JUDGMENT : Even in our blinkered dialectical system certain litigations assume greater social dimension. Some of them serve a larger cause than the mere lis and considerations of jurisdictional dynamics, concerns of social engineering and equity present themselves, requiring a panoptic view of the issues and assertions, that are placed before the courts for inspection and evaluation. 2. This writ petition is patently one such case where among the byzantine maze of pleadings, an important issue seems to be hidden within a very small compass. 3. The apparent and conspicuous issue, of course, relates to admission to Professional Colleges under the provisions of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee and Other Measures to Ensure Equity and Excellence in Professional Education) Act, 2006 ('the Act' for brevity). However, resolution of these issues have required considerations transcending mere legalism but to foray into the domain of remedial jurisprudence to allay the plight of hapless students caught in the web of unceasing litigative processes. 4. Now to the facts as are most constitutive and essential. 5. As per the provisions of the Act, an Admission Advisory Committee is constituted, which is then enlivened under Section 4 of the Act for regulating admissions in unaided professional colleges and institutions. The power of the Admission Advisory Committee is couched affirmatively in Section 4 of the Act. Under sub-clause (6) of Section 4, the Admission Advisory Committee is invested with the power to supervise and guide the entire process of admission of students in the Unaided Professional Colleges and Institutions with a view to ensure that the process is fair, transparent, merit based and non-exploitative. 6. The issues in concern relates to the year 2007-08. It appears that for the relevant year and to be effective for two years thereafter, the Fee Regulatory Committee fixed the tuition fees, for the course leading to the degree of MBBS, offered by the petitioner college, at Rs.1,30,000/-. This order has been appended to this writ petition as Exhibit P1. However, subsequent to Exhibit P1, the petitioner entered into an agreement with Government of Kerala agreeing to keep apart 50% of the seats to be admitted from among the students included in the list to be forwarded by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations (CEE) (for ease of reference, these seats will be hereinafter referred to as the Government seats). However, subsequent to Exhibit P1, the petitioner entered into an agreement with Government of Kerala agreeing to keep apart 50% of the seats to be admitted from among the students included in the list to be forwarded by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations (CEE) (for ease of reference, these seats will be hereinafter referred to as the Government seats). A copy of the said agreement has been produced by the petitioner as Exhibit P2, under which the annual tuition fee for a student admitted in the government seats was fixed at Rs.20,000/- and such students were also required to make payment of Rs.2,50,000/- described as security/caution deposit. The date of Exhibit P2 agreement is 20.06.2007. It is admitted by all the parties that this agreement was approved by the Fee Regulatory Committee by order dated 13.07.2007, which is shown as Exhibit P3 in this writ petition. 7. Admission should have normally moved on those lines without any issue. 8. However, the events were disturbed by one that supervened in the form of a writ petition, filed before this Court by one student aspiring admission, numbered as W.P.(C)No.19933/2007, wherein it was asserted that the petitioner College is obligated, by the terms of Exhibit P1, to collect fees at the rate of Rs.1,30,000/- from every student, whether admitted to the Government seats or to those to which the Management would be entitled to admit. This Court, by way of an interim order dated 26.07.2007, interdicted the collection of fee, except in conformity with Exhibit P1 order of the Fee Regulatory Committee. The consequence of this order was that any admission to the petitioner institution could have been done only after collecting the fee fixed as per Exhibit P1 and not in deviation thereof. I am told that this interim order was appealed against by the petitioner herein and that while it was pending, W.P.(C)No.19933/2007 was withdrawn by the student on 05.09.2007. Axiomatically, the petitioner also appears to have withdrawn the appeal filed against the interim order. 9. When the writ petition, as noticed above, was withdrawn, the field normally ought to have been set for the operation of Exhibit P2 agreement, as approved by the Fee Regulatory Committee in Exhibit P3. Axiomatically, the petitioner also appears to have withdrawn the appeal filed against the interim order. 9. When the writ petition, as noticed above, was withdrawn, the field normally ought to have been set for the operation of Exhibit P2 agreement, as approved by the Fee Regulatory Committee in Exhibit P3. However, the petitioner says that the CEE forwarded a list of candidates to be admitted to the 50% of the seats, accepted as Government seats in Exhibit P2 agreement, on 28.11.2007 along with a demand Draft for Rs.41,63,200/- representing and being the fee at the rate of Rs.1,30,000/- from each of such students. The petitioner, therefore, says that they were under the legitimate impression that they were only entitled to collect fees from all students as per Exhibit P1 order of the Fee Regulatory Committee. They also assert that they have collected only that money even from the candidates admitted against the management quota as well as NRI quota. 10. While so, it transpires that some of the students, who obtained admission under the list forwarded by the CEE, moved the Admission Supervisory Committee by filing Exhibit P6 complaint. Their complaint essentially was that they have been over charged and that they should have been admitted to the course for an annual fee of Rs.20,000/- along with the applicable deposit, following the fee structure fixed under Exhibit P2 agreement of the petitioner with the Government. When this complaint was pending, some other students approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.37983/2008, which was, however, disposed of by this Court directing them also to approach the Admission Supervisory Committee. 11. The Admission Supervisory Committee thus initiated and continued its processes by issuing notice to the parties, including the petitioner, which culminated in two orders, namely Exhibits P18 and P19. 12. In Exhibit P18, the Committee repelled the contentions of the petitioner, that it had no jurisdiction to deal with Exhibit P6 complaint and proceeded to hold the petitioner to be in wilful disobedience of its earlier orders and thus mulcted it with the maximum penalty, permissible under the Statute, of Rs.10 lakhs. By the subsequent order, namely, Exhibit P19, which is seen issued pending this writ petition, the Committee has directed the petitioner to refund the excess amounts collected by them from the students. 13. By the subsequent order, namely, Exhibit P19, which is seen issued pending this writ petition, the Committee has directed the petitioner to refund the excess amounts collected by them from the students. 13. The petitioner has impugned Exhibit P18 in this writ petition on several grounds, the primary among them being their pointed preliminary objection that the Admission Supervisory Committee does not obtain the jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act to consider the complaint, namely Exhibit P6, or to adjudicate thereupon. 14. I have heard Sri. George Poonthottam, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. V.P. Seemandini, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Smt. M.J. Rajasree, appearing for respondents 4 to 20 and 22 to 31, Smt. Mary Benjamin, the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the third respondent, Smt. P.K. Shakeela, the learned appearing for respondents 32 to 35 and the learned Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2. 15. The central and dominant of the petitioner regarding the jurisdiction of the Admission Supervisory Committee seems to be underpinned on their interpretation of Sections 4(6) and 4(7) of the Act. According to the petitioner, since they did not collect the fee from the students, they cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of Section 4(6). Their specific assertion is that the students were admitted not by them but by the CEE and that the fee from each of them was also collected by the CEE, which, of course, is discernible from Exhibit P4, under which the money was transferred to them by the CEE. They, therefore, avouch that they are not responsible for the admissions and that therefore, the Admission Supervisory Committee could not have initiated any processes against them since they can never be seen to have committed any transgression in ensuring a fair and transparent, merit based admission process, as is mandated by the Statute. 16. This argument may look very lustrous at first blush. However, it looses its sheen quickly thereafter if one examines the real purpose for which the Act has been brought in. 17. The Act is indubitably and concededly intended to ensure that the students are not exploited in the process of admission and that such admission is conducted under a process that is fair, transparent, merit based and non-exploitative. However, it looses its sheen quickly thereafter if one examines the real purpose for which the Act has been brought in. 17. The Act is indubitably and concededly intended to ensure that the students are not exploited in the process of admission and that such admission is conducted under a process that is fair, transparent, merit based and non-exploitative. Obviously therefore, if a student has a complaint that the admission process is vitiated on account of the factors like over charging of fees and other exploitative methods, be that at the hands of the CEE or the petitioner, the only remedy available to him/her would be to approach the Admission Supervisory Committee under the provisions of the Act. To say that, the Admission Supervisory Committee lacks jurisdiction merely because the admissions were made by the CEE and not by the petitioner, even if accepted as being true, would be to look at it in a very parochial manner and such view, I am certain, would never concede to forensic imprimatur. 18. I have no doubt that the jurisdiction vested in the Admission Supervisory Committee is intended exclusively to operate in favour of the students who approach it with a complaint against the admission process, the cause for such complaint being that the process is not fair or transparent or merit based and that it is exploitative, it would not matter at all, as far as the student is concerned, that such process was handled by the CEE or by the Management. Either way, if a complaint of such nature is made, the Admission advisory Committee would be obligated, by the terms of the Act, to examine it notwithstanding the violations which led to such exploitative admission processes being committed by the CEE or by the Management. It is the complaint of the student that is important and not the agency or the person who has committed the violation. The Admission Supervisory Committee being a statutory body, completely autonomous in its operational field, cannot be constrained in its jurisdiction even in cases where the Government or its agencies commit violations in admission processes relating to private self financing colleges. The Admission Supervisory Committee being a statutory body, completely autonomous in its operational field, cannot be constrained in its jurisdiction even in cases where the Government or its agencies commit violations in admission processes relating to private self financing colleges. When there is such a violation or transgression, so as to vitiate the process of admission, even if committed by the agencies of the Government, the students can only approach the Admission Supervisory Committee under the provisions of Act when they feel that the process of admission has not been non-exploitative. 19. Now, coming to the facts at hand, I will take ex arguendo that the petitioner's assertions, that they have not conducted the admissions or collected the fees, to be true and that this was done by the CEE. Even assuming this to be so, it is ineluctable that, as far the students are concerned, their right under the Act is to be admitted in a fair and transparent manner. When they were asked to pay Rs.1,30,000/-, be that either by the CEE or by the petitioner, they were constrained to pay larger amounts than what they were expected to. They legitimately maintain their claims on Exhibit P3 order of the Fee Regulatory Committee, approving Exhibit P2 agreement between the petitioner and the Government, under which, only an amount of Rs.20,000/- as annual fee and an amount Rs.2,50,000/- as security deposit could have been collected. As far as the student is concerned, it is luculent that he or she was charged Rs.1,30,000/- as the annual fee. Whether it was collected by CEE or by the petitioner is of no consequence as far as the student is concerned and when the Statute enures in their favour, this does not matter at all because what we have to ensure is that the Act operates to provide every student fair, transparent and merit based process of admission which is not exploitative in nature. 20. I notice that it is the peculiar circumstances, presenting in the factual scenario, that the petitioner appears to have taken advantage of. The CEE may have collected the fee at Rs.1,30,000/- on account of the interim order of this Court in W.P.(C)No.19933/2007. I am told that the admission process started way back in June 2007 and that it concluded only by 5th September, 2007. The CEE may have collected the fee at Rs.1,30,000/- on account of the interim order of this Court in W.P.(C)No.19933/2007. I am told that the admission process started way back in June 2007 and that it concluded only by 5th September, 2007. The CEE was possibly, therefore, constrained to collect the fee at the rate of Rs.1,30,000/- from every student because, at the relevant time when the admission process was going on, the interim order of this Court operated on the field, inhibiting the CEE from collecting a lower fee as per Exhibit P3 order. This appears to be more than probable because this is the only manner in which the CEE could have acted at that point of time. 21. Now that takes me to examine how the petitioner has acted when they received the money, forwarded to them by the CEE under the cover of Exhibit P4. This examination, in my view, is crucial. 22. The petitioner institution had accepted the list of students from the CEE obviously because they were certain that they were acting under Exhibit P2 agreement as approved by Exhibit P3 order. If this was not so, they did not have to admit students from the list provided by the CEE or to accept the money forwarded to them by the CEE. The fact that the petitioner has accepted the money under the cover of Exhibit P4 and has made admissions from the list forwarded by the CEE would be sufficient enough for me to conclude, with substantial amount of certainty, that the petitioner also knew that they were acting under the mandate of Exhibit P2 agreement as approved by the Fee Regulatory Committee. That being so, the collection of money from the students, in excess of the amounts authorised by Exhibit P3, was obviously in fault and fell foul of the provisions of the Act. 23. It is true that the petitioner did not collect the money but it is admitted that the petitioner retained the money. They did not return the money but retained it knowing fully well that it represented the fees collected by the CEE while forwarding the list of eligible candidates. 23. It is true that the petitioner did not collect the money but it is admitted that the petitioner retained the money. They did not return the money but retained it knowing fully well that it represented the fees collected by the CEE while forwarding the list of eligible candidates. Therefore, to then recant and resile from their obligations, by posing themselves as the sinned and not the sinner, on the pretext that they have accepted and retained the money from the CEE under the impression that they were entitled to retain such money as the annual fee for that year under the prescription of exhibit P1, would be to push things extremely beyond proportions. This is evident and obvious because the CEE would have had no role if the admission process was carried by the petitioner under Exhibit P1 and the function of the CEE would arise only and solely if admissions were carried on under the terms of Exhibit P2 agreement. Hence, the very acceptance of the fee and the list forwarded by the CEE would establish irrefragably that the petitioner knew that they were acting under and being bound by the explicit terms of Exhibit P2 agreement, thus under an obligation not to charge more than Rs.20,000/- as annual fee for students admitted to Government seats. 24. I am firm in the resolve that the jurisdiction of the Admission Supervisory Committee would flow from the singular allegation of a student that he/she has been subjected to an unfair and exploitative process. In the facts at hand, irrespective of whether it was done by the CEE or by the petitioner institution, the students were admitted by charging a fee much higher than what they were expected to be charged under Exhibit P3 order. In such factual confines, the student had no other option but to approach the Admission Supervisory Committee under Section 4(6) of the Act. 25. I, therefore, repel the contention of the petitioner that the Admission Supervisory Committee had no jurisdiction in the matter and that the orders fail for want of such competence in jurisdiction. 26. The above being said, it now brings me to the validity of the orders impugned in this writ petition. There are two issues that I am bound to consider. 26. The above being said, it now brings me to the validity of the orders impugned in this writ petition. There are two issues that I am bound to consider. One is whether the Admission Supervisory Committee was right in imposing a fine of Rs.10 lakhs, under the provisions of Section 4(7) of the Act. The second is whether the Admission supervisory Committee could have, acting under its statutory jurisdiction, passed orders as are done in Exhibit P18 and P19. I see that Exhibit P19 is not challenged specifically in this case but since it is an order that has been issued by the Admission Supervisory Committee pending the writ petition, I deem it appropriate that I consider its validity also. 27. I will come to the question regarding the validity of the fine imposed against the petitioner by the Committee slightly later. 28. As regards the juridical validity of the orders that have been issued in this case is concerned, the Committee initially passed an interim order dated 26.12.2008, a copy of which has been appended to this writ petition as Exhibit P13. In that order it is shown that the petitioner agreed that they will only be entitled to charge annual tuition fee at the rate of Rs.20,000/- and that, therefore, the students who intended to pursue their second year can be allowed to pay an additional amount of Rs.1,60,000/- so that, in addition to the amount earlier collected by them, namely, Rs.1,30,000/-, the total amount retained by the petitioner would become Rs.2,90,000/-. This figure, according to the Committee, constitutes Rs.20,000/- each towards the annual fee for the first two years and Rs.2,50,000/- being the security deposit prescribed as per the terms of Exhibit P2 agreement. I am certain that had the petitioner acted as agreed by them in this order, a quietus could been easily be found at that point of time. 29. However, the petitioner choose not to do so. 30. They appear to have filed a statement about twenty days later resciling from their concurrence recorded in Exhibit P3, maintaining that they never agreed to such an order and that they will permit the students to continue the second year only on the condition that, out of the amount of Rs.1,60,000/- paid by them under the terms of Exhibit P13, an amount of Rs.1,30,000/- would be appropriated towards the annual fee for the second year. This, according to me, was completely unfair on the part of the petitioner because, if they had not agreed to the terms of Exhibit P13 order, they ought not to have accepted Rs.1,60,000/- from the students, as was ordered therein. They cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate among the alternatives that were then available to them since they had accepted Rs.1,60,000/- ordered under Exhibit P13. Their action, after having accepted the terms of Exhibit P13 order, relating to the amount of Rs.1,60,000/- determined to be payable by the students in the manner as shown above, and thereafter filing a statement attempting to fainaigue for their earlier accedence to it, is, to say the least, opportunist and devious. 31. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri. George Poonthottam, at this point of time tells me that according to his instructions, all the students did not pay Rs.1,60,000/- but that only some of them did. Even this being true, when the petitioner institution accepted Rs.1,60,000/-, at least from some students as they now claim, knowing fully well that it was paid under the terms of Exhibit P13, they cannot be allowed to renege from it unless they had refunded the money to the students who had paid it. I note that the learned Senior Counsel Smt. Seemandini refutes the above submission of Sri. George Poonthottam in a vehement tenor that not some but all students have actually paid the amounts as required under Exhibit P13 order. 32. It can only be in the backdrop of the facts noticed by me that an examination of the validity of Exhibits P18 and P19 be done. Quad hoc, Exhibit P18, it has been issued by the Advisory Advisory Committee finding the petitioner to be recalcitrant and obstinately disobedient of its earlier Exhibit P13 order and therefore, imposing a maximum fine of Rs.10 lakhs. The petitioner contests the imposition of fine with great amount of ferver. They say that they have not acted in disobedience to the orders of the Committee and that, therefore, they cannot be burdened with the full fine authorised by the Act. I am sure that I cannot countenance this argument at all for the reasons that I have already recorded above. They say that they have not acted in disobedience to the orders of the Committee and that, therefore, they cannot be burdened with the full fine authorised by the Act. I am sure that I cannot countenance this argument at all for the reasons that I have already recorded above. The action of the petitioner in having agreed to Exhibit P13 order and having collected the money permitted under that order, to have then attempted to resile and retract from their concurrence to such order, can only be malicious, to say the least, and intended to subvert the process of law. I do not, therefore, think that the Committee could have exonerated the petitioner from the liability to pay the full penalty authorised by the Act and I find no circumstances that is obtained to the petitioner to mitigate the gravity of their actions in attempting to subvert the process. I have, therefore, no hesitation in confirming Exhibit P18 order in its full extent. 33. Apropos of Exhibit P19 order, as I have already recorded above, it was issued pending this writ petition. The petitioner had filed this writ petition soon after Exhibit P18 order was issued. They had sought a stay of operation of Exhibit P18 in its full import before this Court,. However, this Court had granted an interim order staying Exhibit P18 only to the limited extent to which the fine was imposed. It is, therefore, obvious that this Court did not inhibit any further proceedings before the Committee and on the contrary, it will have to be assumed that this Court had permitted the Committee to proceed further and complete the proceedings. It is thus that Exhibit P19 order has been issued. 34. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends rather vociferously that the Committee could not have issued Exhibit P19 when this Court was already in seizin of this matter in this writ petition. Noticing the nature of the interim order as above, I am sure that this submission would hold no water. Since this Court had not stayed all further proceedings pursuant to Exhibit P18, the Committee was well within its power of jurisdiction to complete the process and issue a final order. 35. Noticing the nature of the interim order as above, I am sure that this submission would hold no water. Since this Court had not stayed all further proceedings pursuant to Exhibit P18, the Committee was well within its power of jurisdiction to complete the process and issue a final order. 35. As regards the validity of Exhibit P19 order, my examination of it shows that it has considered all the allegations and assertions of the parties in detail and justifiably finds that the petitioner could not have charged anything more than what was permitted under Exhibit P3 order. Thus in denouement, the Committee has ordered the petitioner to repay such amounts as are admittedly retained by them in excess of the amounts they could have charged as annual fee from the students for all the five years. The Committee appears to have worked the calculation in the following manner. It notices that at the time of admission each of the students had paid Rs.1,30,000/-. It, thereafter, proceeds on the uncontroverted assertion of the students that they have all paid Rs.1,60,000/-, under the terms of Exhibit P13 order. The Committee thus found that the total amount retained by the petitioner is Rs.2,90,000/-, out of which the fee for the five years would amount to Rs.1 lakh totally. The Committee has, therefore, directed the petitioner to repay Rs.1,90,000/-, found to be retained by them in such excess, to the students within a period of thirty days from the date of the order and has further directed the petitioner institution to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum in case of failure. 36. I have examined the orders impugned herein with great amount of assiduity in view of the vehemence engaged by the petitioner against its merits. I have, however, no doubt that, in the factual purlieus detailed above, the Committee has acted well within its jurisdiction and has issued orders as are mandatory and imperative in the conspectus of the circumstances that were presented before it by the parties. I cannot find the orders to be vitiated for non-consideration of the relevant factors or that they have been issued arbitrarily or capriciously. On the contrary, I am of the view that these orders have been issued with clarity and for reasons that are completely justifiable. I cannot find the orders to be vitiated for non-consideration of the relevant factors or that they have been issued arbitrarily or capriciously. On the contrary, I am of the view that these orders have been issued with clarity and for reasons that are completely justifiable. In any event of the matter, as I have already recorded above, I am in conformity with the proposition that the Committee has jurisdiction to consider these complaints and that it is within its powers and jurisdiction to issue such orders as has been impugned in this case. 37. In such circumstances and for the reasons that are stated above, I have no hesitation in approving and granting imprimatur to Exhibits P18 and P19 orders and I find that the petitioner is obliged and liable to make payment of the amounts shown in Exhibit P19 as well as the fine imposed under Exhibit P18 order. 38. As regards the interest is concerned, I see that the Committee has directed that the amounts be paid by the petitioner within thirty days from the date of the order. It had then further directed that if there is any failure, the petitioner will have to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum. I do not see any such power being vested with the Committee to pass orders relating to interest payable on such amounts. For such reasons, I have no other option but to vacate that part of Exhibit P19 order, which imposes interest for the delay in payment. However, while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, I cannot be unmindful that the petitioners have been waiting for long for their legitimate dues to be repaid to them. I, therefore, deem it appropriate that I direct the petitioner to repay the amounts to each of the students, as has been directed by the Committee in Exhibit P19, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. I, therefore, deem it appropriate that I direct the petitioner to repay the amounts to each of the students, as has been directed by the Committee in Exhibit P19, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. If this amount is paid within the time granted herein the petitioner will have no further liability or obligations against the students, but if it is not so paid within the time granted herein, I order them to make payment of the amount along with interest at the rate of 10% from the date of this judgment until such time as it is paid to the satisfaction of the Admission Advisory Committee, by the petitioner. The writ petition is ordered as above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs and the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.