JUDGMENT : Shaffique, J. This original petition is filed challenging Ext.P9 order dated 20/8/15 in IA No.1029/15 in OP No.534/15. The said application was filed by the petitioners herein seeking for an injunction restraining the respondents from evicting the petitioners from the petition schedule property and building thereon and not to disturb the peaceful enjoyment of the property. 2. The short facts involved in the dispute arises out of a matrimonial issue between first petitioner and first respondent. The first petitioner is the wife and petitioners 2 and 3 are the minor children. OP No.534/15 was filed for recovery of gold ornaments, money and for past maintenance. Apprehending that the petitioners will be evicted from the petition schedule property, the above application was filed. Petitioners contended that the first petitioner was the legally wedded wife of the 1st respondent and their marriage was solemnized on 31/8/1988. It is contended that they have got every right to reside in the matrimonial home. It is alleged that the marital life became strained on account of the mental and physical cruelty meted out by the first respondent. It is further contended that on 30/9/2013, first petitioner was brutally manhandled and she was forcibly evicted from the petition schedule property. She filed a complaint before the Women's Commission and police authorities and as per their direction, they have been residing in the building w.e.f. 28/2/2015. It is apprehending that she will again be forcefully evicted, the above application was filed. An interim injunction was initially granted. 3. The respondents filed their objection to the original petition and raised a counter claim seeking eviction of the petitioners from the petition schedule property and for recovering possession. It is further contended that 1st respondent filed OP No.1894/2013 seeking for divorce on the ground of cruelty and adultery. An ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage was obtained on 30/6/2014. Respondents contended that she has no right over the petition schedule property. The Family Court while considering the question as to whether a temporary injunction order could be granted in the matter, dismissed the application after vacating the interim injunction already granted. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Court below ought to have found that petitioners were in possession of the petition schedule building and the respondents had even filed a counter claim seeking to restore possession of the building. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Court below ought to have found that petitioners were in possession of the petition schedule building and the respondents had even filed a counter claim seeking to restore possession of the building. In such circumstances when the possession is admitted, there is no reason for the Family Court to have vacated the interim injunction granted in the application. It is contended that when possession is the only criteria to be decided, the Family Court ought to have granted the interim injunction. Further, she is residing in her matrimonial home and the right of residence has to be protected. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the application for interim injunction was filed in a malafide manner. Ext.P1 is the said application. In the said application, it was contended that on 30/9/2013, she was forcibly evicted from the petition schedule property. At the time of filing the original petition, she was not in lawful possession as alleged. Though, it is alleged that she filed complaints before the Women's Commission and police authorities and as per the directions of the said authorities, she entered into the petition schedule property and building, the argument of the learned counsel is that it is after obtaining an interim injunction from the Family Court in IA No. 1029/15 that she had trespassed into the petition schedule building and it is in the said circumstances that the petitioners had to seek for restoring possession by raising a counter claim. It is contended that when the fact of her not being in possession is admitted, there was no reason to grant an injunction as sought for and therefore the Family Court was justified in vacating the interim injunction. It is further contended that she was living in adultery and the adulterer is a neighbour and it is only for the purpose of immediate access to him that she insists for residing in the said building. 6. The short question to be considered in the above original petition is whether the Family Court was justified in refusing to grant injunction as sought for. The Family Court after considering the matter observed that the marriage between the parties stand dissolved by a decree of divorce. 6. The short question to be considered in the above original petition is whether the Family Court was justified in refusing to grant injunction as sought for. The Family Court after considering the matter observed that the marriage between the parties stand dissolved by a decree of divorce. It is observed that the first petitioner failed to prove a prima facie case of balance of convenience and also failed to prove that if the injunction is not made absolute, irreparable loss or injury will be caused to her. The Court observed that the first respondent is the title holder of the property. 7. The Family Court proceeded on the basis that sufficient evidence was not available to prove possession of the property by the first petitioner. In fact, even according to the petitioners, she was thrown out of the house on 30/9/2013. A decree for divorce had been passed on 30/6/2014. An application has been filed to set aside the ex parte order, which is later allowed. It is further contended that she filed complaint before the Women's Commission and police authorities and as per the direction of the said authorities, she occupied the building on 28/2/2015. But there is no material to indicate that any such order had been passed either by the Women's Commission or by the police authorities. Therefore it has to be treated that she did not come in possession of the property after she was evicted on 30/9/2013. It is further alleged that on 28/2/2015, respondents tried to evict her. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, no materials had been produced to indicate that any order had been passed either by the Women's Commission or the police authorities permitting her to reside in the building. Further, the original petition was filed as early as on 6/1/2015 and the present application is filed only in June, 2015. In the original petition, the claim is only for recovery of ornaments, money, past maintenance and other inconsequential reliefs. If she was evicted as on 30/9/2013 and she intended to take back possession, necessarily, an application ought to have been filed before the Family Court to permit her to reside in the property. It seems that she had filed a maintenance application before the Family Court as MC No.6/2014, and direction had been issued to pay monthly maintenance. If she was evicted as on 30/9/2013 and she intended to take back possession, necessarily, an application ought to have been filed before the Family Court to permit her to reside in the property. It seems that she had filed a maintenance application before the Family Court as MC No.6/2014, and direction had been issued to pay monthly maintenance. She had also filed an application under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 wherein she had alleged that she was evicted on 30/9/2013. According to the respondents, she was residing at her family house with the children and had occupied the building only after obtaining an interim injunction. 8. First of all, the injunction sought for in the case has nothing to do with the relief sought for in the original petition. When the petitioners had not sought for any permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the respondents from evicting her from the premises, the request for interim relief could not have been granted. None of the claims raised in the suit had anything to do with a final adjudication for grant of interim relief. The only contention urged is that they may try to alienate the property. Getting an injunction from alienation is different from asking for an injunction against forcible eviction. 9. After hearing the parties for some time, we also requested the counsel for 1st respondent to ascertain whether she could be provided with another premises for a residence. Learned counsel for the respondents placed before us a copy of a lease agreement indicating that he has taken on rent another premises so that the petitioners can shift to the said premises. Learned counsel for the petitioners however did not approve the said building as according to them, it is not suitable. 10. Be that as it may, the only question to be considered is whether petitioners are entitled for injunction as sought for. As already indicated, the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands. Admittedly, the petitioners were evicted from the premises though according to them forcibly on 30/9/2013. 10. Be that as it may, the only question to be considered is whether petitioners are entitled for injunction as sought for. As already indicated, the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands. Admittedly, the petitioners were evicted from the premises though according to them forcibly on 30/9/2013. Under such circumstances, when it is contended that she had come back to the building and started residing as per orders issued by the Women's Commission or police and when the said fact is denied and no such order is produced, it has to be assumed that there is no such order either by the Women's Commission or by the police. In the said circumstances, it can only be assumed that, as contended by the respondents, petitioners have entered into the building after getting an interim injunction in the above application. In the said circumstances, as rightly pointed out by the Family Court, the petitioners are not entitled for the injunction as sought for. Family Court has considered the matter in the proper perspective and has declined to grant the interim injunction. 11. Hence, we do not find any reason to interfere with the aforesaid order in an original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Original petition is, therefore, dismissed. If the petitioners intend to reside in the premises taken on rent by the 1st respondent, it shall be open for her to shift, if so advised, in which event, the 1st respondent shall pay the rent for the premises until the disposal of OP No. 534/15.