JUDGMENT : This appeal under section 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Cr.P.C.), has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 07.08.2003 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Ist F.T.C., Roorkee, District Haridwar, in S.T. No.85 of 1998, whereby said court has convicted the accused/appellant Qurban Ali under Section 304-B of The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, IPC) and has sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the lower court record. 3. Prosecution story, in brief, is that on 08.09.1997 P.W.1 Shamshad Hasan lodged a report at P.S. Bhagwanpur, stating therein that marriage of his daughter Alzuber (deceased) was solemnized with the accused/appellant Qurban Ali in April 1997. After 15-20 days’ of the marriage, the accused/appellant has started raising demand of Scooter, whereupon, the complainant told him that he is not in a position to give Scooter. During these four months, the accused/appellant had also come at the house of the complainant and had made demand of Scooter and had also told that if (complainant) would not give scooter, he (accused/appellant) will commit suicide. Thereafter, the complainant also went to accused house at Village Chauli and made them understand and returned back. On 08.09.1997 at about 4:00 pm, one person came from Village Chauli and informed him that his daughter is sick. The complainant along with his friend Pramod immediately rushed to Village Chauli and found his daughter dead. They met Ashiq Teli and Akbar who told them that in-laws and husband of Alzuber (deceased) has given her poison. The complainant alleged that the accused persons have committed murder of his daughter due to non-fulfillment of demand of Scooter. On the basis of said report, Case Crime No. 114 of 1997 was registered against the present accused/appellant and father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased, relating to offence punishable under sections 304-B IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Investigation was taken up by P.W.6 C.O. Shobit Yadav. During the course of investigation, the I.O. visited the spot and prepared the site-plan, recorded statement of witnesses and on completion of investigation, submitted charge sheet against accused/appellant and two others for their trial in respect of offences punishable under sections 304-B IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Roorkee. During the course of investigation, the I.O. visited the spot and prepared the site-plan, recorded statement of witnesses and on completion of investigation, submitted charge sheet against accused/appellant and two others for their trial in respect of offences punishable under sections 304-B IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Roorkee. District Haridwar, on receipt of charge sheet, after giving necessary copies to the accused as required under section 207 Cr.P.C., committed the case to the court of Sessions for trial. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Roorkee, on 18.08.1999, after hearing the parties, framed charge of offence punishable under section 304-B IPC against the accused/appellant Qurban Ali and two others, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, got examined P.W.1 Shamshad Hasan (complainant), P.W.2 Wahid, P.W.3 Idrish, P.W.4 Smt. Sanjeeda, P.W.5 Dr. O.P. Sharma, P.W.6 C.O. Shobit Yadav, P.W.7 Dr. K.K. Karoli and P.W.8 Sub Inspector Baljeet Singh. 6. Oral and documentary evidence was put to the accused persons under section 313 Cr.P.C, in reply to which they pleaded that they have been falsely implicated in the case. They also stated that accused/appellant Qurban Ali had already bought scooter on 28.06.1997 thus there was no question of demanding any Scooter. In defence, they produced three witnesses viz. D.W.1 Ashraf, D.W.2 Sahdev Singh and D.W.3 Ashiq. 7. The trial court, after hearing the parties, found that no charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt against accused Ali Sher and Smt. Haseena. They were acquitted of the charge but accused/appellant Qurban Ali (husband) was found guilty of charge of offence punishable under section 304-B IPC. After hearing the convict on sentence, the trial court sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years. Feeling aggrieved by said judgment and order, accused/appellant Qurban Ali has preferred present appeal. 8. P.W.1 Shamshad Hasan is the complainant and father of the deceased. He has reiterated the version of F.I.R. in his testimony. However, in cross-examination, he has stated that after three days of the marriage, when the deceased had come back to her parental house, she did not make any complaint. He has also stated that at the time of marriage also, no talk has taken place regarding dowry. 9. He has reiterated the version of F.I.R. in his testimony. However, in cross-examination, he has stated that after three days of the marriage, when the deceased had come back to her parental house, she did not make any complaint. He has also stated that at the time of marriage also, no talk has taken place regarding dowry. 9. P.W.2 Wahid has stated that P.W.1 Shamshad Hasan had told him that in-laws of deceased are making demand of Scooter in dowry. He has further stated that before him the accused/appellant had made demand of Scooter and had also stated that he would consume poison if he (complainant) would not meet his demand. He has also deposed that P.W.1 Shamshad Hasan was unable to give Scooter, and on his persuasion, the accused had also convinced. 10. P.W.3 Idrish is witness of inquest report. He has proved the inquest report Ext.A2. 11. P.W.4 Smt. Sanjeeda is mother of the deceased. She has corroborated the statement of P.W.1 Shamshad Hasan. In cross-examination, she has stated that at the time of marriage, a dispute had arisen due to demand of scooter. 12. P.W.5 Dr. O.P. Sharma was on the panel of doctors who had conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased. He has proved post-mortem report Ext.A3. He also deposed that as cause of death was not ascertained, therefore, viscera was preserved. 13. P.W.6 C.O. Shobhit Yadav is Investigating Officer. He has stated that the investigation of the case was handed over to him. During the course of investigation, he visited the spot, prepared the site-plan, recorded the statement of witnesses and on completion of investigation, he had submitted charge sheet against the accused persons. 14. P.W.7 Dr. K.K. Karoli has stated that on 09.09.1997 he conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased. He has stated that no internal injury was found on the body of deceased. He also stated that on external examination, face was bluish and blood was oozing out from mouth and nose. The deceased was four and half months pregnant. As cause of death was not ascertained, hence, viscera was preserved. 15. P.W.8 Sub Inspector Baljeet Singh is formal witness. He has proved the chik FIR Ext.ka-6 and inquest report Ext.Ka-2. 16. Shri Vivek Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no demand of dowry. Demand of dowry is not proved. As cause of death was not ascertained, hence, viscera was preserved. 15. P.W.8 Sub Inspector Baljeet Singh is formal witness. He has proved the chik FIR Ext.ka-6 and inquest report Ext.Ka-2. 16. Shri Vivek Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no demand of dowry. Demand of dowry is not proved. It was an after thought. It is neither a case of homicide nor unnatural death. It is further submitted that the ingredients of section 304 B IPC are not proved by the prosecution as the prosecution has utterly failed to prove that ''soon before the death' there was any demand of dowry by the accused. There is also no evidence on record to prove that the deceased was ever tortured for demand of dowry by the accused. 17. Per contra, learned AGA has submitted that prosecution has successfully proved the case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. It has been proved that the deceased was tortured for demand of Scooter by the accused, soon before her death. Deceased died in abnormal circumstances within seven years of her marriage in her in-laws’ house. 18. Before going any further, it would be relevant to mention here that section 113B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that when the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. The explanation to the section provides that expression 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of IPC. Section 304B of the IPC defines 'dowry death' and provides punishment for said offence. Section 304B IPC provides that where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise, than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any other relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Sub-section 2 of section 304B further provides that whoever commits dowry death shall be punished for imprisonment for a term which may not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 19. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satvir Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, (2001) 8 SCC 633 has observed as under: “20. Prosecution, in a case of offence under Section 304B IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and also that such cruelty or harassment was caused soon before her death. The word dowry in Section 304B has to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. That definition reads thus: “2. In this Act, ‘dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly - (a) by one party to marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. 21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is “at any time” after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are “in connection with the marriage of the said parties”. This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of “dowry”. Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. 22. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of “dowry”. Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. 22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304B is to be invoked. But it should have happened soon before her death. The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words soon before her death is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the death would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept “soon before her death”. 23. Applying the said principle in this case we have to refer to the evidence of the prosecution to know whether the findings made by the High Court on the facts warrant interference. PW-5 Tejinder Pal Kaur in her evidence said that 4 or 5 months after her marriage, she was ill-treated on the ground of insufficiency of dowry and then she reported the matter to her father. But PW-5 did not say one word in her evidence regarding any other ill treatment relating to dowry thereafter. It is true, she said in her evidence that in November 1995, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid by her father. But PW-5 did not say one word in her evidence regarding any other ill treatment relating to dowry thereafter. It is true, she said in her evidence that in November 1995, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was paid by her father. But neither PW-5 (Tejinder Pal Kaur) nor PW-6 (Narendra Singh) testified that the said amount was paid as part of the dowry or in connection with the marriage. We cannot overlook two important events which had happened in the family during the said long interregnum of three years. One is the birth of the elder son on 12.11.1993 and the other is the birth of the second son on 10.6.1995. We have to bear in mind the payment of Rs.20,000/- was made five months after the birth of the second son. Even PW-6 had no case that his daughter was subjected to any ill treatment in connection with the demand for dowry on any day after she reported to him about the demand for further dowry way back in the early 1993 months. All amounts paid by the in-laws of the husband of a woman cannot become dowry. 20. Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Punja, (2015) 6 SCC 477 has observed as under: “7. The primary ingredient to attract the offence under Section 304B is that the death of a woman must be a "dowry death". "Dowry" is defined by Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as follows: "2. Definition of "dowry".-In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation I.- [***] Explanation II.-The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 8. Explanation I.- [***] Explanation II.-The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 8. A perusal of this Section shows that this definition can be broken into six distinct parts: (1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable security -the word "any" is a word of width and would, therefore, include within it property and valuable security of any kind whatsoever. (2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is, therefore, not necessary. (3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. (4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned. (5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can be many years after a marriage is solemnised. (6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression "in connection with" would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean "in relation with" or "relating to". 9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304B have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry.” 21. Now, this Court has to examine as to whether the basic ingredients to attract the provisions of section 304-B IPC have been proved by the prosecution. 22. First ingredient under Section 304-B IPC is that the death of a woman should be caused by burns or fatal injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. In order to prove this ingredient, prosecution has produced P.W. 5 Dr. O.P. Sharma and P.W.7 Dr. K.K. Karoli, who have conducted the postmortem of the body of the deceased. No apparent cause of death of the deceased could have been assessed by the Doctor, hence the viscera was preserved and was sent for chemical examination to F.S.L., Agra. In the report received from the Forensic Laboratory, Agra, Aluminum Phosphide was found in her viscera. Therefore, there is no doubt that the first essential ingredient of section 304-B I.P.C. is present in this case that the deceased has died under unnatural circumstances. 23. There is no dispute regarding the existence of second essential ingredient of section 304-BI.P.C. The deceased has died within seven years of her marriage. All the prosecution witnesses of fact are throughout cogent and consistent with regard to the date of marriage of deceased Alzuber with Qurban Ali which is 14.04.1997. Thus, the second ingredient of dowry death is also present in this case. 24. Now the question is whether the third ingredient of section 304-B I.P.C. relating to cruelty and harassment by the husband in connection with dowry demand and harassment of deceased soon before her death is present in this case or not. 25. A careful scrutiny of evidence available on record shows that although all the prosecution witnesses have repeated the same facts that there was consistent demand of Scooter, however, on an over all assessment of their depositions, it reveals that they are not stating true facts. P.W.1 Shamshad Hussain and P.W.2 Wahid, father and brother of deceased, has deposed that the accused started raising demand of scooter after 15-20 days of marriage whereas P.W.4 Smt. Sanjeeda, mother of deceased, has deposed that this demand of scooter was also made by the accused at the time of marriage and a dispute had also taken place in the marriage due to the same demand. Statement of these witnesses is contradictory and hence does not inspire confidence. Statement of these witnesses is contradictory and hence does not inspire confidence. One more aspect of the matter is that the accused/appellant Qurban Ali had already bought scooter, after marriage, on 28.06.1997 and this has also been stated by D.W.3 Ashiq in his statement who has categorically stated that the accused/appellant had purchased scooter after marriage. In such circumstances, demand of scooter, as alleged in the F.I.R. and in the statements of prosecution witnesses, does not arise. 26. The Court also finds that in the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that any cruel treatment was meted out to the deceased soon before her death for demand of dowry. From the very inception, i.e. lodging of the F.I.R. and recording of the statement of the witnesses before the trial court, there was no whisper about any cruel behaviour of the accused with the deceased, rather the prosecution witnesses have stated that the accused was saying that if scooter will not be given, he will commit suicide. It has nowhere come on record that the deceased was ever subjected to cruelty or harassment for such demand of dowry. The postmortem report shows that the doctor has not found any external or internal injury on the body of deceased. As the cause of death could not be ascertained hence viscera was preserved. Aluminum Phosphide has been found in her viscera report, but in that case also, it cannot be assumed that poison was administered to her by her husband. The defence evidence D.W.1 Ashrad and D.W.3 Ashiq has stated that on the fateful day condition of deceased was very serious and the accused had taken her to hospital. DW1 has stated that before doctor the deceased had admitted that she has taken some wrong medicine. D.W.2 Dr. Sahdev Singh has also corroborated this fact and has stated that the condition of the deceased was very serious and he has advised the accused persons to take her to Saharanpur Hospital. In my considered opinion, it is clearly a case of suicide. But there is no evidence on record that under which circumstances or mental state, she consumed poison, thus in absence of any evidence, the appellant is not liable to be convicted. 27. In my considered opinion, it is clearly a case of suicide. But there is no evidence on record that under which circumstances or mental state, she consumed poison, thus in absence of any evidence, the appellant is not liable to be convicted. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the allegation of demand of dowry and harassment of the deceased in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death does not found established and the third essential ingredient of section 304-B I.P.C. as mentioned earlier is found missing in the present case. The presumption under section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, would have arisen only after the prosecution had proved the factum of demand of dowry and harassment for non fulfillment of demand of dowry. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has not successfully proved the case against the appellant and the trial court has also not correctly appreciated the evidence on record, and without considering the material available on record, has convicted the accused/appellant. 28. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 07.08.2003 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Ist F.T.C., Roorkee, District Haridwar, in S.T. No.85 of 1998, is hereby set aside. Appellant Qurban Ali is acquitted of the charge of offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC, giving him benefit of reasonable doubt. He is on bail. He need not surrender, unless wanted in any other case. Lower court record be sent back.