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2017 DIGILAW 626 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Mukesh Kantilal Shrimali

2017-03-21

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The appellant-State has filed the present criminal appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order, dated 31.5.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 224 of 2003, by the learned Principal Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court No. 1, Ahmedabad whereby, the trial court has been pleased to acquit the respondent accused from the charges for which he has been tried. 2. The facts leading to the rise of present criminal appeal are that the marriage of deceased Rekhaben has taken place with respondent accused Mukesh Kantilal Shrimali prior to four years from the date of incident as per religious custom. It is further the case of prosecution that after her marriage deceased Rekhaben was residing with her father in law, mother in law and brother in law in a joint family at Dhanjibhai ni Chali, near last bus stand, Meghaninagar, Ahmedabad at her in-law's house. It is further the case of prosecution that during her wedlock period, she has given birth to a baby named Sejal who was aged about 10 months as on date of incident. It is further the case of prosecution that complainant Rekhaben has studied upto Std. X and her father Mohanlal Jivabhai Pandya is residing at village Ambapur and serving with FCI. It is further the case of prosecution that husband of the complainant is unemployed and he is not doing any activities for maintenance of his family and he is also having habit of consuming liquor. It is further the case of prosecution that many time complainant Rekhaben has given advise not to consume liquor, inspite of the fact husband of the complainant was consuming liquor and by consuming liquor he was raising disputes with complainant Rekhaben. It is further the case of prosecution that on 19.11.2000 at about evening hours, as per natural habit, husband of the complainant came in drunken condition and raised dispute with complainant Rekhaben and thereafter, husband of the complainant has gone to his another house situated at Saugannagar. Thus, the husband of the complainant by consuming liquor was causing physical and mental torture to the deceased Rekhaben and therefore, deceased Rekhaben along with her daughter Sejal has committed suicide at about 7.30 p.m. By sprinkling kerosene on her body and setting her on fire. Thereafter, complainant Rekhaben was taken to Civil Hospital where complaint was given by complainant Rekhaben. Thereafter, complainant Rekhaben was taken to Civil Hospital where complaint was given by complainant Rekhaben. It is further the case of prosecution that during treatment, complainant Rekhaben has died and therefore, report was made for addition of charge and offence was registered for the alleged offence under Section 498(A), 306, 304(B) of IPC before the Meghaninagar Police Station, vide C.R. No. I-270 of 2000. 2.1 The Investigating Officer, pursuant to the registration of offence, conducted an investigation after recording the statements of witnesses and also executed several steps in furtherance of his investigation by recording statements of relevant witnesses as well as by drawing various panchnamas and the material having been found against the respondent accused, a detailed charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Magistrate for the offence punishable under Sections 304(B), 306 and 498-A of the IPC. 2.2 The learned Magistrate upon receipt of the charge-sheet registered the criminal case but, then, since the same was triable by the court of sessions, in exercise of powers under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. the case was committed to the sessions which had come up for consideration before the learned learned Principal Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court No. 1, Ahmedabad and same was registered as Sessions Case No. 224 of 2003. 2.3 Pursuant to the committal order passed by the trial court, the trial court, as stated above, was pleased to frame the charge at Exh. 1 against the respondent accused and his plea has also been recorded. But since the respondent accused has denied the offence being committed, the case was put up for further adjudication. 2.4 The record indicates that with a view to prove the case against the respondent accused, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence in the following manner:- S. No. PW No. Name Exhibit 1 PW-1 Chinubhai Dahyabhai Parmar 10 2 PW-2 Pratapsinh Shivaji Vaghela 13 3 PW-3 Dr. Dharitri Bhikhabhai Jadav 17 4 PW-4 Ranjitsinh Chuthaji Chauhan 20 5 PW-5 Nathuji Narsinh Chauhan 25 6 PW-6 Gauridutt Dayanidhi Sharma 29 7 PW-7 Dr. Dharitri Bhikhabhai Jadav 17 4 PW-4 Ranjitsinh Chuthaji Chauhan 20 5 PW-5 Nathuji Narsinh Chauhan 25 6 PW-6 Gauridutt Dayanidhi Sharma 29 7 PW-7 Dr. Sumanlal Bhelanath Shrimali 31 8 PW-8 Bhikhabhai Mohanbhai Pandya 34 9 PW-9 Pushpaben Mohanbhai 35 10 PW-10 Bipinbhai Tulsibhai Kumbhariya 36 11 PW-11 Natvarlal Somabhai Rathod 38 Evidence led by prosecution:- 1 Complaint 14 2 Report u/s. 157 of the Cr.P.C. 15 3 Inquest Panchnama 12 4 Panchnama of place of incident 11 5 Opinion by Officer of FSL as to place of incident. 30 6 Postmortem report 18 7 Report to Executive Magistrate for taking DD. 16 8 Letter as to sending of muddamal to FSL 39 9 FSL report 40, 41, 42 10 Death certificate 19 11 Medical case papers in respect of deceased Rekhaben 33 12 Copy of Vardhi of police constable from civil hospital 23 13 Copy of Vardhi of Ranjitsinh from civil hospital 24 2.5 After the said evidence is led, a closure pursis came to be given by the prosecution and after recording the statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. the case was put up for trial. The trial court had framed the issues for which adjudication is to take place in sessions case and after considering in detail the evidence led by the prosecution and after considering the further statement, the trial court was pleased to pass an order of acquittal and the respondents accused came to be acquitted from the charges for which they have been tried. It is this judgment and order is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal by the appellant-State. 3. Mr. L.R. Poojari, learned APP for the appellant-State has vehemently contended that despite the fact that prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent evidence, the trial court has committed a serious error in exercising the jurisdiction. Learned APP has further contended that there is adequate material adduced before the trial court and the testimony of witnesses have clearly indicated connectivity of respondent accused with actual commission of crime and therefore, to pass an order of acquittal on the basis of inferences and surmises, the said exercise of jurisdiction is uncalled for and therefore, learned APP requested the Court to correct the mistake committed by the trial court. Learned APP has further contended that looking to the material on record even if there appears to be some contradiction but, then Dr. Shrimali's testimony and initial version before him is clearly indicative of the role being played by the respondent accused. Learned APP has also contended that her initial version before Dr. Shrimali was sufficient enough to establish the guilt by the prosecution and that has been done and therefore, there appears to be no cogent reason available for the trial court to acquit the respondent accused. Learned APP has further contended specifically that marriage span between the deceased and the respondent accused was about 7 years and since the offence is committed, the initial version to dislodge the inference and presumption is on the accused which has not been discharged by the respondent accused and therefore, by virtue of the statutory provisions contained in Section 113 of the Evidence Act, the order of acquittal is unjust and improper. Learned APP has further contended that there appears to be a specific assertion not only in the complaint but the same is getting substantiated from the testimony of witnesses and therefore, when enough corroborative material is available, there is hardly any cogent circumstance left which could have been used as a circumstance to acquit the person and therefore, a serious error is committed in passing the judgment and order. Learned APP has further contended that Investigating Officer has specifically deposed and from his testimony and the material gathered during the course of investigation since having been established before the court, the order of acquittal is unwarranted in the background of present fact. It has also been contended that the marriage life is below the statutory limit prescribed by the Act and therefore, when the respondent accused was pressed with a specific charge of Section 304(B) r/w Section 498-A and 306 of IPC, the onus having not been established and discharged by respondent accused, the very exercise of jurisdiction is erroneous and therefore, when such specific material is available in which the accused has done away with a young lady, to ignore certain circumstances which are emerging is nothing but a glaring material error in exercising the jurisdiction. So much so that on account of such act of the respondent accused, an infant has also been done away and the record sufficiently established the drinking habit of respondent accused and therefore, all presumptions are leaned against the respondent which ought not to have been ignored while passing the judgment and order. Learned APP has prayed to the Court that in such kind of heinous crime, no leniency is required to be shown favouring such kind of elements of the society. Learned APP has further contended that this Court has wide powers sitting in an appellate jurisdiction to even review or reassess the evidence led before the court and from the material on record, the findings which have been arrived at are clearly emerging as perverse, misreading of evidence and raising undue inference and therefore, when such kind of caviler exercise of jurisdiction is reflecting from a bare reading of the judgment, this Court should embark upon and set aside the impugned order passed by the trial court. By contending this, learned APP has requested the Court to allow the appeal and inflict appropriate punishment upon the respondent accused. No other submissions are made by learned APP. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Ms. Dharitri Pancholi, learned counsel for HL Patel Advocates for the respondent accused has contended that while passing the judgment and order, due weightage is given to all the evidences which are brought to the notice of the court and therefore, after dealing with the evidence at length, no case is made out by the prosecution to arrive at a conclusion to convict the respondent accused and therefore, such detailed exercise of jurisdiction since it is reflecting, the order requires no interference. Ms. Pancholi has further submitted that there are several infirmities in the evidence led by the prosecution. First if all the place of occurrence is also seriously in doubt. Over and above that, the testimony of Dr. Shrimali is not possible to be accepted for the simple reason that not only he is a related person to the deceased family but, his version is not reposing any confidence. 4.1 Ms. Dharitri Pancholi, learned counsel has further contended that from the entire material on record, not only except testimony of Dr. Shrimali is not possible to be accepted for the simple reason that not only he is a related person to the deceased family but, his version is not reposing any confidence. 4.1 Ms. Dharitri Pancholi, learned counsel has further contended that from the entire material on record, not only except testimony of Dr. Shrimali, no other corroboration is taking place about the stand taken by the prosecution and therefore, in the absence of any corroborative material to arrive at a decision to hold the respondent guilty is not safe. Ms. Pancholi has further submitted that even the trial court while arriving at a conclusion that suicide no doubt is established but, connectivity to the same of respondent accused is not linking in any form and therefore, in the background of these facts, when there is no other reliable evidence available, there is no justifiable reason to interfere with the order under challenge. Ms. Pancholi has further submitted that looking to the inquest panchnama and the postmortem examination injuries reflecting in body of the deceased, it is hardly possible for her to speak anything as not only 93% burnt injuries have been sustained but, face and other parts of the body is also such by virtue of which it is not possible to even speak and therefore, except Dr. Shrimali there is no other material to dislodge the finding arrived at by the trial court. Ms. Pancholi has further drawn our attention to other witnesses and materials from which it is emerging that vardhi which has been recorded by the police officer is at the behest of Dr. Shrimali and according to her Dr. Shrimali is a related person to the family of deceased, his role has indicated that somehow the implication of the respondent accused was to be made. In fact, there are no independent witnesses examined and furthermore, main material witness Dr. Chhadha, who lastly treated the deceased, whom was referred by Dr. Shrimali, has not been examined by the prosecution to unearth the real reason and therefore, in the absence of any linking material against the respondent accused, the trial court has not committed any error in passing the judgment and order and therefore, considering this overall analysis of evidence, Ms. Pancholi has requested the Court that order of acquittal is not warranting any interference and the present appeal may be dismissed. 5. Pancholi has requested the Court that order of acquittal is not warranting any interference and the present appeal may be dismissed. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record and having independently assessed the evidence and compared the same with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, following circumstances are requiring proper consideration. 5.1 First of all, the charge which has been framed at Exh. 1 is that on 19.11.2000 at about 19.30 hours, the respondent accused, who was in habit of consuming liquor, had ill-treated the deceased which ultimately led the deceased to commit a suicide by pouring kerosene on herself on 29.11.2000 and it is this specific incident for which the trial has been conducted. 5.2 The prosecution has examined few witnesses to establish the case against the respondent accused and some of the material witnesses, who can throw some light, their depositions which have been relied upon by the prosecution are requiring attention. The PW-2 - Pratapji Shivji Vaghela, who is examined at Exh. 13 had received a vardhi from second Police Inspector, Shri Parmar, who, in turn, had received from civil hospital and accordingly, said vardhi received from civil hospital was protested by the respondent accused side from being exhibited. The testimony of this witness has indicated that he received the vardhi at about 9.15 p.m. And when he went to the hospital pursuant to that, has found that the deceased was in conscious state of mind but, was found to have sustained burns injuries on neck, lips and chicks and was intermittently in a position to speak. The testimony of this witness has further indicated that no doctor's opinion either prior or post was taken for recording the complaint and according to this testimony, the offence of Section 302 of IPC was recorded. But the reading of this testimony is suggesting that deceased was having burns injuries on the face as indicated above. 5.3 Now, as against this, PW-3 - Dr. Dharitri Bhikhabhai Jadav, who is examined at Exh. 17, who was the Medical Officer at the relevant point of time, conducted the P.M. Examination as a panel doctor and found that 2nd and 3rd degree burns and to an extent of 99% burns injures found by her. She also found the carbon particles in the trachea and also found both lungs congested. 17, who was the Medical Officer at the relevant point of time, conducted the P.M. Examination as a panel doctor and found that 2nd and 3rd degree burns and to an extent of 99% burns injures found by her. She also found the carbon particles in the trachea and also found both lungs congested. According to the testimony of this Medical Officer, on account of stove, the injuries have been caused which resulted into the death. The PW-5 - Nathuji Narsinh Chauhan, who is examined at Exh. 25, who recorded the vardhi from Ranjitsinh, a police constable (Buckle No. 7374) as per the say of the CMO Dr. Shrimali and therefore, this witness has substantially stated that vardhi has been recorded at the instance of Dr. Shrimali. 5.4 In the aforesaid evidence if now a testimony of PW-7-Dr. Shrimali is to be examined, he has stated that on 19.11.2000 when he was working as Medical Officer at Civil Hospital, at about 8.30 p.m. one Rekhaben Mukeshbhai Shrimali had come for examination and in that process, this Medical Officer has stated that she has been burnt by her husband at the house of maternal uncle by pouring kerosene and therefore, this medical officer found extensive burns and after informing the police constable having Buckle No. 7374, transferred the deceased to the Burns and Plastic Surgery Ward of Dr. A.C. Chhadha and therefore, this testimony indicates that this Medical Officer has not treated the deceased. Though in cross-examination this Medical Officer has attempted to deny that history has been recorded as per the say of relatives of Rekhaben i.e. deceased but then, the entire version of this Medical Officer indicates that at 8.30 p.m. the deceased had come for treatment to his hospital. One factor which is unusual is that undisputedly deceased Rekhaben had sustained burns injuries on face and without treatment since condition was serious, she was referred to Dr. Chhadha. But this Medical Officer, who is stated to have recorded the history, has in very first paragraph stated that as if the deceased Rekhaben on her came as is visible. Be that as it may. This testimony if can be viewed in the context of the testimony of PW-9 Pushpaben Mohanbhai, the mother of the deceased, she has denied that she is not related to Dr. Be that as it may. This testimony if can be viewed in the context of the testimony of PW-9 Pushpaben Mohanbhai, the mother of the deceased, she has denied that she is not related to Dr. Shrimali but, that attempt is not going further but a serious doubt has arisen to straightway believe the testimony of Dr. Shrimali. 5.5 This PW-9 - Pushpaben Mohanbhai, who is examined at Exh. 35 has indicated that respondent accused had a habit of drinking liquor and some element of ill-treatment on account of that, is reflecting by this testimony. 5.6 The further examination of material in the form of one independent witness - PW-10 - Bipinbhai Tulsibhai, who is examined at Exh. 36, who is the neighbour, has on the contrary dislodged the theory of prosecution which is tried to be developed during the course of adjudication. This independent witness is the person who immediately went to the spot residing nearby, has indicated that the door was locked from inside and it was required to be broken down to enter into. It has also been stated by this witness that in emergency ward, the doctor has neither inquired anything from this witness nor from the deceased and when doctor made an attempt to inquire, this witness has stated that she has not replied at all since the physical condition was acute and very serious. This independent witness has clearly stated that deceased Rekhaben was not in a position to speak. 6. The entire evidence if to be analyzed at one point of time, it is emerging that Dr. Shrimali has recorded the history from deceased, has indicated that she came for the treatment and given the history. But the same if to be considered from the averments contained in the complaint recorded on 19.11.2000, the said averments have indicated that she has locked the doors from inside and on her own kept daughter with her sustained burns injuries. Yet another material reflecting the evidence in the form of document at Exh. 16 which has indicated that when executive magistrate was called for taking dying declaration, the deceased was not in conscious state of mind and was not replying anything. Whereas on Page-2 an endorsement of doctor it is appearing that the patient was conscious and then, expired at 11.45 p.m. It appears that the dying declaration was not possible to be recorded. Whereas on Page-2 an endorsement of doctor it is appearing that the patient was conscious and then, expired at 11.45 p.m. It appears that the dying declaration was not possible to be recorded. From the entire evidence, therefore, there seem to be two set of versions (i) that she has stated that her husband poured the kerosene and ultimately, she succumbed to the injuries, whereas the paper-book compilation reflecting on Page-375 in which on 19.11.2000 at 9.00 p.m. it is recorded in papers that 'self inflicted burns' and therefore, when Dr. Chhadha who has treated the deceased, has not been examined and (ii) Dr. Shrimali found to be the relative which is a questionable circumstance not established by prosecution and the history which has been recorded has no clarity, a serious doubt has arisen with respect to the incident in question. Yet one more document which is visible from the record indicates that she might have succumbed to the injuries on her own which fact is emerging from the document at Exh. 39 on Page-377 and therefore, from this material, no clinching circumstance established that with a certainty it can be said that husband i.e. respondent who has poured the kerosene and done away with the deceased. In the context of aforesaid analysis of evidence visualized by the trial court, it appears that a specific conclusion is arrived at that prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt which ultimately culminated into order of acquittal. 7. Now, coming to the conclusion which is reflecting from the reasons which are assigned by the trial court, it is categorically mentioned that the history which has been given by Dr. Shrimali is found to be contradictory. On the contrary, the trial court has found that neither accidental death is established nor a suicide is established from the record and therefore, in such a doubtful circumstance, it appears that the trial court has given the benefit of doubt to the respondent accused. The categorical conclusion contained in Para.28 has suggested that same is arrived at upon analysis of entire evidence on record and therefore, when the trial court has dealt with entire material, the same is not appearing to be so perverse which may result into miscarriage of justice. The categorical conclusion contained in Para.28 has suggested that same is arrived at upon analysis of entire evidence on record and therefore, when the trial court has dealt with entire material, the same is not appearing to be so perverse which may result into miscarriage of justice. There appears to be no irregularity nor any illegality or perversity in the order of acquittal passed by the trial court and accordingly, sitting in an appeal against the order of acquittal, we are unable to dislodge the finding arrived at by the trial court and as such, we are of the considered opinion that the order requires no interference. 8. Upon overall analysis of the evidence further raises serious doubt about the case of prosecution that looking to the panchnama of scene of offence, it is emerging that stopper of the door was locked from inside and further, there was no matchbox nor any kerosene tin was found from the spot nor any visible sign about the burns has been reflecting and therefore, when such a situation is prevailing on the spot where a lady has sustained burns injuries to the extent of 93%, it is not possible so confidently to believe that the story put up by the prosecution on the basis of Dr. Shrimali's testimony can be believable with certainty and therefore, looking to this entire set of circumstance, more particularly when even the panchnama of scene of offence, the version of prosecution is hardly any credence. In addition thereto, if we believe the contents of FIR then, at that time whether the Medical Officer was present or not, whether condition of the deceased was certified or not, are all serious issues which ought to have been proved by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt and therefore, if the first information report is to be disbelieved then, the version i.e. history given by Dr. Shrimali is suspicious and therefore, these are the circumstances which are prevailing on record indicate that the prosecution appears to have not been able to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt, as has been rightly concluded by the trial court. 9. Shrimali is suspicious and therefore, these are the circumstances which are prevailing on record indicate that the prosecution appears to have not been able to prove the case beyond the reasonable doubt, as has been rightly concluded by the trial court. 9. While coming to this conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that no doubt, the appellate court has ample powers to reassess the entire material but, then even if plausible view is available, a different view may not be substituted qua that of the trial court more particularly when the trial court had an opportunity to see the demeanor of witnesses and therefore, overall analysis of present background led us to consider the proposition laid down by the Apex Court on the issue of exercising appellate jurisdiction which deserves to be quoted hereinafter. 9.1 In the decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para-55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598, as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 and Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994)." 9.2 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed as observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31. 9.3 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (See Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 9.4 The decision taken by the Apex Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State, 2016 AIR (SC) 2045, wherein the apex Court in paragraph No. 21 observed thus: "21. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. If the evaluation of the evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the grounds on which the trial court has based its conclusion are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal if another view is possible. Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. In State through Inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court reiterated the well settled principle that if two views are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the acquittal by the lower court and that only where the material on record leads to an inescapable conclusion of guilt of the accused, the judgment of acquittal will call for interference by the appellate court. The same view was reiterated in T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401 ." 10. In the premise aforesaid, we have given our anxious thought to the entire material on record, compared the same with the finding arrived at by the trial court and upon close scrutiny and reassessment of the evidence, we are of the considered opinion that chain is not connecting completely to hold the respondents accused as guilty of an offence beyond reasonable doubt and in such a suspicious circumstance, it is not just and proper for the appellate court to substitute the finding and hold them guilty. Perversity is not getting reflected and manifest error is not appearing which may turn out to be a miscarriage of justice and therefore, in the absence of such element, we are unable to accept the contentions raised by learned APP and accordingly, we find no error committed by the trial court and therefore, the appeal filed by the State being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 11. In view of above, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order, dated 31.5.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 224 of 2003, by the learned Principal Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court No. 1, Ahmedabad, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith. Appeal Dismissed.