Order : 1. This writ petition has been filed by Smt. Rashmi Saxena, who happens to be daughter-in-law of respondent Suresh Prakash Saxena, praying for setting aside order dated 26.11.2015 passed by the court of Sub Divisional Officer, Jaipur-Second (Sanganer), Jaipur, as also order dated 10.10.2016 passed by the court of District Collector & District Magistrate, Jaipur, with further prayer that respondent be directed not to create any hindrance in the staying of the petitioner in the matrimonial home. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with Mr. Navin Saxena on 23.01.2007, who is son of respondent Suresh Prakash Saxena. The petitioner, since then, was living with her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and mother-in-law at BB-39, Jai Ambey Nagar, Tonk Road, Jaipur. Allegation of the petitioner is that her husband obtained fraudulently consent for divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, ‘the Act of 1955’), which the petitioner revoked during pendency of proceedings before the Family Court. Even then, the learned Judge, Family Court No.2, Jaipur, passed illegal judgment and decree dated 26.10.2013. Petitioner filed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal challenging that judgment before Division Bench of this court, which has been admitted and presently pending for adjudication. The Division Bench attempted to persuade the parties to amicably settle their dispute out of court but no such compromise could take place. The petitioner’s husband Mr. Navin Saxena tried to forcibly throw out the goods of the petitioner from the matrimonial home and when he failed to do so, he adopted a tactic by making his father i.e. the respondent herein, to move application under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short, ‘the Act of 2007’) before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, who mechanically passed an illegal order and ordered eviction of the petitioner from her matrimonial home within one month. He further submitted that the petitioner then filed appeal against the aforesaid order before the District Magistrate, Jaipur, who too dismissed the same without application of mind. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner argued that the impugned orders are ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction. He further submitted that the petitioner then filed appeal against the aforesaid order before the District Magistrate, Jaipur, who too dismissed the same without application of mind. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner argued that the impugned orders are ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction. Section 23 of the Act of 2007 merely prohibit transfer of property in certain circumstances and provides that where any senior citizen, who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the court. Learned counsel argued that there is no question of any transfer of property or any part thereof in the present case. The impugned order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer as also the District Magistrate are perverse and erroneous being based on misapplication of law on the subject. The direction of eviction of the petitioner from matrimonial home is outside the purview of Section 23 of the Act of 2007. Even if marriage of the petitioner has been dissolved by the Family Court, since the appeal against the said judgment and decree has been admitted to hearing by the division bench of this court, the petitioner is entitled to live in her matrimonial home with dignity and respect till the appeal is decided by this court. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner further argued that even if the case of the respondent is accepted that the petitioner was a licensee, even a licensee cannot be evicted from the premises by application of Section 23 of the Act of 2007. Word ‘licensee’ has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The license has neither been revoked under Section 60 of the Act of 1882 nor any notice for eviction of licensee has been served upon the petitioner. Word ‘licensee’ has been defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. The license has neither been revoked under Section 60 of the Act of 1882 nor any notice for eviction of licensee has been served upon the petitioner. The only remedy available to the respondent is to file a civil suit for recovery of possession after revocation of license or obtain mandatory injunction under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, but the respondent did not file any suit for possession or mandatory injunction provided under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner, in support of his arguments, has relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in Smruti Pahariya Vs. Sanjay Pahariya – 2009 AIR SCW 4267, Smt. Sureshta Devi Vs. Om Prakash – AIR 1992 SC 1904 and Hitesh Bhatnagar Vs. Deepa Bhatnagar – 2011 AIR SCW 2555. 6. Mr. Anoop Pareek, learned counsel for respondent, opposed the writ petition and submitted that the petitioner and son of respondent mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage and executed an agreement by consent to this effect on 27.06.2012. The petitioner agreed to take permanent alimony to the tune of Rs.9,00,000/-, out of which an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid by way of demand draft dated 26.06.2012 and rest of Rs.5,00,000/- was agreed to be taken at the time of finalization of divorce petition. It is thereafter that the petitioner and son of the respondent filed a joint petition under Section 13B of the Act of 1955 on 27.06.2012 before the Family Court, but on subsequent date the petitioner was not present in the Family Court, hence the divorce petition was dismissed on 03.09.2012. Thereafter, they again filed a petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13B of the Act of 1955 on 26.02.2013. The counseling was done by the Presiding Officer for restitution of conjugal rights but the parties were not interested to reconcile, so divorce petition was put up for next hearing on 27.08.2013, on which date both the parties were present in the Family Court and after counseling, a statement of the parties was recorded by the Presiding Officer and both agreed to pass a decree of divorce at 4:30 PM but the petitioner later on withdrew her consent by filing an application on the same date. Even then, learned Family Court heard the arguments on the application and passed decree of divorce by mutual consent on 26.10.2013. 7. Learned counsel contended that mere filing of appeal against the decree of divorce does not tantamount to saying that the decree of divorce by mutual consent does not subsist. The house in question is owned by the respondent and not by his son. In fact, son of respondent Mr. Navin Saxena most of time lived in Russia to earn livelihood there and due to the family circumstances the respondent evicted his son from his properties. Even then, the petitioner was allowed to stay in the same house for some time as a licensee, but when the petitioner started abusing, misbehaving and assaulting the respondent and his wife, who are old, respondent revoked the license and asked her to vacate the house. When she did not do so, the respondent filed an application under Section 23 of the Act of 2007. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in the facts of this case, the impugned order could have been passed under the scope of Section 23 of the Act of 2007. The writ petition be therefore dismissed. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his arguments, has relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra and Another Vs. Smt. Taruna Batra – AIR 2007 SC 1118 and that of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Promil Tomar and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others – CWP No. 20072/2013 decided vide judgment dated 06.12.2013, and Manjit Singh Vs. District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Karnal and Others – CWP No. 22405/2015, decided vide judgment dated 30.10.2015. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 11. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Smruti Pahariya, supra, on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner, can be of no help to her in so far as deciding the correctness of the impugned orders is concerned. Besides, the facts in that case were entirely different. Therein the respondent was present on the date of hearing and the matter was adjourned to the next date but thereafter the date was preponed ex-parte in favour of wife and exparte decree was passed. In those facts, the decree was held liable to be set aside. Besides, the facts in that case were entirely different. Therein the respondent was present on the date of hearing and the matter was adjourned to the next date but thereafter the date was preponed ex-parte in favour of wife and exparte decree was passed. In those facts, the decree was held liable to be set aside. Additionally the court observed that continued consent of husband cannot be presumed from such absence and the divorce decree passed by presuming consent, was held liable to be set aside. The other two judgments relied on behalf of the petitioner are also distinguishable on facts. 12. In Promil Tomar, supra, the order impugned therein was also passed on 19.06.2013 by the Presiding Officer, Maintenance Tribunal, Panchkula, exercising powers under Section 23 of the Act of 2007 on the application of respondent therein, a senior citizen. The Presiding Officer allowed the application with direction that respondent (petitioner before the High Court) may reside in house with consent of all stack holders and not otherwise and that they should try to make the good family relations so that every family member may lead the best life. The Tribunal was having paramount obligation to secure the life and property of parents and senior citizen under the provisions and rules of the Act of 2007. The argument of the petitioner before the High Court was that the Maintenance Tribunal, Panchkula, had no jurisdiction or power to interfere in the application under Section 23 of the Act of 2007 with regard to properties, which were not received/inherited by the petitioners from respondent no.5 in terms of Section 23 of the Act. The Tribunal has no power, authority or execution to order of eviction of the petitioner from the disputed house or to order execution as such and jurisdiction vests only with Civil Court. The High Court, on consideration of statement, objects and reasons and various provisions of the Act of 2007 held that the function of the court is to interpret the statute to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Where the language of the Statute is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it because in that case words of the Statute unequivocally speak the intention of the legislature. Where the language of the Statute is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it because in that case words of the Statute unequivocally speak the intention of the legislature. It was observed by the High Court as under:- “I have carefully considered the said contention of learned counsel for the petitioners and I am of the opinion that Section 23(1) of the Maintenance Act provides that "where any senior citizen has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, and the transferee refuses or fails to provide amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of the property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal." The transfer by a senior citizen in first part of Section 23(1) of the Maintenance Act could be a gift or otherwise. The property transferred by gift or otherwise would include the transfer of the possession of a property or part of it by a senior citizen. The word "otherwise" used under Section 23(1) of the Maintenance Act by the legislation would include transfer of ownership, transfer of possession by way of a lease deed, mortgage, gift or sale deed. Even a transfer of possession to a licencee by a senior citizen will also fall under the ambit of Section 23(1) of the Maintenance Act. The word "otherwise" cannot be ignored for the objective of Section 23(1) of the Maintenance Act. In context to the objectives of the Act, "transfer" would mean that transfer of property by senior citizen need not be a gift only but it could be any transfer within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act or would even include transferring of any right of the nature of title or possession. Section 23(1) of the Maintenance Act further provides that if the transfer is subject to a condition that transferee shall provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and transferee refused to do so, the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud, coercion or undue influence and would be declared so by the Maintenance Tribunal on the option of transferor. A senior citizen who had transferred his right, title or interest to any other person by gift or otherwise (which would include transfer of possession by lease, mortgage or licence) would become void in the event of transferee refusing to provide amenities and physical needs. The said transfer in such circumstances would be termed as fraud and would be void.” 13. In Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania Vs. Vallabhdas Govindram Meswania - AIR 2013 Guj.160, the Gujarat High Court, while considering the scope of Section 23 (1), observed as follows:- "14. The question which, therefore, arises is whether the term "transfer" in Section 23 of the Act should be construed so as to mean only actual transfer of ownership and title or the said expression should be construed, having regard to the object of the Act and the provisions under Section 2(b), 2(d), 2(f), 2(h) and Section 4, so as to also include possession of the property as well......... 14.2. Having regard to the object of the Act and the intention of the legislature, there is no reason or justification or indication to restrict the meaning and scope of the term "transfer" so as to mean only "actual transfer of title and ownership" and to exclude "possession of property" from the purview of Section 23 and/or from the term "transfer" employed in Section 23 of the Act. 14.3. There is no provision in the Act to suggest or to indicate that the said term carries very narrow, and literal meaning so as to mean only actual transfer of title and ownership and the concept of possession, which is recognized by the Act - particularly under Section 4 of the Act, has to be kept out........ 16. In view of the foregoing discussion and the scope and purview of the provisions under Section 23 read with Section 4 of the Act and having regard to the object of the Act, the impugned orders and the direction to handover the possession of the property to the respondent cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or beyond the scope of Section 23 read with Sections 4, 2(b), 2(d) and 2(f) of the Act. The impugned direction, therefore, cannot be faulted." 14. The impugned direction, therefore, cannot be faulted." 14. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Manjit Singh, supra, was also dealing with question whether order of eviction could not have been passed by Maintenance Tribunal on application under Section 23 of the Act of 2007, which only deals with issue of maintenance. The High Court, on analysis of the provisions of the Act especially provisions of Section 22(2) read with Section 24 of the Act of 2007, held that there is no iota of doubt that there is provision of eviction in the Act. Even on merits, the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal found that the house in which the petitioner is residing totally belongs to respondent no.3, who not only purchased but also constructed the same from his own fund and has been held entitled not to retain the petitioner and his family in occupation thereof. 15. The Supreme Court in S.R. Batra, supra, in the context of the provisions of Sections 17 and 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, held that there is no law on matrimonial home in India but as per available law, right to wife can only be as against husband and not against father-in-law, or other relatives including mother-in-law. It was held that mother-in-law’s house does not become “shared house hold” only because applicant wife had shared that house with her husband earlier. For that it has to be a house owned or taken on rent by husband or a house which belongs to joint family of which husband is a member. 16. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagdev Singh Vs. Paramjit Kaur and Others – CRR No.2937 of 2010 (O&M), decided vide judgment dated 12.09.2013, was dealing with the case where application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, was filed by respondent no.1. The application was allowed by the Magistrate restraining her husband and father-in-law (petitioner before the High Court) from dispossessing her from ‘shared household’ except in due course of law. The High Court held that the Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in favour of a wife. She not only acquires a right to be maintained but also thereunder acquires a right of residence. The right of residence is a higher right. The High Court held that the Domestic Violence Act provides for a higher right in favour of a wife. She not only acquires a right to be maintained but also thereunder acquires a right of residence. The right of residence is a higher right. The said right as per the legislation extends to joint properties in which the husband has a share. The parents of the husband may allow her to live with them so long as their relations with the son are cordial and full of love and affection. But if the relations of the son or daughter-in-law with the parents of husband turn sour and are not cordial, the parents can turn them out of their house. The son can live in the house of parents as a matter of right only if the house is an ancestral house in which the son has a share and he can enforce partition. Where the house is self-acquired house of the parents, the son, whether married or unmarried, has no legal right to live in that house. He can live in that house only at the mercy of his parents upto the time the parents allow. Wife has her rights of maintenance against her husband or son/daughters. She can assert her rights, if any, against the property of her husband, but she cannot thrust herself against the parents of her husband, nor can claim a right to live in the house of parents of her husband, against their consult and wishes, held the High Court. 17. Consideration of Section 23, supra, shows that it contains the word “transferred”, which is followed by the words “by way of gift or otherwise” and therefore, connotation of the word “otherwise” would cover within its definition. Almost every mode of transfer is involved not necessarily transfer of title and ownership of property alone but also physical possession thereof. In other words, the word “transfer” would also include the transfer of possession. It is trite that when there is doubt about the meaning of a word used in a statute, it has to be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. In the present case, the possession of part of the house holds by respondent was given to the petitioner as licensee, may be at the time when her marriage with the son of the respondent was subsisting. The fact, however, remains that as of now marriage between two does not subsist and both are strangers to each other. In view of this, the daughter-in-law cannot claim right of residence as against father-in-law, although she can proceed against her husband. This court therefore does not find any error or infirmity in the impugned orders. 18. In view of above, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Stay application no.13743/2016 is also dismissed.