JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. The petitioner has filed this writ petition for the following reliefs :- “a. That the impugned order dated 22-8-08 passed by the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal in Execution Case no. 14/07 Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Surma Devi be set aside. b. That the cost of the petition may be awarded in favour of the petitioners against the contesting respondents. c. Award cost of the petition in favour of the petitioner.” 2. The petitioner has prayed for that the Execution Case No. 14 of 2007, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Surma Devi and the order passed in it on 22nd August, 2008, may be set aside. 3. Primarily, the challenge to the order passed in the execution proceedings is based upon the following grounds : 1. There is no decree against the petitioner for recovery of amount of compensation 2. The proceedings are not tenable in view of Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 3. The execution of the decree cannot be beyond the decree itself. 4. The factual backdrop leading to the institution of the present writ petition questioning the orders passed by the Executing Court is in pursuance to an award which has been rendered by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in Motor Accident Case No. 27 of 2003, Darban Singh and another Vs. Oriental Insurance Company and another. 5. The factual backdrop or the manner in which the controversy traveled upto the Tribunal is not required to be dealt with in the instant writ petition. What is relevant for consideration is the award passed by the Tribunal. The same is quoted hereunder :- ^^vkns’k ;kfpdk vkaf’kd :i ls Lohdkj djrs gq, foi{kh la01 vksfj;UVy ba’;ksjsal dEiuh ds fo:) {kfriwfrZ ds :i esa vadu 2]68]500@&:0 nks yk[k vM+lB gtkj ikap lkS dh fMdzh dh tkrh gSA foi{kh la01 chek dEiuh dks vknsf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd {kfriwfrZ dh jkf’k fnukad 27&1&07 rd izkf/kdj.k esa tek djs vU;Fkk fu.kZ; ds fnukad ls 9 izfr’kr pdzo`f) O;kt tks Nekgh ns; gksxk] dh Hkh nsunkj gksxhA {kfriwfrZ dh jkf’k esa ls e`rd ds HkkbZ jktdqekj o cgu yhyk dks 50&50 gtkj :i;s udn fn, tk;saxs rFkk ‘ks”k jkf’k e; C;kt vk/kh vk/kh e`rd ds ekrk firk ;kph la0 1 o 2 ikus ds vf/kdkjh gksaxsA** 6. On a judicious scrutiny of the operative portion of the award, it specifically assigns a liability on the Insurance Company to pay the amount of compensation as quantified by it to the claimant. On a simple reading, and on the ground which has been argued by the petitioner, the award is not fixing any liability on the petitioner, who is the owner of the vehicle at the time when the accident occurred on 07/07/2002. Thus, the controversy which boils down is as to whether after an adjudication rendered by the MACT, where the liability has been fixed upon the Insurance Company, can the Insurance Company avail the liberty at an execution stage to interpret an award by expanding its scope then what it was intended to while it was fixing the liability. 7. Once the award has specifically assigned liability on the Insurance Company without making the owner liable to pay any amount and that too when it is not in controversy that vehicle was insured at the time of accident, the Executing Court could not have fixed the liability by the impugned order dated 22nd August, 2008, on the petitioner, that too beyond the award itself. 8. In response to this argument, the argument as extended by Mr. D.S. Patni, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 is in the following manner :- 1. What he tries to argue is that irrespective of the fixation of the liability by the award, he has got a right to recover. 2. Insurance Company can exercise power under Section 174 and recover the amount. 9. First of all, this argument is absolutely untenable for the reason : 1. If this argument is accepted then even without fixation of a liability, it will lead to situation where it would be open to the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the insured, it defeats the very concept of insurance which has been constitutionally envisaged by incorporating insurance in Entry 47 of List 1 of Schedule 7 of the Constitution, for the reason, the philosophy of insurance is an assurance given to the insure that the company would be coming forward to meet the liability in any eventuality which otherwise would be falling heavily on the insured. Thus, any liberty which has been granted to the Insurance Company for recovering the amount would not be beyond the purpose of insurance itself, and even beyond the award. 2. The second argument which is extended by the learned counsel for the respondent too cannot be accepted by this Court for the purposes of exercising his recoverable rights from the owner of the vehicle on the ground as referred under Section 174. For the said purpose, Section 174 of the Act is quoted hereunder :- “174. Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue. - Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.” 10. Section 174, on its literal interpretation, has very categorically used the word “amount due” from any person “under an award”. Meaning thereby, once Section 174 uses the word “due” , it means that there has to be a settlement of liability to pay under an award and further when Section 174 uses the word “under an award”, it means that a determination has to be there against a person for paying it under an award. 11. In the instant case, if we read the operative portion of the award, there is no due which has been settled to be paid by the owner of the vehicle, and as such, it cannot be the amount said to be paid payable as against the owner, it will not be falling to be an amount payable under an award by the petitioner. Thus, Section 174 does not come to the rescue to the respondent No. 1 at all. 12. Another limb of argument of learned counsel for respondent No.1 is that he admits that under the Motor Vehicles Act, no doubt there is no recoverable rights granted to the Insurance Company, and rightly so, as already dealt above as the purpose for which Insurance is envisaged. If recoverable rights are contemplated or granted to an Insurance Company under the Motor Vehicles Act, there would not be a necessity to get the vehicle insured at all. If recoverable rights are contemplated or granted to an Insurance Company under the Motor Vehicles Act, there would not be a necessity to get the vehicle insured at all. Furthermore, he, in support of his argument has placed reliance on a pronouncement as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The first judgment in the sequence is reported in (2004) 2 SCC 1 , National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur and others. In this judgment, he draws the attention of this Court to para 21, which is quoted hereunder:- “21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh (supra). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani (supra). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant, herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the tribunal in such a proceeding.” 13. Though, this judgment on which reliance has been placed was it is not dealing with the aspect as to whether the amount determined by the Tribunal could be recovered from the owner or not despite the fact when no liability has been fixed upon him by the award. But, on scrutiny of para 21, the ratio laid by Hon’ble Apex Court was in relation to where recoverable rights have been granted to the Insurance Company by the award, it had altogether a different social perspective to be met with, i.e. the claimant should not be suffering on account of any delayed payment where the liability has been fastened upon the owner of the vehicle and that is why the Insurance Company has been made to pay the amount and then it has been left open for the Insurance Company to recover from the owner who has otherwise been determined to pay the amount of compensation, thus, was the situation which was being dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court. 14. While going through para 21 of the judgment, in the light of the intention what is reflected from para 21, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has not been able to place before this Court as to what was the nature of award which was subject matter of determination before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Hence, the preposition as enunciated, since apparently it was not dealing as to whether the scope of the award could be widened, it will not be of any rescue to the respondent. 15. The second judgment, on which, he places reliance is the judgment reported in (2009) 8 SCC 377 , New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Kusum and others. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 tries to draw attention of this Court to para 8 of the said judgment, which refers to another judgment which has been referred by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in (2004) 13 SCC 224 , Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanjappan. Para 8 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder:- “8. The courts, however, keeping in view the social justice doctrine in mind wherefore the Act was enacted and in the interest of the claimants had been passing such orders. The High Court has noticed the decision of this Court in Nanjappa (supra), wherein it was held: 8. Ltd. Vs. Nanjappan. Para 8 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder:- “8. The courts, however, keeping in view the social justice doctrine in mind wherefore the Act was enacted and in the interest of the claimants had been passing such orders. The High Court has noticed the decision of this Court in Nanjappa (supra), wherein it was held: 8. Therefore, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur case that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondent claimants within three months from today. For the purpose of recovering the same from the insured, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the executing court concerned as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Authority concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the insured, owner of the vehicle shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.” 16. In case there is any default it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.” 16. The direction to pay the amount of compensation or to recover the amount as fixed by the Tribunal, the terminology used there would mean that the fixation of the liability is condition precedent has to be by virtue of an award, which would be otherwise be substitutively paid by the Insurance Company to the claimant and then it was left open to be recovered by the Insurance Company from the actual person or a body against whom the liability has been settled by the award and amount has been held due to be paid. Yet again, this judgment was not dealing with the controversy from the perspective as to whether the scope of the award could be widened and the liability could be harnessed upon even the party to a proceedings who has otherwise not be made liable to pay and that too at the stage of execution of the award. It has been one of the limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the award was rendered on 22nd November, 2006, the award constituted thereof was in the following fashion :- ^^eqdnek iqdkjk x;kA i{kdkj ds vf/koDrk gkftj vk;sA 19x ij vkns’k ikfjr fd;k x;kA eqrkfcd vksn’k /kkjk&174 M.V. Act dk izk0 i= Lohdkj fd;k x;kA foi{kh iathd`r okgu Lokeh Jherh lqjek nsoh dks vkns’k fn;k tkrk gS fd og ,d ekg ds vUnj chek dEiuh dks vadu 2]74]393@&:0 Hkqxrku dj nsaA** 17. On the other hand, his argument is that the Executing Court has passed an order granting the recoverable rights directing the petitioner to pay the amount to the Insurance Company. This has what has been happened in the present case by the impugned award. 18. As already discussed above, the liability for payment of the amount since has been settled against the respondent No.1, but, the Executing Court, while passing the order dated 22nd August, 2008, has harnessed the liability on the owner of the vehicle which was beyond the intention of the award itself, could not be extended by Executing Court. 18. As already discussed above, the liability for payment of the amount since has been settled against the respondent No.1, but, the Executing Court, while passing the order dated 22nd August, 2008, has harnessed the liability on the owner of the vehicle which was beyond the intention of the award itself, could not be extended by Executing Court. Lastly, the argument which has come forward from the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 is that by virtue of extracting a part of the award and the finding which has been recorded on issue Nos. 3 and 4. 19. Let us scrutinize his argument in relation to the finding recorded therein. On its logical scrutiny, the said finding was not a conclusive fixation of liability rather it was based on a particular fact which has emerged during the course of argument and that is why, it starts with the word ^;|fi pkyd* ----] means it was a situation which was considered by the Court and it was not reasoning for it. If, we further scrutinize the finding when the subsequent para of finding on issue No. 3 and 4, it uses the word ^rks* this term too is a use of thought by Tribunal will always relate to a existence of a pre-existing situation dealt in the preceding paragraphs and not independently. Hence, the subsequent finding is of no benefit to the respondent No. 1. 20. In that view of the matter, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.08.2008, passed by the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal in Execution Case No. 14 of 2007, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Surma Devi is quashed. Respondent No.1 is directed to meet the entire liability as it has been harnessed upon him by the award. 21. No order as to costs.