JUDGMENT : Mr. Jainendra Kumar Ranka, J. 1. The instant petition is directed against order dt 28.9.2016 passed by Civil Judge & Metropolitan Magistrate (East), Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, in Civil Suit No.81/2006, whereby the application filed by defendant-petitioner, under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC was dismissed. 2. Brief facts noticed are that the plaintiff respondent filed a suit for declaration, permanent injunction and cancellation of patta against defendant no.1 & defendant no.2 in the court of Civil Judge & Metropolitan Magistrate (East), Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur. The plaintiff pleaded in her plaint that she is a resident of plot no.509, Mahaveer Nagar, Jaipur, and just adjacent to her plot, there is a park situated towards western side measuring 130 x 130 sq ft, which is recorded as ‘facility area’ in the records of the Jaipur Development Authority. It was further pleaded that earlier JDA allotted land admeasuring 1000 sq yd to one Hadoti Samaj and land measuring 708 sq yd to defendant-petitioner from the said ‘facility area’ and after some time, land allotted to Hadoti Samaj was cancelled and defendant no.1 was allotted land measuring 708 sq yd from the land allotted to Hadoti Samaj and the patta issued to defendant no.1-petitioner was modified and revised patta was issued to defendant no.1 on 12.2.2016. It was further pleaded in the plaint that defendant no.1 had not taken any other person as its member, except persons belonging from the Jain religion in their amended bye-laws and/or constitution, and as per the directives of this court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1270/2001, Mahendra Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority (Public Interest Litigation), a meeting was convened by the JDA to enable the parties to arrive at a settlement, wherein the husband of the plaintiff though not present, but still the JDA had shown the presence of plaintiff’s husband in the meeting dt 24.4.2007, and it was further pleaded that neither the husband of the plaintiff was called by the JDA to attend the meeting, nor her husband was present in the meeting and no compromise was arrived at. It has also been pleaded that this court in its judgment dt 22.5.2015 had directed the use and occupation of the disputed land by general public and open to all and as defendant no.1 did not amend/modify their bye-laws as per mandate of this court, modified/revised patta issued on 12.2.2016 was liable to be declared as null and void and an injunction was sought that the JDA may be restrained from approving the site-plan/map of the suit property allotted to defendant no.1. 3. An application came to be filed under Order 7, Rule 11 read with section 151 CPC by defendant no.1, petitioner herein, for rejection of the plaint primarily on the ground that no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff to file the present suit and that order of the Division Bench of this court settled all the issues and as per the mandate of such order, all conditions stand fulfilled and pursuant thereto revised patta granted by the JDA, was in accordance with law, and the suit was an abuse of the process of law and ought to be dismissed at the threshold. However, the trial court vide the impugned order, held that there were disputed questions and the same could only be decided after framing of issues and recording of evidence and thus rejected the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the State Government was pleased to accord sanction to allot to the petitioner, a registered society, under the provisions of the Rajasthan Societies Act, an allotment of land admeasuring 726 sq. yd out of the facility area adjacent to plot nos.508 & 509 in Mahaveer Nagar, Tonk Road, vide order dt 3.2.2001. 5. Learned counsel contends that the said allotment was duly approved by BPC, a high level body in its meeting and thereafter allotment letter dt 28.7.2001 was issued in favour of defendant no.1-petitioner, and also a lease-deed (patta) was issued/executed and registered on 3.8.2001 by the JDA in favour of petitioner-defendant no.1. Learned counsel further contended that a Public Interest Litigation petition came to be filed by Mahendra Singh & Others, challenging the action of JDA by way of filing D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1270/2001 (supra). Learned counsel further contended that a Public Interest Litigation petition came to be filed by Mahendra Singh & Others, challenging the action of JDA by way of filing D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1270/2001 (supra). The State Government, the JDA, and the petitioner and others contested the petition and at one stage the court passed an order on 10.4.2007 directing the parties to evolve a compromise formula for resolving the dispute and a meeting was held in presence of all concerned. He further contends that a compromise was arrived at, minutes were drawn and the same were placed on record before the Divisional Bench of this court, and were taken on record and the Divisional Bench of this court vide its judgment dt 22.5.2015 disposed of the writ petition taking note of the settlement arrived at between the parties, and certain directions were given to the petitioner to amend its bye-laws. Learned counsel further contends that it was categorically held by this court in the aforesaid judgment (supra) that the allotment made in favour of the petitioner society was in accordance with law and the action of JDA in allotting the land and executing the lease-deed, was held to be legal and within the authority of JDA. Learned counsel further contended that petitioner no.1 got their bye-laws/constitution amended as per the mandate of this court, and the JDA after completely satisfying itself, issued a revised patta to the petitioner. Learned counsel thus contends that once the Divisional Bench of this court has upheld issuance of patta in favour of the petitioner defendant no.1, respondent-plaintiff had no right to have the patta declared as null and void, and further contends that in pursuance of the directions issued vide judgment dt 22.5.2015, the petitioner will construct building which shall be open for use by general public without any discrimination on the basis of caste, colour or creed, and not exclusively by or for members of Jain religion alone. Learned counsel thus contends that once validity of allotment of land to the petitioner has been affirmed by the Division Bench of this court, no cause of action accrued to the plaintiff-respondent to file the instant suit, which was an abuse of process of law and the suit ought to have been dismissed at the threshold, and the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC moved by the petitioner was just and proper. Learned counsel further contended that a contempt petition no.1036/2016 came to be filed raising the same issue, however, this court dismissed the contempt petition on 6.9.2016. Reliance was placed on judgment passed by this court in the case of Anil Kumar Shrivastava v. Mukesh Chand Saxena & Others 2014 (2) WLC (Raj.) 404. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC preferred by the defendant-petitioner was misconceived for all the issues raised therein could only be decided after completion of trial and a meaningful reading of the plaint, which is the only requirement to decide the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, abundantly reveals that it disclosed “cause of action” and was not covered under any of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. Learned counsel further contended that a Misc. Application No.463/2016 was filed by the petitioner in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1270/2001, before the Division Bench of this court, where a prayer had been made to regularise the illegal construction made in the set back area of the land, and the said application is pending, therefore, it was contended that the petitioner was guilty of raising contradictory stands and the trial court was justified in rejecting the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. Learned counsel further contends that there was a categorical observation of this court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1270/2001 (supra) that no construction, even temporary construction, will be made by the petitioner in the concerned set back areas, and constructions having been made in the set back areas, the petition deserves to be rejected with costs. Learned counsel further contends that wrong fact has been recorded by the JDA in the minutes about the presence of husband of the respondent-plaintiff, although the husband of respondent never participated in such meetings and, therefore, the compromise/minutes drawn had no valid basis or could not have been acted upon. Learned counsel also contended that the petitioner has not amended its bye-laws as per the mandate of this court and, therefore, the plaintiff had a just cause of filing the instant suit and thus the instant petition was liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel also contended that the petitioner has not amended its bye-laws as per the mandate of this court and, therefore, the plaintiff had a just cause of filing the instant suit and thus the instant petition was liable to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on the following judgments :- Babulal Yadav v. State of Rajasthan 2012 (5) WLC (Raj.) 563, Laxmi Lal Dangi v. State of Rajasthan & Others 2013 WLC (Raj.) UC 430, Govind Narayan v. Shri Baheti Dharmshala & Others 2011 (4) WLC (Raj.) 531, Mohan Lal Sukhadia University, Udaipur v. Miss Priya Soloman 1999 (2) WLC (Raj.) 110. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material on record, and put my thoughtful consideration on the rival contentions raised. Before proceeding to deal with the factual matrix, it would be fruitful to discuss the well established legal proposition with respect to the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC :- Order 7, Rule 11 CPC “11. Before proceeding to deal with the factual matrix, it would be fruitful to discuss the well established legal proposition with respect to the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC :- Order 7, Rule 11 CPC “11. Rejection of plaint- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the Plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provision of Rule 9 : Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp paper shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the Plaintiff.” 7.1 It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fail to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. 7.2 This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 1 SCC 557 , in which, while considering Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: “9. A perusal of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application there under are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.” 7.3 It is clear that in order to consider Order 7, Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial Court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property (1998) 7 SCC 184 and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M. v. Fortune Express and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 100 . These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property (1998) 7 SCC 184 and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M. v. Fortune Express and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 100 . 7.4 It is also useful to refer to the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. (1977) 4 SCC 467 , wherein while considering the very same provision, i.e. Order 7, Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, the Apex court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p.470, para 5) “5. ...The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and merit less, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.” 7.5 It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and merit less and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 . If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer J., in the above referred decision, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code. 7.6 While scrutinizing the plaint averments, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to ascertain the materials for cause of action. The cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff the right to relief against the defendant. 7.6 While scrutinizing the plaint averments, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to ascertain the materials for cause of action. The cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff the right to relief against the defendant. Every fact which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to get a decree should be set out in clear terms. It is worthwhile to find out the meaning of the words “cause of action”. A cause of action must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. 7.7 In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem (1989) 2 SCC 163 , this Court explained the meaning of “cause of action” as follows: (SCC p. 170, para 12) “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” 7.8 It is useful to refer the judgment in Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 322 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of the Apex court held as under: “28. (1994) 6 SCC 322 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of the Apex court held as under: “28. By “cause of action” it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court, (Cooke v. Gill (1873) LR 8 CP 107); in other words, a bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. “It is mandatory that in order to get relief, the plaintiff has to aver all material facts. In other words, it is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove in order to succeed in the suit.” 8. In Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (2012) 8 SCC 706 , it was held by the Apex court that “it is settled law that where a document is sued upon and its terms are not set out in the plaint, but referred to in the plaint, the said document gets incorporated by reference in the plaint”. In the light of the above legal proposition, a careful scrutiny of the plaint averments reveal that the plaintiff placing reliance on judgment passed by the Division Bench of this court on 22.5.2015 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1270/2001 titled Mahendra Singh & others v. JDA & others, has sought declaration with respect to patta issued to defendant no.1-petitioner by defendant no.2 JDA on the following grounds :- (a) that the plaintiff's husband was not present in the meeting dt 24.4.2007 and their consent shown to the compromise on such date was erroneous; (b) that the defendant petitioner society has not included the plaintiff and several members of the colony as its members and restricted its membership only to such members, who are followers of Lord Mahaveer; (c) that the amendment made on 31.7.2005 in the constitution of the defendant society, was in defiance of the judgment dt 22.5.2015; (d) that the defendant society has made construction of 10x15 feet in the set back area. 9. From a bare perusal of the plaint averments, it is clear that the whole suit is based on judgment dt 22.5.2015 passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1270/2001 titled Mahendra Singh & others v. JDA & others. 9. From a bare perusal of the plaint averments, it is clear that the whole suit is based on judgment dt 22.5.2015 passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1270/2001 titled Mahendra Singh & others v. JDA & others. The same position is further fortified from para 23 of the plaint, which is reproduced as under :- ^^;g fd Jheku~ ds {ks=kf/kdkj esa fooknkLin ifjlj fLFkr gksus ls o gkbZdksVZ ds vkns'k fnukad 22-05-2015 ds iSjk uEcj&28 ds rgr Jheku~ U;k;ky; dks nkok Jo.k djus dk Jo.kkf/kdkj ,oa {ks=kf/kdkj izkIr gSA^^ 10. Thus, the above noted judgment, being the sheetanchor and foundation of the whole plaint becomes part and parcel of the “cause of action” in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra). Paras 19 and 20 of the above Division Bench judgment of this court is quoted verbatim as under :- “19. On 10.04.2007, this Court passed an order directing the parties to evolve a compromise formula for resolving the controversy between the parties. The order dated 10.04.2007, is quoted as below:- “List this writ petition on 26.04.2007 to enable the contesting parties to evolve a compromise formula for resolving the controversy between the parties. Mr. Bharat Vyas, learned counsel appearing for JDA is expected to use his good offices along with the officers of the JDA to assist in arriving at an amicable settlement. 20. In pursuance to the aforesaid order dated 10.04.2007, a meeting was held on 24.04.2007 under the Chairmanship of Commissioner, JDA in the presence of all the parties, and in which a settlement was recorded as follows:- “Relevant Extract Of Minutes Of Meeting Held on 24.04.2007 “After deliberations, Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra expressed its willingness to continue with the present allotment in the part and modification in the allotment while Hadoti Samaj agreed to have an allotment in any other facility area in Mahaveer Nagar or vicinal colonies. It was categorically mentioned that whichever facility area is finally opted by Hadoti Samaj, not more than 50 percent of the area of the facility plot will be allotted to Hadoti Samaj so that rest of the 50 percent can be kept open for the public to be used as park. Both the parties decided to deliberate with their other members and meet again in the evening. Both the parties decided to deliberate with their other members and meet again in the evening. At 5 pm on the same day, meeting was conducted with both the parties to the petition. It was attended by one more partcipant, Shri Mathur, resident of Plot No.509, Mahaveer Nagar. Both the parties, agreed on following proposal:- (1) Allotment to Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra should be modified and it may be allotted land equivalent to the same area 708.33 sq. yards adjacent to plot No.508 and 509 in the same facility area, but Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra will have to keep the following set backs open forever- - 20 ft front set back on 80 ft. road - 10 ft. rear set back on 30 ft. road - 15 ft. side set back on the side of plot No.508 and 509 - Charpeta (Zero set back) on the park side. No construction even of temporary nature will be made by Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra in the above set back areas. Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra will not have any entry into the park side. This way the inhabitants of the colony will have an open area of 1205.55 sq. yards which can be developed as park. The neighboring residents of plot No.508 and 509 were also satisfied with this arrangement.” 11. A bare perusal of the above paras of the judgment abundantly displays that the allegation of the plaintiff that neither she or husband were present in the meeting held on 24.4.2007, is nothing but farce. The Division Bench has categorically noted the proceedings drawn of meeting dt 24.4.2007, with approval. The extract of such meeting specifically mentions that one participant Shri Mathur resident of plot no.509 (who happens to be husband of the present plaintiff, as displayed from the plaint) was present on such date who also agreed on the proposal. Hon’ble Division Bench further decided the implication of non filing of signed compromise petition in the following words :- “22. With the aforesaid settlement, nothing further survives, to be decided in this writ petition. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.3 and 4, have not denied this settlement, which was agreed to, between the parties on 24.04.2007, and thus, even if the compromise petition signed by the parties, has not been filed, the Court can dispose of the writ petition, in terms of the settlement.” 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.3 and 4, have not denied this settlement, which was agreed to, between the parties on 24.04.2007, and thus, even if the compromise petition signed by the parties, has not been filed, the Court can dispose of the writ petition, in terms of the settlement.” 12. From the above emerging position this court is at a loss as to how the plaintiff can attack the allotment in the instant civil suit on the basis that her husband’s presence on 24.04.2007 was wrongly recorded, when the Division Bench of this court has already settled such issue. This court is of the firm view that such controversy cannot be reopened or agitated again or can be made the basis of a suit, when the plaintiff respondent has not even challenged such a finding by the Division Bench of this court. Thus the respondent-plaintiff was not entitled to file the instant suit on the basis of such alleged non-presence on meeting dt 24.4.2007. 13. Now, if the other grounds of the plaint are scrutinized in the light of the directions given in the Division Bench judgment (supra), the same position emerges and it is apparent that the plaint discloses merely an illusionary cause of action and fails to disclose real cause of action. 14. It would also be appropriate to quote paras 24, 26 and 27 of the Division Bench judgment (supra) :- “24. The allotments to Hadoti Samaj and Mahavir Sadhna Kendra, were made in accordance with law, and the lease deeds have also been executed. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the allotments were illegal, or were beyond the authority of the JDA. We, however, agree with learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that even if any allotment is made in the facility area to any society for public purposes, or religious purposes, utilization of the its land and the building constructed by such society, has to be primarily for general public, with participation of the residents of the colony. 25. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 26. The Mahavir Sadhna Kendra, the respondent No. 3, had agreed to modify the allotment, and for allotment equivalent to the same area i.e. 708.33 sq. yds., adjacent to plot Nos.508 and 509 in the same facility area, with set backs of 20 ft. on 80 ft. road; 10 ft. on 30 ft. road; 15 ft. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 26. The Mahavir Sadhna Kendra, the respondent No. 3, had agreed to modify the allotment, and for allotment equivalent to the same area i.e. 708.33 sq. yds., adjacent to plot Nos.508 and 509 in the same facility area, with set backs of 20 ft. on 80 ft. road; 10 ft. on 30 ft. road; 15 ft. side set back towards plot Nos.508 and 509; and Charpeta (Zero set back) on the park side. It was agreed that no construction, even temporary construction, will be made in the concerned set back areas, and that Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra will not have any entry into the park side, leaving 1205.55 sq. yds. area clear for development of a park. 27. We may further observe that the Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra cannot usurp the facility area only for followers of Jain religion. Once the area has been earmarked as facility area, it means that all the residents of the colony have a right to use the facilities established on such land. The allotment of plot measuring 708.33 sq. yds. to Mahavir Sadhna Kendra, would not allow it exclusive use of the plot and its building by the Jain Community only.” 15. The directions given by the Division Bench displays that the allotment and issuance of lease-deed to the petitioner defendant Mahaveer Sadhna Kendra, was held to be made in accordance with law, but it was directed that user of the land and building constructed by the society had to be primarily for general public with participation of the residents of the colony. The Hon’ble Division Bench did not pass directions as to the inclusion or non-inclusion of members of any sect or religion, as members of the petitioner society. Thus, the plaintiff’s allegation that non inclusion of the plaintiff or any member of the colony as member of the petitioner society, was infringement of the Division Bench judgment providing the plaintiff cause of action to institute the instant suit, fails, and on this count no cause of action can be said to have accrued to the plaintiff to institute the instant suit. 16. The next ground raised is the assertion in the plaint that the defendant petitioner was directed to amend the bye-laws and the defendant has not amended the bye-laws to include participation by members who are not follower of Lord Mahaveer in the affairs of defendant petitioner. 16. The next ground raised is the assertion in the plaint that the defendant petitioner was directed to amend the bye-laws and the defendant has not amended the bye-laws to include participation by members who are not follower of Lord Mahaveer in the affairs of defendant petitioner. To evaluate such assertion, para 28 of the Division Bench judgment in verbatim deserves to be mentioned :- 28. The Mahavir Sadhna Kendra, the respondent No.4, is, therefore, directed to amend the bye-laws of the Society, to allow the use of their land and building by the general public, with predominant purpose of propagating the objects of the Society, as provided in the bye-laws. The property and its facility should be allowed to be used by the residents of the colony. The use of land for exclusive purpose of Jain religion, may give cause of action to any resident of the colony to file a civil suit against such use.” 17. The above para also discloses that the Division Bench only passed direction with respect to user of the land and building under the patta held by the defendant petitioner society. Directions were not issued with respect to the membership of the petitioner defendant society. The right to file a civil suit was given only in case of breach in user of the land and building by the defendant society. The plaintiff has nowhere asserted in the plaint that the defendant society is using the land and building contrary to the directions given by the Division Bench. The plaintiff has categorically asserted in the plaint itself that no permanent building has been constructed upon the land and in the absence of such construction, question of user contrary to the directions did not arise at all. Thus even if such plaint averments are taken in its face value and for the sake of arguments urging to be true at the stage seeking direction under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC the same did not provide the plaintiff cause of action to institute a suit for declaration and injunction as claimed 18. The last ground according to the plaint averment is to the alleged construction of 10x15 feet in the setback area by the defendant petitioner society. The last ground according to the plaint averment is to the alleged construction of 10x15 feet in the setback area by the defendant petitioner society. According to the plaintiff, such rights were resolved by the Division Bench and upon such construction, the plaintiff had every right to lay a declaratory suit for cancellation of patta in favour of the defendant petitioner society. To appreciate such ground, a re-look at para 28 of the Division Bench judgment quoted herein above, is warranted. From perusal of the same, it transpires that any resident of the colony has been given the right to file a civil suit only if the allotted land and its facilities being used exclusively for the purposes of Jain religion and not allowed to be used by the general public or residents of the colony. The right to approach the civil court was vested only in the eventuality of breach of user of land and building, as noted above. The plaintiff in plaint is seeking to declare patta issued in favour of the defendant petitioner society as null and void which does not fall in the limited right given by the Division Bench judgment (supra). Thus, on this count as well, the plaint cannot be said to have disclosed a real “cause of action”. 19. The plaintiff has based her whole suit on the Division Bench judgment dt 22.5.2015 and unless and until the plaint does not contain any averment which display infringement of the direction given in such judgment, the plaint cannot be said to have disclosed a real cause of action. The plaint averments, even if taken to be true for consideration under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, miserably fails to disclose a cause of action and, thus the plaint deserves to be rejected. Further, the plaint has raised such issues which have already been settled by the Division Bench. Re-agitating such issues by way of a civil suit, is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process of law and such irresponsible suits ought to be nipped in the bud at the threshold and liable to be rejected under the inherent powers vested u/s 151 CPC. The instant suit falls in this category also, and thus was bound to be rejected u/s 151 CPC. 20. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent plaintiff (supra) are dealt hereunder. The instant suit falls in this category also, and thus was bound to be rejected u/s 151 CPC. 20. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent plaintiff (supra) are dealt hereunder. 20.1 In the case of Babulal Yadav v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the court dealing with suppression of material facts, dismissed the writ petition with exemplary costs. In Laxmi Lal Dangi v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the court while noting that the writ petitioner had not come with clean hands, dismissed the writ petition. In Govind Narayan v. Shri Baheti Dharmshala (supra), the court held that disputed questions cannot be decided at the stage of considering application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. In Mohan Lal Sukhadia University, Udaipur v. Miss Priya Soloman (supra), the court merely reiterated that only plaint averments are considered at such stage. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff, as aforesaid, are not applicable to the facts, situation and circumstances of the instant case. 21. Resultantly, the impugned order being perverse, improper and illegal, is set aside. The instant revision petition as well as the application of petitioner defendant under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, stands allowed and the plaint filed by the respondent plaintiff is rejected with no order as to costs.