JUDGMENT : Sheel Nagu, J. Shri D.K. Katare with Shri P.D. Bidua, counsel for the petitioner Shri Praveen Surenge with Shri Harshvardhan Topre, counsel for the respondents. 1. The present petition seeks review of the final order dated 07.10.2014 passed in WP No. 2967/2014 whereby petition in question assailing the action of the bank in putting to auction the secured assets under the Securitazation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ( For brevity "SRFAESI Act") was dismissed on the ground of non-availing of remedy of appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. 2. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard. 3. Shri Katare and Shri Bidua counsel for the petitioner distinguishing on facts the case of Lokendra Singh v. State of M.P & Ors. decided 25.02.2014 in WP No. 1421/2008 contends that factual scenario is distinct. It is submitted in continuation that in the decision of Lokendra Singh (supra) reference made to the civil suit in respect of joint Hindu Family property, had been dismissed and therefore there was no decree passed in favour of anyone and thus, it was similar to the case of petitioner where there was no civil suit filed at all by any of the parties. 3.1 It is further submitted by review petitioner that by relying upon the decision of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of G.P. Ispat Private Ltd. & Ors. v. Authorised Officer & Chief Manager State Bank of India & Ors., 2017 (I) MPJR-CG 85 that remedy of appeal u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act is not available against the order passed under Section 14 by the District Magistrate and therefore, the impugned order suffers from palpable error which needs to be corrected by way of review. Counsel for the petitioner has also pressed into serve the decision of the Apex Court in the case of J.P. Builders and Anr. v. A. Ramadas Rao and Ors. 2011 (1) SCC 429 and (Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of Maharashtra and ors.), 2015 (6) SCC 557 to contend that any order obtained by fraud is nullity in the eye of law. 4. v. A. Ramadas Rao and Ors. 2011 (1) SCC 429 and (Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of Maharashtra and ors.), 2015 (6) SCC 557 to contend that any order obtained by fraud is nullity in the eye of law. 4. As far as ground of appeal under Section 17 SARFAESI Act is concerned, the same is said to be not available in terms of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court which was dealing with the following question of law :- "Whether remedy of appeal u/s 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is available against the order passed by the District Magistrate u/s 14 of the Act even before borrower/guarantor loses its possession." 4.1 The said question after detailed discussion of the statutory provisions of the previous laws in this subject was answered in the following manner :- "The remedy of appeal u/s 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, is available against the order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act after the borrower/guarantor loses its possession and as long as the borrower/guarantor has not been dispossessed, the remedy of appeal u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act is not available to him." 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Nobel Kumar and Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 620 . The Apex Court in the said case of Standard Chartered Bank has inter alia held in para 37 thus :- "37. ...........The grievance of the respondent that it will be left with no remedy is, therefore, misplaced. As held by a Bench of three Judges in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 , it would be open to the borrower to file an appeal under Section 17 any time after the measures are taken under Section 13(4) and before the date of sale/auction of the property. The same would apply if the secured creditor resorts to Section 14 and takes possession of the property with the held of the officer appointed by the Magistrate." 6. The same would apply if the secured creditor resorts to Section 14 and takes possession of the property with the held of the officer appointed by the Magistrate." 6. From the above law laid down by the Apex Court, it is evident that the remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is available even to the person who is aggrieved by any action taken by secured creditor by resorting to Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. 6.1 The Apex Court in the case of Standard Chartered Bank (supra) which has been followed by the Division Bench of Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of G.P. Ispat (supra) have held in one voice that remedy of appeal under Section 17 is available against any action taken u/s 14 of the SARFAESI Act immediately after the dispossession of the debtor of the secured asset not prior to it. In the instant case, the petitioner has admittedly been partly dispossessed and therefor,e can very well avail the remedy of appeal u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 6.2 Interpretation extended by the Apex Court to scope of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act by holding that the remedy of appeal is available even against the orders passed and action taken under Section 14 by the District Magistrate, is obviously correct construction of SARFAESI Act and its scheme. Section 17 provides that any person aggrieved by any of the measures taken under Section 13(4) by the secured creditor may approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing appeal. Thus the cause of action in appeal u/s 17 arise out of any order or action taken or measures adopted under Section 13(4) which provides that when borrower fails to discharge his liability in full then the period specified u/s 13(2) the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the two options provided therein. Thus the cause of action in appeal u/s 17 arise out of any order or action taken or measures adopted under Section 13(4) which provides that when borrower fails to discharge his liability in full then the period specified u/s 13(2) the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the two options provided therein. The first option is to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower with certain ancillary right and second is of taking management of the business of the borrower with ancillary rights means by which the first mode of taking possession of secured assets as adopted is obviously by invoking Section 14 which extends liberty to secured creditor to approach the District Magistrate for taking possession or control over the assets of the borrower situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Magistrate concerned, who in turn does the needful. 6.3 Thus Section 14 is not an independent substantive provision of SARFAESI Act but is a mere procedural means by which the substantive right given to secured creditor of liquidating and taking possession of the secured assets of the borrower is extended by Section 13(4). 7. In view of the above, the mere measures taken under Section 13(4) as cause of action for filing appeal u/s 17 does not exclude the cause arising out of the consequential action taken under Section 14 by the District Magistrate. The expanse of Section 13(4) for the purpose of giving rise to cause of action for filing appeal u/s 17 includes within its sweep the action and orders passed u/s 14. 8. In this view of the matter, the petitioner against whom action u/s 14 has been taken and petitioner though was partly been dispossessed can very well avail the remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 9. In view of the above discussion, it would not be necessary to go into the reliance placed by the petitioner on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of J.P. Builders and Anr. v. A. Ramadas Rao and Ors. 2011 (1) SCC 429 and (Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of Maharashtra and ors.), 2015 (6) SCC 557 . 10. Accordingly, this Court does not find any palpable error in the order assailed herein. 11. Consequently, the review petition stands dismissed.