JUDGMENT : Nishita Mhatre, J. 1. The dispute in the present appeal is whether words can be added to the tender document at a later stage, after the bids are received, while interpreting the document. 2. The facts are within a narrow compass. The Additional District Magistrate (G), North 24 Parganas floated an e-tender on 18th April, 2017 inviting bids from “Government/Undertaking/Corporations/Co-operative Societies/SHG/Clusters/Federations/Food Production Units/NGOs for preparing and supplying ready to eat (RTE) food in powdered form and consisting of ingredients mentioned in Clause 1 of the tender document. The supply of such RTE food was for the consumption of ICDS beneficiaries, that is, children of the age of six months to six years as morning snacks in Anganwadi Centres for a period of one year. The ingredients of the RTE food packets were specified as Bengal Grams (whole roasted) and oats (whole roasted) in a stipulated proportion, besides sugar to be supplied in “specific packets”. Under Clause 4 of this e-tender notice a tenderer having at least one year’s experience in supply of similar kind of RTE food with an annual turnover of more than one crore was eligible to participate in the process. For self-help groups (SHG) clusters or federations having the infrastructure of the capability of production of the desired food, the pre-requisite of experience could be relaxed subject to the verification and satisfaction of the district authority. Under Clause 6 of the tender document, amongst the various documents which the tenderer was expected to furnish, were his credentials which were expected to include work orders in the last one year for the same type of supply and payment certificates. Clause 12 stipulated that a sealed packet, containing 100gms of the RTE food mix and sugar, along with food testing report from a Government approved laboratory was to be submitted to the District Authority by the tenderers. 3. The bids were expected to be submitted by 12th May, 2017. The technical bid was to be opened on 15th May, 2017 and the financial bid on 23rd May, 2017. 4. The appellant No. 1 bid for the tender as it fulfilled all the requisite criteria in the e-tender notice. The technical bid of appellant No.1 was disallowed. 3. The bids were expected to be submitted by 12th May, 2017. The technical bid was to be opened on 15th May, 2017 and the financial bid on 23rd May, 2017. 4. The appellant No. 1 bid for the tender as it fulfilled all the requisite criteria in the e-tender notice. The technical bid of appellant No.1 was disallowed. It appears that the appellant bid was rejected because the Appellant No. 1 did not have the experience of supplying RTE food packets of the “same type” or “similar kind” to the Government. A writ petition was filed in this Court being W.P. 14863(w) of 2017 challenging this rejection. The tender process was stayed by the Learned Single Judge till 12th June, 2017 by an interim order. After affidavits were filed by the respective parties the writ petition was heard and by a judgment dated 19th June, 2017, the writ petition was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. 6. Mr. Shaktinath Mukherjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that a tender document must be strictly construed. He submitted that when there is no specific criterion in the e-tender notice that the tenderer must have experience of supplying RTE packets to Government or Government organisations, the State cannot read these words into the tender document. He argued that when the document is not capable of two interpretations, the State cannot alter the rules of the game after the tender document had been issued only in order to reject the technical bid of the appellants. He further submitted that even in case of a tender issued by the State acting in its executive capacity, it is incumbent on the State to comply with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He has drawn our attention to the judgment in the case of M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal and others Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 1977 (3) SCC 457 and Monarch Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others reported in 2000 (5) SCC 287 in support of his submission that there cannot be any discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of Government between persons who are similarly situated while accepting the bids. State of Bihar and others reported in 1977 (3) SCC 457 and Monarch Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others reported in 2000 (5) SCC 287 in support of his submission that there cannot be any discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of Government between persons who are similarly situated while accepting the bids. The learned Counsel then placed reliance on the judgment of Shagun Mahila Udyogik Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in 2011 (9) SCC 340 where the Supreme Court had observed that it cannot be over emphasised that beneficiaries of the ICDS programmes who are infants from the age group of six months to three years and pregnant and lactating mothers would require energy food and verified blended mixtures and it is desirable to have fully automated plants to provide such food. The learned Counsel pointed out that the plant of the appellant No.1 being automated avoids the use of any person in most of the processes and therefore Appellant No.1 is highly suited for supplying RTE food packets as morning snacks for children. He submitted that the rejection of the appellants’ bid for supply of RTE food packets as morning snacks is unsustainable. 7. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that while interpreting the tender document one must adopt a purposive construction. The learned Counsel has relied on the judgements in the case of NICCO Corporation Limited Vs. Cable Corporation of India Limited and others reported in 2008 (1) CHN 567 in support of this submission. His next submission was that the experience required for supplying “similar kind” of RTE food to Government and Government organisations is essential as the food packets were meant for the consumption of the ICDS beneficiaries. The learned Counsel then submitted that even assuming the appellant did have the experience of supplying food for ICDS programmes, the food packets which were required to be supplied under the tender document required a mixture of Bengal Gram, oats and sugar in specified quantities. He drew our attention to the various documents submitted by the appellant No.1 with its technical bid. According to him none of these documents suggest that it had the experience to supply the mixture of the ingredients required under the tender document. He drew our attention to the various documents submitted by the appellant No.1 with its technical bid. According to him none of these documents suggest that it had the experience to supply the mixture of the ingredients required under the tender document. Learned Counsel pointed out that although the appellants have been supplying Bengal Gram there is no indication in any of the documents submitted that they have the wherewithal to supply oats. Therefore according to him when the credentials required in the tender document under 6(g) mentioned that the work orders obtained by the tenderer in the last one year for supply of the “same type” of food packets, the Court cannot ignore the same. The Learned Counsel submitted that the appeal deserved to be dismissed. 8. Mr. Bandopadhyay, the Learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.5 to 7, those successful in the technical bid, supported the arguments of Mr. Mazumdar, the learned Additional Advocate General. The learned Counsel submitted that unless the appellants demonstrate that there is any perversity in the order of the Learned Single Judge the appeal should not be entertained. According to him, the Learned Single Judge for cogent reasons has dismissed the writ petitions and therefore, the appeal should not be entertained. Mr. Bandopadhyay relied on Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another Vs. Union of India and others reported in 1990 (3) SCC 223 to fortify his submission. The learned Counsel has also relied on the judgment in the case of Bakshi Security and Personnel Services Private Limited Vs. Devkishan Computed Private Limited and others reported in 2016 (8) SCC 446 in support of his submission that where the tender committee has, for reasons which are genuine, evaluated the tenders and rejected the technical bid of the appellants it is not for the Courts to judicially review such administrative action unless the same is in public interest. According to him, the rejection of the technical bid of the appellants does not raise any public interest and therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition. 9. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the Bar and the material on record before us. It must be remembered that the RTE food packets are required for providing morning snacks at the Anganwadi Centres. 9. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the Bar and the material on record before us. It must be remembered that the RTE food packets are required for providing morning snacks at the Anganwadi Centres. The consumers of these food packets will be the beneficiaries of the ICDS programme namely children from the age of six months to six years. Obviously, therefore, the best quality food would have to be provided. Such food, as observed by the Supreme Court in Shagun Mahila Udyogik Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit (supra) should be processed, as far as possible, in automated machines so that the possibility of the contamination of the food is excluded. There is no dispute that the appellants’ plant is automated, although this factor is not a prerequisite for being a successful bidder. 10. Let us now examine whether the appellant No.1 fulfils the criteria mentioned in Clause 4 of the tender document. Clause 4 reads as under: “The tenderers having at least 1 year’s experiences in supply of similar kind of RTE food with annual turnover of more than one (1) crore are eligible to participate in the tender. However, for the SHG/Clusters or federations having due infrastructure and capability of production of the desired food, the prerequisite of experience may be relaxed subject to the verification and satisfaction of the District Authority.” Thus, the tenderer is expected to have experience in supply of “similar kind” of RTE food. It is evident from the material on record that the appellants have been supplying similar food packets to intermediaries who then supply them to ICDS beneficiaries. There is no dispute that the annual turnover of the appellant No.1 is more than one crore. The words used in Clause 4 are “supply of similar kind of RTE food”. There is no mention in this clause that the bidder should have experience in supplying such food to a specific organisation. The State is now reading into this phrase “supply to the Government”. It is not possible to accept this contention on behalf of the State. The tender document must be read strictly. Clause 4 in our opinion does not lend itself to the interpretation sought to be advanced by the Government. Even if we accept Mr. The State is now reading into this phrase “supply to the Government”. It is not possible to accept this contention on behalf of the State. The tender document must be read strictly. Clause 4 in our opinion does not lend itself to the interpretation sought to be advanced by the Government. Even if we accept Mr. Mazumder’s contention that there should be a purposive construction, the words “to the Government” cannot be read into Clause 4 as we would then be doing violence to the meaning of Clause 4. When the tender document is explicit in disclosing the eligibility criteria no new condition can be introduced at the whim of the State. 11. In Clause 6(g) the credentials include the work order in the last year for the “same type of supply” and payment certificates. Mr. Mazumder has sought to argue that the words “same type” used in 6(g) and “similar kind” used in Clause 4 would mean that a bid can be accepted only if a tenderer has the experience of supplying RTE food packets containing the identical ingredients specified in the tender document. Again this submission of the learned Counsel in restricting the meaning of the words “similar kind” and “same type” is untenable. “Similar kind” does not mean “identical”. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th Edition defines “similar” to mean “of the same kind in appearance, character, or quality, without being identical”. Thus, the argument of Mr. Mazumder that similar should mean identical food is without merit. We have, on perusal of the documents before us, noticed that the appellant has had the experience of supplying mixtures of RTE packets containing roasted powder of Bengal gram, ground nut, wheat and sugar to various entities. Certificates have been produced indicating that such supply to these entities have been satisfactory. A chart has been annexed to the affidavit filed by the State before the learned Single Judge indicating the names of the bidders whose technical bids have been accepted. One of the columns mentions the names of the bidders who had credentials for supply of “Chattu (Porridge)” for the last one year though that food item is not mentioned in the tender document. One of the columns mentions the names of the bidders who had credentials for supply of “Chattu (Porridge)” for the last one year though that food item is not mentioned in the tender document. From the documents on record it is apparent that the appellant No.1 has been supplying mixtures of RTE packets on the basis of orders placed by various organisations and in fact most of them are for ICDS projects. The documents indicate that the appellants have also been supplying the RTE food packets to the ICDS projects directly on the instructions of the intermediaries. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument on behalf of the State that the appellants had no experience to supply similar kind of RTE food. Furthermore, the tender document does not stipulate that the bidder should have been supplying such food packets for one year immediately prior to the tender document. Clause 4 only stipulates that the bidder should have one year’s experience, not necessarily during the past one year. 12. The argument of Mr. Mazumder is that Clause 6(g) stipulates that the prior work orders issued to the bidder should be for the “same type” of food meaning identical category of food. Now, the category of food required to be supplied was morning snacks. The documents on record amply indicate that the appellants did have the experience of one year of supplying the identical category of food packets that is morning snacks containing ready to eat food in powdered form. The ingredients in the RTE packets supplied by the appellants earlier may not have comprised of oats as well, required by the tender document. But that cannot disqualify the appellants if the tender document is interpreted by applying its true meaning and proper construction. 13. In our opinion, therefore, the rejection of the technical bid of the appellant was erroneous. Their bid must be taken into consideration. The impugned judgement of the learned single judge is quashed and set aside. 14. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The application for stay A.S.T.A 28 of 2017 is disposed of as infructuous. There is no order as to costs. 15. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.