JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present application is filed by the applicant - original accused No. 2 under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for seeking quashment of the complaint being Inquiry Case No. 149 of 1996 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana. 2. The premise upon which the present application came to be filed is that one Pratapji Madhuji Vihol had also filed the Criminal Complaint on 25.7.1996 before the ACB Police Station, Mehsana being CR No. 16 of 1996 against the present respondent No. 2 - complainant for the offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is further the case of the applicant that in that context, a trap was executed on 26.7.1996 by the applicant along with another police personnel of ACB Police Station, Mehsana along with the panchas. In that trap proceedings, the currency notes came to be seized from respondent No. 2. The necessary formalities of execution of panchnama has also been undertaken on that very day and the statement of respondent No. 2 also came to be recorded. The seizure memo as well as panchnama of trap is executed on very same day. 2.1 It is further the case of applicant that surprisingly, after a substantial period of time, the present respondent No. 2 filed the criminal complaint on 30.9.1996 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mehsana for the offence under Section 342 r/w 114 of the IPC against the present applicant. It has been asserted by the applicant that in the process the earlier complaint which was filed on 25.7.1996, a charge-sheet has also been filed against the respondent No. 2 on 22.12.1997 for the offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. So much so that respondent No. 2 was also arrested on 19.12.1997. 2.2 The case of the applicant further travelled by asserting that on 31.7.2000, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana, after conducting an inquiry, issued process against the present applicant for the offence under Section 342 r/w Section 114 of the IPC. 2.3 On account of aforesaid process having been issued by the learned JMFC, the applicant initially filed an application below Exh. 38 on 20.3.2003 in Criminal Case No. 3809 of 2000 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana for seeking discharge from the prosecution lodged by respondent No. 2. 2.3 On account of aforesaid process having been issued by the learned JMFC, the applicant initially filed an application below Exh. 38 on 20.3.2003 in Criminal Case No. 3809 of 2000 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana for seeking discharge from the prosecution lodged by respondent No. 2. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana vide order dated 28.10.2005 was pleased to dismiss the said application below Exh. 38. 2.4 The applicant has further pointed out in the memo of application that being aggrieved by and feeling dissatisfied with the order passed below Exh. 38, the applicant preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 12 of 2006 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court, Mehsana, which, later on, came up for consideration before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Fast Track Court, Mehsana, who, by judgment and order dated 21.4.2006, was pleased to reject the same. 2.5 The applicant thereafter had approached this Court by way of Special Criminal Application by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for challenging the orders passed by the courts below and said writ petition was registered as Special Criminal Application No. 1185 of 2006 which came to be admitted and thereafter, upon further adjudication as legal issue was raised with respect to maintainability of petition challenging the order of seeking discharge whether the same was maintainable or not in a summons triable case and therefore, a request was made by the applicant to permit the said petition to be withdrawn so as to enable the applicant to file a substantive petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and it is in that context pursuant to the said order passed by this Court, the present application appears to have been filed. Said order was passed on 26.3.2009 and thereafter, it emerges from the record that present application appears to have been prepared in the month of May, 2009 and presented before this Court on 15.9.2009. The present application was entertained by this Court on 24.2.2010 by issuing notice upon the respondents but, then it appears that on 20.7.2010, this Court was pleased to issue Rule and also granted interim relief in terms of Para.6(B) and now it has come up for final disposal before this Court. 3. Mr. The present application was entertained by this Court on 24.2.2010 by issuing notice upon the respondents but, then it appears that on 20.7.2010, this Court was pleased to issue Rule and also granted interim relief in terms of Para.6(B) and now it has come up for final disposal before this Court. 3. Mr. M.M. Tirmizi, learned counsel appearing for the applicant - original accused No. 2 has vehemently contended that prior to filing of the complaint, no sanction is obtained as required under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, the complaint itself is not maintainable. In addition thereto, Mr. Tirmizi has further contended that on the basis of averments contained in the complaint itself, no offence under Section 342 is made out ex-facie and therefore, since the ingredients of the offence alleged are not apparently visible from the complaint, such complaint may not be entertained as the same would tantamount to be an abuse of process of law. Mr. Tirmizi has further contended that the averments which are made in the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 are not in any way outside the discharge of applicant's duty and on the contrary, false averments have been made to duck himself from the complaint filed against him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Mr. Tirmizi has further contended that the applicant has undertaken the lawful discharge of his duty and nothing beyond. It is also contended that neither force is applied of such a nature which may permit even respondent No. 2 to raise any grievance. On the contrary, on that day i.e. on 25.7.1996 since the FIR was lodged against the respondent No. 2, as a part of investigating process the trap was carried out, even the seizure memo has also been drawn, necessary panchnama has been executed and therefore, whatever is done is done in discharge of his official duty and therefore, same cannot form an act overreaching any process of law. On the contrary, the respondent No. 2 being a lawyer was expected to cooperate with the process of investigation instead has chosen to raise the grievance like this. He submitted that simply because some time has taken for taking steps of drawing panchnama of preparation of seizure memo etc., for some time respondent No. 2 has to remain with the applicant in police station. He submitted that simply because some time has taken for taking steps of drawing panchnama of preparation of seizure memo etc., for some time respondent No. 2 has to remain with the applicant in police station. But neither imprisonment has taken place nor any torture is executed of any nature and therefore, simply because the respondent No. 2 is a lawyer, the applicant cannot keep aside all his works as required in his office and that expectation is not to be kept in mind by respondent No. 2. This entire complaint which has been filed is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law and just with a view to undermine the authority of applicant being police officer. On the basis of averments contained in the complaint, no offence is made out which may permit the respondent No. 2 to drag the applicant in prosecution. 3.1 Mr. Tirmizi has further agitated that there is a gross delay in filing the complaint which is unexplained and the manner in which the applicant has dragged the respondent No. 2, who was in dress code of a lawyer, is possible the reason for bringing the complaint with the support of bar association and a prestige issue is tried to be made out by lodging the complaint in question. Otherwise without any undue delay, immediate actions have been taken by drawing panchnama, preparing the seizure memo and everything was done promptly and therefore, this is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law by the respondent No. 2 and therefore, Mr. Tirmizi has requested the Court to set aside the impugned complaint as also the process issued therein. 3.2 To substantiate his contentions about sanction as well as abuse of process of law, Mr. Tirmizi has relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court as well as various High Courts which are as under: "(i) Amal Kumar Jha v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 734 . (ii) Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das & Anr., reported in 2006 (3) GLR 2304. (iii) Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in AIR 2006 SC 820 . (iv) Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2009 (1) Scale 574." 3.3 By referring to these decisions, Mr. (ii) Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das & Anr., reported in 2006 (3) GLR 2304. (iii) Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in AIR 2006 SC 820 . (iv) Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2009 (1) Scale 574." 3.3 By referring to these decisions, Mr. Tirmizi has contended that the complaint is not only not tenable but, for want of sanction the same is not entertainable and therefore, this is a fit case to grant the relief as prayed for. Mr. Tirmizi has further contended that earlier filing of discharge application and to agitate the same right upto this Court, the same cannot be termed as a delay intent on the part of applicant. On the contrary, whatever steps which were advised to the applicant, have been taken in lawful manner and therefore, simply because an error of law in bringing discharge application in summons triable case has occurred, the same cannot be termed as an abuse of process at the instance of applicant for applying dilatory tactics. On the contrary, the chronology of events would clearly indicate the action has been respectfully challenged by the applicant in appropriate forum. Simply because to the misfortune of the applicant, no favourable order has been passed in such an application, the same cannot be termed as an abuse of process. On the contrary, it is converse in the present case that a police officer has been dragged in prosecution by an counsel knowing fully well that counsel was facing serious charges of corruption and the applicant has in discharge of his official duty has undertaken appropriate steps. Mr. Tirmizi has further contended that if this kind of proper exercise of power by the applicant is not visualized in a right spirit, the same would undermine the authority of police department and therefore also, keeping in mind this aspect, the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 deserves to be quashed. The authorities which have been cited would be dealt with by this Court at a later point of time in the present judgment at an appropriate stage. However, by submitting this, Mr. Tirmizi has requested the Court to quash the complaint by granting the relief as prayed for in the present application. 4. To oppose the application, Mr. The authorities which have been cited would be dealt with by this Court at a later point of time in the present judgment at an appropriate stage. However, by submitting this, Mr. Tirmizi has requested the Court to quash the complaint by granting the relief as prayed for in the present application. 4. To oppose the application, Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2 - original complainant has vehemently submitted that Section 482 powers being extraordinary in nature, the same cannot be utilized to permit the police authority to act at their sweet will. Mr. Shah has submitted that the manner in which the respondent No. 2 is practically lifted in court dress and to apply the force upon respondent No. 2, cannot be termed as discharge of his official duty of the applicant. The act which has been narrated in the complaint has no relation in connection with discharge of official duty of the applicant and therefore, such act does not require any sanction. Mr. Shah has further contended that systematic dilatory tactics is adopted by the applicant in bringing the application so as to see that the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 cannot proceed further. For that purpose, Mr. Shah has drawn attention of this Court to the record as well as affidavit-in-reply filed by him and contended that chronology of dates would clearly indicate that there was a clear intent of applicant to dodge the proceedings. Mr. Shah has further contended that the applicant is a senior police officer must have a knowledge about the act of discharge of duty and must have in mind the distinction between summons triable and warrant triable case. He further submitted that as it is a settled position of law that discharge application is not to be entertained in summons triable but, this senior officer knowing fully well has adopted such a course to proceed and for that purpose, a discharge application came to be filed though not maintainable which ultimately dismissed on 28.10.2005. He further submitted that as it is a settled position of law that discharge application is not to be entertained in summons triable but, this senior officer knowing fully well has adopted such a course to proceed and for that purpose, a discharge application came to be filed though not maintainable which ultimately dismissed on 28.10.2005. Now, this order of dismissal of discharge application was very much clear in the mind of applicant, still, however, instead to rushing down this Court, as has been done in the present proceedings, he should have adopted such a course instead has preferred a criminal revision application before the learned Sessions Judge and since it was not maintainable, the same was not entertained having found no ground which ultimately came to be dismissed on 21.4.2006. Mr. Shah has specifically contended that even then after dismissal of his request at both the time, the applicant has chosen to approach this Court by way of petition in the year 2006 which was registered as Special Criminal Application No. 1185 of 2006. Mr. Shah has contended that this petition has been dragged on for pretty long period and on 26.3.2009, the applicant has chosen to withdraw the same with a view to avail appropriate remedy before the appropriate bench and thereafter, interim relief went on continuing. Mr. Shah has agitated that even after withdrawal of the same, this petition has been presented before this Court and has also dragged on from 2009 to 2016 and therefore, this chronology of events is clearly establishing that somehow the applicant wants to see that the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 may not be precipitated any further and therefore, such kind of conduct on the part of applicant is to be viewed seriously since the applicant is not a layman but, is a senior police officer, has the knowledge of lawful process of the Court and therefore, this deliberate conduct requires applicant to oust for the equitable extraordinary jurisdiction and therefore, the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are not to be exercised to encourage the applicant any further. Mr. Shah has further contended that the case which has been filed is a summons triable case. Mr. Shah has further contended that the case which has been filed is a summons triable case. The very object of summons triable case is - the summary process so as to see that as fast as possible, the summons case to be disposed of and that is the purport behind the decision delivered by the Apex Court that no discharge application to be entertained. By applying the conduct like this, the applicant has frustrated the very object of the process of summons case and therefore, on this ground alone, the present application deserves to be dismissed. 4.1 Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2 has further contended that even the summons which has been issued upon the complaint filed by respondent No. 2, there is a proper application of mind reflected in an order. It is not that just for the sake of issuance of summons, the same came to be issued. On the contrary, the learned Judge has considered each aspect and then, the process came to be issued upon the complaint. This aspect has also been well considered at two stages by the court below as can be seen from the record and therefore, in no eventuality the present application may be entertained which would encourage the applicant to dodge the complaint. Mr. Shah has contended that it is a settled position of law that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and not in a routine manner. Mr. Shah has further contended that this is not a case in which the applicant may be viewed with sympathized. Mr. Shah has also contended that the entire chronology which has occurred as is reflecting from the record is clearly suggesting that no case is made out by the applicant to entertain the application. Mr. Shah has drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that the panchnama has been prepared at 3.00 p.m., still though the complaint cannot lie against a lawyer he was made to sit upto 6.00 p.m. and detained in the police station. In addition thereto, the applicant being a senior police officer ought to have advised that complaint against the private lawyer under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not maintainable. In addition thereto, the applicant being a senior police officer ought to have advised that complaint against the private lawyer under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not maintainable. The timings which are submitted by learned counsel about drawing the panchnama, about lodging the complaint, about keeping panchas ready well in advance would clearly indicate that respondent No. 2 was framed under the Act by the present applicant and therefore, when this aspect has been pointed out in the complaint which has established the case under Section 342 of the IPC, the learned Magistrate upon appreciation has issued the process and therefore, the process has been issued after prima facie finding the case against the applicant and therefore, an opportunity is required to be given to prosecution to prove the case against the applicant and therefore, at the ultimate stage itself the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 cannot be throttled and therefore, Mr. Shah has requested the Court not to entertain the application by exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Shah has specifically further contended that picking up from the neck a lawyer, who was in court dress and from the premises and dragged him away by pushing him in rickshaw and made to sit in the police station for considerable long period as if he is a criminal, is not an act which can be said to be an act within the official discharge of his duty and therefore, no sanction is required to be taken to deal with the applicant in the present case and therefore, this aspect, Mr. Shah contended, is requested to be considered. Mr. Shah has further drawn the attention of the Court to some of the documents which are part of present application submitted by him along with affidavit-in-reply in which various orders have been placed on record and by drawing attention to some of the relevant paragraphs of the deposition of the complainant and by drawing the testimony of other witnesses along with the decision delivered by the Apex Court, Mr. Shah has requested that in no circumstance, the present application be entertained. To substantiate his contentions, Mr. Shah has requested that in no circumstance, the present application be entertained. To substantiate his contentions, Mr. Shah has drawn the attention to some of the decisions delivered by the Apex Court in case of Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2009 (1) Scale 574 and in case of Sanjiv Bhatt, IPS v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2011 (0) GLHEL-HC-231472 and by referring to these decisions, Mr. Shah has requested the Court that this is not a case in which the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. may be exercised and therefore, earnestly requested the Court not to entertain the present application. Mr. Shah has submitted that on the contrary, filing of the present application itself amounts to an abuse of process of law which has frustrated the very object of summons triable cases and has applied a systematic design to dodge the complaint and therefore, requested the Court that the disputed versions which are emerging from the record, cannot be allowed to form the proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. At the best, the stand which has been taken by the applicant can be said to be his defence which can be examined at an appropriate stage in the trial when the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 be proceeded with and therefore, this defence at this stage in view of settled position of law cannot be taken into consideration so as to throttle the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 and therefore, Mr. Shah has ultimately requested the Court not to grant any relief as prayed for in the present application. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having considered the relevant material on record, some of the issues which are emerging from the record are not possible to be unnoticed in the context of exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 6. It appears from the record that a specific averment is made in the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 that his client - Pratapji Madhuji Vihol has entrusted two cases pertaining to tenancy and his client had fixed an amount of Rs. 6000/- by way of fees. It appears from the record that a specific averment is made in the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 that his client - Pratapji Madhuji Vihol has entrusted two cases pertaining to tenancy and his client had fixed an amount of Rs. 6000/- by way of fees. It is specifically averred in the complaint that despite repeated letters having been written, his client had not turned up and later on, when notice was given through UPC said client on 26.7.1996 had come in the court campus at around 11.30 a.m. and requested respondent No. 2 to go near canteen attached to the court campus and handed over Rs. 5000/- by way of fees. The complainant has specifically further asserted that this Rs. 5000/- is in connection with the relevant cases and has, therefore, accepted. It is at this juncture the present applicant along with his officer came to the spot, lifted respondent No. 2 from neck and other accused persons have dragged him in the rickshaw and then, took respondent No. 2 to ACB office. This unnatural conduct by present applicant was in the presence of another members of the bar named as Shri Karimbhai Vora, Shri C.B. Chaudhary, Shri N.B. Chaudhary and Shri Haribhai Thaker as well. By lifting in this manner, the respondent No. 2 was then detained from 12.00 noon to 6.00 p.m. in the evening against his will and illegally taken out Rs. 5000/- which was given by his client. This specific assertion is coming out on the basis of which the process was issued under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. 7. The averments contained in the complaint appears to have been then preliminarily examined by the court on the basis of deposition of one Shri Naranbhai Bhagwandas Chaudhary at Exh. 5, Shri Somabhai Vitthalbhai Prajapati at Exh. 6, Shri Bipinbhai Kacharabhai Patel at Exh. 8 and with the depositions of these 3 witnesses along with deposition of respondent No. 2, the learned Magistrate has formulated an opinion and found prima facie material and arrived at a satisfaction that detailed adjudication by leading evidence is very much required and therefore, prima facie having found the offence being reflected under Sections 342 and 114 of the IPC, the summons came to be issued. 8. 8. Yet another circumstance which is required to be noticed is - while examining the issue in the context of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., this very plea contained in the complaint and the allegations were not accepted by the applicant has chosen to file an application for discharge on the premise that no sanction is obtained on the premise that false and frivolous complaint came to be lodged and further, keeping in view the decision delivered by the Court as narrated in the application, a request for discharge from the prosecution came to be filed. This very application filed for seeking discharge under Section 37 appears to have been contested and on merits, the same came to be dismissed vide order dated 28.10.2005 and it is that order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mehsana was made the subject matter of Criminal Revision Application No. 12 of 2006 filed by the very applicant. Again, all these issues which have been tried to be canvassed, have been agitated and the learned Sessions Judge, Mehsana also was pleased to dismiss the Revision Application on merit by assigning cogent reasons and therefore, the issues which have been agitated have been considered at length by court below concurrently and passed the orders against the applicant. 9. These orders by courts below were then again assailed by way of filing the petition being Special Criminal Application No. 1185 of 2006. But, then after 2006 till 2009, said petition appears to have been dragged on by the applicant and then, on 26.3.2009 after almost a period of 3 years, said petition came to be withdrawn with a view to file petition for seeking quashment of the complaint and it is that stage the earlier petition came to be disposed of and the present one is filed. 10. 10. It is also emerging from the record that this application came to be opposed by respondent No. 2 by filing a detailed affidavit-in-reply along with other documentary material which were very much part of the proceeding and has taken up the issue that the act of applicant and the manner in which the respondent No. 2 was dragged in ACB Police Station cannot be said to be a discharge of his official duty and the entire narration mentioned in the affidavit-in-reply has pointed out that action of applicant deserved to be adjudicated in detail. Some of the relevant Paragraphs contained in affidavit-in-reply are worth to be taken into consideration and therefore, reproduced hereinafter: "7. It is respectfully submitted that in present case also, systematic conspiracy was hatched with the help of the client of the deponent. The present petitioner accused advised the client of the deponent that to file ACB case against a private Advocate, some Govt. servant is also required to be involved. That before filing of complaint Panchs were called at 4:00 pm. and complaint is registered at 5:00 pm. When one Panch having found belong to Prajapati Community, he was changed and another Panch was called. "9. Therefore, being a Police Officer, it is the duty of the petitioner accused not to register such FIR which is not maintainable against a private Advocate and it is also the duty of the petitioner accused not to give ill-advice to the effect that to involve a private Advocate, some name of clerk is required to be involved. It is also important to note that when such amount of fee was given by said Pratapji in the Court compound, the petitioner accused came there and acted inhumanly with me When it was in the dress of Advocate. The petitioner -accused dragged me from the Court compound inhumanly and thereafter even detained me for 6 hours, though, apparently, no case under Anti Corruption Act is made out against me and therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that he has done all these acts in discharge of his duties. 10. It is respectfully submitted that the act of the petitioner -accused has no relation whatsoever with the performance of the duty of the accused. 10. It is respectfully submitted that the act of the petitioner -accused has no relation whatsoever with the performance of the duty of the accused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2009 (1) Scale 374 in case of Chaudhary Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, observed that, "if the authority vested in a public servant is misused for doing things which are not otherwise permissible under the law, such acts cannot claim protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and have to be considered dehors the duties, which a public servant is required to discharge or perform." Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure H is the copy of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court. 12. It is respectfully submitted that after considering the statement of deponent and two witnesses, the learned Magistrate has been pleased to issue process in year 2000. But, for one or another reason, petitioner is avoiding the proceedings of criminal case. 13. I say and submit that one Civil Suit was filed by me for damages wherein also the petitioner was avoiding the summons and therefore the warrant was issued by the Hon'ble Court for securing his presence. The above thing was also reported in the newspaper. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure 1 is the copy of the newspaper cutting. Thus, looking to the conduct of the present petitioner -accused to delay criminal as well as civil proceedings and looking to his inhuman behaviour and illegal detention of the deponent Advocate as alleged in the complaint, the extra ordinary jurisdiction vested with the Hon'ble High Court may not be exercised in favour of the petitioner accused and petition may kindly be dismissed with heavy cost and appropriate direction to cooperate with the criminal case." 10.1 These averments have not been disputed as it appears from the record as no counter to this has been filed by the applicant. The depositions which are attached to the reply filed are reflecting clear narration of the manner in which the respondent No. 2 has dealt with and therefore, this undisputed version clearly indicates that circumstances are such which are required to be examined in detail by examining in detail at appropriate stage of adjudication. 11. The depositions which are attached to the reply filed are reflecting clear narration of the manner in which the respondent No. 2 has dealt with and therefore, this undisputed version clearly indicates that circumstances are such which are required to be examined in detail by examining in detail at appropriate stage of adjudication. 11. The proceedings are further revealing the fact that ACB case which has been filed against respondent No. 2 under the guise of which applicant has dealt with, has turned out to be a false case and respondent No. 2 came to be acquitted by the competent court against which no further proceedings have been initiated and therefore, this circumstance also is brought to the notice of this Court and therefore, considering aforesaid set of circumstance which is prevailing on record is requiring the Court to consider whether on the basis of such kind of detailed version which corroborates the say of the complainant, the plea raised by applicant can be gone into. The answer is in negative as this detailed facts which are substantially corroborated by evidence which has been taken into consideration prima facie suggests that offence is made out of Sections 342 and 114 of the IPC which requires adjudication. 12. Now, in the background of this situation prevailing on record, whether inherent jurisdiction deserves to be exercised is to be considered in the light of recent pronouncement on such issue by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. 12.1 The law laid down by the Apex Court on the issue of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. suggests that if the facts are disputed under normal circumstance, no exercise of power need be under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as has been laid down in a decision of the Apex Court in case of Rishipal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2014) 7 SCC 215 and in case of HMT Watches Ltd. v. M.A. Abida & Anr., reported in (2015) 11 SCC 776 . Relevant Para.11 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter: "11. In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited and others (2008) 13 SCC 678 ], this Court has made following observations explaining the parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:- "17. Relevant Para.11 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter: "11. In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited and others (2008) 13 SCC 678 ], this Court has made following observations explaining the parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:- "17. The parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now well settled. Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of caution is also required in its exercise. What is required is application of the well-known legal principles involved in the matter. xxxx 22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious of the fact that although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant immediately. The courts on the one hand should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be maintainable." 12.2 Yet in another decision of the Apex Court in case of N. Soundaram v. P.K. Pounraj & Anr., reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616 , it has been propounded that the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are to be used sparingly and not in a routine manner. Relevant Para.13 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter: "13. Relevant Para.13 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter: "13. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance." 12.3 Yet in another decision the Apex Court in case of Gunmala Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Anu Mehta & Ors., reported in (2015) 1 SCC 103 has propounded that the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are not to be exercised in a manner as if a mini trial is to be conducted and therefore, in such a situation, to test the veracity of allegations is not deserved as is culled out from the said decision. Relevant observations are as under: "34.4 No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formula to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the Court. There are no fixed formula to be followed by the High Court in this regard and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but, nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable circumstances into account which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director." 12.4 The aforesaid proposition is also substantiated by yet another decision in case of Taramani Parekh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260 where merits are not to be assessed in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore, this clearly indicates that to examine the merit and demerit, Section 482 powers are not to be resorted to. Relevant Para. 11 of the said decision is reproduced hereinafter: "11. Law relating to quashing is well settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not made out any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process of law, the proceedings can be quashed but if there is a triable case the Court does not go into reliability or otherwise of the version or the counter version. In matrimonial cases, the Courts have to be cautious when omnibus allegations are made particularly against relatives who are not generally concerned with the affairs of the couple. We may refer to the decisions of this Court dealing with the issue. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 4604, it was observed: 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a civil wrong with no element of criminality and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [ (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [ (1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]). 27.16. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence." 13. Keeping this proposition in mind, the Court is not inclined to entertain the plea of the applicant for seeking quashment of a complaint. Prima facie, the satisfaction arrived at by the learned Judge is required to be allowed to be adjudicated further in detail and therefore, this is not a fit case to undertake such exercise as not warranted under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. On the contrary, the manner in which the respondent No. 2 is lifted from the spot and the manner in which in a court hours, the respondent No. 2 was detained in the police station is not the powers of the applicant. The applicant being a senior police officer, who is well aware about the intricacy of law, more particularly when he was dealing with such kind of offence, ought to have been vigilant before reacting in such a manner, it cannot be said to be a discharge of official duty. However, this prima facie observation by this Court is to be examined in detail during the course of trial of the case and therefore, based upon aforesaid record of the case, the Court is no inclined to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 14. Now, coming to the decisions which are cited by learned counsel for the applicant deserve to be considered. It is settled position of law that slight change in the facts would make a world of difference in applying principle or the ratio laid down in the decision and therefore, in the context of this proposition, the cases which have been cited are required to be looked into and dealt with. 15. Mr. Tirmizi, learned counsel has first of all drawn the attention of the Court to a decision in case of Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra) and by referring to this decision, Mr. 15. Mr. Tirmizi, learned counsel has first of all drawn the attention of the Court to a decision in case of Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra) and by referring to this decision, Mr. Tirmizi has contended that in view of procedure having not been followed as required under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., the process could not have been issued. The background of said decision was that there was an offence of dacoity lodged and the offence was registered in respect of Section 395 of IPC and in that context, the investigation was to be undertaken about involvement of some persons and raid was carried out and the team of inspector visited the house, arrested the accused and the material could not be found. In the background of such fact situation, question arose whether for discharge of such official duty, the protection of Section 197 is available or not. 15.1 Whereas here in case on hand, it is quite reflecting that though the complaint was not tenable, the senior police officer spotted respondent No. 2 near the court campus, lifted him from the neck, dragged him in the rickshaw and placed him in ACB police station and though the panchnama was drawn much earlier was not relieved from the police station and detained. This is the circumstance in which a case was registered against the applicant more particularly when the amount which was paid of Rs. 5000/- was in respect of the fees pertaining to two cases and therefore, the case on hand cannot be equated by the applicant with the case which has been narrated in the afore-mentioned decision and therefore, in the context of different factual background, the Apex Court has opined with respect to Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and therefore, said decision is of no avail. Further, here in this case on hand, the discharge application almost on a similar ground has been dealt with by the court below and concurrently it has been held that such plea which has been raised in the present application is not amenable to applicant and therefore, this case has altogether a different scenario than what has been reflected in the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court. This very issue whether this conduct on the part of applicant can be said to be attracting Sections 342 and 114 of the IPC is the subject matter of trial and one another material fact is that except the present applicant, no other person i.e. co-accused has approached this Court by way of a petition and therefore, when track record of present case is such in which the conduct of applicant deserves adjudication in detail, the ratio laid down no doubt respectfully agreeing but, the same has no bearing as a straitjacket formula. 16. Yet another decision which has been pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant in case of Sankaran Moitra (supra). In the said case, again the background is altogether different. The very second paragraph of the said judgment indicates different fact situation that what has been prevailing on record of the case on hand. In the said decision a public servant i.e. police officer was in police uniform and in official jeep went to the police booth where some disturbance was taking place there was a clash between two political parties, Lathicharge was undertaken. The deceased was chased by the police and in maintaining law and order situation on the spot, something has happened and in that context, the Apex Court has propounded that the said act was in discharge of performing official duty. 16.1 Whereas, here lifting a lawyer from the place near vicinity of court when the client is paying fees and not in official vehicle, picking respondent No. 2 and dragging in private rickshaw and brought to the police station, detained for a long period despite requesting though the work was over, is nothing but a reflection of a power charged officer. Such act cannot be equated with the act which is mentioned in the aforesaid decision and therefore, the conduct of applicant which is reflected on the case on hand, from bare reading of a complaint appears to have been found by both the courts below which requires no requisite of Section 197 procedure and therefore, in the background of this peculiar set of present facts of the case, the Court is of the opinion that the decision which has been cited cannot be pressed into service. 17. 17. Yet another decision which has been referred to by learned counsel for the applicant in case of Amal Kumar Jha (supra) which again on the issue of requirement of Section 197 procedure. In the said decision also, there is a reference that public servant is not entitled to indulge in any criminal activity in the course of his duty provided such act has some intrinsically nexus with the discharge of his official duty. Now, this proposition cannot be picked up out of context by the applicant on the background of present facts because here what has been alleged in the complaint is ex-facie appearing to have not been found which is intrinsically connecting with discharge of his official duty and therefore, no doubt the salutary principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision. But the background of present facts are such which requires no interference at this stage because the real crux of the complaint which requires detailed adjudication and that cannot be possible in the present proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. but before an appropriate forum where the evidence is possible to be led and therefore, keeping the proposition of scope of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court is of the opinion that the judgments cited by the applicant are not applicable as if straitjacket formula laid down by the Apex Court. The Apex Court has categorically mentioned in the background of the facts which were prevailing on those cases and therefore, this is not the case where such proposition cited by the applicant can be resorted. 18. Now, in the context of aforesaid decisions, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has brought to the notice of the Court some of the decisions which also requires attention and consideration. The first judgment which has been cited is in case of Choudhury Parveen Sultana (supra). 18. Now, in the context of aforesaid decisions, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has brought to the notice of the Court some of the decisions which also requires attention and consideration. The first judgment which has been cited is in case of Choudhury Parveen Sultana (supra). In the said decision, it has been propounded that all acts done by the public servant in purported discharge of his official duty cannot as a matter of course be brought under the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. The underlying object of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is to enable the authority to scrutinize the allegations made against the public servant and to save from frivolous and vexatious litigation and therefore, this act which has been specifically alleged against the petitioner, whether can be said to be a discharge of official duty is a subject matter of scrutiny during the course of trial of the case. In the said decision, the Apex Court has also considered the background of fact situation of the said complaint and then, propounded that the said act does not fall within the ambit of Section 197 and therefore, the High Court's order was set aside by holding that the trial court shall proceed further with the trial against the accused. The background of these facts attract to substantial extent the case of present one and therefore, a right emphasis has been made by learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 19. Yet another decision which has been pressed into service in case of Sanjiv Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2011 (O) GLHEL-HC 231472 wherein also, the police officer had beaten, ill-treated and tortured the person in police custody. Whether that act can be said to be a discharge of official duty. 19. Yet another decision which has been pressed into service in case of Sanjiv Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2011 (O) GLHEL-HC 231472 wherein also, the police officer had beaten, ill-treated and tortured the person in police custody. Whether that act can be said to be a discharge of official duty. The answer was negative and therefore, it was held by the Court that no protection is amenable under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Now, exactly here also, the case on hand if to be viewed, the applicant has come to the court premises vicinity, has lifted the respondent No. 2 from neck and during the court working hours dragged him in the rickshaw as if he is a criminal and detained in the custody from 12.00 noon to 6.00 p.m. Despite persistent request, the respondent No. 2 has been taken away by preparing seizure memo and though the panchnama was already drawn much prior, upto 6.00 p.m. the respondent No. 2 was detained in ACB Police Station and all throughout the coercive measures are reflected to have stated in the complaint. Now this act prima facie suggests that if a proper investigation is to be undertaken, necessity of this kind of act with the aid and assistance of other police officer is not a part of the official duty. A citizen who is not a hardcore criminal, on the contrary, he is not an absconder, is being lifted in the manner in which it is reflected and detained in the custody without any further requirement is not suggesting that, that act was a discharge of official duty of applicant. On the contrary, entire facts clearly emerging that applicant was acting at the behest of either original complainant i.e. client of respondent No. 2 or at the behest of some pressure. Otherwise after panchnama having been drawn, there was no question of further detention. On the contrary, entire facts clearly emerging that applicant was acting at the behest of either original complainant i.e. client of respondent No. 2 or at the behest of some pressure. Otherwise after panchnama having been drawn, there was no question of further detention. Be that as it may, these allegations prima facie which are established suggest that proper adjudication is required of the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 and therefore, in view of aforesaid proposition of law on the issue and keeping in mind the factual background which is prevailing on record, the Court is of the opinion that this is not a fit case in which inherent jurisdiction is required to be exercised especially when the applicant has been successfully dragging the issue for a pretty long period. 20. Since the merits and demerits are not to be adjudged in exercise of inherent jurisdiction, however, looking to the definition of 'wrongful confinement' and bare reading of the provisions of Section 340 r/w Section 342 which suggests that this ingredient is required to be examined and established during the course of adjudication. A person whether wrongfully confined beyond the circumscribing limit is termed as wrongfully confined. Now what is circumscribing limit is the question of fact which can be gone into during the course of adjudication and therefore, prima facie the allegations which are established supported by independent witnesses, the case requires detailed adjudication and therefore, the Court finds it not proper to exercise inherent jurisdiction in favour of the applicant. The Court while coming to this conclusion has considered the entire factual background, undisputed version and proposition of law to arrived at this ultimate conclusion that present application being devoid of merit in the context of exercise of inherent jurisdiction, the same is not entertainable and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated. 21. At this stage, learned counsel for the applicant has requested the Court that since the interim relief which is operative since long in the present proceedings, the same may be continued for some time so as to enable the applicant to take further recourse. However, such request is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 - complainant. At this stage, learned counsel for the applicant has requested the Court that since the interim relief which is operative since long in the present proceedings, the same may be continued for some time so as to enable the applicant to take further recourse. However, such request is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 - complainant. Looking to the fact that interim protection is continued throughout and at the time when the main petition was withdrawn with a view to file the petition for quashing, no much resistance is made by the learned counsel for the respondent and therefore, keeping that factor in mind also, since no serious efforts are made by respondent No. 2 to even vacate the interim relief in the meantime, the Court deems it proper to continue the protection to give fair opportunity to the applicant for a period of 4 weeks from today. Application Dismissed