JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed on behalf of the petitioner being aggrieved with the judgment dated 23.9.2008 passed by the Sessions Judge, Jalore (hereinafter referred to as the revisional-appellate court), whereby the Criminal Revision Petition No. 2/2007 filed on behalf of the petitioner and Criminal Appeal Nos. 13/2006 and 18/2006 filed on behalf of accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 have been dismissed. 2. The said criminal revision petition was filed by the petitioner against the judgment dated 9.3.2006 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalore (hereinafter referred to as the trial court) in Criminal Original Case No. 334/1997, whereby the trial court while convicting the accused-respondent Nos.2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323/149 and 325/149 IPC released them on probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act. The trial court has further directed the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 to deposit Rs. 1,000/- each as litigation cost and ordered that the same may be paid to the petitioner after expiry of limitation of filing appeal. 3. Brief facts of the case are that on 27.8.1997, the petitioner lodged an FIR against the accused persons while alleging that he purchased a plot No. 57 situated at Sanjay Nagar Colony, Jalore from one Sunil Kumar in the year 1994 in the name of his sister-in-law Kamla. It is claimed that since 1994 he was in possession of the said plot and raised boundary of it and also put a wooden gate on it. It is alleged that on the date of incident, when he went to see the said plot, then, suddenly Prithvi Singh, Surendra Singh, Anand Singh, Kanku, Umed Kumar, Ram Dutt, Prathvi Raj Mewara and his wife came there in a jeep and abused him. Thereafter, the accused persons entered into the said plot and gave severe beatings to him. It is alleged by the complainant that Prithvi Singh inflicted injury by iron rod on his nose and when he raised alarm, Chagan Das and Harish Kumar came there and rescued him from the accused persons. 4. The police after registering the FIR started investigation and after conclusion of the investigation has filed charge-sheet against the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 325, 325/149 IPC. 4. The police after registering the FIR started investigation and after conclusion of the investigation has filed charge-sheet against the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 325, 325/149 IPC. Later on, the trial court has framed charges against the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323, 325, 323/149 and 325/149 IPC. After conclusion of the trial, the trial court vide judgment dated 9.3.2006 convicted the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323/149, 325/149 IPC, however, released them on probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act and directed them to pay litigation cost to the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 1,000/- each. 5. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 9.3.2006 passed by the trial court, the petitioner has preferred criminal revision petition No. 2/2007 and the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 have preferred appeals before the revisional/appellate court. The revision petition filed by the petitioner and the appeals filed by the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 have been dismissed by the revisional/appellate court vide judgment dated 23.9.2008 with a minor modification that the conviction of appellant Prathvi Raj will not adversely affect his service. 6. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 23.9.2008 passed by the revisional-appellate court in criminal revision petition, the petitioner has preferred this Criminal Misc. Petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the courts below have grossly erred in granting probation to the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 because the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant grant of probation to them. It is also contended that it is settled law that probation cannot be granted to any accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act without calling report from the Probation Officer, however, in this case, no such report from the Probation Officer has been called either by the trial court as well as the revisional court before granting probation to the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7. 8. 2 to 7. 8. It is also argued that on 27.3.2006, the accused respondents-Prithvi Singh and Prithvi Raj were convicted in another Criminal Case No. 93/1998 for the offences punishable under Sections 420/120-B IPC and sentenced for three years' imprisonment and as those persons were convicted during the period of probation, the revisional court is not justified in granting probation to those accused persons. 9. It is also contended that the revisional court has also failed in not ordering just compensation to the petitioner. It is also contended that till date, the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 have not deposited the cost of litigation as per the judgment of both the courts below. Learned counsel for the petitioner has therefore prayed that the impugned judgments passed by the courts below be set aside and the trial court be directed to award appropriate sentences to the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323/149 and 325/149 IPC. 10. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M.C.D. vs. State of Delhi and Another, 2005 Crl. L.J. 3077 and Manjappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2007 Crl. L.J. 3220. 11. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 have supported the impugned judgments passed by the courts below and argued that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below have not committed any illegality in passing the impugned judgments. It is also contended that all the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 are facing this criminal litigation from the last 20 years and at this stage, if they are sentenced to any imprisonment, it will be very harsh for them. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. It is also contended that all the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 are facing this criminal litigation from the last 20 years and at this stage, if they are sentenced to any imprisonment, it will be very harsh for them. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State through C.B.I. Anti Corruption Branch vs. Sanjiv Bhalla and Another, (2014) 4 JCR 37 (SC), Manohar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 449 and the decision of this Court rendered in the case of State vs. Dilip Singh and Another, (2009) 3 RLW (Raj.) 2396 and argued that as the accused respondents have already completed their probation period and their sureties have also been discharged, the order of granting probation to the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 cannot be interfered with. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgments passed by the courts below as well as the record of the case. 14. So far as regarding the conviction of the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323/149 and 325/149 IPC is concerned, the same has been confirmed by the revisional/appellate court and is also not challenged in this criminal misc. petition. The petitioner is being aggrieved with the grant of probation to the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is to be noticed that the incident is of the year 1997 and almost 20 years have been passed. The probation period of the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 have already been completed and their sureties must have been discharged, I am not inclined to interfere with the orders of the courts below whereby benefit of probation is extended to them. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State through C.B.I. (supra) and this court in the case of State vs. Dilip Singh (supra) have refused to reverse the finding of granting probation to the accused persons taking into consideration the date of incident and the fact that the probation period has already been completed and the sureties have been discharged. 16. 16. However, there is force in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not been sufficiently compensated by the courts below looking to the nature of injuries suffered by him. As per the injury report of the petitioner, he has received as many as nine injuries, out of which, one is a lacerated wound on the nose. As per the injury report, following injuries were found on the body of the injured:- "1. Crushed wound with bleeding and freeze blood on front portion of nose. 2. Abrasion 1 x ½ cm on back side of left ear and on upper ½ portion. 3. Bruise pain with Swelling 3 x 2 cm on back side of left elbow and Swelling upper side of left shoulder on ? portion and movement of joint was slow. 4. Abrasion with pain 3 x1 cm on front and upper side of left leg. 5. Abrasion with pain 1 x ½ cm on down portion of left knee and on tibial ocity. 6. Abrasion with pain 4 x 3 cm on upper left shoulder and lower ? portion and on back side. 7. Abrasion like line 1 cm in length on right elbow and on back side. 8. Bruise with pain 5 x 1 on back side of chest, on upper portion and on right side. 9. Swelling on centre of stomach and pain on testicles of the injured." 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar Singh's case (supra) has taken into consideration the question of paying just compensation to the injured complainant in a case where the accused were granted benefit of probation though they were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "9. After giving due consideration to the rival submissions, we are of the view that while it may not be appropriate to impose the sentence of imprisonment at this stage, having regard to the nature and extent of injuries, the appellant-complainant deserves to be duly compensated." 10. We find that the Court of Sessions and the High Court have not fully focused on the need to compensate the victim which can now be taken to be integral to just sentencing. Order of sentence in a criminal case needs due application of mind. We find that the Court of Sessions and the High Court have not fully focused on the need to compensate the victim which can now be taken to be integral to just sentencing. Order of sentence in a criminal case needs due application of mind. The Court has to give attention not only to the nature of crime, prescribed sentence, mitigating and aggravating circumstances to strike just balance in needs of society and fairness to the accused, but also to keep in mind the need to give justice to the victim of crime. In spite of legislative changes and decisions of this Court, this aspect at times escapes attention. Rehabilitating victim is as important as punishing the accused. Victim's plight cannot be ignored even when a crime goes unpunished for want of adequate evidence. 11. In the present case, following injuries were found on the appellant by Dr. A.P. Modi, PW-2:- "1. Bruise 6 cm x 4 cm down of right forearms. 2. Bruise 8 cm x 2 cm front of right arms. 3. Bruise 8 cm x 2 cm front of right arms. 4. Bruise 10 cm x 2 cm right supra scupular region. 5. Swelling of right shoulder with tenderness. 6. Bruise 15 cm x 2 cm on the middle of the back. 7. Abbression 1 cm x 1 cm left forearms. 8. Incised boon 2.5 x 0.5 x muscle deep fost of left leg. 9. Lancirated boon 3 x 1 cm x bone deep above injury no. 8. 10. Incised boon 8 cm x 0.5 x bone deep on right parital region." Just compensation to the victim has to be fixed having regard to the medical and other expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earning and other relevant factors. While punishment to the accused is one aspect, determination of just compensation to the victim is the other. At times, evidence is not available in this regard. Some guess work in such a situation is inevitable. Compensation is payable under Section 357 and 357-A. While under section 357, financial capacity of the accused has to be kept in mind, Section 357-A under which compensation comes out of State funds, has to be invoked to make up the requirement of just compensation. 12. We may refer to some recent decisions on the subject. In State of Gujarat and Another vs. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, it was observed: "46. 12. We may refer to some recent decisions on the subject. In State of Gujarat and Another vs. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, it was observed: "46. One area which is totally overlooked in the above practice is the plight of the victims. It is a recent trend in the sentencing policy to listen to the wailings of the victims. Rehabilitation of the prisoner need not be by closing the eyes towards the suffering victims of the offence. A glimpse at the field of victimology reveals two types of victims. The first type consists of direct victims, i.e. those who are alive and suffering on account of the harm inflicted by the prisoner while committing the crime. The second type comprises of indirect victims who are dependants of the direct victims of crimes who undergo sufferings due to deprivation of their breadwinner. 94. In recent years, the right to reparation for victims of violation of human rights is gaining ground. The United Nations Commission of Human Rights has circulated draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Violation of Human Rights. (See annexure)." 13. In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra, it was observed: "30. In Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh, (1988) 4 SCC 551 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 984, this Court lamented the failure of the courts in awarding compensation to the victims in terms of Section 357(1) CrPC. The Court recommended to all courts to exercise the power available under Section 357 CrPC liberally so as to meet the ends of justice. The Court said: (SCC pp. 557-558, para 10) "10.........Sub-section (1) of Section 357 provides power to award compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on accused. It is an important provision but courts have seldom invoked it. Perhaps due to ignorance of the object of it. It empowers the court to award compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. In addition to conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system. We, therefore, recommend to all courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way......" (Emphasis supplied) 31. The amount of compensation, observed this Court, was to be determined by the courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the nature of the crime, the justness of the claim and the capacity of the accused to pay. 32. In Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1978) 4 SCC 111 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 549, Balraj vs. State of U.P. (1994) 4 SCC 29 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 823, Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 593 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1132, Dilip S. Dahanukar vs. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 528 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 209, this Court held that the power of the courts to award compensation to victims under Section 357 is not ancillary to other sentences but in addition thereto and that imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a great extent must depend upon the relevant factors apart from such fine or compensation being just and reasonable. In Dilip S. Dahanukar case this Court even favoured an inquiry albeit summary in nature to determine the paying capacity of the offender. The Court said: (SCC p. 545, para 38) "38. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a great extent must be considered having the relevant factors therefor in mind. It may be compensating the person in one way or the other. The amount of compensation sought to be imposed, thus, must be reasonable and not arbitrary. The Court said: (SCC p. 545, para 38) "38. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a great extent must be considered having the relevant factors therefor in mind. It may be compensating the person in one way or the other. The amount of compensation sought to be imposed, thus, must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Before issuing a direction to pay compensation, the capacity of the accused to pay the same must be judged. A fortiori, an enquiry in this behalf even in a summary way, may be necessary. Some reasons, which may not be very elaborate, may also have to be assigned; the purpose being that whereas the power to impose fine is limited and direction to pay compensation can be made for one or the other factors enumerated out of the same; but sub-section (3) of Section 357 does not impose any such limitation and thus, power thereunder should be exercised only in appropriate cases. Such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised at the whims and caprice of a Judge." 33. The long line of judicial pronouncements of this Court recognised in no uncertain terms a paradigm shift in the approach towards victims of crimes who were held entitled to reparation, restitution or compensation for loss or injury suffered by them. This shift from retribution to restitution began in the mid-1960s and gained momentum in the decades that followed. Interestingly the clock appears to have come full circle by the lawmakers and courts going back in a great measure to what was in ancient times common place. Harvard Law Review (1984) in an article on Victim Restitution in Criminal Law Process: A Procedural Analysis sums up the historical perspective of the concept of restitution in the following words: "Far from being a novel approach to sentencing, restitution has been employed as a punitive sanction throughout history. In ancient societies, before the conceptual separation of civil and criminal law, it was standard practice to require an offender to reimburse the victim or his family for any loss caused by the offense. The primary purpose of such restitution was not to compensate the victim, but to protect the offender from violent retaliation by the victim or the community. It was a means by which the offender could buy back the peace he had broken. The primary purpose of such restitution was not to compensate the victim, but to protect the offender from violent retaliation by the victim or the community. It was a means by which the offender could buy back the peace he had broken. As the State gradually established a monopoly over the institution of punishment, and a division between civil and criminal law emerged, the victim's right to compensation was incorporated into civil law." 46. The amendments to Cr.P.C. brought about in 2008 focused heavily on the rights of victims in a criminal trial, particularly in trials relating to sexual offences. Though the 2008 amendments left Section 357 unchanged, they introduced Section 357-A under which the Court is empowered to direct the State to pay compensation to the victim in such cases where "the compensation awarded under Section 357 is not adequate for such rehabilitation, or where the cases end in acquittal or discharge and the victim has to be rehabilitated." Under this provision, even if the accused is not tried but the victim needs to be rehabilitated, the victim may request the State or District Legal Services Authority to award him/her compensation. This provision was introduced due to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its 152nd and 154th Reports in 1994 and 1996 respectively. 48. The question then is whether the plenitude of the power vested in the courts under Sections 357 and 357-A, notwithstanding, the courts can simply ignore the provisions or neglect the exercise of a power that is primarily meant to be exercised for the benefit of the victims of crimes that are so often committed though less frequently punished by the courts. In other words, whether courts have a duty to advert to the question of awarding compensation to the victim and record reasons while granting or refusing relief to them? 49. The language of Section 357 Cr.P.C. at a glance may not suggest that any obligation is cast upon a court to apply its mind to the question of compensation. In other words, whether courts have a duty to advert to the question of awarding compensation to the victim and record reasons while granting or refusing relief to them? 49. The language of Section 357 Cr.P.C. at a glance may not suggest that any obligation is cast upon a court to apply its mind to the question of compensation. Sub-section (1) of Section 357 states that the Court "may" order for the whole or any part of a fine recovered to be applied towards compensation in the following cases: (i) To any person who has suffered loss or injury by the offence, when in the opinion of the court, such compensation would be recoverable by such person in a civil court. (ii) To a person who is entitled to recover damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, when there is a conviction for causing death or abetment thereof. (iii) To a bona fide purchaser of property, which has become the subject of theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, cheating, or receiving or retaining or disposing of stolen property, and which is ordered to be restored to its rightful owner. 50. Sub-section (3) of Section 357 further empowers the court by stating that it "may" award compensation even in such cases where the sentence imposed does not include a fine. The legal position is, however, well established that cases may arise where a provision is mandatory despite the use of language that makes it discretionary. We may at the outset, refer to the oft-quoted passage from Julius vs. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 AC 214 : (1874-80) All ER Rep 43 (HL) wherein the Court summed up the legal position thus: (AC pp. 222-223) ".......The words 'it shall be lawful' are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. 222-223) ".......The words 'it shall be lawful' are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so." 54. Applying the tests which emerge from the above cases to Section 357, it appears to us that the provision confers a power coupled with a duty on the courts to apply its mind to the question of awarding compensation in every criminal case. We say so because in the background and context in which it was introduced, the power to award compensation was intended to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. The victim would remain forgotten in the criminal justice system if despite the legislature having gone so far as to enact specific provisions relating to victim compensation, courts choose to ignore the provisions altogether and do not even apply their mind to the question of compensation. It follows that unless Section 357 is read to confer an obligation on the courts to apply their mind to the question of compensation, it would defeat the very object behind the introduction of the provision. 58. This Court has through a line of cases beginning with Hari Singh case held that the power to award compensation under Section 357 is not ancillary to other sentences but in addition thereto. It would necessarily follow that the court has a duty to apply its mind to the question of awarding compensation under Section 357 too. 58. This Court has through a line of cases beginning with Hari Singh case held that the power to award compensation under Section 357 is not ancillary to other sentences but in addition thereto. It would necessarily follow that the court has a duty to apply its mind to the question of awarding compensation under Section 357 too. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in State of A.P. vs. Polamala Raju, (2000) 7 SCC 75 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1284 wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court set aside a judgment of the High Court for non-application of mind to the question of sentencing. In that case, this Court reprimanded the High Court for having reduced the sentence of the accused convicted under Section 376 IPC from 10 years' imprisonment to 5 years without recording any reasons for the same. This Court said: (SCC pp. 78-79, paras 9 & 11) "9. We are of the considered opinion that it is an obligation of the sentencing court to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence........ * * * * * 11. To say the least, the order contains no reasons, much less special or adequate reasons. The sentence has been reduced in a rather mechanical manner without proper application of mind." 61. Section 357 Cr.P.C. confers a duty on the court to apply its mind to the question of compensation in every criminal case. It necessarily follows that the court must disclose that it has applied its mind to this question in every criminal case. In Maya Devi vs. Raj Kumari Batra, (2010) 9 SCC 486 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 842 this Court held that the disclosure of application of mind is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support of the order or conclusion. The Court observed: (SCC p. 495, paras 28-30) "28.........There is nothing like a power without any limits or constraints. That is so even when a court or other authority may be vested with wide discretionary power, for even discretion has to be exercised only along well recognised and sound juristic principles with a view to promoting fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity. 29. What then are the safeguards against an arbitrary exercise of power? That is so even when a court or other authority may be vested with wide discretionary power, for even discretion has to be exercised only along well recognised and sound juristic principles with a view to promoting fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity. 29. What then are the safeguards against an arbitrary exercise of power? The first and the most effective check against any such exercise is the well-recognised legal principle that orders can be made only after due and proper application of mind. Application of mind brings reasonableness not only to the exercise of power but to the ultimate conclusion also. Application of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind. And disclosure is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support of the order or conclusion. 30. Recording of reasons in cases where the order is subject to further appeal is very important from yet another angle. An appellate court or the authority ought to have the advantage of examining the reasons that prevailed with the court or the authority making the order. Conversely, absence of reasons in an appealable order deprives the appellate court or the authority of that advantage and casts an onerous responsibility upon it to examine and determine the question on its own." (Emphasis supplied) 66. To sum up: while the award or refusal of compensation in a particular case may be within the court's discretion, there exists a mandatory duty on the court to apply its mind to the question in every criminal case. Application of mind to the question is best disclosed by recording reasons for awarding/refusing compensation. It is axiomatic that for any exercise involving application of mind, the Court ought to have the necessary material which it would evaluate to arrive at a fair and reasonable conclusion. It is also beyond dispute that the occasion to consider the question of award of compensation would logically arise only after the court records a conviction of the accused. Capacity of the accused to pay which constitutes an important aspect of any order under Section 357 CrPC would involve a certain enquiry albeit summary unless of course the facts as emerging in the course of the trial are so clear that the court considers it unnecessary to do so. Capacity of the accused to pay which constitutes an important aspect of any order under Section 357 CrPC would involve a certain enquiry albeit summary unless of course the facts as emerging in the course of the trial are so clear that the court considers it unnecessary to do so. Such an enquiry can precede an order on sentence to enable the court to take a view, both on the question of sentence and compensation that it may in its wisdom decide to award to the victim or his/her family." 14. In Suresh and Another vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 420 of 2012 decided on 28th November, 2014, it was observed :- "14. We are of the view that it is the duty of the Courts, on taking cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain whether there is tangible material to show commission of crime, whether the victim is identifiable and whether the victim of crime needs immediate financial relief. On being satisfied on an application or on its own motion, the Court ought to direct grant of interim compensation, subject to final compensation being determined later. Such duty continues at every stage of a criminal case where compensation ought to be given and has not been given, irrespective of the application by the victim. At the stage of final hearing it is obligatory on the part of the Court to advert to the provision and record a finding whether a case for grant of compensation has been made out and, if so, who is entitled to compensation and how much. Award of such compensation can be interim. Gravity of offence and need of victim are some of the guiding factors to be kept in mind, apart from such other factors as may be found relevant in the facts and circumstances of an individual case. We are also of the view that there is need to consider upward revision in the scale for compensation and pending such consideration to adopt the scale notified by the State of Kerala in its scheme, unless the scale awarded by any other State or Union Territory is higher. The States of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya and Telangana are directed to notify their schemes within one month from receipt of a copy of this order. The States of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya and Telangana are directed to notify their schemes within one month from receipt of a copy of this order. We also direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to National Judicial Academy so that all judicial officers in the country can be imparted requisite training to make the provision operative and meaningful." 15. In K.A. Abbas H.S.A. vs. Sabu Joseph and Another, it was observed:- "26. From the above line of cases, it becomes very clear, that, a sentence of imprisonment can be granted for default in payment of compensation awarded under Section 357(3) CrPC. The whole purpose of the provision is to accommodate the interests of the victims in the criminal justice system. Sometimes the situation becomes such that there is no purpose served by keeping a person behind bars. Instead directing the accused to pay an amount of compensation to the victim or affected party can ensure delivery of total justice. Therefore, this grant of compensation is sometimes in lieu of sending a person behind bars or in addition to a very light sentence of imprisonment. Hence on default of payment of this compensation, there must be a just recourse. Not imposing a sentence of imprisonment would mean allowing the accused to get away without paying the compensation and imposing another fine would be impractical as it would mean imposing a fine upon another fine and therefore would not ensure proper enforcement of the order of compensation. While passing an order under Section 357(3), it is imperative for the courts to look at the ability and the capacity of the accused to pay the same amount as has been laid down by the cases above, otherwise the very purpose of granting an order of compensation would stand defeated." 16. In the present case, in the absence of any evidence about the medical expenses, loss of earning etc. and the financial capacity of the accused, we are of the view that the appellant needs to be paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation under Section 357(3) within two months by the surviving respondents. In default the surviving-respondents will undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Since compensation is being directed to be paid, we set aside the sentence of fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in above terms." 18. 50,000/- as compensation under Section 357(3) within two months by the surviving respondents. In default the surviving-respondents will undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Since compensation is being directed to be paid, we set aside the sentence of fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in above terms." 18. Taking guidance from the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that though the judgments passed by the courts below regarding probation to the respondent Nos. 2 to 7 is not liable to be interfered with, however, the petitioner is liable to be compensated suitably by the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7. 19. Hence, this Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed in part. The judgments passed by the courts below are confirmed to the extent of convicting the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 447, 323/149 and 325/149 IPC and releasing them on probation, however, the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 shall pay compensation of Rs. 5,000/- each to the petitioner in addition to the litigation cost of Rs. 1,000/- each awarded by the trial court. 20. The accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 shall deposit amount of compensation of Rs. 5,000/- each before the trial court within a period of two months from today. If the litigation cost awarded by the trial court has not been deposited by the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 before the trial court till date, the same may also be deposited within a period of two months from today. 21. The trial court shall disburse the compensation amount so deposited by the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 to the petitioner on moving appropriate application. It is also directed that if the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 7 fail to deposit the fine/compensation amount as ordered above within the stipulated period, they shall undergo three months' rigorous imprisonment. Petition partly allowed.