North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (NEEPCO) v. Sagar Chandra Das Village Lankeswarigranti
2017-05-22
AJIT SINGH, MANOJIT BHUYAN
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Ajit Singh, J. 1. This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 27.4.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge of this High Court, whereby he has allowed respondent’s WP(C) No.3462/2009. 2. The respondent, while working as Security Guard with the appellants, was charge-sheeted on the following 3 (three) charges:- (i) That he made allegations against the doctors of appellants’ hospital regarding denial of treatment to him by them at the behest of senior officers of the Security Wing (HQ) and that he tried to incite other Security Guards by spreading rumour that the doctors were indifferent towards him; (ii) That he failed to pay respect to superiors by not saluting them; and (iii) That he failed to report on duty at the Guest House despite order of the Manager (Security) to do so. 3. The respondent, in his reply, denied the charges, but the same was not found to be satisfactory. In the result, he was subjected to departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer, after concluding the enquiry, in his report, found all the charges established against the respondent. And the disciplinary authority, acting upon the report, vide order dated 8.1.2004, imposed a major penalty of removal from service on the respondent with immediate effect. The respondent was then simultaneously served with the copies of enquiry report as well as order of punishment dated 8.1.2004. Aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal, but it was dismissed by the appellate authority. The respondent was informed about the dismissal of appeal vide communication dated 25.3.2009. The respondent then filed WP(C) No.2133/2005. In that case, a Single Bench of this court vide order dated 27.1.2009 held that the appellate authority did not pass a speaking order, while dismissing respondent’s appeal and quashed its order dated 25.3.2005. The learned Single Judge also remanded the matter to the appellate authority for passing a speaking order. After remand, the appellate authority, again, by a speaking order dated 20.3.2009 dismissed the respondent’s appeal. Aggrieved with the dismissal of appeal, the respondent filed WP(C) No.3462/2009, which the learned Single Judge has allowed by the impugned order with a direction against the appellants to re-instate him with 50% back-wages. This the learned Single Judge has directed only on the ground that respondent was not served with a copy of the enquiry report before penalty was imposed due to which, serious prejudice was caused to him.
This the learned Single Judge has directed only on the ground that respondent was not served with a copy of the enquiry report before penalty was imposed due to which, serious prejudice was caused to him. The learned Single Judge has also held that since the respondent’s appeal has already been dismissed by the Head of appellants’ Organization, remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority would be a useless formality. It is in this background, the appellants have filed the present appeal and vide order dated 10.9.2015 operation of the impugned order was stayed. It is also stated at the Bar that respondent attained the age of superannuation on 30.4.2016. 4. The learned senior counsel for the appellants mainly relying upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad vs. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 has argued that the learned Single Judge committed gross illegality in not giving liberty to the appellants to proceed with the enquiry from the stage of furnishing the respondent with the enquiry report. It has also been argued that the learned Single Judge was wrong in holding that remanding the matter to disciplinary authority would be a useless formality merely because the appellate authority had dismissed the respondent’s appeal. The learned senior counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has vehemently defended the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 5. The question which calls for our consideration is whether the learned Single Judge committed an illegality in not giving liberty to the appellants to proceed with the enquiry from the stage of furnishing enquiry report to the respondent. 6. The decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad vs. B Karunakar (supra) is directly on the point. The relevant paragraph 31 of the decision reads as under:- “31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report.
If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” 7.
The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” 7. From the above quoted decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court has mandated all the courts that when the order of punishment is set aside on the ground that non-furnishing of enquiry report has caused prejudice to the employee, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The Supreme Court has also held that the question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. According to the Supreme Court if the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The Supreme Court has further declared that the reinstatement made as a result of setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held and this is the correct position in law. 8. Thus, in view of the clear position of law laid down by the Supreme Court the order passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. We also disagree with the learned Single Judge that merely because the appeal of the respondent has been dismissed by the appellate authority remanding the enquiry to the disciplinary authority would be a useless formality.
We also disagree with the learned Single Judge that merely because the appeal of the respondent has been dismissed by the appellate authority remanding the enquiry to the disciplinary authority would be a useless formality. We accordingly direct the appellants to proceed with the enquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the copy of report. We hope and trust that after receiving all the objections raised by the respondent against enquiry report, the disciplinary authority will decide the same in accordance with law by a speaking order. As seen above, since the appellant has already attained the age of superannuation on 30.4.2016, he now cannot be directed to be reinstated and then to be placed under suspension till the completion of enquiry. 9. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above.