Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 624 (GUJ)

Baluben v. State of Gujarat

2017-03-21

K.M.THAKER

body2017
JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Manan Mehta, learned AGP. Mr. M.D. Pandya, learned advocate for respondent No. 2 is not present and Mr. Nilesh Pandya, learned advocate for the respondent No. 3 is also not present. Ms. Nair, learned advocate has appeared for newly added respondent No. 5. 2. In present petition the petitioner has prayed, inter-alia, that:- "32 (A) The Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the instructions contained in the communication dated 5.2.2001 addressed by the Collector, Baroda to the Municipal Commissioner, Baroda Municipal Corporation at Annexure-L hereto do not apply to the land in question and, therefore, the respondent corporation is under an obligation to sanction the plans submitted by the petitioner ignoring the said instructions. (B) The Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing respondent No. 4 herein to inform respondent No. 3 herein that the instructions contained in the communication at Annexure-L hereto do not apply to the land of the petitioner and therefore, the plans submitted by the petitioner may be sanctioned ignoring the said instructions" 3. The petition with above mentioned request came to be admitted vide order dated 28.2.2003. The said order reads thus:- "Ld. Senior Counsel Mr. A.J. Patel appearing for the petitioner states that one petition filed by Baluben Somabhai Shrimali being Spl. Civil Application No. 766/2002 has been admitted by this Court which involves similar issues. Hence, Rule. To be heard with Spl. C.A. No. 766/2002." 4. So far as Special Civil Application No. 766/2002 (which is referred to by the Court in the order dated 28.2.2003) is concerned the Court is informed that the said petition was filed by some other party in respect of some other land and the said petition is disposed of vide order dated 2.2.2013 and that against the said order dated 2.2.2013 LPA is filed (i.e. Letter Patents Appeal (ST) No. 241 of 2014). 5. Mr. Majumdar, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that subject matter of present petition is not connected with said petition and that this petition can be decided independent of the said petition. 6. 5. Mr. Majumdar, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that subject matter of present petition is not connected with said petition and that this petition can be decided independent of the said petition. 6. After this petition came to be admitted vide order dated 28.2.2003 several civil applications came to be filed by the petitioner from time to time and different orders came to be passed in such civil applications. The petitioner has placed reliance on order dated 25.4.2007 in CA No. 5671/2007 and order dated 30.10.2012 in CA No. 11881/2011. The said orders read thus:- "ORDER IN CA NO. 5671/2007 Rule. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Maulik Nanavatiwaives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 4. 2. Heard the learned advocates on interim relief. Pending this petition, the respondents are directed to decide the application made by the petitioner herein under section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and under section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 within three months from today. 3. The petitioner shall pay the amount of premium/conversion charges that may be determined by the concerned authority. Such payment shall be subject to the result of the petition. In the event the petitioner, succeeds in this petition, she shall be entitled to claim the refund of the said amount. In that eventuality, the petitioner may also claim the interest over the said amount. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. (Emphasis supplied) ORDER IN CA No. 11881/2011 1. By an order dated 12.6.2012, this Court had passed an order in this application to be heard along with the main matter. 2. Mr. A.J. Patel, learned advocate for the applicant-original petitioner states that as per the directions issued by this Court in the earlier order, the applicant-original petitioner had already made an application. However, the same has not been decided and hence, the present application is filed with the following prayers:- "(A) Be pleased to admit and allow the application. (B) Be pleased to direct the respondents to comply with the order dated 25.4.2007 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Civil Application No. 5671 of 2007 and to fix the market price accordingly since long time has intervened. (C) Be pleased to pass any other and further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice. 3. (C) Be pleased to pass any other and further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice. 3. It appears that this application is also filed in the month of November, 2011. Till date, no affidavit has been filed. Therefore, the District Collector, before whom the application is pending, is hereby directed to file an appropriate affidavit to this application on or before 27.11.2012. If no affidavit is filed, opponent No. 4 shall remain personally present before this Court on 27.11.2012. S.O. to 27.11.2012. 4. Registry is directed to serve a copy of this order upon Mr. Ronak B. Raval, learned AGP for onward communication." 7. It has also emerged from the submissions by Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner that after above mentioned two orders came to be passed the competent authority passed order dated 21.2.2013 and determined the premium/market price in respect of land in question. 7.1 It appears that the petitioner was not satisfied with the said determination of the amount of premium/market price. The petitioner felt that the amount of premium determined by the authority was on higher side and that therefore the petitioner sought amendment in the petition and challenged said order dated 21.2.2013. 7.2 The request to amend the petition was granted vide order dated 19.3.2013 in CA No. 3118/2013. In pursuance of the said order dated 19.3.2013 the petitioner added below mentioned prayer in the petition:- "32(BB) This Honourable Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned communication dated 21.2.2013 issued by the collector, and be further pleased to direct the collector Vadodara to determine the price of the land by following guidelines issued by the State Government vide circulars dated 23.9.2002 and 30.9.2002. 32(CC) pending admission, hearing and till the final disposal of this Civil Application the opponents by restrained from dealing with the land in question in any manner as the same undisputedly has been running in the name of the applicant since last more than 5 decades, and be further pleased to direct the collector, Vadodara to determine the price of the land afresh taking into consideration the guidelines contained in the circular issued by the State Government dated 23.9.2012 and 30.9.2012, in the interest of justice." Thus, now the said order dated 21.2.2013 is also placed under challenge by the petitioner. 8. 8. So as to consider the dispute raised by the petitioner and the relief prayed for in present petition it is necessary to take into account factual background. 9. Before turning to the factual background it is appropriate to clarify one side issue which has arisen on account of the order passed by the Court in CA No. 12830/2014. One Mr. Shankarbhai Virabhai Mali preferred above mentioned CA No. 12830/2014 with a request for permission to join the proceedings of SCA No. 1956/2003. The applicant filed CA No. 12830/2014 on the premise that certain portion of the land in question is under his possession and he has been cultivating the land since long time and that therefore the petition may not be decided without hearing him. Of course the application was opposed by the petitioner on various grounds. The petitioner would claim that the applicant has no locus and has no right, title or interest in the property in question. The petitioner would also submit that even the suit which was filed by the applicant staking his claim has been withdrawn and in fresh suit which the applicant has filed any order or direction have not been granted by the learned trial court and that therefore unless the applicant gets his right or interest established in the proceedings before the learned trial Court, the applicant would not have any locus to be heard in petition. This court, subject to the petitioner's objection against respondent and while reserving petitioner's right to raise such contention against the respondent, allowed the CA No. 12830/2014 vide order dated 2.3.2017. In pursuance of the said order the said applicant is impleaded as respondent No. 5 in main petition, of course, subject to the petitioner's right which is reserved vide order dated 2.3.2017. 10. So far as factual backdrop is concerned, it has emerged from the record and from the submissions by learned advocate for the petitioner and learned AGP that the question has arisen in present petition with reference to land bearing revenue survey No. 103 of village Tandalja, taluka and district Vadodara. It appears that subsequently, draft town planning scheme No. 21 was framed which came to be finalized in 1992. Thereafter, the land in question came to be settled as final plot No. 85. It appears that subsequently, draft town planning scheme No. 21 was framed which came to be finalized in 1992. Thereafter, the land in question came to be settled as final plot No. 85. According to the petitioner's (claim), Vadodara Urban Development Authority has issued zoning certificate in 2001 according to which the land in question is situate within residential zone. 11. It appears that after above mentioned events, in or around October 2001 an application and plan for development of land bearing final plot No. 85 was submitted to the municipal corporation. 12. While the petitioner's application for approval of plan and development permission was pending for appropriate order by the competent authority of the municipal corporation, the Collector Vadodara issued notification dated 16.8.2000 extending the limits of municipal corporation. The said notification included village Tandalja within limits of municipal corporation. 13. Thereafter, a communication dated 5.2.2001 was forwarded by the Collector to Commissioner, Vadodara Municipal Corporation. The said communication dated 5.2.2001 by Collector is placed on record of present petition (page-83). 14. On reading the said document dated 5.2.2001, it comes out that by the said communication the Collector suggested to the Municipal Commissioner to take into account and protect the government's interest while processing application for development permission or application for construction (Rajachithi) so that the government's right to claim premium/market price in respect of such land may not be jeopardized. 15. Somehow, the petitioner felt aggrieved by such communication from the Collector to the Municipal Commissioner. The petitioner made said communication the cause and base for present petition. The petitioner challenged said communication in this petition. 16. At this stage, it is pertinent to note and mention that the said communication dated 15.2.2001 is absolutely general and broad based communication without having any reference to any specific applicant or any specific application. The suggestion by the Collector is in respect of all and every applications which the corporation may receive for development permission or construction permission (Rajachithi) over the land which are liable for payment of premium/market price. 16.1 Therefore, as such, the petitioner had no cause to raise grievance or objection against such general or broad based communication more so when it was not directed only against the petitioner. 16.2 Nonetheless, the petitioner chose to challenge the said communication and the petitioner filed present petition seeking relief contained in paragraph No. 32(A) of this petition. 16.1 Therefore, as such, the petitioner had no cause to raise grievance or objection against such general or broad based communication more so when it was not directed only against the petitioner. 16.2 Nonetheless, the petitioner chose to challenge the said communication and the petitioner filed present petition seeking relief contained in paragraph No. 32(A) of this petition. The petitioner also prayed that the said instruction may not be made applicable to the petitioner's application for development/construction permission. 17. Before proceeding further, it is necessary and appropriate to mention at this stage that during pendency of present application, Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner clarified, stipulated and declared that the petitioners accept and they have no dispute against the respondent's case that the land in question is new tenure land. 17.1 Once this aspect is clarified and settled and when it is admitted that the land in question is new tenure land, then, it becomes clear that the State/Collector will have right in law to demand premium in accordance with law. 18. As mentioned above, the Court considered the said request and admitted the petition vide order dated 28.2.2003. Thereafter, above mentioned two orders came to be passed in two separate civil applications. 18.1 By the said two orders (passed in civil applications), the respondents were directed to take decision with regard to the amount of premium. 19. The petitioner claims that the respondent unreasonably delayed the decision inasmuch as after the order passed in 2007, the respondent passed order in 2013 (i.e. 21.2.2013) whereby the respondent determined the amount of premium/market price and informed the petitioner to pay Rs. 8,40,30,168/- towards premium/market price within 21 days. 20. The petitioners, however, undisputedly did not pay the said amount. They, instead, amended the petition and challenged the order dated 21.2.2013 by incorporating prayer paragraph No. 32(BB) in the petition. According to the petitioner, the amount determined by the respondent is unreasonable. 21. The Court, in this background, is required to decide as to whether any interference with reference to communication dated 5.2.2001 is required to be made and whether the decision dated 21.2.2013 warrants any interference on the ground that the said decision is arbitrary and unreasonable as claimed by the petitioner. 22. Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the communication dated 5.2.2001 affected the petitioner's right of getting his application considered by the municipal corporation. 23. 22. Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the communication dated 5.2.2001 affected the petitioner's right of getting his application considered by the municipal corporation. 23. In light of the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the subject of the said communication dated 5.2.2001, this Court is of the view that the said communication, in any manner, does not affect any right or interest of the petitioner, more particularly when the fact that the land in question is new tenure land is not in dispute and the fact that the land, being new tenure land, would be liable for payment of premium is also not in dispute. The petitioners accept and admit both position. Thus, the petitioners were (and are) in any case, liable to pay the premium/market price. Therefore, the said communication did not abridge or curtail any right of the petitioner neither it imposed any new/additional obligation or burden other than the one which undisputedly existed. 23.1 As mentioned above, the said communication dated 5.2.2001 is absolutely general and broad -based communication by the Collector to the Municipal Corporation and it is not aimed at or restricted to the applicant and all that the Collector did was to request the Municipal Commissioner to ensure that while processing - granting development permission or construction permission other provisions under different Acts may not be overlooked and State's interest may not be jeopardized. 23.2 In this view of the matter, there is no base or justification to interfere with the said communication. Besides this, almost 16 years have passed since the said communication was issued. Therefore also, at this stage, there is no reason or justification to disturb the said communication. 24. Now, so far as second challenge by the petitioner is concerned, it is necessary to recall that the impugned order dated 21.2.2013 is passed in light of the order which the Court passed in civil application filed by present petitioner. 24.1 Actually, it is the petitioner who invited the order (i.e. determination of premium/ market price). 24.2 During pendency of the petition, the petitioner filed Civil Application No. 5671 of 2007 wherein the order dated 25.4.2007 came to be passed. 24.1 Actually, it is the petitioner who invited the order (i.e. determination of premium/ market price). 24.2 During pendency of the petition, the petitioner filed Civil Application No. 5671 of 2007 wherein the order dated 25.4.2007 came to be passed. By the said interim order, the Court, by way of interim relief, directed the respondents to decide the application of the petitioner under Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code within 3 months. The Court also clarified, vide said order dated 25.4.2007, that after the amount is determined by the competent authority, the petitioner shall pay the amount of premium and such premium shall be subject to result of the petition. 24.3 It appears that the respondents failed to determine the amount of premium within 3 months and that therefore, the applicant preferred another civil application being Civil Application No. 11881 of 2011 wherein the applicant prayed, inter-alia, that:- "9B. Be pleased to direct the respondents to comply with the order dated 25.4.2007 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Civil Application No. 5671 of 2007 and to fix the market price accordingly since long time has intervened." 24.4 In the said application, the Court passed order dated 30.10.2012 directing the respondents to comply the order dated 25.4.2007. 24.5 As mentioned above, after the said directions, impugned order dated 21.2.2013 came to be passed. 25. Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner, reiterated the contentions raised in paragraph Nos. 29(B) and 29(C) of the petition against the said order dated 21.2.2013. The said paragraphs read thus:- "29(B) The petitioner submits that the rate that was prevailing in the area where the land in question is situated, as per the Jantri, is around Rs. 2800 per sq. mtrs. However, the Collector has, without any basis, has come to the conclusion that the rate prevailing then was Rs. 7690 per sq. mtrs., which is absurd to say the least. This is incomprehensible. the Collector has so ermined the price of the land to drive out the petitioner, as the petitioner has approached this Honourable Court time and again seeking challenging the action of the Collector and seeking directions against the Collector. 7690 per sq. mtrs., which is absurd to say the least. This is incomprehensible. the Collector has so ermined the price of the land to drive out the petitioner, as the petitioner has approached this Honourable Court time and again seeking challenging the action of the Collector and seeking directions against the Collector. The Collector has clearly acted with a vengeance against the petitioner." 29(C) The petitioner submits that the petitioner has also come across couple of circulars issued by the State Government on 23.9.2002 and 30.9.2002, which provide guidelines with regard to fixation of price for lands. If the parameters as provided in these circulars are applied, then the price of the land in question at the relevant point of time would be around Rs. 1500 to Rs. 1700 per sq. mtrs. This is the grossest piece of injustice and the same is done by the Collector solely with a view to teach a lesson to the petitioner, as the petitioner has dared to repeatedly knock the doors of this honourable court for justice. Circulars issued by the Government reflect the policy of the Government and the same are binding upon all the authorities below. There may be variation to some extent, but in the present case, the rate determined by the Collector is at least 6 to 7 times more than the rate which was prevalent in the year 2007. The Collector is therefore, required to be directed to determine the price of the land in question by considering the provisions/guidelines contained in the said two circulars issued by the State Government. The petitioner begs to annex copy each of the said two circulars issued by the State Government on 23.9.2002 and 30.9.2002 at Annexure-O collectively to this petition." 25.1 He further submitted that the premium/market price determined by the order dated 21.2.2013 is unjust and unreasonable. He also submitted that if the sale instances executed during the year 2007 are taken into account, then, it comes out that the amount determined by the respondent is on higher side. The petitioner has also come out with the allegation that the Collector acted arbitrarily and with bias while determining the premium/market price. The learned counsel for the petitioner alleged that the Collector was annoyed with the petitioner who preferred this petition and that therefore, the impugned order came to be passed out of grudge against the petitioner. The petitioner has also come out with the allegation that the Collector acted arbitrarily and with bias while determining the premium/market price. The learned counsel for the petitioner alleged that the Collector was annoyed with the petitioner who preferred this petition and that therefore, the impugned order came to be passed out of grudge against the petitioner. Learned advocate for the petitioner also submitted that even considering the rate in Jantri, the market price/premium determined by the respondent is on higher side and that therefore, it deserves to be set aside. Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner, also assailed the impugned order on the ground that the order is passed without granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He relied on the decision in case of B.K. Jethva vs. State of Gujarat, 2006 (2) GLH 303 and in light of the said decision, learned advocate for the petitioner emphasized that the order impugned should not have been passed without granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner, also submitted that since the order is passed without granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the same may be set aside and the authority may be directed to determine the market price/premium for the land in question at the rate applicable in 2007. He also submitted that the authority concerned caused unreasonable delay in determining the price and that therefore also, the determination is vitiated on account of delay. 26. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP, opposed the submissions by Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner. He submitted that the allegations on the ground of bias or prejudice or on the ground that the Collector was annoyed with the petitioner because he filed the petition and therefore the impugned order came to be passed are baseless and unjustified and in the facts and circumstances of the case, such allegations, even otherwise, do not survive in view of the fact that the order in question is not passed by the Collector, but it is the State Government who has passed the order dated 21.2.2013. He submitted that in view of the valuation of the land in question, the matter was outside and beyond the authority of the Collector and that therefore, the State Government passed the order. Under the circumstances, the allegations about bias or prejudice etc. do not have any base or justification. He submitted that in view of the valuation of the land in question, the matter was outside and beyond the authority of the Collector and that therefore, the State Government passed the order. Under the circumstances, the allegations about bias or prejudice etc. do not have any base or justification. He further submitted that in view of the order dated 21.2.2013, the petitioner was called upon to pay Rs. 8,40,30,168/- towards premium/market price within 21 days, however, the petitioner did not pay the said amount and that therefore, the petitioner's application is rejected vide order dated 25.6.2013 and that therefore, now, the cause to prosecute the petition does not survive, inasmuch as though almost 3 years have passed, the petitioner has not challenged the said order dated 25.6.2013. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP, further submitted that the competent authority has passed the order dated 21.2.2013 after taking into account the valuation determined by the State Valuation Committee and that therefore, there is neither any illegality nor arbitrariness in the order. According to the learned AGP, the State Valuation Committee determines the valuation of the land on the basis of appropriate formula and after taking into account diverse and relevant factors. The competent authority while determining the market price/premium in respect of the land in question took into account the said valuation determined by the Valuation Committee and processed the application on the basis of such valuation and that therefore, there is no base or justification for petitioner's grievance against the impugned order and the decision of the competent authority. 27. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP, while addressing petitioner's contention and grievance on the ground of delay, submitted that while it is true that the authority passed the order in 2013, the fact remains that the authority has determined the market price/premium by taking into account the rates determined by State Valuation Committee as applicable in 2007 and that therefore, the contention is unjustified and there is no adverse effect to the petitioner. According to learned AGP, when the market price/premium is determined on the basis of rate prevailing in 2007, the petitioners cannot have any grievance on the ground of delay. Mr. According to learned AGP, when the market price/premium is determined on the basis of rate prevailing in 2007, the petitioners cannot have any grievance on the ground of delay. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP, while addressing the submission by learned advocate for the petitioner that even if the petitioner's objection against the impugned order on the ground of opportunity of hearing is accepted by the Court and if the authority is directed to decide market price/premium, then, the authority will decide the market price/premium on the basis of rates applicable as of now i.e. in 2017, and not on the basis of rates which were applicable in 2007. He submitted that the Government has issued guidelines and instructions for determining market value/premium vide circulars dated 26.4.2011 and 5.8.2011 and that therefore, the decision by the authority would be governed by the said and other relevant circulars. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP, also submitted that the impugned order passed by the authority determining market price/premium is administrative order and therefore, petitioner's submission that the authority should determine price after hearing the petitioner is unjustified and opportunity of hearing for passing such order would not vitiate the order. 28. Ms. Nair, learned advocate for newly added respondent No. 5, submitted that half part of the land is in possession of and of the ownership of the respondent No. 5 and that therefore, the petitioner cannot submit any application for determination of market price/premium or for any purpose in respect of land which is in possession of and ownership of the respondent No. 5 is unjustified. 29. Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner, vehemently opposed the submissions by respondent No. 5 and contended that the right, title or interest of the respondent No. 5 is yet not decided and therefore, the objections by the respondent No. 5 have no bearing or locus in present case. 30. I have considered rival submissions. I have also considered the material available on record and various orders passed by the Court from time to time in different applications as well as the order dated 21.2.2013 which is impugned in present petition. 31. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the land in question is new tenure land is not in dispute. 31.1 Likewise, the right of the respondent to demand market price/premium in respect of the land in question is also not in dispute. 31. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the land in question is new tenure land is not in dispute. 31.1 Likewise, the right of the respondent to demand market price/premium in respect of the land in question is also not in dispute. 31.2 Actually, the petitioner has declared and stipulated that they are bound to pay the premium/market price and that they are ready and willing to pay the same. 31.3 They submitted their grievance and objection against the determination is limited and restricted to the amount determined by the authority since it is on higher side. 32. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent has no right or authority in law to demand market price/premium. The petitioner would contend that if the authority had granted opportunity of hearing to the petitioner then the petitioner could have placed before the authority appropriate material which could have been considered by the authority while determining the market price. To support the said submission, reliance is placed on the decision in case of B.K. Jethva (supra). 33. On the other hand, it has emerged from the order dated 21.2.2013 that the authority has determined the market price/premium after taking into account the valuation of land determined by the State Valuation Committee and that therefore, it cannot be said that the order is baseless or contrary to applicable guidelines and/or that the amount is determined without any base or contrary to applicable guidelines or without application of mind. The order does not suffer from such vice. 33.1 Further, this Court cannot enter into the process of determining the valuation. It is a technical matter and the Court does not have the expertise or data or infrastructure to decide such issues. The petitioner would, however, on strength of the decision in case of B.K. Jethwa (supra), claim that the petitioners deserve opportunity of hearing to place the material for consideration by the authority. 34. It is a technical matter and the Court does not have the expertise or data or infrastructure to decide such issues. The petitioner would, however, on strength of the decision in case of B.K. Jethwa (supra), claim that the petitioners deserve opportunity of hearing to place the material for consideration by the authority. 34. It is also relevant to mention that learned AGP is justified in contending that the petitioner's grievance on the ground of delay is unjustified, inasmuch as at the relevant time when the authority passed the order, it had taken into account the rates prevailing in 2007 and that therefore, the grievance or objection/ground of delay is misconceived and it, even otherwise, does not survive and in light of said fact issue of delay does not survive and it pales into insignificance. 35. At this stage, it is necessary to recall that it was interim order by virtue of which the authority was directed to determine market price/premium. 35.1 It is pertinent to note that when the said order came to be passed in civil application, the scope of the petition was restricted only qua the relief prayed for in paragraph Nos. 32(A) and 32(B) i.e. the communication dated 5.2.2001. 35.2 However, at that stage, considering the application filed by present petitioner, the Court passed said interim direction. 35.3 The Court, at the same time, also clarified that the order will be subject to result of the petition. 35.4 Thus, the order dated 21.12.2013 which is now impugned by the petitioner was passed in view of interim direction which is subject to final order in the petition. 35.5 It is also pertinent that actually by the same interim order, the Court had directed the petitioners to pay the amount determined by the authority. 35.6 However, the petitioners disregarded said direction and did not pay the amount. 35.7 Now, after hearing the petition/parties, the Court has, for the reasons mentioned above, found that the grievance or challenge against the order dated 5.12.2001 is misconceived and unjustified and baseless. The challenge cannot be entertained or sustained. 35.8 So far as the order dated 21.2.2013 is concerned, the Court has found that even the objection raised on ground of delay is misconceived and unjustified. 35.9 Further, the interim order was subject to final decision in the petition. The authority complied the Court's direction. The challenge cannot be entertained or sustained. 35.8 So far as the order dated 21.2.2013 is concerned, the Court has found that even the objection raised on ground of delay is misconceived and unjustified. 35.9 Further, the interim order was subject to final decision in the petition. The authority complied the Court's direction. Then it was for the petitioner to pay the amount determined by the authority and if the determination was not acceptable, then, the petitioners were free to drop the application. The petitioners rather chose to challenge the determination, that too without complying the direction to pay the amount determined by the authority. 35.10 This Court has also found that the authority followed/adopted the guidelines and took into account the valuation determined by Valuation Committee after considering relevant and diverse factors. Therefore, the order cannot be branded as baseless or arbitrary or without application of mind. 35.11 Besides this, the applicant exercised their discretion and choice and they opted to ignore the determination and they also decided to ignore the direction to pay the amount within 21 days and of their own choice they did not pay the amount (did not even deposit the amount in the Court) even under protest and/or subject to their objections. 35.12 The said order, therefore, has, technically, lapsed and met its natural death with passage of time. The order died after 21 days. Now, the order is dead since last 3 years. 35.13 Actually, the authority has passed consequential order dated 25.6.2013 whereby the petitioners' application is disposed off. The said order dated 25.6.2013 is not challenged by the petitioners. 35.14 Besides all these aspects, it is pertinent to note that by the same interim relief/order, the Court had also observed and directed that the applicants - petitioners shall pay the amount. However, despite the said order the petitioners did not pay the amount. Further, operation of said order has not been stayed by the Court. Almost 4 years have passed since the authority passed the said order. For all these reasons, the petitioners have no ground to oppose the order dated 21.2.2013. Moreover, the petitioners have remedy or option to submit another/fresh application. 36. In this background, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in case of Mr. B.K. Jethva (supra) and reiterated that the authority should grant opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. For all these reasons, the petitioners have no ground to oppose the order dated 21.2.2013. Moreover, the petitioners have remedy or option to submit another/fresh application. 36. In this background, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in case of Mr. B.K. Jethva (supra) and reiterated that the authority should grant opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. The learned counsel also reiterated that the authority should take into account rates which prevailed in 2017. 37. In this background, even if the petitioner's contention on the ground that since the order is passed without granting opportunity of hearing were to be accepted, then also, the petitioner's submission that the authority should now (i.e. in 2017) determine the market price/premium on the basis of the rates prevailing in 2007 (before 10 years) cannot be sustained. 37.1 That is so because:- (a) on face of it the submission is unreasonable and unjust as well as legally untenable, (b) despite the direction in the order dated 25.4.2007 (in Civil Application No. 5671 of 2007 that the petitioners shall pay the amount determined by the authority) the petitioners did not pay the amount; (c) since the petitioners on one hand ignored and disobeyed said direction/order now they do not deserve to nor they are entitled for or fit to either rely on said order for any purpose or take benefit of said order or to bind the respondents by said order and the actions taken by the respondents to comply said order; (d) the direction in the interim order to pay the amount determined by the authority - though part of the same order which the petitioners are using, or abusing, as weapon - is not complied and is consciously ignored by the petitioners, the said order now does not survive; (e) even otherwise, ordinarily, the rate/price/value prevailing on the date of decision would be relevant and applicable in the matter wherein the premium/market price has to be determined; (f) by not paying the amount, at least with objection as regards the quantum, the petitioners have lost the cover and benefit of interim order on account of their own conduct and decision. 37.2 For all these reasons and also in light of the fact that in such cases the rate prevailing on date of the decision/order would be applicable/relevant for determining the premium/market value, the petitioner's request that the rate prevailing/applicable in 2007 may be taken into account while determining the premium/market value is not tenable and does not deserve even consideration. The said demand/request and submission deserve to be rejected and are hereby rejected. In this context, a profitable reference can be had to the decision in case of Vardhman Charitable Trust through Authorised Signatory vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 2011 (4) GLR 2933 wherein the Court observed and held that:- "5. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the petitioner has claimed that its application seeking affiliation for the academic year 2007-2008 remained unattended and undecided for long time, until the impugned order dated 15.06.2010 came to be passed. However, from conjoint reading of the respondent University's two replies-one dated 3.6.2009 addressed to the petitioner (page 32/Annexure-B) and another dated 3.7.2009 addressed to the respondent No. 2 (page 38/Annexure-D) it comes out that the petitioner's application was considered (with other applications) and disallowed/not accepted in view of the policy decision in the meeting held on 13.4.2007 and the said decision was ratified by the Executive Council in the meeting held on 5.5.2007. The petitioner's application-fee was also returned. 5.1 In this context, it is pertinent to note that in the appeal preferred by the petitioner in June, 2009 (i.e. about two years against the said decision) the petitioner had requested and stipulated in the memo dated 9.6.2009 that its application be treated as application seeking affiliation for 2009-10. In view of such specific request, the said application would no more be, and would not continue to be nor the petitioner can claim it to be the application for affiliation for 2007-2008 but in view of its own stipulation in the appeal memo the said application was converted into and it had to be treated as application seeking affiliation for 2009-10. 5.2 Thus, when (a) the petitioner's application seeking affiliation (for 2007-08) was actually considered by the Committee of the respondent University in the meeting held on 13.4.2007 and was not granted in light of the policy decision and the "affiliation- application fee" was also refunded; and when (b) present petitioner had preferred appeal against the said decision after almost 2 years i.e. in June, 2009; and when (c) in its memo of its Appeal dated 9.6.2009, the petitioner trust itself, had requested that its application for affiliation should be treated as application for academic year 2009-2010, and when (d) the respondent State had remanded (in July 2009) the matter to university; then (i) any occasion or question of considering the application in light of the Rules prevailing and applicable in 2007-2008 would not arise or survive (ii) the claim that the application seeing affiliation remained unattended and undecided until the impugned decision dated 15.6.2010, would also not survive and (iii) the contention to the effect that the application should be decided as per the Rules prevailing in 2007 (i.e. on the date of application) and not 2009 Regulations, will not (and does not) have foundation and support of facts, particularly in view of its own stipulation in the appeal. In the aforesaid facts the said grievance of the petitioner is without merits and it must fail. 5.3 Having noticed that the facts of petitioner's do not support or justify its contention, we may, now, turn to the judicial precedents which would bring in light the legal position. The petitioner has relied on unreported judgment dated 07.07.1990 in LPA No. 435 of 1988. In the cited case, much before the amendment in the Rules the entire selection process for the post of Armed Police Constable was concluded and the candidates also stood selected and the "select list" was already prepared/finalized before or on 31.12.1987 in accordance with the then prevailing Rules, whereas the relevant Rules came to be amended subsequently i.e. in February 1988. Inspite of such facts, the said select list, whose life was for 12 months i.e. until 31.12.1988, was cancelled in view of the amendment. Inspite of such facts, the said select list, whose life was for 12 months i.e. until 31.12.1988, was cancelled in view of the amendment. Whereas in the matter on hand, it is not the case of the petitioner that before the introduction of 2009 Regulations its application was already allowed and affiliation was finalized/granted in its favour, but it came to be cancelled after the introduction of and in view of 2009 Regulation. Actually, the petitioner's application was already rejected and against the said decision it had preferred appeal after 2 years. Since the facts of the cited case are materially different it will not help the petitioner in taking its case further, more particularly in view of the decisions mentioned below. 5.4 In this context, reference may be made to (a) the judgment in the case between State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Hind Stone, AIR 1981 SC 711 wherein, while considering the rival contention in the backdrop of the application seeking renewal of lease and amendment in the relevant Rules [particularly insertion of Rule 8(C)] the Apex Court, in para 13 of the judgment, has observed thus:- "13. Another submission of the learned counsel in connection with the consideration of applications for renewal was that applications made sixty days or more before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 (2.12.1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. It was also contended that even applications for grant of leases made long before the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time.... No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time.... While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable tune clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application...an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C did not exist. (Emphasis supplied) (b) In the case between Union of India and Another vs. Indian Charge Chrome, (1999) 7 SCC 314 wherein the Apex Court considered the dispute, which had arisen in light of the provisions under Customs Act, observed that:- "Mere making of an application for registration does not confer any vested right on the applicant. The application has to be decided in accordance with the law applicable in the date on which the authority granting the registration is called upon to apply its mind to the prayer for registration...." (Emphasis supplied) (c) In the case between P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 3461 the Apex Court has, in para 4 and 5 of the judgment, observed that:- "4. An applicant has no vested right to have export or import licences in terms of the policies in force at the date of his making application.... 5.......clear that grant of licence depends upon the policy prevailing as on the date of the grant of the licence. The Court, therefore, would not bind the Government with a policy which was existing on the date of application.... 5.......clear that grant of licence depends upon the policy prevailing as on the date of the grant of the licence. The Court, therefore, would not bind the Government with a policy which was existing on the date of application.... We, therefore, hold that the petitioners have no vested or accrued right for the issuance of permits on the MEE or NQE, nor the Government is bound by its previous policy...." (Emphasis supplied) (d) In the case between S.B. International Ltd. and Others vs. Assistant Director General of Foreign Trade, 1996 (2) SCC 439 the Apex Court considered the issue as to whether any subsequent change in policy will be applicable to issuance of licences and in para 10 of the judgment, the Apex Court has observed:- "We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention that a vested right accrues to an applicant for issuance of advance licence on the basis of the norm obtaining on the date of application is unacceptable...." (Emphasis supplied) (e) In the case between Chief of Marketing (Marketing Division) Coal India Limited vs. Mewat Chemicals & Tiny S.S.I. Coal Pulverising Unit, 2004 (4) SCC 146 : AIR 2004 SC 2640 , the Apex Court, in para 16 observed that:- 16. In our view, the High Court was also in error in concluding that the position prevailing on the date of the application must apply. It is settled law that there is no vested right when a person makes an application. The position prevailing at the time the allotment is to apply...." (Emphasis supplied) (f) In the case between T. Vijayalakshmi and Others vs. Town Planning Member and Another, AIR 2007 SC 25 the Apex Court has in para 18 of the judgment observed that:- "It is, thus, now well settled law that an application for grant of permission for construction of a building is required to be decided in accordance with law applicable on the day on which such permission is granted. However, a statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within reasonable time...." (Emphasis supplied) (g) Narayanbhai Ramabhai vs. State of Gujarat, 1985 (1) GLR 531 wherein the learned Single Judge rejected the said contention and observed that: "...If, during the pendency of the application, the earlier guidelines got rescinded it cannot be said that any vested right of the petitioner got affected. Merely because of the application was filed earlier, the petitioners cannot insist that this application should be considered only in the light of the earlier guidelines and not in the light of the subsequent guidelines which comes to operate by the time of application comes up for consideration on merits. The authority while deciding the question of granting exemption under Section 20(i)(a) has to keep in view all the relevant guidelines applicable at the time the question comes up for consideration. Mere filing of application gives no vested right to the applicant to get exemption in the light of the then existing guidelines which do not exist by the time the application comes up for decision. If the earlier guidelines have been uniformly withdrawn all pending applications which have to be decided in the light of the fresh guidelines which may be holding the field on the date of the decision. If that is not done the competent authority would get exposed to the charge of considering old and stale guidelines ignoring the current and applicable guidelines and its decision would be rendered arbitrary and illegal...." (Emphasis supplied) 5.5 When a statute or the Rules thereunder impose obligation to secure a licence or a permit or recognition, or affiliation from the Competent Authority or a body (e.g. municipality, university, school board etc.) before commencing any activity and the commencement of any activity or business or a vocation is, by law, regulated and/or made subject to the permission or the licence or affiliation or recognition then such pre-conditions or requirements (mandated to be coupled with for obtaining permission/affiliation/ recognition) which are prescribed and prevailing on the date when the application (for licence/permit/recognition/affiliation) is decided, will be applicable. 5.6 Besides the aforesaid aspects, in view of the provisions under the UGC Act and the Act of 1949-particularly Section 33 thereof-a university is required to take in consideration various aspects (e.g. whether the proposed college will supply the need in the area or not and it has adequate infrastructure and duly qualified staff or not etc.) while deciding application for affiliation and it may, for a given and valid reason (illustratively speaking-if it found that the proposed college will not supply the need in the area or it does not have qualified faculty) reject the application. Thus, the authority is supposed to actively and constructive apply mind and take an informed and judicious decision. Therefore also it would be the contemporaneous status of the aforesaid and such other relevant aspects (i.e. the status of the aspects existing at the time when application is considered/decided) which would be relevant while considering and deciding application for affiliation. Therefore also the provision holding the field on the date of the decision would be relevant applicable otherwise i.e. if such application is not decided in light of the guidelines/rules applicable, and holding the field, on the date of the decision then, as held by the Apex Court, the authority would get exposed to the charge of considering old and stale guidelines ignoring the current and applicable guidelines. Furthermore, mere submission of application would not and does not create any right in favour of the applicant. 5.7 In view of the facts of present case and in light of the above referred decisions we cannot accept the petitioner's contention that the application seeking affiliation should be considered in light of the provision prevailing when the application is made and not when the application is decided." At this stage, a profitable reference can also be had to a decision in case of Gohil Jesangbhai Raysangbhai and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (2014) 5 SCC 199 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held that:- "21. It was submitted by the appellants that assuming that the valuation of the land is permitted to be done as per the Jantri rates, it must be so done on the basis of the rates as prevalent on the date of the application. The resultant injustice was highlighted in the case of Savitaben in Civil Appeal No. 4129/2012. The fact however, remains that the Section speaks of previous sanction. As noted earlier, Section 4(2) of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 also speaks about the previous sanction. Thus, this is the theme which runs through all such welfare agricultural enactments, and a similar provision in the said Act has been left undisturbed by the bench of three Judges of this Court. As noted earlier, Section 4(2) of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 also speaks about the previous sanction. Thus, this is the theme which runs through all such welfare agricultural enactments, and a similar provision in the said Act has been left undisturbed by the bench of three Judges of this Court. Therefore, the Jantri rate to be applied will be on the date of the sanction by the Collector, and not on the date of the application made by the party." 37.3 The learned AGP is, therefore, justified in his submission that even if the petitioner's grievance against the impugned order on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice is accepted, then also, it is necessary to clarify that the petitioners cannot expect or demand that the authority should consider the rate prevailing in 2007. The said demand/ claim and submission of the petitioner deserve to be rejected and they are hereby rejected. 38. From the order passed by the authority, it has emerged that the authority determined market value at Rs. 7690/- on the basis of State Valuation Committee's report. However, it cannot be denied that the said decision is not taken after granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. On this count, this Court in above mentioned decision in case of B.K. Jethva (supra) observed, inter-alia, that:- "6. Having heard the learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the order dated 18th November, 2005 passed by the Collector, Kutch (Annexure-D to the memo of petition) in so far as it relates to the amount of premium, to be paid by the petitioner is concerned, deserves to be quashed and set aside mainly for the following facts and reasons:- (i) That the impugned order is passed without affording any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In view of judgment delivered by this Court, it is held by this Court in the case of Harijan Vithalbhai Madhavbhai vs. Krishnamurthy, the Collector, Baroda and Another, 1976 GLR 525 , especially in para 7, as under:- "7..........In the instant case, the price of the land in question was fixed without the knowledge of the petitioner. He did not have any opportunity to express his views before the Collector and to tell him what in his opinion would be the just and fair price. He did not have any opportunity to express his views before the Collector and to tell him what in his opinion would be the just and fair price. Since the petitioner in the instant case did not have such an opportunity it is difficult to say that the price of Rs. 4500/- fixed by the Collector for the land in question is a just and fair price. It is, therefore, necessary to direct the Collector to fix it again after ascertaining the views of the petitioner and after permitting him to submit to him whatever he wants to submit on that aspect of the question? (Emphasis supplied) Thus, whenever the valuation of the land is fixed by the concerned authority, the opportunity of being heard ought to have been provided to the person, who is made liable to make the payment of the money. The fixation of market value, of any land, is a complex phenomena. Always the applicant should be heard so that he will have an opportunity to provide latest value of the lands situated in the near vicinity for arriving at correct market price of land in question. This bare minimum requirement, of principles of natural justice has not complied with before passing the impugned order dated 18th November, 2005. (ii) The document upon which the Collector, Kutchh, has placed reliance, in the impugned order has not been supplied to the petitioner. The valuation arrived at by the committee has been shown as the main base, but this document has been kept so secret, by the Collector that it has not been supplied. This tantamounts to violation of principles of natural justice. Nor even this report is annexed with the impugned order. Nobody knows even today, what is the report of the so called, committee, on the basis of which the Collector has passed the impugned order. (iii) Several figures, are referred, in the impugned order, dated 18th November, 2005. The committee has fixed the market price at Rs. 90 per sq. mtrs. And made the petitioner liable to pay Rs. 28,95,570/-. This figures of price cannot be arrived at by Collector, Kutch without any basis. The figure of price and premium cannot come in the mind of Collector, Kutch from heaven or sky. There ought to be some calculation, some base for arriving at market value based upon legal principles of valuation. And made the petitioner liable to pay Rs. 28,95,570/-. This figures of price cannot be arrived at by Collector, Kutch without any basis. The figure of price and premium cannot come in the mind of Collector, Kutch from heaven or sky. There ought to be some calculation, some base for arriving at market value based upon legal principles of valuation. Such base ought to be supplied to the applicant. No base is reflected in the impugned order, hence, the order is a non-speaking order. (iv) The application dated 25.8.2004 was preferred by the petitioner under section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, whereas the impugned order has been passed after lapses of one year and two months. The market price ought to have been arrived at as on date of the application made by the petition. It has been held in the case of Jayantibhai Naranbhai Amin and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 2002 Gujarat 193, especially part of para 6 thereof, reads as under:- "6.......Therefore, determining the market price of such land prevailing at the time of passing of the order, apparently an injustice to the petitioners. It is also necessary to note that while fixing the market price, the respondent-Collector has not given any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, otherwise, the petitioners would have drawn the attention of the respondent-authority toward actual market price prevailing at the relevant time in respect of the land in question. However, from the record of this case, it seems that the respondent-Collector has fixed the market price universally without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Therefore, according to my opinion, when the authority has consumed unreasonable time in considering the application submitted by the petitioners for regularising the land in question and fixing the market price and if the respondent- Collector passed the order after the period of five to ten years fixing the market price prevailing at the time of passing of order, can be said to be clear injustice to the petitioners and such orders can be said to have passed in arbitrary manner. If the orders regularizing the land in question had passed at the time of first application submitted by the petitioners, then, naturally the market price would have been fixed at the rate prevailing at the relevant time....? If the orders regularizing the land in question had passed at the time of first application submitted by the petitioners, then, naturally the market price would have been fixed at the rate prevailing at the relevant time....? (Emphasis supplied) Enough time has lapsed after the application and, therefore, if an opportunity would have been given to the petitioner, he would have brought to the notice of the Collector, Kutch the market price of the land in dispute at the relevant time and of land in the vicinity, would have avoided the payment of unreasonably excessive figure of premium fixed by the impugned order. As this Court is remanding the matter to the Collector, Kutch, for afresh decision, there is no need to go into fine nicety of facts. Suffice it to say that for want of affording the opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, the order is arbitrary, illegal. It is also a non-speaking order and hence requires to be quashed and set aside. 7. As a cumulative effect of aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, I hereby quash and set aside the order passed by the Collector, Kutch dated 18th November, 2005 (Annexure-D to the memo of the petition), so far as the amount of premium is concerned. The Collector, Kutch is hereby directed to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and decide afresh, the amount of premium to be paid by the petitioner, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ from this Court, keeping in mind, observations made hereinabove and all the relevant documents presented by the petitioner a the time of hearing. Rule made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs. Direct service permitted." 39. In the result, following order is passed:- "(a) Having regard to the decision by this Court in case of B.K. Jethva (supra), the order dated 21.2.2013 is set aside. (b) It is clarified that the said order is set aside only on the limited ground viz. not granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as held in the decision in case of B.K. Jethva (supra). However, the petitioners' contention against the determination/quantification of amount and/or the submission that even now the rate of 2007 should be taken into account, are not accepted and the said submissions and demand or claim or request are rejected. not granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as held in the decision in case of B.K. Jethva (supra). However, the petitioners' contention against the determination/quantification of amount and/or the submission that even now the rate of 2007 should be taken into account, are not accepted and the said submissions and demand or claim or request are rejected. (c) It is further clarified that present order shall not be construed to mean that the Court has accepted petitioner's contention that the rate determined by the authority is unreasonable or on higher side. This order shall also not be construed to mean that the Court has accepted and granted the submission and the request that, now, while considering the request under Section 43 of Tenancy Act and under Section 65 of Gujarat Land Revenue Code, the rates prevailing in 2007 should be considered. The said contentions and submissions/requests are rejected. (d) It is further clarified that the authority shall pass fresh reasoned and speaking order after taking into account relevant and applicable guidelines or policy as issued from time to time and applicable as on date of decision. (e) It is also clarified that the application shall be processed in accordance with all Rules, Regulations, Policies, guidelines, etc. which are and may be in force and applicable at the time of consideration/hearing and decision. At this stage, it will not be out of place to mention that above discussed and above mentioned aspects were clearly informed to the learned counsel for the petitioners during the hearing. (f) It is also clarified that if the respondent No. 5 wants to make any submission with regard to petitioner's application, then, the said submissions may be considered subject to petitioner's objection and the petitioners as well as respondent No. 5 will be entitled to raise all such contentions and objections as may be available in law." 40. With aforesaid observations and clarifications, present petition stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Disposed off.