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2017 DIGILAW 622 (ORI)

Tirtha Bararty v. Dingar Kanda

2017-06-20

D.DASH

body2017
JUDGMENT R.S. A. No.159 of 2005 Misc.Case Nos. 716, 717 & 718 of 2016. 20.6.2017. Mr. H.S. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the appellants (L.Rs. of deceased appellant No.10) is permitted to insert his name in the relevant column of the Vakalatnama. Heard learned Counsel for the appellants who are the legal representatives of deceased appellant no.10 and learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the son of the deceased-respondent No.1. Considering the submission and on going through the petition averments as also viewing other circumstances, the prayers for substitution of the legal representatives of appellant No.10 is allowed. Misc. Case is accordingly disposed of. Sd. D. Dash, J. (A) Misc. Case Nos.719, 720 & 721 of 2016. (B) Misc. Case No.493 of 2016. & (C) Misc. Case No.672 of 2016. 20.06.2017. Miscellaneous petition under (A) have been filed for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No.1, by setting aside the abatement of the appeal and condoning the delay in filing the said petition for setting aside the abatement. Miscellaneous petition under (B) has been filed by the son of the deceased respondent No.1 praying to pass an order of abatement of the appeal as a whole. Miscellaneous petition under (C) has been filed by the appellants praying for initiation of criminal proceeding against legal representative of respondent No.1 by directing investigation for obtaining the death certificate of respondent No.1 fraudulently. 2. Heard learned Counsel for the appellants and learned Counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No.1. Perused the petitions averments. 3. The appellants have challenged the judgment and decree passed by learned Addl. District Judge (FTC), Bolangir in Title Appeal No.26/48 of 2000-02 wherein the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bolangir in Title Suit No.63 of 1992 have been confirmed. The said first appeal had been filed by these appellants as the unsuccessful defendants in the trial Court. The memorandum of appeal having been presented on 2.4.2005, this Court by order dated 3.6.2005 had directed for issuance of notice in the matter of condonation of delay of 26 days in filing the second appeal. On 2.5.2016 the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1 came to file an application nomenclatured to be one under Order 24 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking a specific order as regards the abatement of the second appeal giving rise to Misc. On 2.5.2016 the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.1 came to file an application nomenclatured to be one under Order 24 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking a specific order as regards the abatement of the second appeal giving rise to Misc. Case under (B).The same when appeared on the board on 9.5.2016, learned Counsel for the appellants has sought for time to file objection. When it come up for consideration on 29.6.2016, again time was sought for to file objection and that was also repeated on 11.7.2016. Finally, on 22.7.2016 the above noted Misc. Cases under (A) have been filed. 4. It is stated in the petition that respondent No.1 had died on 27.2.2007. It is further stated that after the said date no intimation as given to the Court by the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 as regards said death of respondent No.1 and in the meanwhile the appellants have filed requisite for issuance of notice to respondent No.3 as directed by this Court. It is also stated that said factum of death of respondent No.1 came to the notice of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants only from the averments of the petition filed by the son of deceased respondent No.1 giving rise to the Misc. Case under (B) wherein he has sought for a specific order of abatement of the appeal. It has also been the case of the appellants that thereafter on enquiry it came to be known that respondent No. 1 died on 27.2.2007 and not on 5.4.2005 as specifically pleaded by the legal representatives of respondent No.1 in his petition and objection. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants in course of hearing submits that the death certificate has been obtained in the year 2015 by getting it registered only 30.3.2015. it is said to have been obtained by practising fraud and for that Misc. Case under (C) has been filed for initiating criminal action by directing investigation. It is further contended that since the factum of death of respondent No.1 was not known, no step for substitution of his legal representatives had earlier been taken. He further submits that these appellants are rustic villagers and had no knowledge about the steps to be taken in the appeal. It is further contended that since the factum of death of respondent No.1 was not known, no step for substitution of his legal representatives had earlier been taken. He further submits that these appellants are rustic villagers and had no knowledge about the steps to be taken in the appeal. So he contends that it is a fit case where the Court should view the matter liberally in condoning the delay and setting aside the abatement of the appeal on account of death of respondent No.1 in finally passing necessary order for substitution of the legal representatives of respondent No.1. Learned Counsel for the legal representatives of respondent No.1 contends that even accepting the date of death of respondent No.1 to be 27.2.2007, the prayer for substitution of the legal representatives of respondent No.1 having been made after lapse of more than nine years, no such sufficient cause surfaces for condonation of delay. It is further submitted that the appellants and deceased are the residents of the same village. The factum of death of respondent No.1 was well known all the 10 appellants. Inviting the attention of this Court to the complaint filed by one of the appellants in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Balangir, he contends that the factum of death of respondent No.1 had clearly been mentioned therein. So he contends that the explanations given for the purpose of not taking timely steps for substitution of the legal representatives of respondent No.1 are prima facie not at all acceptable. He further submits that the appellant No.1 has filed another C.S. No.81 of 2015 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Bolangir and there also he has shown the respondent No.1 to be dead. 6. It is the settled position of law that the date of knowledge of the death of a party is not relevant for the purpose of computing the period for substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased party and abatement. 7. The settled principles of law is that the suit/appeal abates automatically against a deceased party if his legal representatives were not brought on record within the stipulated period. Rule 1 of Order 22, CPC mandates that the death of a defendant, or a plaintiff shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. 7. The settled principles of law is that the suit/appeal abates automatically against a deceased party if his legal representatives were not brought on record within the stipulated period. Rule 1 of Order 22, CPC mandates that the death of a defendant, or a plaintiff shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. In other words, in the event of death of a party, where the right to sue does not survive, the suit shall abate and come to an end. In the event the right to sue survives, the concerned party is expected to take steps in accordance with provisions of this order. Order 22 Rule 4, CPC therefore, prescribes that where the defendant dies and the right to sue has survived, then an application could be filed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased defendant on record within the time specified (90 days). Once there is abatement, the suit essentially has to come to an end, except when the abatement is set aside and the legal representatives are ordered to be brought on record by the Court in terms of Order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC which is to be filed within 60 days after expiry of above 90 days. Order 22 Rule 9 (3) of the CPC contemplates that provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to an application filed under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 9 of Order 22, CPC i.e. provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act may come to an aid in case of filing of such application beyond 150 days since death. In order words, an application for setting aside the abatement has to be treated at par and the principles enunciated for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are to apply pari materia. Section 3 of the Limitation Act requires that suits or proceedings instituted after the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed. However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the applicant shows ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the applicant shows ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thus categorically demonstrates that they are to be decided on similar grounds. The decision of such an application has to be guided by similar precepts. It will be appropriate to trace the law enunciated by the Apex Court while referring, both the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Union of India v. Ram Charan, ( AIR 1964 SC 215 ), a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was concerned with an application filed under Order 22 Rule 9, CPC for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Court expressed the view that mere allegations about belated knowledge of death of the opposite party would not be sufficient. The Court applied the principles of ‘reasonable time’ even to such situations. While stating that the Court was not to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151, CPC. view has been expressed that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC should be applied. The Court held as under : “8. There is no question of construing the expression ‘sufficient cause’ liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. The Court held as under : “8. There is no question of construing the expression ‘sufficient cause’ liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set side, the appellant is deprived of his proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to explain away his default. It has to scrutinise it and would be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence led to establish the cause for the appellant’s default in applying within time for the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased or for setting aside the abatement. Xx xx xx 10..... The procedure, requires an application for the making of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff or defendant a party to the suit. It does not say who is to present the application. Ordinarily it would be the plaintiff as by the abatement of the suit the defendant stands to gain. However, an application is necessary to be made for the purpose. If no such application is made within the time allowed by law, the suit abates so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned or as against the deceased defendant. The effect of such an abatement on the suit of the surviving plaintiffs or the suit against the surviving defendants depends on other considerations as held by this Court in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, ( AIR 1962 SC 89 and Jhanda Singh v. Gurmukh Singh, C.A. No.344 of 1956, D/10.4.1962 (SC). The effect of such an abatement on the suit of the surviving plaintiffs or the suit against the surviving defendants depends on other considerations as held by this Court in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, ( AIR 1962 SC 89 and Jhanda Singh v. Gurmukh Singh, C.A. No.344 of 1956, D/10.4.1962 (SC). Anyway, that question does not arise in this case as the sole respondent had died. Xx xx xx 12.... The legislature further seems to have taken into account that there may be cases where the plaintiff may not know of the death of the defendant as ordinarily expected and, therefore, not only provided a further period of two months under Art. 171 for an application to set aside the abatement of the suit, but also made the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to such applications. Thus the plaintiff is allowed sufficient time to make an application to set aside the abatement which, if exceeding five months, be considered justified by the Court in the proved circumstances of the case. It would be futile to lay down precisely as to what consideration would constitute ‘sufficient cause’ for setting aside the abatement or for the plaintiff’s not applying to bring the legal representatives of the deceased defendant on the record or would be held to be sufficient cause for not making an application to get aside the abatement within the time prescribed. But it can be said that the delay in the making of such applications should not be for reasons which indicate the plaintiff’s negligence in not taking certain steps which he could have and should have taken. What would be such necessary steps would again depend on the circumstances of a particular case and each case will have to be decided by the Court on the facts and circumstances of the case. Any statement of illustrative circumstances or facts can tend to be a curb on the free exercise of its mind by the Court in determining whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to ‘sufficient cause’ or not. Courts have to use their discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice.” 8. Any statement of illustrative circumstances or facts can tend to be a curb on the free exercise of its mind by the Court in determining whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to ‘sufficient cause’ or not. Courts have to use their discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice.” 8. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 ) where there was delay of 565 days in filing the first appeal by the State, and the High Court had observed, “taking into consideration the averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition, while setting aside this order, the Apex Court found that the explanation rendered for condonation of delay was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and held as under. “3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order that the Court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is an essential prerequisite to condonation of delay. 4. That part, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12.5.1996 is : “....... at this time the Advocate General’s office was fed up with so many arbitration matters (sic) equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 02.09.1995". 5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge, Koilam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18.01.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. 6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No Costs.” 9. In the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh (supra), a Bench of Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC and while enunciating the principles controlling the application of and exercising of discretion under these provisions, the Court reiterated the principle that the abatement is automatic and not even a specific order is required to be passed by the Court in that behalf. It would be useful to reproduce paragraph 8 of the said judgment which has a bearing on the matter is controversy before us: “8. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be considered liberally. A simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record without specifically praying for setting aside of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement. So also a prayer for setting aside abatement as regards one of the plaintiffs can be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement of the suit in its entirely. So also a prayer for setting aside abatement as regards one of the plaintiffs can be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement of the suit in its entirely. Abatement of suit for failure to move an application for bringing the legal representatives on record within the prescribed period of limitation is automatic and specific order dismissing the suit as abated is not called for. Once the suit has abated as a matter of law, though there may not have been passed on record a specific order dismissing the suit as abated, yet the legal representatives proposing to be brought on record or any other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on record would seek the setting aside an abatement. A prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, if allowed, would have the effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside the abatement though not asked for in so many words is in effect being actually asked for and is necessarily implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is not called for.” 10. Another Bench of Apex Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Sudha Rao, ( AIR 2009 SC 2907 ) again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression ‘sufficient cause’. The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargvi Amma (2008) 8 SCC 321 in its para 9 held as under :- “11. The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” 11. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh (supra), the abatement results in the denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be construed liberally. Thus even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a sustentative in law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing the right and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party as a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bon fide. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bon fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflect normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. It must be impressed upon that delay should be condoned to do substantial justice without resulting in injustice to the other party. This balance has to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding such applications. In the case of Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfieds Ltd. ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ) the Apex Court took the view. “It is however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done, the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;..“ 12. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra). This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;..“ 12. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra). In this case, the Court after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under : “13 (1). The words “sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical, and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the applicant.” (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the Courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the Court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with for closure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The Courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The Courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a Court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, Courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a Court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, Courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The Courts view applications relating to lawyer’s lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant’s lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of Courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects. (v) Want of “diligence” or “inaction” can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, Courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the Court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his Counsel about the listing of the appeal. It may be stated here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equal bench of the Apex Court in the case of Katari Satyanarayana (supra). 13. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay,. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients, then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications. 14. Keeping in view the above principles of law, let us now revert to the merits of the applications in hand. Except the vague averments that the appellants did not know about the death of respondent No.1 and of that timely step could not be taken for arraigning his legal representatives as parties which was only known after the filing of the petition by the legal representative of the said respondent No.1 in the appeal no justifiable reason finds mention in the applications. The applications do not contain even any such reasonable, satisfactory or even proper explanation. Simply stating that it was not within the knowledge and it came to be known from the petition filed in this appeal would not suffice the purpose that the same would be taken as the sufficient cause to have stood on the way of taking timely step here to implead the legal representatives of respondent No.1. The delay is for a period of about 09 years. The parties belong to the same village,. It is seen from the documents that the appellants have long prior to the filing of the applications here have stated in other proceedings as regards the factum of death of respondent No.1. In view of all these want of bonafide is highly imputable in the matter. There is no reason or sufficient cause shown as to why the step for substitution of the legal representatives of respondent No.1 was not taken in time. The conduct on the part of the appellants appears to be uncondonable. The cumulative effect of all the circumstances is that there has been a miserable failure in showing any ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay in filing the applications in question. 15. In the backdrop of the above position of law, the facts and circumstances of the case being examined as above, I am not inclined to condone the delay and set aside the abatement of the appeal on account of death of respondent No.1 which had taken place way back in the mid of the year 2007. 15. In the backdrop of the above position of law, the facts and circumstances of the case being examined as above, I am not inclined to condone the delay and set aside the abatement of the appeal on account of death of respondent No.1 which had taken place way back in the mid of the year 2007. Even accepting the date of death of respondent No.1 as stated by the appellants no sufficient cause is thus found out to have prevented the appellants in approaching the Court in time and when by virtue of such abatement, a valuable right has already accrued to the legal representatives of respondent No.1 and with that status, when he has been continuing for quite a long period, it cannot be brushed aside lightly on such vague and unacceptable explanation. 16. For the aforesaid, the prayer for condonation of delay in setting aside the abatement of the appeal on account of death of respondent No.1 is rejected and consequently, the prayer for setting aside the abatement of the appeal against the respondent No.1 and for substitution of his legal representatives also stand rejected. The Misc. Cases under (A) are, accordingly, dismissed. The Misc. Case under (B) and (C) do no more survive in the eye of law for consideration and those stand accordingly disposed of. Sd. D. Dash, J. 20.06. 2017. The Misc. Case No.186 of 2005 and R.S.A. No.159 of 2005. In view of the above order, the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No.63 of 1992 as affirmed in Title Appeal No.26/48 of 2000-02 have thus attained their finality in so far as the respondent No.1 is concerned. This respondent No.1 is none other than one of the legal representatives of sole plaintiff who had been substituted during the first appeal. In that view of the matter, the legal representatives of respondent No.1 have now been armed with said judgment and decree standing in favour of their predecessor in interest having all the legal force. The appeal cannot proceed against the rest of the respondents especially against respondent No.2 as there remains all the possibility of passing of inconsistent decrees in so far as respondent Nos.1 and 2 are concerned as in the present case the other respondents are the defendants in the suit. In view of the aforesaid, the petition for condonation of delay giving rise to the above noted Misc. In view of the aforesaid, the petition for condonation of delay giving rise to the above noted Misc. Case as also the second appeal as noted above stand dismissed. Petition dismissed.