JUDGMENT : Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. 1. This First Appeal is directed against an order being no. 7 dated 23rd March, 2017 passed by the learned Judge, 5th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit no. 236 of 2017 at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant. 2. By the impugned order, the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected. 3. Let us now consider as to how far the learned Trial Judge was justified in rejecting the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction in the facts of the present case. 4. After being successful in the tender, a contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1, allotting different sites permitting the plaintiff to display hoardings and kiosks on Vidyasagar Setu (2nd Hooghly Bridge), Gariahat flyover, A.J.C Bose Road flyover, Beck Bagan flyover, Park Street flyover, Lock Gate flyover, Nager Bazar flyover (Dum Dum), Khidderpore flyover and bridge for the period of three years (36 months) on the terms and conditions as mentioned in the notice inviting tender. 5. Admittedly, there was no problem between the parties during the said contract period. There was no complain against the plaintiff for non-compliance of any of the obligations which the plaintiff was required to fulfill in terms of the said contract. Admittedly, the said contract was extended for a further period of one year w.e.f. the date next to the date of expiry of the original contract with the same terms and conditions as laid down earlier except the locations as mentioned in the office letter dated 17th December, 2013 wherein already a further period of one year two months has been extended due to removal of hoardings from the other locations because of declaration of green zone. The extended period of the contract is due to expire sometime in August, 2017. There was no complaint from the side of the defendant that the plaintiff has not fulfilled any of the conditions which it is required to perform in terms of the subsequent contract for the extended period. The extended period of the contract is due to expire sometime in August, 2017. There was no complaint from the side of the defendant that the plaintiff has not fulfilled any of the conditions which it is required to perform in terms of the subsequent contract for the extended period. Problems started when the defendant by its letter dated 27th December, 2016 intimated the plaintiff that the defendant will take back the area of operation as mentioned in the contract w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 in terms of Clause 15 of the terms and conditions of contract and instruction to the bidder. Service of such notice upon the plaintiff gave rise to the cause of action for filing the present suit by the plaintiff against the defendants as the advertisement right of the plaintiff was sought to be disturbed by the defendant during the extended period of contract causing loss of reputation and also loss of business. In the said suit the plaintiff prayed for a decree of declaration that the termination notice dated 27th December, 2016 is bad in law and also for a further declaration that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 and the extension pursuant to the letter dated 18th August, 2016 are valid and still in force. A decree for permanent injunction was sought for restraining the defendants from creating any obstruction and/or hindrance to the plaintiff towards exercising its user right over and at advertisement sites hoardings/bill boards and kiosks allotted by the defendant no.1 at A.J.C Bose Road flyover, Gariahat flyover, Park Street flyover, Khidderpore flyover and bridge without due process of law. After filing the said suit the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction for restraining the opposite party/defendant from creating any third party interest at the allotted sites and also restraining them from acting in terms and/or from giving any effect and the further effect to the impugned termination notice dated 27th December, 2016 at the suit property which is mentioned in the schedule of the said petition and allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to exercise its contractual rights thereat in terms of the Memos dated 18th August, 2016. Ad interim order of injunction was also sought for in the said application. Ad interim order of injunction was also sought for in the said application. Since the cause of action for filing the said application was identical to the cause of action for filing the suit this Court for the purpose of avoiding further repetition does not choose to narrate the pleadings of the plaintiff made out in his temporary injunction application once again. 6. The defendant contested the plaintiff’s said application for temporary injunction by filing objection. Thought the defendants did not complain about any lapse on the part of the plaintiff in performing its part of the contract but tried to justify its action by relying upon Clause 15 of the terms of the conditions of the contract and instructions to the bidder which runs as follows:- “Clause 15. HRBC reserves the right to take back any area with three months notice and refund the sum already deposited for such areas for the balance period on pro rata basis (simple pro rata will be applicable and no weight-age for any other factor shall be considered).” 7. Though the defendant issued the said notice in exercise of its power reserved in Clause 15 of the said contract, but reasons for exercise of such discretion has not been mentioned by the defendant in the said notice. However reasons for exercise of such discretion has been disclosed by said defendant in its affidavit in paragraph 12 thereof which runs as follows:- “Paragraph 12. With regard to the statements made in paragraph no.13 of the said petition it is stated that the Board of HRBC in its 196th meeting held on 23rd December, 2016 upon discussion viewed that in the absence of any provision in the agreement for extension of contract period, any decision and action to extend the contract period is not proper and thus, decided for issue of e-tender in that regard. Accordingly, the Memo No. HRBC/ 10T-95/2013/Pr. & Co/229 dated 27th December, 2016 was issued intimating about taking back the contract area of operation w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 in terms of Clause 15 of terms and conditions of contract and instructions to the bidders. The defendants, thus, claimed that since such right of termination of the contract was reserved with them, the plaintiff cannot make any grievance if the contract is terminated by the defendant by observing the condition as mentioned in Clause 15 of the said contract.” 8. The defendants, thus, claimed that since such right of termination of the contract was reserved with them, the plaintiff cannot make any grievance if the contract is terminated by the defendant by observing the condition as mentioned in Clause 15 of the said contract.” 8. They, thus, prayed for dismissal of the plaintiff’s said application for injunction. 9. The learned Trial Judge after considering Clauses 14 and 15 of the said contract and particularly Clause 15 thereof came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not been able to establish a prima facie case in his favour and the balance of convenience and inconvenience also does not tilt in favour of the plaintiff. 10. Since clause 14 of the said contract was referred by the learned Trial Judge, clause 14 is set out hereunder for proper appreciation of the legality of the impugned order:- “Clause 14. If any areas is required for use in public interest or Force Majeure condition, the same area will be handed over by the tenderer to HRBC prematurely and the proportionate sum already deposited with HRBC shall be refunded within 30 days of handing over such areas back to HRBC (excluding the area beyond 20% please see Cl. No. 29)”. 11. The learned Trial Judge also held that there is no question of facing irreparable loss by the plaintiff if the petition for temporary injunction is rejected. It is also held that if, on the contrary, the plaintiff’s prayer for temporary injunction is allowed the defendant nos. 1 and 2 may suffer losses and further if the bids are invited by the process of e-Tender, the Government can generate more revenues which would ultimately go to the public exchequer. Such conclusion was drawn by the learned Trial Judge by referring to Clause 15 of the said agreement which gives right to the defendant to pre-terminate such contract for public interest. 12. The legality of the said order passed by the learned Trial Judge is under challenge in this appeal. 13. Let us now consider the merit of the instant appeal in the facts of the instant case. Mr. 12. The legality of the said order passed by the learned Trial Judge is under challenge in this appeal. 13. Let us now consider the merit of the instant appeal in the facts of the instant case. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant submits that the plaintiff being in settled possession in the sites allotted to it by the defendant under the contract permitting the plaintiff to display advertisement therein and also by placing kiosks, cannot make an attempt to take back forcible possession of the said sites from the plaintiff during the contractual period. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that even the defendant cannot even forcefully dispossess the plaintiff from these allotted sites by exercise of its right reserved under Clause 15 of the said contract as the Indian law does not recognize exercise of the such right of re-entry for recovering the possession of any immovable property from occupier thereof even after termination and/or expiration of the contractual period. 14. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that possession of the settlee can only be recovered by the settler only after expiration of the contractual period or on termination of the contract, by following due process of law. 15. Mr. Mukherjee, thus, contended that the plaintiff’s possession in respect of those settled sites cannot be disturbed otherwise than in due process of law. Since no decree has yet been passed by any Court of competent jurisdiction for recovering the possession of those sites from the plaintiff, the defendant ought to have been injuncted from disturbing the plaintiff’s possession in those sites until the defendant succeeds in recovering possession thereof from the plaintiff through due process of law, notwithstanding the right of termination and/or taking back possession was reserved with the defendant under the contract. In support of such submission Mr. Mukherjee has referred to the provision of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and has also relied upon the following decisions:- (1) In the case of Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his LRS Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 620 . (2) In the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRS Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 and (3) In the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 620 . (2) In the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRS Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 and (3) In the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 And (4) In the case of Lucknow Development Authority and Ors. Vs. Maharani Rajlaxmi Kumari Devi & Ors. Reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 . 16. Relying upon these decisions Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel submitted that exercise of force for recovering possession from the lessee and/or licensee even after expiration of the lease/license and/or on termination thereof is unknown in India and particularly when the lessor and/or the licensee is the Government and/or the statutory authority, they should not be permitted to exercise such right of re-entry even if such right as reserved in the contract, as exercise of such right by the Government and/or the statutory authority even in the contractual field, is opposed to the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel invited this Court to set aside the impugned order. 17. Mr. Basu, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant refuted such submission of Mr. Mukherjee by relying upon the Clauses 14 and 15 of the terms and conditions of the contract. By referring to those terms and conditions of the contract, Mr. Basu submitted that the contract being determinable in nature such contract is not enforceable in terms of Section 14(1)(c) of this Specific Relief Act and consequently injunction as prayed for should be refused in view of the bar under Section 41(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 18. Mr. Basu submitted that legality and validity of Clauses 14 and 15 of the terms and conditions have been sought to be challenged on the ground that same are illegal, unlawful and arbitrary, but such challenges, according to Mr. 18. Mr. Basu submitted that legality and validity of Clauses 14 and 15 of the terms and conditions have been sought to be challenged on the ground that same are illegal, unlawful and arbitrary, but such challenges, according to Mr. Basu are not sustainable for the following reasons: (i) Firstly excepting an averment made in paragraph 18 of the plaint that the impugned notice is bad in law and if the defendant is permitted to act upon such notice, the plaintiff may suffer loss in its business and its reputation will also be damaged, no relief for the damages due to loss of business and/or loss of reputation has been sought for by the plaintiff in the said suit; and (ii) Secondly when the parties entered into an agreement accepting the terms and conditions with open eyes such terms and conditions cannot be varied and/or modified on the grounds of violation of principles of fairness and/or reasonableness as pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee. In support of such submission he has relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Puravankara Projects Ltd. Vs. Hotel Venus International & Ors. Reported in (2007) 10 SCC 33 . 19. By referring to another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Amritsar Gas Service & Ors. Reported in (1991) 1 SCC 533 , Mr. Basu further contended that since the contract is determinable in nature, no interference with the impugned order is necessary in the facts of the present case particularly when learned Trial Judge has refused to grant of interim injunction in the said suit by looking at the nature of the said contract which is determinable in nature. 20. Mr. Basu thus, invited this Court not to interfere with the impugned order. 21. Let us now consider the merit of the instant appeal in the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel hereinabove. 22. While narrating the cases of the respective parties, we have already mentioned that execution of the contract between the parties and the extension of the contractual period granted by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff for a period of one year after expiration of the three years term, originally granted to the plaintiff by the defendant under the original contract, is admitted by the parties. There is no complaint from the side of the defendant that plaintiff committed any breach of contract, either during the original contractual period or even during the extended period. The defendant by its notice intimated the plaintiff of its decision to take back the possession of the sites settled with the plaintiff for exercise of their advertisement right therein, before expiry of the extended contractual period by invoking its right reserved under Clause 15 of the contract which has already been set out hereinabove. No doubt, right to take back the possession by service of three months notice by the defendant upon the plaintiff was reserved in Clause 15 of the said contract, but we will have to test as to how far such right can be exercised by the defendant to recover forcible possession of the settled sites from the plaintiff before expiry of the contractual period or even after expiry of the notice period without following due process of law. 23. In this regard reference may be made to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which provides for recovery of possession of the person dispossessed from his settled possession by any person otherwise than in due process of law. In this regard we like to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lallu Yeswant (dead) by his LRS (supra) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court approved of the view of the Bombay High Court in the case of K.K. Verma Vs. Naraindas C. Malkani, reported in AIR 1945 Bom. 358 as follows:- “Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession, cannot go to Court under Section 9 and claim possession against the true owner”. 24. In a subsequent decision in the case of State of U.P & Ors. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. and Lucknow Development Authority & Ors. Vs. 24. In a subsequent decision in the case of State of U.P & Ors. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. and Lucknow Development Authority & Ors. Vs. Maharani Rajlaxmi Kumari Devi & Ors. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a lessor, with the best title, has no right to resume possession extra judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. 25. It was further held therein that use of the expression “re-entry” in the lease deed does not mean otherwise use of extra judicial methods to resume possession under law as the possession of a lessee, even after expiry of the lease or its earlier termination is juridical and forcible dispossession is prohibited. It was further held there that a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due process of law. 26. Identical view was also expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRS Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 , wherein it was held that it is well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. Holding as such Hon’ble Supreme Court declared that since the licensee was unlawfully dispossessed, she was entitled to a decree for recovery of possession and damages for such unlawful dispossession is not the appropriate remedy for such licensee. 27. If we apply the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in those cases in the present case, we find that the defendant cannot take back the possession of these allotted sites from the plaintiff forcibly and without taking due recourse to law during the subsistence of the contractual period notwithstanding reservation of right of taking back such possession from the plaintiff in Clause 15 of the said contract. Plaintiff is no doubt, in settled possession of the allotted sites as the plaintiff was given the right to display advertisement by displaying signboards and also by placing kiosks on the allotted sites. Plaintiff is no doubt, in settled possession of the allotted sites as the plaintiff was given the right to display advertisement by displaying signboards and also by placing kiosks on the allotted sites. It may be mentioned herein that signboards are placed on the structures embedded to the earth and kiosks are also placed on the allotted sites embedded to the earth. It is not out of place to mention herein that for utilization of the land for construction of iron structure therein, the Kolkata Municipal Corporation has also demanded land utilization charge from the plaintiff which the defendant denied to pay as the land, according to the plaintiff, does not belong to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation but the same belongs to the defendants who have permitted the plaintiff to exercise its right of advertisement therein in the manner as mentioned above. 28. A writ petition has been filed challenging the competence of the Municipal Corporation to demand such land utilization charges from the plaintiff and an interim order was passed in the said writ petition restraining the Municipal authority from collecting any land utilization charge from the plaintiff during the pendency of the writ petition. As such, it cannot be denied that the plaintiff is not in settled possession of the allotted sites which are embedded to earth and, thus, the principles underlined, in the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is applicable in the instant case. 29. We cannot accept the submission of Mr. Basu that damages is the only remedy in the facts of the instant case in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to above as though it is true that the contract is terminable by service of three months notice upon the plaintiff and such notice in fact has been served upon the plaintiff , but in view of the decisions cited by Mr. Mukherjee, the defendants cannot be permitted to take back forcible possession of the settled sites from the plaintiff without taking recourse to law and damages as contemplated in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act is not the appropriate relief where the settled possession of the settlee is disturbed by the settler, in view of section 6 of the said Act. 30. 30. When restoration of possession is the remedy available to the person dispossessed from his settled possession otherwise than in due process of law is recognized under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act then why injunction cannot be granted to protect the possession of such settlee when his possession is threatened by the settler without following due process of law. 31. We thus, hold that injunction is the appropriate relief in the instant case by relying on the proverb that prevention is better than cure. 32. Before parting with, we also like to mention here that admittedly, the notice to take back was not issued by the defendants for any breach of contract made by the plaintiff. Such notice was issued by the defendants by invoking its right reserved under Clause 15 of the Contract as according to the defendant, extension of the contractual period was wrongly given by the defendant without holding any auction and/or floating tender for settlement of the suit sites after expiry of the contractual period. 33. Thus, we find that the defendants themselves claimed that the plaintiff was not at fault leading to issuance of such take back notice. The defendants themselves claimed that they were at fault by extending the contractual period. The defendants do not claim that any fraud was committed by the plaintiff upon the defendant in getting the contractual period extended by a year. 34. Thus, we hold that the defendants are responsible for the wrong allegedly committed by them and as such, the defendants, in our view, cannot issue the said notice to take back possession in pursuance of their right reserved in clause 15 of the contract by taking advantage of its own wrong. Here question of modification of Clause 15 of the contract is not an issue. Justification for application of Clause 15 of the contract and exercise of force for taking back possession by the defendants in terms of the said clause is an issue in this proceeding. Here question of modification of Clause 15 of the contract is not an issue. Justification for application of Clause 15 of the contract and exercise of force for taking back possession by the defendants in terms of the said clause is an issue in this proceeding. Even clause 15 is retained in the contract as it is without any modification, the defendants, in our view, cannot exercise force to recover possession from the plaintiff as in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Ram Mohale (dead) (Supra), such possession can only be recovered through due process of law and damage is not the appropriate relief in such cases. Damage is the appropriate relief when there is breach of contract or wrongful termination of contract. In the present case the termination of the contract which was made by the defendants cannot be held to be wrongful, as such action was taken by the defendants in pursuance of the right reserved in Clause 15 of the contract. As such damage is not appropriate remedy in the instant case. We accordingly hold that injunction is the appropriate remedy in case damage is not the adequate remedy. 35. Under such circumstances, we set aside the impugned order by holding that the plaintiff has succeeded in making out a strong prima facie case in favour of the grant of temporary injunction in his favour and the balance of convenience and inconvenience is also in favour of grant of injunction. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and pass an interim order of injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff in the suit sites till the disposal of this suit, otherwise than in due process of law. 36. The appeal is thus, disposed of. 37. The connected application is thus deemed to be disposed of. 38. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible. I agree. Shivakant Prasad, J Later: After the judgement is delivered in Court, Mr. Biswajit Basu, learned advocate appearing for the respondents prays for stay of operation of the order. The connected application is thus deemed to be disposed of. 38. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible. I agree. Shivakant Prasad, J Later: After the judgement is delivered in Court, Mr. Biswajit Basu, learned advocate appearing for the respondents prays for stay of operation of the order. Since the instant appeal relates to the plaintiff’s prayer for interim injunction and we have ultimately allowed such prayer for injunction, after considering the principles laid down for grant of interim injunction in the suit and/or the appeal, we refuse to grant stay of the operation of the order, as the plaintiff is under threat of eviction from the defendants.