication, were considered by Ministry of Defence, which made changes in Draft Building Byelaws and vide Government of India, Ministry of Defence (Directorate General Defence Estates, Delhi Cantt) letter no.76/40/ Court Case/WC/Jammu/C/DE/14(Vol-III) dated 8th April 2015, the same was approved for publication by Cantonment Board for inviting suggestions and objections from public. Thus, as directed by this Court, Ministry of Defence has set in motion the process of publication of Byelaws, which is stated to be a multi-level process passing through various stages as per the provisions of Cantonments Act, 2006, and in compliance with above decision of Ministry of Defence, a public notice, publishing byelaws was issued/notified by Cantonment Board, Jammu, in leading daily Newspaper of Jammu, i.e. Daily Excelsior, in its Issue dated 10th April 2015, along with its parallel publication in a leading Hindi daily newspaper, namely, Amar Ujala, in its Issue dated 10th April 2015. In pursuance to notification, inviting objections qua publishing of byelaws, a Board meeting is said to have been held on 14th May 2015. These aspects of the matter are stated to have taken place subsequent to filing of MP no.09/2015, which are, according to respondent, relevant to be brought to the notice of this Court in furtherance to the directions passed by the Supreme Court. While the above referred proceedings are pending, prior to which parallel proceedings are stated to have been initiated by petitioner before various subordinate courts as well as in this Court, in order to achieve its illegal designs. Petitioner, it is next averred, initiated Lis in different subordinate courts as well as before this Court and has committed forum picking, as such, conduct of petitioner, is apparently far from being fair. 3.
Petitioner, it is next averred, initiated Lis in different subordinate courts as well as before this Court and has committed forum picking, as such, conduct of petitioner, is apparently far from being fair. 3. It is maintained by respondent in supplementary affidavit that on 26th June 2012, a civil original suit titled Vishal Dhar & ors v. Cantonment Board and ors was filed by Vishal Dhar and others (M/s Taksal Hotel), before learned Sub Judge, Jammu, for Permanent Prohibitory Injunction, restraining defendants, i.e. Cantonment Board, from interfering with construction of basement on the land situated at Satwari, Jammu, wherein relief of decree for restraining defendants from interfering with construction of basement up to ground level, had been sought. Learned Sub Judge, Jammu, is stated to have passed ex parte interim direction dated 9th August 2012, restraining defendant therein from interfering without adopting the due course of law into the construction of the basement up to ground level till next date. Learned Sub Judge vide order dated 31st December 2012, is asserted to have dismissed interim application, after appreciating the stand of defendants therein (Cantonment Board). Aggrieved thereof, petitioner is said to have filed a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal titled Vishal Dhar and ors v. Cantonment Board before learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, who vide order dated 3rd June 2013 directed to maintain status quo from raising further construction on spot. Petitioner, as contended by respondent, also challenged order dated 3rd June 2013 before this Court in CIMA no.269/2013. This Court kept in abeyance operation of order dated 3rd June 2013 and thereafter petitioner continued with construction of building, constraining respondent to seek modification of order dated 6th June 2013, which this Court vide order dated 21st June 2013 modified, directing that construction, raised by petitioner, shall be in accordance with the designs approved by Chief Engineer, Inspection and Quality Control Department, J&K Government. Learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, as maintained by respondent, had also, during pendency of appeal, directed Chief Engineer, Design, Inspection & Quality Control, to inspect the suit property with a view to come to conclusion vis-a-vis the design as well as construction raised on the spot and in this connection the report was filed before learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu.
However, petitioner is alleged to have continued construction in violation of approved designs, constraining Cantonment Board to file contempt petition (COA(c) no.D-4 of 2014), which is also pending consideration before this Court. Petitioner, as asserted by respondents, has deliberately with an intention to negate the directions passed by this Court filed an application seeking withdrawal of appeal and this Court, vide order dated 9th May 2014, allowed application and permitted him to withdraw the appeal. Since first appeal preferred against order dated 3rd June 2013 had been withdrawn by appellant (Vishal Dhar & ors (M/s Taksal Hotel Pvt Ltd), as such, learned Trial Court vide order dated 22nd January 2015, while appreciating and taking into consideration the report of Chief Engineer, Design, Inspection and Quality Control, as well as violation of the status quo order dated 3rd June 2013, directed SHO P/S Satwari to ensure compliance of order dated 3rd June 2013. 4. Respondents also contends that Deputy Inspector General of Police, J&K, Range Jammu, vide letter dated 21st November 2014, communicated that unauthorised construction was stopped by Cantonment authorities and construction, undertaken by petitioner, was not in line with designs vetted, as reported by Chief Engineer, DI&QC. It is further avowed that petitioner deliberately withdrew appeal from learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, on 7th February 2015. Respondent insists that petitioner has initiated above proceedings for achieving illegal and vested designs, but when the same turned otherwise, the Lis was deliberately withdrawn with the sole intention to deceit the judiciary and to earn favourable orders for its benefit. Respondent avows that deliberate withdrawal of proceedings by petitioner would suggest that petitioner was hoodwinking the process of law and deflected the course of justice by earning interim orders from the courts and then withdrawing petitions and that filing of regular petitions and successive withdrawal, after earning interim orders, would be evident from the fact that petitioner initially withdrew CIMA no.269/2013, and thereafter withdrew appeal from learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, and this was done with mala fide intentions to deflect the course of justice to obtain undue benefits. Respondent avers that he has taken all requisite steps to demonstrate bona fide and also to bring publication of byelaws to logical conclusion. 5. Petitioner filed objections to MP no.01/2015.
Respondent avers that he has taken all requisite steps to demonstrate bona fide and also to bring publication of byelaws to logical conclusion. 5. Petitioner filed objections to MP no.01/2015. Petitioner state therein that respondent never felt aggrieved of order passed by this Court on 25th October 2013 in OWP no.1132/2013, which became subject matter of LPA no.01/2014, and dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on 27th January 2014. Subsequently SLPs were filed, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 22nd April 2014. Respondent is stated to have never been aggrieved of any orders passed by the Writ Court and that in absence of respondent no.1, namely, Shri Radhia Krishan Mathur, being aggrieved of any orders, the respondent herein could not file MP no.09/2015. According to petitioner, the fact that Shri Radha Krishan Mathur never felt aggrieved of the orders passed by this Court in OWP no.1132/2013 on 25th October 2013, or the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 27th January 2014, is further reinforced by the fact that respondent herein, Shri Radha Krishan Mathur, preferred an application before this Court, which came to be filed through learned ASGI in Contempt of Court proceedings, i.e. M/s Taksal Hotel Pvt. Ltd. V. Shri Radha Krishan Mathur (COA(OW) no.04/2015, in which Shri Radha Krishan Mathur is insisted to have expressed his desire/intention in unambiguous terms/quite illuminatingly that he wanted implementation of direction of this Court and sought time to do so as he had to proceed abroad on 10th February 2015 on official duty and therefore, it was not possible for him to implement the directions of this Court. 6. Petitioner also insists that judgment/order, rendered by this Court on 25th October 2013, relates to averments made in writ petition titled M/s Taksal Hotel Pvt Ltd v. Union of India and others (OWP no.1132/2013) and paragraph 15 of writ petition provides that byelaws, which were required to be put to publication, were contained in CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 of Jammu Cantonment Board and the judgment rendered by this Court on 25th October 2013, provides publication of byelaws, which stood approved by CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009, and not byelaws, which have been right now put to publication.
Therefore, publication of byelaws other than what were required to be published, aggravates contempt further, inasmuch as respondent was required to publish byelaws contained in CBR no.34 dated 22nd April 2009 and not any other byelaws, which have been put to publication by now. This Court is said to have referred to the byelaws, which had been fresh and had been already approved prior to 25th October 2013 and not any other fresh bye laws and that CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 upon having been forwarded to Ministry of Defence for publication, were placed in the agenda for consideration in the Board Meeting on 25th August 2010 as Item no.10 and in the said meeting, CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 was further amended and approved and these were the byelaws, which this Court directed to be published on 25th October 2013 and not the byelaws, which have been put to publication by now illegally. It is also insisted that the Supreme Court vide order dated 22nd April 2014 provided that an application had already been filed before this Court seeking extension of time to publish fresh byelaws as already permitted by the Supreme Court and in furtherance of directions of the Supreme Court, an application came to be filed before this Court i.e. AP (WP) no.28/2014, which was disposed of vide order dated 21st November 2014. Petitioner asserts that for disobedience of order dated 21st November 2014, a contempt petition has been filed before this Court. Shri Radha Krishan Mathu is alleged to have been intentionally avoiding to support his applications by his personal affidavit and he has only sworn his personal affidavit when he sought time to implement directions of this Court.
Petitioner asserts that for disobedience of order dated 21st November 2014, a contempt petition has been filed before this Court. Shri Radha Krishan Mathu is alleged to have been intentionally avoiding to support his applications by his personal affidavit and he has only sworn his personal affidavit when he sought time to implement directions of this Court. It is maintained that every endeavour has been made by respondent to side track the issue of contempt of court proceedings by filing applications, which are illegal and factually incorrect and by publishing byelaws other than referred to herein above, which are identifiably different and distinguishably separate from those contained in CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 and approved on 25th April 2010, respondent has violated Section 350 of Cantonment Boards Act, 2006, and that any change in the draft byelaws is to take place by the Government of India and not by Director General of Defence Estates, Delhi Cantonment, as he has no jurisdiction to make any alteration in byelaws inasmuch as under Section 350 of Cantonments Act, 2006, it is provided that changes is to be made in the draft byelaws by the Government of India after previous publication and upon receiving objections from the general public, but in the present case the changes are said to have been made by incompetent functionary of Government of India in absence of receiving objections from general public in repugnance to their own Act. Further contention of petitioner is that Ministry of Defence had to simply publish the already approved byelaws, which stood approved on 25th August 2010, when this Court issued directions in this behalf on 25th October 2013 and that in fact changes could be made only after public notice by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, which, in the present case, is Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Shri Radha Krishan Mathur – respondent. Petitioner maintains that injunction suits filed before subordinate courts have nothing to do with contempt committed by respondent and civil suits pending before learned subordinate court are required to be dealt with in accordance with merit and have nothing to do with the contempt proceedings. 7.
Petitioner maintains that injunction suits filed before subordinate courts have nothing to do with contempt committed by respondent and civil suits pending before learned subordinate court are required to be dealt with in accordance with merit and have nothing to do with the contempt proceedings. 7. An application was filed by respondent on 24th August 2015, contending that pursuant to Order dated 25th October 2013 in OWP no.1132/2013, process for publication of notification regarding Building Byelaws in accordance with procedure prescribed under the rules, was initiated, but unfortunately counsel representing Union of India made a statement before this Court and that too without instructions and authority, for publication of Building Byelaws within one month and that since the same was practically impossible, the matter ultimately landed before the Supreme Court in two SLPs, which were filed by Cantonment Board as well as Union of India separately. In one SLP, being SLP no.3371/2014, the Apex Court directed that petitioner therein may file an application in the High Court seeking extension of time to publish the fresh Byelaws and contesting respondent no.1 therein, who is the petitioner in this Court, had assured through his counsel, Mr Altaf Ahmed, that he would not press contempt proceedings pending before this Court in the interregnum. The Supreme Court while disposing of another SLP, being SLP no.3862/2015, mentioned that it was informed that petitioner there (respondent here) had already filed an application before this Court seeking extension of time to publish fresh byelaws as already permitted by the Supreme Court vide order dated 4th February 2014, but it had been requested that in the meantime contempt proceedings be deferred, which the Supreme Court allowed on the assurance of counsel for respondent no.1 there (petitioner here). With the consent of counsel for both sides, Special Leave Petition was disposed of with liberty to petitioner there (respondent here) to put forth its stand regarding publication of approved byelaws before this Court and counsel appearing for present petitioner had also fairly assured that he would not press for contempt in the matter before this Court.
With the consent of counsel for both sides, Special Leave Petition was disposed of with liberty to petitioner there (respondent here) to put forth its stand regarding publication of approved byelaws before this Court and counsel appearing for present petitioner had also fairly assured that he would not press for contempt in the matter before this Court. Respondent also avers in the application that while the matter was pending before this Court and since the process of publication of Building Byelaws was already in progress which was nearing its completion, a separate MP no.09/2015, detailing comprehensive steps taken from time to time by respondent regarding publication of Building Byelaws, was filed, which is pending consideration. Respondent states that after complying with mandatory provision of law as well as procedure relating thereto, the Central Government has approved the Jammu Cantonment (Building) Bye Laws 2015 and the same has been forwarded vide letter dated 11th August 2015 to Controller of Publication, Department of Publication, Ministry of Urban Development, Civil Lines Delhi, for publication in Part III Section 4 of the Official Gazette of India and in this regard copy of communication dated 11th August 2015, along with copy of Jammu Cantonment (Building) Bye Laws 2015, have been enclosed by respondent with the application. 8. In compliance of order dated 16th December 2015, respondent filed statement of facts on 11th February 2016. He states that he had joined as Secretary to Government of India in the Ministry of Defence on 25th May 2015. Before assumption of his charge, appropriate steps had already been taken in the matter and draft of Jammu Cantonment (Building) Bye Laws, 2015, had been approved by competent authority on 28th March 2015 and, after the same were vetted by Ministry of Law and Justice, and sent to Directorate General, Defence Estates, for publication in newspapers to invite objections/suggestions from the general public within 30 days. After publication in newspapers on 10th April 2015, and considering objections/suggestions, draft Bye Laws 2015, are said to have been sent to Ministry of Defence for approval on 15th June 2015 and approved by competent authority on 6th July 2015 and subsequently the said notification/SRO sent vide communication dated 11th August 2015 to Controller of Publication, Department of Publication, Ministry of Urban Development Civil Lines, New Delhi, for publishing the same in Part III Section 4 of the Official Gazette of India.
The Jammu Cantonment Building Bye Laws, 2015, according to respondent, came to be published in official gazette of India, vide its Issue no.274 dated 12th August 2015. Respondent has given chronological sequence of events that culminated in issuance of Notification of Jammu Cantonment (Building) Bye Laws, 2015. Draft Bye Laws are stated to have been recommended for approval by the then Defence Secretary on 27th March 2015 and on 28th March 2015 Draft Bye Laws were approved by competent authority. On 30th March 2015, Draft Bye Laws were sent to Ministry of Law and Justice, for vetting and on 07th April 2015 Draft Bye Laws, vetted by Ministry of Law and Justice, were returned to Director General of Defence Estates, New Delhi, for publication in newspaper for inviting objections/suggestions within 30 days. On 10th April 2015 Draft Bye Laws are said to have been published by Cantonment Board Jammu in Newspapers for inviting objections / suggestions within 30 days and on 14th May 2015 Cantonment Board, Jammu, considered and rejected the objections. On 15th June 2015, Draft Building Bye Laws are said to have been sent to Ministry of Defence and on 4th July 2015, Draft Building Bye Laws were recommended for approval by the Defence Secretary. The Draft Bye Laws are said to have been approved by the competent authority on 6th July 2015 and on 7th July 2015 the same were sent to Ministry of Law and Justice for vetting. On 14th July 2015 Draft Bye Laws were vetted by Ministry of Law and Justice and Bye Laws for vetting of Hindi Translation was vetted by Ministry of Law and Justice on 24th July 2015. Vetted Draft Building Bye Laws were sent to Director General of Defence Estates for publication on 27th July 2015 and on 12th August 2015 Jammu Cantonment (Building) Bye Laws 2015 were notified vide SRO no.4/A/15-16 (No.274) dated 12th August 2015 in the Gazette of India. Respondent states that in view of the above development, including publication and notification of Bye Laws, the contempt may be dropped. Contention of respondent is that petitioner cannot, in law, claim that Bye Laws should be published according to his need and requirement, and even otherwise publication of the laws falls within the domain of competent authority and that if petitioner is aggrieved, he can work out remedy available under law. 9.
Contention of respondent is that petitioner cannot, in law, claim that Bye Laws should be published according to his need and requirement, and even otherwise publication of the laws falls within the domain of competent authority and that if petitioner is aggrieved, he can work out remedy available under law. 9. On 7th November 2016, petitioner filed objections to the statement of facts of respondent. According to petitioner statement of facts filed by respondent does not at all show implementation of directions of this Court and that facts in respect of the matter in controversy have been distorted beyond dimensions. Petitioner’s submission is that respondent no.1 in writ petition, i.e. Secretary of Defence, Government of India, was directed to publish already existing fresh byelaws, i.e. CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 as approved by Jammu Cantonment Board within a period of one month from the date of service of the order of this Court to Secretary of Defence, Government of India. Petitioner’s assertion is that this Court had asked respondent to publish fresh byelaws, which stood approved by Jammu Cantonment Board i.e. CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009, which already existed on the date when this Court passed the order dated 25th October 2013. Respondent no.2 is said to have taken note of these challenges of modernization and development and approved revised building byelaws vide CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 and forwarded it to Ministry of Defence for publication and amended byelaws were placed in the agenda for consideration in the Board meeting on 25th August 2010 at item no.10 and the draft amended. Respondents, as said by petitioner, were required to publish CBR no.34 dated 30th April 2009 and not any other byelaws which did not exist on the date of judgment. 10. I have heard learned counsel for parties at length and considered the matter. 11. It may not be out of place to mention here that early man was free to act in any manner he liked and his will to do an act depended upon the strength of his limbs, strengthened by the use of arms, which he developed day by day. That instinct to prevail over another survives even to this day. The society was formed by our first ancestors to bring peace, without which no development is possible.
That instinct to prevail over another survives even to this day. The society was formed by our first ancestors to bring peace, without which no development is possible. If a man is in constant fear of losing his limb, life or livelihood, the creative spirit in him remains dormant. Therefore, it was agreed that individual liberties be curtailed to some extent and disputes between the warring groups be settled by an independent agency. This agency came to be called the ‘King’. It was for the King to decide disputes arising between men, who chose him to be King. The King formulated certain guidelines which were termed laws. Everyone in the society was expected to act in such a manner so as not to come in conflict with these laws. If there was disobedience to the laws, punishment was awarded for the same. In early stages of society, the King personally disposed of the disputes. As the society expanded, disputes increased in number. It was not possible for the King personally to settle all the disputes. He, therefore, appointed persons to perform his duties. This is how “Courts” came into existence. Most of the disputes were settled by the Courts on the basis of guidelines given by the King. Still the King retained his right to hear any dispute himself. In this way, the decisions given by the Courts were the decisions of the King in law. If the King’s authority could not be questioned, then authority of the Courts could not be questioned, too. If the King could not be abused or scandalized, so also the Courts could not be abused or scandalized. Just as the proceedings before the King could not be prejudiced, or obstructed, similarly the proceedings before the Court could not be prejudiced or obstructed. If anyone interfered in the administration of justice, he was liable to be punished. It is the genesis of the law of contempt of Courts. King’s word was law. He could not be disobeyed. If a person was asked to stay, he had to stay. If he was asked to depart, he had to depart. Anyone howsoever high he may be, could be punished for disobedience. The punishment had no limits. The condemned man could lose his property, liberty, limbs or even his life. Since the King had the right to punish, he also had the right to pardon.
If he was asked to depart, he had to depart. Anyone howsoever high he may be, could be punished for disobedience. The punishment had no limits. The condemned man could lose his property, liberty, limbs or even his life. Since the King had the right to punish, he also had the right to pardon. A sincere apology for any lapse could save the man from the wrath of the King. 12. The authority of the King travelled down to superior courts. Their word was also final, in the ladder of various stages of the litigation. No one could question the authority of the Courts. No one could humiliate the Courts or scandalise them and no one could prejudice or obstruct the course of justice. Anyone who did all this, was punished. Yet for a long time, the law on the subject remained in a confused state. Different Judges describe contempt of Court in different ways. For the first time, it was Wilmot, J., who pronounced the law on the subject with precision. In the case of R. v. Almon (1765) Wilm. 243, the facts were that one John Almon, a book-seller, published a libel on Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice. An attachment of the person of John Almon was obtained, but in the warrant of attachment by mistake, instead of writing R. v. Almon, R. v. Wilkes was written. Mr Justice Wilmot (as he then was) urged Sergeant Glyn to accept the amendment, but he as a man of honour, did not agree. The mistake was fatal and the proceedings were dropped. Wilmot, J., thus, could not deliver the judgment, which he had written out. The judgment was written in 1765, but it came to limelight when Wilmot’s son published it in 1802, as “Notes of Judges’ Opinion and Judgments” (1765 Wilmot 243). The judgment is the cornerstone of the law on the subject. Wilmot, J., in this case says, as follows: “The power which the Courts in ‘Westminster Hall have of vindicating their own authority, is coeval’ with their foundation and institution; it is a necessary incident to every Court of Justice, whether of record or not, to fine and imprison for a contempt to the Court, acted in the fact of it.
Wilmot, J., in this case says, as follows: “The power which the Courts in ‘Westminster Hall have of vindicating their own authority, is coeval’ with their foundation and institution; it is a necessary incident to every Court of Justice, whether of record or not, to fine and imprison for a contempt to the Court, acted in the fact of it. And the issuing of attachments by the Supreme Courts of Justice in Westminster Hall, for contempts out of Court, stands upon the same immemorial usage, as supports the whole Fabric of the Common Law; in as much as the lex terrae, and within the exception of Magna Charta, as the issuing any other legal process whatsoever.” 13. He was followed by Cockburn, C.J., in R.v. Lefroy (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B.134, in these words: “In the case of the Superior Courts at Westminster, which represent the one Supreme Court of the land, this power was coeval with their original constitution, and has always been exercised by the. These Courts were originally carved out of the one Supreme Court, and are all divisions of the aula regis, where it is said the King is person dispensed justice, and their power of committing for contempt was an emanation of the royal authority, for any contempt of the Court, would be a contempt of the Sovereign. 14. The dictum of Wilmot, J., was followed by successive Courts and constitutional authorities not only in England, but also in America. The same power was exercised by the High Courts in India. In the case of Surendra Nath Banerji (10 Cal. 109 : 10 O/A/ 171), Peacock, J., said: “Thus a High Court derives the power to punish for contempt of Court from its own existence or creations. It is not a power conferred upon it by any law.” 15. Lord Hardwicke, L.C. [St. James’s Evening Post, (1742) 2 Atk. 409 at p.471], said, “There are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt of scandalising the Court itself. There may be likewise a contempt of this Court, in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here. There may be also a contempt of this Court, in prejudicing man-kind against persons, before the cause is heard”.
409 at p.471], said, “There are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt of scandalising the Court itself. There may be likewise a contempt of this Court, in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here. There may be also a contempt of this Court, in prejudicing man-kind against persons, before the cause is heard”. He adds, “There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.” To speak generally, contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during the litigation. 16. The legislation, first brought on the statute Book of India was “The Contempt of Court Act (XIII of 1926)”. The Act was replaced by the Act 1952 (XXXII of 1952). In both these Acts, the object was mentioned as, “An Act to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing contempts of Courts.” The Act of 1952 was replaced by Act 70 of 1971, which also had the object as above, but “added and regulate their procedure in relation thereto”. 17. It is pertinent to mention here that Contempt of Court means civil contempt or criminal contempt. Civil Contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court, or wilful breach of undertaking given to a court. Criminal contempt means publication whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise of any matter, or the doing of any other act, whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding, or interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. 18.
18. Any conduct, by which the course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending, even if the threatening letter is marked “private” or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be witnessed in the cause, have been held to be contempt. The Courts in India have held that it is the duty of the Court to protect defendants from being cowed down into submission and under pressure of threat, menace, being made to abandon pleas, which they can legitimately take in a pending case and that if person attempts to bring pressure on a party to a proceeding, to admit his claim, he should be committed for contempt of court, as his action tends to interfere with the due course of justice in the Court. The Court, while considering the issue as to whether alleged contemnor should be punished for not having complied and carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act, while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court. Before a contemnor is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a Court, the court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ, but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. The Civil Court, while executing a decree against judgment debtor, is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been passed, it is the duty of the Court to execute the decree whatever may be the consequence thereof. But while examining the grievance of the person, who has invoked jurisdiction of the Court to initiate proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemnor is held guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. 19. Now after having above discussion, let me come to case in hand.
19. Now after having above discussion, let me come to case in hand. Instant motion is for initiation of contempt proceedings against respondents for wilful and intentional non-implementation and disobedience of order dated 21st November 2014 passed in AP (OWP) no.28/2014 titled M/s Taksal Hotel Private Limited v. Union of India and another. 20. First of all, petitioner came with a writ petition, being OWP no.1132/2013, titled M/s Taksal Hotel Pvt. Ltd. Company v. Union of India and another. The said petition was, at its threshold, vide order dated 25th October 2013, disposed of in the following terms: “The only grievance projected by petitioner in the present writ petition is that respondent No.1 be directed to publish fresh Bye Laws approved by Jammu Cantonment Board. Mr S.S.Chib, learned CGSC, stated that he has not received any instructions in writing whereas he has been communicated through telephone that respondent No.1 require fifteen days more time for publishing fresh Bye Laws. His statement is taken on record. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, writ petition is taken up for final disposal and disposed of with a direction to respondent No.1 to publish fresh Bye Laws as approved by Jammu Cantonment Board within a period of one month from the date copy of the order is made available to respondent No.1. Disposed of along with connected CMA, if any. Registry is directed to supply copy of this order to Mr. Chib.” 21. Letters Patent Appeal, being LPAOW no.01/2014 titled Union of India and another v. M/s Taksal Hotel Private Ltd, was filed against aforesaid order dated 25th October 2013, which was dismissed vide order dated 27th January 2014, in that, appeal, as held by the Division Bench, was not competent against consent order. Dissatisfied therewith, Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Supreme Court. After delay was condoned in preferring Special Leave Petition, the petitioner there (respondent here) on 22nd April 2014 informed the Supreme Court, that petitioner there (respondent here) had already filed an application before this Court for extension of time to publish fresh bye-laws as already permitted by this Court vide order dated 4th February 2014, but a request was made that in the meantime contempt proceedings, that had been initiated before this Court by petitioner herein (respondent before the Supreme Court), be deferred.
As an assurance had already been extended by counsel for respondent no.1 there (petitioner here), on 4th February 2014, the Supreme Court allowed deference of contempt proceedings. With the consent of the counsel for both sides, Special Leave Petition was disposed of with liberty to petitioner there (respondent here) to put forth its stand regarding publication of approved byelaws before this Court. It would be advantageous to reproduce the order dated 22nd April 2014, passed by the Supreme Court hereunder: “Delay condoned It is informed that the petitioner has already filed an application before the High Court seeking extension of time to publish fresh bye-laws as already permitted by this Court vide order dated 04.02.2014. However, it has been requested that in the meantime, the contempt proceedings be deferred which we allow on the assurance of the counsel for the respondent no.1 which was given on the earlier occasion i.e. 04.02.2014. With the consent of the counsel for both the sides, we dispose of this special leave petition with liberty to the petitioner to put forth its stand regarding publication of the approved bye-laws before the High Court. Mr Altaf Ahmad, learned senior counsel, has also fairly assured that he will not press for contempt in the matter before the High Court.” 22. The order dated 22nd April 2014, passed by the Supreme Court, thus, unequivocally, provides that Special Leave Petition was disposed of with the consent of counsel appearing for parties and liberty given to respondent herein to put forth its stand regarding publication of approved byelaws before this Court. Even counsel for present petitioner, appearing before the Supreme Court, had assured that petitioner would not press for contempt in the matter before this Court. 23. Application (APOWP no.28/2014 in OWP no.1132/2013) was filed by respondent for extension of time, which was granted by 45 days. 24. Petitioner’s gravamen is that Bye-Laws existing on 25th October 2013, and not subsequent Building Bye-Laws, should be published and made applicable. Petitioner in its objections filed in opposition to statement of facts of respondents at paragraph 04 and 07, states: “ 4……The proposed amended Bye Laws have been approved by the Board but are pending publication before the Ministry. Three level Basement parking within the complex.
Petitioner in its objections filed in opposition to statement of facts of respondents at paragraph 04 and 07, states: “ 4……The proposed amended Bye Laws have been approved by the Board but are pending publication before the Ministry. Three level Basement parking within the complex. Parking under the basement is proposed to be permissible over 75% of the plot area subject to a minimum set of back of 3 mts on all sides. The Area under parking/ services in the basement floor shall not be counted towards the calculation of F.A.R. in the Cantonment…. 7…… Perusal of the statement of facts filed by the respondents provides that they wanted to publish some other Bye-Laws which are identifiably different and distinguishably separate from CBR No.34 Dt: 30.04.2009. Obviously the Hon’ble writ court could not direct the publication of a Bye-Law which did not exist on the date of the order i.e. 25.10.2013 passed by the Hon’ble High Court J&K at Jammu. It is submitted that the averments contained in para no:3 of the statement of facts provides that the respondents have been referring to some Bye-Laws which were approved on 28.03.2015 when apparently on the date of the judgment/order, these Bye-Laws were not in existence and the Hon’ble court could not thus direct the publishing of some Bye-Laws which were non-existent on the date of the judgment…..” 25. Petitioner wants that Building Bye-Laws of a particular time, that is, when the order dated 25th October 2013 in OWP no.1132/2013, was passed and not the Building Bye-Laws that came into being thereafter, be issued and notified. However, respondents, in their statement of facts, filed on 11th February 2016, in compliance of order dated 16th December 2015, have given chronological sequence of events, which reveals that what was required for respondents to follow, has been followed in letter and spirit and Building Bye-Laws were required to be first of all vetted by concerned authority and thereafter approved by competent authority and after approval, notified vide SRO no.4/A/15-16 (no274)( dated 12th August 2015 in the Gazette of India. In that view of matter, it was not only respondents’ contribution and obligation in issuing and notifying the Building Bye-Laws, but there were other departments and organisations involved in finalisation, vetting and approving of Building Bye-Laws.
In that view of matter, it was not only respondents’ contribution and obligation in issuing and notifying the Building Bye-Laws, but there were other departments and organisations involved in finalisation, vetting and approving of Building Bye-Laws. Thus, there is no wilful and intentional disobedience on part of respondents in implementation of Court order(s) vis-a-vis issuance and notification of Building Bye-Laws. 26. Submission and counter-submission of parties would take this Court to the conclusion that it would be relevant for petitioner to avail of appropriate remedy by challenging the action(s) of respondents, of which petitioner is aggrieved. It is pertinent to mention here that there are cases in which even if a technical breach is proved and respondent had mens rea, the Court will, nonetheless, dismiss the application. For contempt proceedings to be instituted there must be something more involved than a mere technicality. In the words of Arlidge Eady and Smith in Adam Phones v. Goldschmidt (1999) 4 All ER 486, “the process of contempt should not be invoked in aid of a civil remedy where some other method of achieving the desired result is available”. 27. Whether action of respondents, by issuing Building Bye Laws, is open to be reviewed in the contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is to be seen that once respondents have issued Building Bye Laws on the basis of directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation, drafting, vetting, finalising and approval of the Bye-Laws may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review and that cannot be considered to be wilful violation of the order. In exercise of powers as contemplated under contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by this Court cannot be given to respondents to redraw the Building Bye Laws, in that, same would amount to exercising jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in contempt proceedings, which is not otherwise permissible. My these views are fortified by judgment rendered in J. S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and others, 1997 AIR (SC) 113.
My these views are fortified by judgment rendered in J. S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and others, 1997 AIR (SC) 113. The Supreme Court held in the said case that seniority list may or may not be in conformity with the directions, the aggrieved party can avail of opportunity of judicial review and order of Single Judge of High Court in contempt proceedings ordering for redrawal of list, amounts to exercising jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings, which is not permissible in contempt proceedings. 28. The improper and reprehensible conduct of a party in not complying with the terms of the consent decree does not amount to an offence within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. My said view is buttressed by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin, AIR 1979 SC 1528 . This Court, in contempt proceedings, cannot go beyond proceedings available under contempt and open another branch of proceedings, which is beyond the scope of contempt proceedings. Reliance in this regard is made to Lalith Mathur v. L. Maheshwara Rao (2000) 10 Supreme Court Cases 285, wherein the Supreme Court has held that in view of consideration accorded by respondents, further directions in contempt proceedings will be without jurisdiction. 29. Further to point out here that the Court in Contempt jurisdiction has to consider only whether the direction or judgment of the Court passed in regular proceeding, has been complied with or not. It cannot go beyond the directions contained in the order, disobedience whereof is complained of. Whether the authority rightly passed the order, or issued the byelaws, or considered the case of petitioner pursuant to the order passed by the Court or procedure adopted is correct, is not the matter to be seen by the Court dealing with contempt matter. For that purpose, it is open to aggrieved person to approach the Court in regular proceedings by filing a fresh writ petition etcetera. 30. For the foregoing reasons, I am not satisfied that there has been any willful and intentional disobedience of the orders of this Court. The contempt petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. 31. Notice issued, is discharged. 32.
30. For the foregoing reasons, I am not satisfied that there has been any willful and intentional disobedience of the orders of this Court. The contempt petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. 31. Notice issued, is discharged. 32. However, it is clarified that dismissal of this contempt petition shall not be construed as any expression of opinion on the issues raised in the petition and that it shall be open to petitioner to take recourse to such other remedy in such forum as may be available to petitioner in law