JUDGMENT Hon’ble Suneet Kumar, J.—Heard Sri G.K. Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Santosh Kumar Singh, learned counsels appearing for the petitioner, Sri R.K. Ojha, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent and the learned Standing Counsel. 2. On the consent of the parties, the writ petitions are being decided by a common judgment and order as per Rules of the Court. 3. All the petitions common facts and law is involved, therefore, is being heard together, the pleadings of petition of Writ - C No. 13189 of 2016 (Committee of Management, Mohammadpur Educational and Welfare Society and another v. State of U.P. and 3 others) is being taken as the lead case. 4. The first two writ petitions is directed against the order dated 27 February 2016 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Dy. District Magistrate Nizamabad District Azamgarh under Section 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (1860 Act), whereby, the proceeding of 10 June 2012 set up by the contesting respondent claiming that the Manager of the Committee, namely, Mohd. Ashraf Ali (second petitioner) has been suspended and six new members have been enrolled. The Prescribed Authority rejected the theory of resignation of the second petitioner but upheld the proceeding of 10 June 2012. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order to that extent. 5. The second petition has been filed by Mohd. Sajid (fourth respondent of the first writ petition), assailing the same order passed by the Prescribed Authority insofar as it discards the theory of resignation of the second petitioner. 6. The third petition assails the order dated 16 August 2016 passed by the second respondent, Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits, Azamgarh directing under Section 25(2) of 1860 Act that the election of committee be held based upon the list prepared pursuant to the order impugned in the first two writ petitions. 7. The facts, briefly stated is, that Mohammadpur Educational and Welfare Society Mohammadpur, District Azamgarh, a Society, duly registered on 18 August 2009. The Society runs and manages a Madarsa, duly recognized institution. The affairs of the Society is governed by its bye-laws, having 13 members in the general body and all the members are also part of the managing committee of the Society. Sri Abdul Rasheed was the President and the second petitioner Mohd. Ashraf Ali, the Manager/Nazim, whereas, the contesting fourth respondent Mohd. The affairs of the Society is governed by its bye-laws, having 13 members in the general body and all the members are also part of the managing committee of the Society. Sri Abdul Rasheed was the President and the second petitioner Mohd. Ashraf Ali, the Manager/Nazim, whereas, the contesting fourth respondent Mohd. Sajid, the Deputy Manager. An emergent meeting of the general body was convened by the second petitioner with the permission of Vice President, as it is alleged that the President was not cooperating. In the meeting of the general body held on 4 May 2010, six new members were enrolled; a separate meeting of the general body was convened by the Manager and the Vice President on 28 October 2011, whereby, the President and the Deputy Manager (fourth respondent) were removed and one Waseem Ahmad was elected President and Sri Shajnawaj Alam as the Deputy Manager. Pursuant to the resolution, upon induction of President and Deputy Manager, list of office bearers of the Committee of Management for 2011-12 was submitted before the Assistant Registrar, which was duly registered in terms of Section 4 of the 1860 Act on 10 January 2012. 8. The fourth respondent, however, did not file any objection. The fourth respondent filed objection to the list of the Committee for the subsequent year i.e. 2012-13 alleging, inter alia, that in proceeding of 10 June 2012 which was convened under the signature of the President and Deputy Manager, scheduled to be held at 10:00 A.M., but for want of quorum the meeting was adjourned to 12:00 noon, on the same day, the Committee in its resolution annulled the earlier proceedings of 4 May 2010, 28 October 2011 and 9 November 2011. The Assistant Registrar on 9 September 2014 referred the dispute to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25 (1) of the 1860 Act, that apart, Mohd. Sajid also filed a reference before the Prescribed Authority on 16 October 2014 being Reference No. 2 of 2014. The Prescribed Authority ultimately decided the controversy by the impugned order dated 27 February 2016, whereby, the proceeding of the general body held on 4 May 2010 and 28 October 2011 set up by the petitioner was held invalid being against the bye-laws, whereas, the proceeding of 10 June 2016 set up by the contesting respondent was upheld to be valid proceeding. 9. 9. Upon perusal of the record and considering the rival submissions of the contesting parties, two issues fall for determination: (i) Whether the word stagit as used in Clause 9 of the bye-laws would mean ‘postponement’ or ‘adjournment’ of a meeting ; (ii) Whether the resignation of Mohd. Ashraf Ali (second petitioner) was duly accepted by President Abdul Rasheed before his death. 10. As regard the first issue, perusal of the proceeding dated 10 June 2012 would show that the meeting of the Committee was scheduled to be held at 10:00 A.M., however, could not commence for want of quorum. Consequently, the President adjourned the meeting for two hours, consequently, the meeting was held at 12:00 noon, which was attended by 7 members. The Committee passed a resolution annulling the previous resolutions and elected the contesting respondent as Manager. The point for determination is as to whether the meeting convened and held is as per Clause 9 of the bye-laws. 11. Clause 9 of the bye-laws provides for convening ordinary meeting of the committee of management upon 10 days prior notice and in case of extraordinary meeting at least two days prior notice is required. The quorum of the meeting under Clause-9 is 2/3; the clause further provides that in the event of the meeting being adjourned for want of quorum and another meeting is called again for discussing the same agenda, the requirement of quorum would not be an impediment. From a careful reading of Clause 9, it is clear that : (a) the meeting is to be postponed for want of quorum; (b) another meeting may be called for discussing the same agenda; (c) in the event of such a meeting being called, the requirement of quorum is not needed. 12. The admitted facts would reveal that seven persons were present at 10:00 A.M., consequently, for lack of quorum the meeting was adjourned for 12:00 noon and thereafter, committee passed the resolution. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that to commence a meeting under the bye-laws quorum is mandatory and in the event of the meeting being postponed for want of quorum, a fresh notice, two days prior to the emergent meeting is required, therefore, the meeting held on 10 June 2012 upon being postponed for want of quorum is no meeting in the eye of law. The resolution passed in such a meeting is, therefore, a nullity. 14. In rebuttal, Sri Ojha, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondent would urge that once the meeting convened lacked quorum, thereafter, to discuss the same agenda the meeting could be adjourned to a subsequent time, therefore, would not require a fresh notice for the reason that the meeting was not postponed. He would further urge that adjournment would mean continuation to the meeting, therefore, not requiring a fresh notice, whereas, postponement of meeting would require reconvening of the meeting upon fresh notice. 15. In the backdrop of rival submissions, clause-9 of the bye-laws as is worded calls for interpretation. Whether the meeting convened on 10 June 2012 on being adjourned temporarily to be held at some later time would amount to adjournment or tantamount to postponement of the meeting. 16. Clause 9 of the bye-laws is extracted: ^^9- izcU/kdkfj.kh lfefr % xBu izcU/kdkfj.kh lfefr dk xBu lk/kkj.k lHkk }kjk fuokZfpr lnL;ksa ds vk/kkj ij gksxk] ftlesa 5 inkf/kdkjh ,oa 8 lnL; gksaxs dqy la[;k 13 gksxhA cSBdsa izcU/kdkfj.kh lfefr dh lkekU; cSBd o"kZ esa ,d ckj vo'; gksxhA fo'ks"k cSBd vko';drk iM+us ij fdlh Hkh le; cqykbZ tk ldrh gSA lwpuk vof/k&izcU/kdkfj.kh lfefr dh lkekU; cSBd dh lHkh lnL;ksa@inkf/kdkfj;ksa dks de ls de 10 fnu iwoZ nsuh gksxhA fo'ks"k cSBd dh lwpuk 2 fnu iwoZ nsuk vko';d gksxkA dksje izcU/kdkfj.kh lfefr dk dksje lnL;ksa@inkf/kdkfj;ksa dk 2@3 cgqr ds vk/kkj ij ekuk tk;sxkA dksje ds vHkko esa ,d ckj cSBd LFkfxr gks tkus ij iqu% mlh ,t.Ms ij fopkj.k gsrq cSBd cqykus ij dksje dh vko';drk ugha gksxhA^^ 17. On plain reading of Clause-9, in my opinion, meeting convened to be valid must satisfy the quorum; on quorum being satisfied, meeting can commence and proceed. But for want of quorum the meeting cannot commence as it does not fulfill the requirement of a valid meeting. A meeting duly commenced on having quorum can be adjourned to a later point of the day to discuss the agenda that would tantamount to continuity of the same meeting. However, a meeting for want of quorum is no meeting since inception, therefore, adjournment of such a meeting is of no consequence and would not validate the invalid meeting. A meeting duly commenced on having quorum can be adjourned to a later point of the day to discuss the agenda that would tantamount to continuity of the same meeting. However, a meeting for want of quorum is no meeting since inception, therefore, adjournment of such a meeting is of no consequence and would not validate the invalid meeting. Further, where the meeting commenced upon having quorum is adjourned to a subsequent time, thereafter, on reassembly some of the members abstain and the strength is below the quorum, in that event, that would be a valid meeting as it being continuation of a duly convened meeting. 18. In the facts of the present case, it is admitted by the parties that the meeting convened lacked quorum from inception, therefore, on a plain reading of Clause-9, the meeting had to be postponed (stagit) to a subsequent date with minimum two days notice, thereafter, the same agenda could have been considered irrespective of the quorum. 19. In Narain v. The State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1993 Raj 64 : 1992 (2) WLN 300 , the Court referred to B.S. Sen Gupta’s Company meeting Law and Procedure (Eastern Law House), 1985 Edition at page 92, wherein, ‘adjournment’ has been explained as follows: “The meaning of the word “adjournment” is the act of adjourning or state of being adjourned. To adjourn means to suspend continuance of or action or decision on something, to put off further proceedings of something either indefinitely or until a later stated time; to suspend a session or meeting till another time or indefinitely (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).” 20. Adjournment has been contrasted to postponement and the exposition of law on this aspect shows that adjournment is different from postponement altogether. The following observation in the said book would elucidate this point : “Adjournment of a meeting and postponement of a meeting are not the same thing. To postpone means to hold back to a later time; to defer (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). And adjournment of a meeting denotes that the meeting is suspended and, therefore, assumes that the proceedings have once commenced. Postponement, on the other hand, is used to indicate that the commencement of a meeting is itself deferred.” 21. An adjourned meeting is merely an extension or continuation of the original meeting, Scadding v. Lorant, (1851) 3 HL Cas 418. 22. Postponement, on the other hand, is used to indicate that the commencement of a meeting is itself deferred.” 21. An adjourned meeting is merely an extension or continuation of the original meeting, Scadding v. Lorant, (1851) 3 HL Cas 418. 22. The Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings (Seventh Edition) by lan Shearman at page 80 states the law on this subject as follows:— “An adjourned meeting is deemed to be a continuation of the former meeting and no new notice is necessary.” 23. The Supreme Court in Jayantbhai Manubhai Patel and others v. Arun Subodhbhai Mehta and others, (1989) 2 SCC 484 , referred to the decision rendered in Mohd. Yunus Saleem v. Shiv Kumar Shastri, (1974) 4 SCC 854 : AIR 1974 SC 1218 : (1974) 3 SCR 738 and R.K. Jain v. Bar Council of U.P., AIR 1974 All 211 , with approval explaining the differences between postponement and adjournment. The Court relying upon the definition contained in various legal dictionaries explained that the word ‘adjournment’ must be construed with reference to the object of the context, and with reference to the object of the enquiry. ‘Adjounment’, inter alia, is defined as ‘to put off to another day or place’, as a meeting or session; ‘to postpone or suspend proceedings for a specified time’; ‘put off, postpone; break off for later resumption’, therefore, strictly speaking, unless the object of the context or inquiry otherwise warrants the term ‘adjournment’ in connection with a meeting should be applied only to the case of a meeting which has already convened and which is thereafter postponed and not to a case where a notice convening a meeting is cancelled and subsequently, a notice for holding the same meeting on a later date is issued. 24. The question, therefore, in the facts of the case at hand is that where a meeting duly convened, whether could have commenced for lack of quorum. From the plain reading of Clause-9, meeting convened could never have commenced as it lacked quorum, therefore, there was no question of adjournment of the meeting to a subsequent time. The meeting, therefore, could have been reconvened in terms of the bye-laws by putting the members to notice as required in the bye-laws. The meeting had to be postponed for want of quorum, therefore, it was to be preceded by a fresh notice. The meeting, therefore, could have been reconvened in terms of the bye-laws by putting the members to notice as required in the bye-laws. The meeting had to be postponed for want of quorum, therefore, it was to be preceded by a fresh notice. The word stagit as used in Clause 9 would mean postponement of the meeting for want of quorum and not adjournment of the meeting. The first point is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the fourth respondent. The proceeding of 10 June 2012 set up by Mohd. Sajid, therefore, is a nullity and invalid proceedings. 25. In this view of the matter, the order dated 27 February 2016 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Dy. District Magistrate Nizamabad, District Azamgarh, to the extent upholding the meeting dated 10 June 2012 is set aside and quashed. The writ petition being Writ - C No. 13189 of 2016 (C/M Mohammadpur Educational and Welfare Society and another v. State Of U.P. and others) is allowed in part to the extent herein-above. 26. Writ - C No. 18153 of 2016 (Mohd. Sazid v. State Of U.P. and others) is confined to the second point arising in the same impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority. 27. The issue involved therein has arisen with regard to the date on which the President, namely, Abdul Rasheed died. According to Mohd. Ashraf Ali, Abdul Rasheed died on 30 October 2012, whereas, according to Mohd. Sazid, the date of death of Abdul Rasheed is 1 October 2013. A large number of material was placed before the Prescribed Authority. In my opinion, the Prescribed Authority has rightly refused to enter into the controversy with regard to the date of death of the President as serious and complicated question of fact being involved. The question whether second petitioner (Mohd. Ashraf Ali) resigned and his resignation was duly accepted by the then President viz. Abdul Rasheed was left open. This Court does not find any illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order to that extent. The order dated 27 February 2016 is affirmed in part. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 28. The question whether second petitioner (Mohd. Ashraf Ali) resigned and his resignation was duly accepted by the then President viz. Abdul Rasheed was left open. This Court does not find any illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order to that extent. The order dated 27 February 2016 is affirmed in part. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 28. The third writ petition being Writ - C No. 40130 of 2016 (C/M Mohammadpur Educational and Welfare Society and another v. State of U.P. and others) is directed against the order dated 16 August 2016 passed by the second respondent-Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits, Azamgarh discarding the election of the Committee held on 10 February 2014 as invalid, consequently, directed that the election of the Committee be held under Section 25(2) of the 1860 Act on the list of 19 members of the general body. The order is based on the decision dated 27 February 2016 passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 25(1), which was subject-matter of the lead petition, validating the meeting of the Committee held on 10 June 2012. Since the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and the meeting dated 10 June 2012 has already been held to be invalid in the lead writ petition, therefore, the order cannot be sustained. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of with the following order : (i) the order dated 16 August 2016 passed by the second respondent, Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits, Azamgarh is set aside and quashed. (ii) the second respondent, Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies & Chits, Azamgarh, shall pass a fresh order in the light of the judgment rendered in Writ - C No. 13189 of 2016 (C/M Mohammadpur Educational and Welfare Society and another v. State Of U.P. and others) expeditiously, preferably within two months from the date of filing of certified copy of this judgment and order.