JUDGMENT : Sonia Gokani, J. 1. This is a classic case as to how the litigation in civil court by misuse of process of the Court could be elongated to tire the rightful claimant and deprive him of his legal dues for years and decades. It is also a matter which would fill every that person or authority with dismay for inexplicable slow pace of civil litigation. 1.1 The applicant is the original defendant No. 2 in Civil Suit No. 10 of 1975 and opponent No. 2 in Execution Application No. 117 of 2015, who as revisionist preferred this Revision Application aggrieved by the order passed by the learned 12th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara on 03.02.2016. 1.1 The applicant - Revisionist and the respondents shall be addressed respectively as the defendant and the plaintiffs hereinafter. 2. The facts bereft of the details are as follow:- 2.1 One Tamboli Becharbhai Bapubhai was the original owner of the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 523/1, 524/1 and 524/2 situated at Village Manjalpur, Tal & Dist. Vadodara, which was originally the agricultural land. 2.2 Late Shri Punjabhai Adarbhai was a protected tenant of the said agricultural land. He claimed deemed ownership by virtue of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 since he was cultivating the land on the tillers' day i.e. 01.04.1957 and was in possession of the land. The opponent No. 6 - the State Government had acquired the land for the benefit of the petitioner for industrial purpose in the year 1962. The order of the acquisition passed by the opponent No. 6 was dated 10.09.1962. 2.3 This Court, vide its judgment and order dated 21.10.1966, in Special Civil Application No. 819 of 1962 struck down the acquisition of the land in question. On 19.12.1968, a Notification came to be issued by the State Government declaring deacquisition of the land in question. The compensation was refunded by the respondent plaintiff to the authority concerned on 27.01.1969. 2.4 The petitioner defendant did not hand over the possession to the respondent No. 1 - Punjabhai Adarbhai Solanki (deceased) who, therefore, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 10 of 1975 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara for possession and for other consequential reliefs in the year 1975. The defendant appeared in the suit and filed written statement vide Exh. 10 and additional written statement vide Exh. 120. The defendant appeared in the suit and filed written statement vide Exh. 10 and additional written statement vide Exh. 120. The petitioner led oral evidence by examining two witnesses. On 30.10.1996, the Trial Court allowed the prayers and declared the plaintiff entitled, from the petitioner, to recover possession of the suit property. 2.5 Aggrieved defendant filed appeal challenging the decree before the District Court, Vadodara in the month of October, 1997. A Miscellaneous Application No. 176 of 1997 needed to be preferred for condonation of delay. On 21.10.2005, the learned District Judge rejected the application for condonation of delay and dismissed the appeal as well. 2.6 The plaintiff filed Execution Application No. 117 of 2015 under Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC', for short) and sought issuance of possession warrant, substantiating the claim with various documents. On 29.01.2016, the application for grant of possession warrant under Order 21 Rule 35 of the CPC was filed by the plaintiff - decree holder and on 03.02.2016 the Court issued bailable warrant for taking possession of suit land. 2.7 On 10.02.2016, the Bailiff took possession from the defendant through one Shri Anil Kumar Singh and the possession has been handed over to the plaintiff on the very day i.e. on 10.02.2016. The grievance raised by the defendant is to an effect that as per the Article 136 of the Limitation Act, an application for execution of decree has to be filed within 12 years of obtaining the decree. The decree, in the instant case, is dated 30.10.1996, which was challenged by preferring appeal and such Appeal was dismissed on 21.10.2005 along with the application for delay condonation being Miscellaneous Application No. 176 of 1997. 2.8 The Execution Application is filed in the month of October, 2015. Thus, it would be clearly hit by provision of Limitation Act. Moreover, the defendant has also challenged the service of notice which was directed through the Registered A.D. Post. The warrant had been issued by the Court through the bailiff to take possession of the property without service to the legal representatives of the defendant and again the defendant has not handed over the possession on his own. Moreover, the defendant has also challenged the service of notice which was directed through the Registered A.D. Post. The warrant had been issued by the Court through the bailiff to take possession of the property without service to the legal representatives of the defendant and again the defendant has not handed over the possession on his own. 2.9 Yet another challenge is to the additional document sought to be produced on record which is being resisted fervently by other side on the ground that production of such document is barred under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(AA) of the CPC. 3. Mr. Munshi, learned advocate for the revisionist has urged along the line of revision application. 4. Mr. Pahwa, learned advocate for Thakkar Associates has strongly resisted this revision application. 5. After hearing both the sides and on careful perusal of the record, it emerges that, the land is given the final plot No. 131 and 136 in Town Planning Scheme No. 19 by the Vadodara Municipal Corporation. The company has been incorporated prior to the year 1956. In the original record of survey, the land was agricultural land which belonged to the tenant (Ganotiya) who was the original plaintiff viz. Punjabhai Adarbhai. On the death of Punjabhai Adarbhai, the names of the plaintiffs were brought on revenue record. It is the case of the revisionist that on 16.11.1960, the then Management of the Revisionist proposed to the Collector, Vadodara, for acquisition of the land in village Manjalpur, situated on the western and northern side of Hirapara Taluka for establishment of the industrial Unit. The State of Gujarat issued Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act which was published in the Government Gazette dated 06.04.1961. The Notice came to be issued under Section 4(9) of the Land Acquisition Act and the same was also published and served upon the persons interested in the land. Report was prepared under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Notification thereafter was published under Section 6 of the Act in the Government Gazette dated 14.09.1961. At the time of the award, certain persons interested in the said land preferred the Writ Petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No. 819 of 1962. The Court granted stay on 16.01.1962 in respect of some of the survey numbers. The Notification thereafter was published under Section 6 of the Act in the Government Gazette dated 14.09.1961. At the time of the award, certain persons interested in the said land preferred the Writ Petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No. 819 of 1962. The Court granted stay on 16.01.1962 in respect of some of the survey numbers. It is the case of the revisionist that, since there was no stay in respect of the survey number in question, the LAQ Officer proceeded with the acquisition proceedings and made an award on 09.09.1962. The possession of the land of those survey numbers also had been taken in presence of panchas on 05.10.1962. Thereafter the Collector, Baroda under order dated 10.07.1965 granted permission for Non Agricultural use (NA use) in respect of the very land. However, serious challenge had been made by the plaintiff to the land acquisition proceedings before the Gujarat High Court which vide its order dated 21.10.1966 struck down the acquisition of the land in question, by quashing the Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Notification came to be issued by the State Government declaring the deacquisition of the land on 19.12.1968 and the compensation also had been refunded by the plaintiff to the authority on 27.01.1969. 6. The plaintiffs were aggrieved by the fact that defendant did not hand over the possession to the respondent plaintiff and hence, the Regular Civil Suit No. 10 of 1975 came to be preferred before the Court of learned Civil Judge, Vadodara for possession of the land and consequential relief. In written statement at Exh. 37, the revisionist had urged that though the permission granted by the Collector Vadodara of permitting non-agricultural use of the land, by way of registered sale deed dated 04.08.1970 the purchase had been made by the revisionist from the owner Shri Tamboli Bechar Bapu. A certificate was also issued under Section 88(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') by the Competent Authority i.e. Mamlatdar which stipulated the exemption with regard to applicability of the provisions of Section 32 to 32(R) of the said Act to the land in question. 7. A certificate was also issued under Section 88(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') by the Competent Authority i.e. Mamlatdar which stipulated the exemption with regard to applicability of the provisions of Section 32 to 32(R) of the said Act to the land in question. 7. After allowing both the parties to adduce evidence, the Court passed judgment and decree in favour of plaintiffs holding them entitled to recover peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property vide its judgment and order dated 30.10.1996. Learned 4th Extra Assistant Judge vide his judgment and order dated 21.07.1986, in the interregnum had directed the lower court to give finding on additional issues (1A), (1B) and (1C), after the remand request was made by the defendant (petitioner) for recasting the issues and for referring the matter to the Mamlatdar under Section 85(A) of the said Act which was rejected and Appeal which was preferred came to be disposed of vide order dated 17.06.1996 with a direction to the Court to deliver the judgment. The revisionist therefore had approached the Appellate forum challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned 5th Joint Civil Judge, Vadodara. Before the Appellate Forum, the application also was made for condoning the delay of one year as according to the revisionist the defendant came to know about the ex-parte decree passed by the Trial Court on 30.10.1996, at the time when Special Civil Application No. 4558 of 1997 was preferred where on affidavit, that fact came to be disclosed on 03.09.1997. 8. The Appellate Court, noticed the fact that application below Exh. 130 in the Civil Suit was in relation to the proceedings of the suit which was made known to the revisionist by a notice which was issued on 01.07.1996 and served upon defendant on 05.07.1996. The Court virtually found no explanation, much less satisfactory explanation for condoning the delay and therefore, rejected the same on 21.10.2005. No further challenge has been made to the said order. 8.1 The plaintiff preferred Execution Application No. 117 of 2015 under Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code before the Trial Court and sought possession warrant. The Court virtually found no explanation, much less satisfactory explanation for condoning the delay and therefore, rejected the same on 21.10.2005. No further challenge has been made to the said order. 8.1 The plaintiff preferred Execution Application No. 117 of 2015 under Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code before the Trial Court and sought possession warrant. The possession has been handed over to the respondent through one Shri Anil Kumar Singh, of the property in question, after the Court issued the possession warrant under Order 21 Rule 35 of the CPC. 9. The first question which needs to be addressed by this Court is as to whether an application for execution would be hit by Article 136 of the Limitation Act which permits the period of 12 years for execution of decree. Admittedly, the decree in the instant case is of 30.10.1996, whereas the rejection of application of condonation of delay and consequently Regular Appeal preferred by the defendant revisionist was of 21.10.2005. The Execution Petition seeking possession warrant is in the month of October, 2015, which would be 10 years from the date of rejection of application and appeal. If the judgment and decree passed on 30.10.1996, by the Trial Court is to be construed as the date for construing the starting point of limitation period, surely this revision application was needed to be allowed. However, it is not so simple as attempted to be made out by the revisionist. The challenge was already made to the said decree in the month of October, 1997, and the application of condonation of delay also came to be preferred in the year 1997. The very application was found merit-less and therefore, the Appellate Court rejected such an application for condonation of delay and consequently, confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 10. Before proceeding further, the decision sought to be relied upon by both the sides will profitably need consideration at this juncture. 10.1 In case of Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal reported in (2005) 1 SCC 436 , the case of the appellant before the Apex Court was of a challenge to the ex-parte decree passed against the appellant where he filed petition under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code accompanying with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal and for setting aside the ex-parte decree. Such application for condonation of delay was dismissed. The Court held that, a dismissal of appeal on refusal to condone the delay is the decision in appeal and the writ petition under Order 39 of the Code would not lie. Before the Apex Court also, the appeal against the judgment had been dismissed for default and there was no appeal in existence nor was there any decision in Appeal so as to bring out merger of the decree of the trial Court in the decree of the Appellate Court. It was argued that since the appeal itself could not be entertained in view of dismissal of the application for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal in terms of Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it has to be regarded as if there came into existence no appeal in the eyes of law and consequently, the bar created by the explanation did not apply. Relevant paras of the same are reproduced hereinbelow. "8. The first question to be considered is whether an appeal accompanied by an application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is an appeal in the eye of law, when the application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed and consequently the appeal is dismissed as being time barred by limitation, in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. There was conflict of views on this question before the High Courts. But the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (59 Indian Appeals 283) held, "there is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent." These observations were referred to with approval by this Court in Raja Kulkarni and others v. The State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 384 . 9. The specific question involved, came to be considered by this Court in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, 1956 SCR 166 . 9. The specific question involved, came to be considered by this Court in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, 1956 SCR 166 . This Court held that an appeal presented out of time is an appeal and an order dismissing it as time barred is one passed in an appeal. This Court referred to and followed the view taken by the Privy Council and by this Court in the two respective decisions above referred to. This Court quoted with approval the observations of Chagla C.J. in K.K. Porbunderwalla v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1952) 21 ITR 63 to the following effect: ".. although the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not hear the appeal on merits and held that the appeal was barred by limitation his order was under Section 31 and the effect of that order was to confirm the assessment which had been made by the Income-tax Officer." (9) 1. In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 rendered by four learned Judges of this Court, one of the questions that arose was whether the dismissal of an appeal from a decree on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation was a decision in the appeal. This Court held: "We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision of the trial court on the merits, itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal." (9) 2. In Board of Revenue v. M/s. Raj Brothers Agencies Etc., 1973 (3) SCR 492 , this Court approved the decision of the Madras High Court which had applied the principle stated in Messrs Mela Ram and sons. 10. The question was considered in extenso by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thambi v. Mathew, 1987 (2) KLT 848 . 10. The question was considered in extenso by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thambi v. Mathew, 1987 (2) KLT 848 . Therein, after referring to the relevant decisions on the question it was held that an appeal presented out of time was nevertheless an appeal in the eye of law for all purposes and an order dismissing the appeal was a decree that could be the subject of a second appeal. It was also held that Rule 3A of Order XLI introduced by Amendment Act 104 of 1976 to the Code, did not in any way affect that principle. An appeal registered under Rule 9 of Order XLI of the Code had to be disposed of according to law and a dismissal of an appeal for the reason of delay in its presentation, after the dismissal of an application for condoning the delay, is in substance and effect a confirmation of the decree appealed against. Thus, the position that emerges on a survey of the authorities is that an appeal filed along with an application for condoning the delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay is nevertheless a decision in the appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mamuda Khateen and others v. Beniyan Bibi and others, AIR 1976 Cal 415 to contend that an order rejecting a time barred memorandum of appeal consequent upon refusal to condone the delay in filing that appeal was neither a decree nor an appealable order. On going through the said decision it is seen that though the Full Bench referred to the divergent views on that question in the Calcutta High Court prior to the rendering of the decision of this Court in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons (supra) had not considered the decisions of this Court in Raja Kulkarni (supra) and in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons (supra), in coming to that conclusion. In fact it is seen that there was no discussion on that aspect as such, though there was a reference to the conflict of views in the decisions earlier rendered by the Calcutta High Court. In fact it is seen that there was no discussion on that aspect as such, though there was a reference to the conflict of views in the decisions earlier rendered by the Calcutta High Court. Since the ratio of that decision runs counter to the principle laid down by this Court in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons (supra), obviously the same could not be accepted as laying down a correct law. 12. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh and others, (2001) 1 SCC 469 rendered by two learned Judges of this Court and pointed out that it was held therein that dismissal of an application for condonation of delay would not amount to a decree and, therefore, dismissal of an appeal as time barred was also not a decree. That decision was rendered in the context of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and in the light of the departure made from the previous position obtaining under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. But we must point out with respect that the decisions of this Court in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons and Sheodan Singh (supra) were not brought to the notice of their Lordships. The principle laid down by a three Judge Bench of this Court in M/s. Mela Ram and Sons (supra) and that stated in Sheodan Singh (supra) was, thus, not noticed and the view expressed by the two Judge Bench, cannot be accepted as laying down the correct law on the question. Of course, their Lordships have stated that they were aware that some decisions of the High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time is a decree within the definition of a decree obtaining in the Code. Thereafter noticing the decision of the Calcutta High Court above referred to, their Lordships in conclusion apparently agree with the decision of the Calcutta High Court. Though the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (supra) was referred to, it was not applied on the ground that it was based on Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and there was a departure in the legal position in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (supra) was referred to, it was not applied on the ground that it was based on Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and there was a departure in the legal position in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. But with respect, we must point out that the decision really conflicts with the ratio of the decision in Messrs Mela Ram and Sons and Sheodan Singh (supra) and another decision of this Court rendered by two learned Judges in Rani Choudhury v. Lt.-Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury, (1982) 2 SCC 596 . In Essar Constructions v. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy, (2000) 6 SCC 94 brought to our notice two other learned Judges of this Court, left open the question. Hence, reliance placed on that decision is of no avail to the appellant. 13. In the context of the explanation to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code, the question was squarely considered by this Court in Rani Choudhury's case (supra). The High Court, in our view, has rightly held that the decision of this case is directly covered by that decision. Therein, the plaintiff, the wife, obtained an ex parte decree for divorce against the husband, the defendant. The husband preferred an appeal in the High Court against the decree and also made an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing that appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal as being time barred. The husband, the defendant, then filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the ex parte decree along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The trial court dismissed the application holding that no sufficient cause was made out for condoning the delay in filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. The husband filed a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in the High Court challenging the said order of the trial court. The trial court dismissed the application holding that no sufficient cause was made out for condoning the delay in filing the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. The husband filed a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in the High Court challenging the said order of the trial court. The High Court took the view that the explanation to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code did not create a bar to the maintainability of the petition under that Rule as the appeal against the ex parte decree had been dismissed not on merits but on the ground of limitation by not accepting the application for condonation of delay which meant that no appeal was preferred in the eye of law. This view of the High Court was challenged in appeal before this Court. It was argued that the High Court has misunderstood the scope and ambit of the explanation to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code and that in the circumstances, the High Court should have held that the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code would not lie. This Court accepted that contention. This Court held that where there has been an appeal against an ex parte decree and the appeal has not been withdrawn by the appellant and had been disposed of on any ground, the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code would not lie and should not be entertained. Hence, even though the appeal against the ex parte decree was disposed of on the ground of limitation and not on merits, the explanation to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code was attracted and hence no petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code would lie. On the scope of the explanation, it was stated that the disposal of the appeal as contemplated in the explanation was not intended to mean or imply a disposal on merits resulting in the merger of the decree of the trial court with a decree, if any, of the appellate court on the disposal of the appeal. The disposal of the appeal may be on any ground and though the withdrawal of an appeal by an appellant is also to be considered a disposal of the appeal, the same has been expressly exempted by the explanation. The disposal of the appeal may be on any ground and though the withdrawal of an appeal by an appellant is also to be considered a disposal of the appeal, the same has been expressly exempted by the explanation. It was also observed that the legislative intent incorporated in the explanation to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code was to confine the defendant to a single course of action and to discourage the prolonging of the litigation on the ex parte decree, namely, by preferring an application to the trial court under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the decree and by filing an appeal to a superior court against it. If he did not withdraw the appeal filed by him or allowed the appeal to be disposed of on any other ground, he was denied the right to apply under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. The Court also clarified that by the introduction of the explanation, the area of operation of the doctrine of merger was enormously extended. By virtue of the explanation, the disposal of the appeal on any ground whatever, apart from its withdrawal, constituted sufficient reason for bringing the ban into operation. In the light of this, it was held that though in that case the appeal filed by the husband against the ex parte decree was dismissed on the ground of it being barred by limitation, it was a disposal of the appeal and the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code was hit by the explanation. In P. Kiran Kumar v. A.S. Khadar and others, (2002) 5 SCC 161 this Court followed the decision in Rani Choudhury (supra) and held that the dismissal of the appeal against an ex parte decree as barred by limitation, prevented the trial court which passed the ex parte decree, from exercising its power under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code in view of the explanation. 14. 14. It was sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant that the above decisions were distinguishable in view of the fact that in those cases, the appeals against the decrees were filed first, followed by the petitions under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code, whereas in the present case the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code was filed first and only during its pendency, an appeal against the decree was filed, with an application for condoning the delay in filing it. In our view, this would not make any difference to the principle enunciated by this Court in Rani Choudhury's case (supra). Moreover, on the day the trial court was called upon to consider and dispose of the petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code, an appeal, though belated, had been filed against the decree by the appellant and the same had been dismissed as barred by limitation and had not been withdrawn. It is not possible to accept the argument that the application of the explanation should be confined to cases where an appeal had already been filed against the ex parte decree and it should be held not to apply to cases where an appeal is subsequently filed. The acceptance of such an argument, in our view, would tend to defeat the legislative scheme as noticed in Rani Choudhury's case (supra). In the light of the object sought to be achieved by the introduction of the explanation to Order IX Rule 13, such an argument cannot also be accepted. 15. We are not impressed by the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the decision in Rani Choudhury's case (supra) requires reconsideration. On going through the said decision in the light of the objects and reasons for the introduction of the explanation to Order IX Rule 13 and the concept of an appeal as indicated by the Privy Council and this Court in the decisions already cited, the argument that an appeal which is dismissed for default or as barred by limitation because of the dismissal of the application for condoning the delay in filing the same, should be treated on a par with the non-filing of an appeal or the withdrawal of an appeal, cannot be accepted. The argument that since there is no merger of the decree of the trial court in that of the appellate court in a case of this nature and consequently the explanation should not be applied, cannot also be accepted in the context of what this Court has earlier stated and what we have noticed above." 10.2 In case of Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh and others reported in (2001) 1 SCC 469 , so far as Article 136 of the Limitation Act is concerned, it is held that 12 years is the limitation period. It becomes enforceable on the date of decree which would not be affected by filing of an appeal, except when the appeal results in decree, which supersedes the decree passed by the lower court. The Court held that, dismissal of the application for condonation of delay would not amount to a decree and therefore, dismissal of an appeal as time-barred would also not be a decree which would permit limitation. "9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower court and it is the appellate court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower court decree continues to be enforceable. 11. In order that decision of a court should become a decree there must be an adjudication in a suit and such adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and such determination must be of a conclusive nature. If those parameters are to be applied then rejection of application for condonation of delay will not amount to a decree. Consequently, dismissal of an appeal as time barred is also not a decree. We are aware that some decisions of the High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time is a decree within the meaning of the said definition. We are also aware of the contrary decisions rendered by High Courts on the same point. We are aware that some decisions of the High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time is a decree within the meaning of the said definition. We are also aware of the contrary decisions rendered by High Courts on the same point. Dealing with some of those decisions a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court [S.P. Mitra, CJ, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J (as he then was) and S.K. Datta, J] has held in Mamuda Khateen and ors. v. Beniyan Bibi and ors., AIR 1976 Cal 415 that if the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected the resultant order cannot be decree and the order rejecting the memorandum of appeal is merely an incidental order. The reasoning of the Full Bench was that when an appeal is barred by limitation the appeal cannot be admitted at all until the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and until then the appeal petition, even if filed, will remain in limbo. If the application is dismissed the appeal petition becomes otiose. The order rejecting the memorandum of appeal in such circumstances is merely an incidental order. We have no doubt that the decisions rendered by the High Courts holding the contrary view do not lay down the correct principle of law. 12. In such a situation the mere fact that the second appeal was dismissed as a corollary to the dismissal of application for condonation of delay has no effect on the decree passed by the first appellate court. 13. Learned counsel cited the decision of a two Judge Bench of Calcutta High Court in Shyama Pada Choudhury v. Saha Choudhury & Co. & ors., AIR 1976 Cal 122 as the Bench repelled the contention that the time would start running from the date of the decree of the lower court when the appellate court did not interfere with the lower court decree. That position was adopted in the background where the appellate court affirmed the decree of the lower court though with a slight modification regarding the costs portion. In such a situation it was rightly held that the appellate court decree became enforceable and hence the time would start running from the date of that decree. 14. That position was adopted in the background where the appellate court affirmed the decree of the lower court though with a slight modification regarding the costs portion. In such a situation it was rightly held that the appellate court decree became enforceable and hence the time would start running from the date of that decree. 14. Learned counsel reminded us of the observation made by this Court in Anandilal & anr. v. Ram Narain and ors., AIR 1984 SC 1383 that there is no justification for placing a rigid construction on the provisions of the Limitation Act. But we must remind ourselves of the other profile that in construing statutes of limitation, considerations of hardships are out of place. What is needed is a liberal and broad based construction and not a rigid or narrow interpretation of the provisions of the Limitation Act. 15. The observations of the Privy Council contained in Nagendra Nath Dey and anr. v. Suresh Chandra Dey and ors., AIR 1932 PC 165 cited by the learned counsel do not help in the present context as it related to the scope and interpretation of Article 182 of the old Limitation Act. The serious departure made by the Parliament from the said article to the present one cannot be lost sight of while considering the decisions rendered under the former article. 16. So the end result is this: The decree became enforceable on 1.8.1973 when the appellate court passed the decree which superseded the decree of the trial court. As no decree was passed by the High Court in the second appeal the decree of the first appellate court remained unaffected and the enforceability once commenced remained undisturbed for a period of 12 years therefrom. The execution process initiated by the appellant long after the expiry of 12 years from 1.8.1973 is thus irretrievably barred. Hence no interference is called for. The appeal is accordingly dismissed." 10.3 The Supreme Court in case of M. Marathachalam Pillai v. Padmavathi Ammal and others reported in 1971 (3) SCC 878 , held that, when property is attached in execution of a decree, any private transfer of that property contrary to such attachment is void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. The appeal is accordingly dismissed." 10.3 The Supreme Court in case of M. Marathachalam Pillai v. Padmavathi Ammal and others reported in 1971 (3) SCC 878 , held that, when property is attached in execution of a decree, any private transfer of that property contrary to such attachment is void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. For the bar of Section 64 of the Code to operate, there must however be an effective attachment which would mean that it should be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to the property by beat of drum or other customary mode, a copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and where the property is situated within the limits of a Municipality, a copy of the order shall be affixed in the office of the Municipality within the limits of which the property is situated. Unless there is an effective attachment the attachment is void as against of claimants enforceable under the attachment and if an attachment is affected, any property contrary to such attachment would not be affected. 10.4 In case of Messrs. Jharkhand Mines and Industries Ltd. v. Nand Kishore Prasad reported in AIR 1969 Pat 228 , para:8 reads as under: "8. During the execution stage as well, the conduct of the appellants was no better. It is not, however, necessary to refer to things which transpired during that stage, because if the ex parte decree itself was vitiated by fraud, as shown above, the execution proceedings or the delivery of possession purported to have been effected in favour of appellant No. 2 can be of no avail to the appellant and cannot bind the plaintiff - respondent. Reference may, however, be made to a prayer made on behalf of the decree-holders, namely the present appellants for issuance of a writ of delivery of possession after dispensing with the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reference may, however, be made to a prayer made on behalf of the decree-holders, namely the present appellants for issuance of a writ of delivery of possession after dispensing with the notices under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the 5th January, 1956, a petition together with an affidavit was filed praying for issue of delivery of possession after dispensing with the notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the judgment - debtors including the plaintiff - respondent were avoiding service of notices, and there was an apprehension of the properties sought to be taken possession of being damaged by the judgment - debtors. It has been rightly pointed out by the trial Court that the notice under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure have to be issued, when an application for execution is made more than one year after the date of the decree or against the legal representatives of a party to the decree or where the application is made for execution of a decree under the provisions of Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the court considers that the issue of such notice would cause unreasonable delay or would defeat the ends of justice. It is thus clear that it is only at the time when an application for execution is filed that the court may, in a fit case, consider the desirability of dispensing with a notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, the court passed an order dispensing with the notice under Order 21 Rule, rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code on the 7th January, 1956, whereas the execution case had been stated on the 17th November, 1955. This was clearly an illegal order which was obtained from the court again on a false allegation that the judgment - debtors namely, the plaintiff - respondent and the pro forma respondents were evading the service of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code, when, in fact, the notices were not being sent to them by their correct addresses known to the decree holders. As long back as the 7th March, 1953 (Exh. As long back as the 7th March, 1953 (Exh. 7), it has been asserted on behalf of the plaintiff that he was not working the mines a Rauta and it having also been established that the appellants knew that the plaintiff - respondent was not residing during the relevant period at Garh Banaili, the petition dated the 5th January, 1956 alleging that the judgment - debtors were avoiding service of notice were avoiding service of notice and that there was an apprehension of the properties sought to be taken possession of being damaged by them did not contain true allegations and, in my opinion, it appears that this petition was yet another fraudulent step taken by the decree - holder of Title Suit No. 46 of 1954 to keep the court as well as the judgment - debtors in dark and snatch an order of delivery of possession." 10.5 In case of Rupai v. Goshain Ram Charandas reported in AIR 1952 All 391 , it has been held that there has been distinction between an application for leave to appeal to the Privy council and the appeal itself. It is held by the Allahabad High Court that the date of dismissal of an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, even if filed along with the memorandum of the proposed appeal to the Privy Council cannot be taken into account as marking the commencement of the limitation for the execution application. The final order in such a case is the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court. Relevant paras 5 and 7 read thus. "[5] In the light of this observation the expression "where there has been an appeal" has to be construed according to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used by the legislature. As observed by their Lordships, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Next learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon Kota Ghiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v Vellanki Venkatarama Rao, 24 Mad. I, in which at p.12 their Lordships of the Privy Council have pointed out that there is a clear distinction between an application for leave to appeal and an appeal. [7] We have given due consideration to the language used in cl. I, in which at p.12 their Lordships of the Privy Council have pointed out that there is a clear distinction between an application for leave to appeal and an appeal. [7] We have given due consideration to the language used in cl. (2) of Article 182 Limitation Act and bearing in mind the observation made by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee referred to above we must interpret it in its strict grammatical sense. We do not think we shall be justified in holding that there was in the present case an appeal which was filed and which came to an end on 4.9.1942. It follows therefore, that the date of the final order passed on the application for leave to appeal, i.e. 4.9.1942, cannot be taken into account as marking the commencement of the period of limitation for an application for execution. Limitation for the execution application filed on 28.8.1945, must, therefore, be held to start from 30-11-1937, the date when the High Court from 30.11.1937, the date when the High Court dismissed Appeal No. 397 of 1934. Viewed in this light the first application for execution filed on 28-8-1945, must be held to be barred by limitation. The objections filed by the judgment - debtors should therefore, have been allowed by the Court below." 10.6 In case of Hari Har Prasad Singh v. Beni Chand reported in AIR (38) 1951 All 79, where appeal was rejected for deficiency of court-fees, it was held that there was no appeal within the meaning of Article 121 of the Limitation Act. Memorandum of appeal which was defective for want of proper court fees and could not be admitted in view of Section 4 of the Court Fees Act and if the same was returned or rejected cannot be treated as an appeal. In other words, when the Court has refused to admit or register it as an appeal, in such a case, it must be held that there has been no appeal from the decree sought to be executed within meaning of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. 10.7 In case of Neela Chinna v. Gangadharan Pillai reported in 2012 AIR CC 3064 (Ker.) had an occasion to consider the case where appellate Court did not decide the appeal on merit but instead had dismissed it for default. 10.7 In case of Neela Chinna v. Gangadharan Pillai reported in 2012 AIR CC 3064 (Ker.) had an occasion to consider the case where appellate Court did not decide the appeal on merit but instead had dismissed it for default. In such a case, it is held that, doctrine of merger does not apply, the execution petition filed beyond the period of twelve years from the date of the trial court decree would be barred by limitation. While so doing, the High Court quoted the case rendered by the Apex Court in case of Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh reported in (2001) 1 SCC 469 , relevant paras of which are as under: "8. When is a decree becoming enforceable? Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified events. The expression enforceable has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which become enforceable subsequently. 9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower court and it is the appellate court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower court decree continues to be enforceable. 11. In order that decision of a court should become a decree there must be an adjudication in a suit and such adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and such determination must be of a conclusive nature. If those parameters are to be applied then rejection of application for condonation of delay will not amount to a decree. Consequently, dismissal of an appeal as time barred is also not a decree. We are aware that some decisions of the High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time is a decree within the meaning of the said definition. We are also aware of the contrary decisions rendered by High Courts on the same point. We are aware that some decisions of the High Courts have taken the view that even rejecting an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of time is a decree within the meaning of the said definition. We are also aware of the contrary decisions rendered by High Courts on the same point. Dealing with some of those decisions a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court [S.P. Mitra, CJ, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J (as he then was) and S.K. Datta, J] has held in Mamuda Khateen and ors. v. Beniyan Bibi and ors., AIR 1976 Cal 415 that if the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected the resultant order cannot be decree and the order rejecting the memorandum of appeal is merely an incidental order. The reasoning of the Full Bench was that when an appeal is barred by limitation the appeal cannot be admitted at all until the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and until then the appeal petition, even if filed, will remain in limbo. If the application is dismissed the appeal petition becomes otiose. The order rejecting the memorandum of appeal in such circumstances is merely an incidental order. We have no doubt that the decisions rendered by the High Courts holding the contrary view do not lay down the correct principle of law. 12. In such a situation the mere fact that the second appeal was dismissed as a corollary to the dismissal of application for condonation of delay has no effect on the decree passed by the first appellate court." 10.8 Thus, the ratio that emerges from the above discussion is held that the decree of the trial Court will merge into the decree of the appellate court when the appeal is decided on the merits and the period of limitation for execution can be computed from the date of the appellate decree. If the appellate court passes an order of stay of execution of the decree applying Section 15 of the Limitation Act, the period during which the stay was in force could be excluded from the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. If the appellate court passes an order of stay of execution of the decree applying Section 15 of the Limitation Act, the period during which the stay was in force could be excluded from the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. However, where there is no stay of the execution and the appeal is decided on merits, the time would begin to run from the date of the appellate decree for computing the period of limitation for filing execution petition where a decree holder can legitimately rely on the principle of merger. 10.9 In case of Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724 decided on 01.10.2004, the three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court held that, in terms of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, a decree can be executed when it becomes enforceable. A decree is defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to mean the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. A decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of CPC would be enforceable irrespective of the fact whether it is passed by the trial court, the first appellate court or second appellate court. For the purpose of considering starting period of limitation the date of the decree or any subsequent order directing any payment of money or delivery of any property should be held to be a starting period. The Court held that, when an appeal is prescribed under the Statute and the Appellate forum is invoked and entertained, for all intent and purpose, the suit continues. When a higher forum entertains an appeal and passes an order on merit, the doctrine of merger applies. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice-delivery system. It does not make the distinction between the order of reversal, modification or order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given time. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice-delivery system. It does not make the distinction between the order of reversal, modification or order of confirmation passed by the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given time. When an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if a subject to modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverse the decree passed by the trial Court. However, when an appeal is dismissed on the ground that delay in filing the same is not condoned, the doctrine of merger shall not apply. Relevant paras read as under: "25. The concept of doctrine of merger and the right of review came up for consideration recently before this Court in Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2000) 6 SCC 359 wherein this Court inter alia held that when a special leave petition is disposed of by a speaking order, the doctrine of merger shall apply stating: "41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court. 42. "To merge" means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68) 43. We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage." 26. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage." 26. In Kunhayammed (supra), it was observed: "12....Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way -whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view." 27. The said decision has been followed by this Court in a large number of decisions including Union of India and Others v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Another, (2004) 2 SCC 747 . 28. However, when an appeal is dismissed on the ground that delay in filing the same is not condoned, the doctrine of merger shall not apply. [See Raja Mechanical Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, ILR 2002 (1) Del. 33]." The Court distinguished the ratio laid down in case of Ratansingh on factual basis. 10.10 This Court, in case of Aminabibi Daughter of Aminmuya v. Fakruddin Shafimiya Kaji reported in 2015 (3) GLH 393 , while considering Article 136 of the Limitation Act considered the commencement of period of limitation to hold that, date of drawing decree of dismissal in the last appeal could be taken as starting point of limitation for the purpose of enforcement of the decree passed by the trial court. It held on the facts of that case that in Execution petition for enforcement of the part of the decree, allowing the claim of the plaintiff preferred during the pendency of the second appeal is not beyond the period of limitation. It held on the facts of that case that in Execution petition for enforcement of the part of the decree, allowing the claim of the plaintiff preferred during the pendency of the second appeal is not beyond the period of limitation. While extensively considering various decisions, the Court at para-21 has referred to the decision of Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal reported in (2005) 1 SCC 436 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the view expressed by two Judges' Bench in Ratansingh's case (supra) is not a correct law. 10.11 It is thus to be concluded that the decision of Hon'ble the Apex Court rendered in case of Shyam Sundar Sarma (supra) on November 4th, 2004, subsequent to the decision of Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad (supra) the Apex Court specifically relying upon the decision of Messers Mela Ram and Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab reported in AIR 1956 SC 367 , so also on the decision in the case of Rani Choudhury v. Lt. Col. Surajit Choudhury reported in (1982) 2 SCC 596 held that even rejecting the appeal on the ground that it was presented beyond the time is a decree within the definition of decree obtained in the Court. In other words, an appeal which is dismissed for default or barred by limitation because an application for condonation is dismissed is not treated at par with non filing of Appeal or withdrawal of Appeal. 10.12 In the decision rendered in case of Ratansingh (supra) by two Judges' bench of the Apex Court, it was held that dismissal of an application for condonation of delay would not amount to a decree and therefore, the dismissal of appeal for being time barred would not amount to a decree is held not to be a correct law. The Court thus followed the decision rendered in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 and also has taken note of the ratio laid down in the aforementioned judgments and had applied doctrine of merger even in cases where an application for condonation of delay has been rejected by holding that period of limitation would start from the date of such rejection of the application for condonation. 11. 11. Considering the said ratio, it can be held that in the instant case where the plaintiff respondent preferred an Execution Petition in the month of October, 2015 after the order of dismissal of application for condonation in filing an appeal on 21.10.2005, the said application is to be held to have been filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 136 of the Act and the objections raised by pressing into service the judgment in case of Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad (supra) deserve no sustenance. 12. Therefore, the next question would be on factual aspect in this petition as to whether the issuance of notice through RPAD had been duly served upon the judgment debtor and whether the warrant which was executed by the Court bailiff which led to the bailiff taking possession for and on behalf of the Court from the person who was the representative of the defendant and whether such possession was taken following the procedure of law. 13. It is say of the plaintiff that judgment of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 819 of 1962 struck down acquisition and judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 10 of 1975 on 30.10.1996 attained finality. 14. The Execution Petition No. 117 of 2015 came to be preferred on 27.10.2015 seeking the possession during the execution of possession warrant of the suit property which has been decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The Court allowed the application permitting the warrant for attachment to be issued. The Court also named the bailiff who was required to execute such warrant in presence of the plaintiff. Such an order came to be passed on 29.01.2016. 15. The panchnama came to be carried out on 10.02.2016 in respect of the said property for and on behalf of original plaintiff. The power of attorney Shri Ramesh Anirruddh remained present and had categorically specified that the suit land bearing revenue survey No. 523/1, 524/1, 524/2, the total admeasuring 0-14, 0-13 and 0-18 respectively which is included in TP Scheme No. 19 and given final plot No. 135 of admeasuring 3870 sq mtr with all four sides is handed over to the power of attorney of the plaintiff after beating the drum at the place and in presence of the panchas and others. The copy of the possession warrant had been pasted or affixed at conspicuous place. 16. The copy of the possession warrant had been pasted or affixed at conspicuous place. 16. The plaintiff also has placed on record the receipt of possession to the bailiff by saying that peaceful and clear vacant possession of the decreed property has been accepted and taken over by the plaintiff. For and on behalf of the defendant, the signature has been obtained of tin groups which was existing at given place being handed over to the defendant for and on behalf of the Court, the bailiff has pressed the signature on receipt passed on by the defendant No. 2. The plaintiff has also withdrawn Execution Petition No. 117 of 2015 on 13.02.2016 on having obtained the possession. The suit was from the beginning resisted by Tensile Steel Limited as mentioned hereinabove. It was the stand of the defendant that there was no stay in respect of the survey number in question. The Land Acquisition Officer proceeded with the acquisition proceedings and made award in the year 1962 and as the Collector, Vadodara had already granted permission of NA under the registered sale deed dated 04.08.1970, the defendant had purchased the same from its owner Bapu Bechar and necessary entries in the record of right were also made thereafter and the land was used for industrial purpose so also for the residence of employees of the defendant. 17. It is an admitted fact that this purchase has been made after in Special Civil Application No. 819 of 1962, this Court had struck down acquisition of the land in question i.e. 21.10.1966 and the State Government also issued Notification declaring de-acquisition of the land in question on 19.12.1968. The refund of the compensation of the said land given to the plaintiff also was made on 27.1.1969 and therefore, any purchase made by the defendant in the past 27.01.1969 period is in complete violation of law. Admittedly, the purchase of the land in question is made by the defendant in the year 1970 as stated by the revisionist defendant himself in Miscellaneous Application No. 176 of 1997 would have no legal or sustainable basis. Admittedly, the purchase of the land in question is made by the defendant in the year 1970 as stated by the revisionist defendant himself in Miscellaneous Application No. 176 of 1997 would have no legal or sustainable basis. Although, the decree has been passed in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1996, undoubtedly and unquestionably with the acquisition having been struck down by this Court and the State having also issued Notification of de-acquisition, the petitioner had no business to enter into any transaction, much less the registered sale deed in respect of the very land. After the land was permitted to be used for NA purpose, the purchase has been made by the petitioner from the third party and not from the original owner in whose favour Special Civil Application No. 819 of 1962 had resulted. Even otherwise, the Trial Court in its judgment has dealt with the claim of the revisionist - defendant. The Court also took note of the fact that Special Land Acquisition Officer corresponded with the Manager of the defendant company and the copies whereof have been sent to the concerned land owner including the land owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu to remain present on 22.10.1969 at Manjalpur Panchayat Officer to hand over the physical possession of the land in question to the Special Land Acquisition Officer pursuant to the cancellation of Notification in respect of the land in question, with the specific mentioning that if he failed to do so, then Special Land Acquisition Officer would take possession of the said land in presence of panchas in accordance with Rules and regulations. 18. On 22.10.1969, the panchnama was drawn and in presence of the panchas physical possession had been taken over by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. None remained present for and on behalf of defendant company. The Court held that the possession of the suit land never reverted back to the original owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu and it further held that defendant under no circumstances was entitled to retain possession of the acquired land including the suit land and any possession which continued thereafter by the defendant was in capacity of trespasser and nothing more than that. Deposition of witnesses of the plaintiff also was taken note of. Deposition of witnesses of the plaintiff also was taken note of. Witness Nirmalbhai had stated in an examination that when the Government cancelled the Notification in the year 1968, he received notice from the Government to give back the possession and at that time, the then land owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu was present there and in his presence possession was handed over to him. The Court did not believe his version holding that it would be unsafe to place any reliance on his own version. While holding so, the Court further held that possession of the land was never reverted to the land owner and it remained with the Government till institution of suit and thereafter also, till the date of passing the judgment. The Trial Court also noticed that in presence of panchas, Special Land Acquisition Officer at Manjalpur Panchayat Office on 22.10.1969 took over possession of the acquired land when nobody from defendant No. 2 - company was present to hand over such possession. The possession receipt dated 22.10.1969 has been referred to, for proper appreciation. 19. It was held that, 'it also becomes abundantly clear therefrom that the alleged land-owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu did not remain present and so is shown as 'Absent', so far the delivery of possession of the suit land is concerned. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation at all in arriving at the conclusion that even on 22.10.1969, the physical possession of the suit land did remain with defendant No. 1 Government and thereafter also, it continued to remain with the defendant No. 1 Government. In other words, in the facts and circumstances of the case this Court cannot restrain itself to observe that as soon as the acquired lands including the suit lands were de-notified the defendant No. 2 company was not entitled to retain possession thereof, if any, and even if by any deceitful means had gained such possession then the defendant No. 2 is in the capacity of merely a Trespasser thereon. Therefore, on overall appreciation of the above discussed oral as well as documentary evidence adduced and produced in the case there is no room for any doubt or suspicion in the mind of this Court that the possession of the suit lands never reverted to alleged original land-owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu as contended in the written statement Exh. Therefore, on overall appreciation of the above discussed oral as well as documentary evidence adduced and produced in the case there is no room for any doubt or suspicion in the mind of this Court that the possession of the suit lands never reverted to alleged original land-owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu as contended in the written statement Exh. 37 and simultaneously as testified by witness Nirmalkumar Chauhan during his sworn testimony. It is also to be noted that legality and veracity of the sale deed Exh. 77 dated 04.08.1970 executed by Tamboli Bechar Bapu in favour of defendant No. 2, also came to be closely examined by the Court to hold that this so-called sale deed (Exh. 70) is a mere piece of paper in black and white having no evidentiary value as the physical possession of the suit land by all means was with the Government and the plaintiff was lawful tenant of the suit property from a time immemorial. 20. It is to be noted that earlier revisionist original defendant had preferred Civil Revision Application 1272 & 1273 of 1987 on 22.12.1987 and had obtained ex parte interim relief staying further proceedings of Regular Civil Suit No. 10 of 1975. Thereafter on 17.06.1995, this Revision Application came up for final hearing and both of them were dismissed. While so doing it, this Court held thus. "The petitioner has sought to raise the contention before the trial Court that it was a tenant of the agricultural land and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to decide this issue and this issues should be referred to a Revenue Court. In my opinion this contention is not well-founded. Undoubtedly where the Tenancy Act applies, it is the authorities under that Act who will decide the issues which arise therein. But whether the Tenancy Act will apply or not is a question which can be adjudicated upon and decided by the Civil Court. In the present case, the contention of the plaintiff is that the petitioner herein is not a tenant. If this contention is not correct, then the Tenancy Act will not apply. This is a contention of the plaintiff which is disputed by the petitioner herein, who pleads tenant under the Tenancy Act. This question can be and should adjudicated upon by the trial Court. If this contention is not correct, then the Tenancy Act will not apply. This is a contention of the plaintiff which is disputed by the petitioner herein, who pleads tenant under the Tenancy Act. This question can be and should adjudicated upon by the trial Court. If the trial Court comes to the conclusion that the petitioner herein is tenant, then further consequences as a result thereof would obviously ensue. With these observations, this Revision Application is dismissed but with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. Ad interim relief is vacant." The trial court therefore decided the question as to whether Tenancy Act would apply to the facts of the present case or not in the following manner. Relevant paras read as under: "51. Therefore, in view of the above observations of Hon'ble HC and in view of the settled legal position in this regard, it must be observed that this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon and decide the question as to whether the Tenancy Act will apply to the facts of the present case or not. It may be appreciated that so far as this question is concerned, as discussed and held in the earlier paragraphs of this Judgment, deceased plaintiff is a protected tenant of the suit lands since the time immemorial. Moreover the said fact is not at all denied by the defendant No. 1 Government vide WS Exh. 37 and written arguments submitted by learned DGP vide Exh. 37 and written arguments submitted by learned DGP vide Exh. 137. In this connection the overwhelming proved documentary evidence is thoroughly discussed in para (15) of this Judgment. Furthermore, at the cost of repetition this Court takes the opportunity as this stage it refer document, Exh. 47 dated 14-8-59 which is a notice served to deceased plaintiff by Mamlatdar Vadodara informing him that as he is holding the lands of S. Nos. 523/1, 524/1 and 524/2 from the Tiller's day he is considered to be a 'Deemed Purchaser' of the said land. It is pertinent to note that the copy of the said notice which is issued under Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is also served to original land-owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu. 523/1, 524/1 and 524/2 from the Tiller's day he is considered to be a 'Deemed Purchaser' of the said land. It is pertinent to note that the copy of the said notice which is issued under Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is also served to original land-owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, in the opinion of this Court, the Tenancy Act, under any circumstances will not apply to the facts of the present case. In view of my above findings that the defendant No. 2 company is holding the possession of the suit lands merely in the capacity of a 'Trespasser' and if any structure or construction is made thereon it should be removed forthwith at the cost and risk of defendant No. 2 company itself. In this connection, during the trial of RCS No. 10/75 by submitting the Purshis/application, Exh. 15 dt. 18-10-1975 LA for defendant No. 2 has duly declared that if the Court ultimately comes to the conclusion defendant No. 2 has no right to make any construction on the suit land, then in that event they will remove the same at their own risk and costs. 52. ... ... xxx" 21. The Decreetal Court while expressing its dismay and displeasure over the state of affair awarded a token compensation and it has given sufficient reasons for vindicating its order in its words. "53. This Court is constrained to observe that this is indeed a very peculiar case wherein the society and the Government authorities should very much look down upon this sort of unfair tactics and for the sheer Injustice caused to a poor-man-agriculturist, the deceased plaintiff. The sources of this survival and livelihood were agricultural lands only. The fact also remains that he was in rightful and lawful possession of the suit lands since time immemorial. However, by an unfortunate stroke of his bad luck, he was deprived of his possession of the suit land at a later stage even though he was found to be entitled to the same as is clear from the notice, Exh. 37A dated 16-1-1969. It is indeed very shameful that he was not informed to receive back possession inspite of his refunding the compensation amount received by him under the award. 37A dated 16-1-1969. It is indeed very shameful that he was not informed to receive back possession inspite of his refunding the compensation amount received by him under the award. By some useful manipulation and deceitful means it was the owner Tamboli Bechar Bapu who received intimation for taking the possession of the suit land. However, immediately thereafter as noticed above, without taking the actual and physical possession of the suit land Tamboli Bechar Bapu sold the suit lands to the defendant No. 2 under a deed of conveyance and in this very fashion illegal possession of suit lands retained by defendant No. 2 was ultimately legalised. On the other hand, there was a poor man from hand to mouth who entirely depended for his survival and livelihood upon these lands only and who was completely ignorant and innocent. He did not receive the possession when actually he was entitled to get back the same. It is this very poor man who claimed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per year for a period of three years. In the facts and circumstances of the case I indeed very much wish that I could have given him more than that but atleast I would refuse him what he has asked for the simple reason that when the possession was taken from him by making the Panchkyas, Exh. 44 dated 05-10-62 standing crop was valued at Rs. 1301/- and that was in the year 1962. Plaintiff has asked for compensation for the 1972 to 1975. I do not see how a sum of Rs. 1500/- per years can be said to be excessive. Therefore, accordingly I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to get compensation for the said period and so issued No. 1-C is decided accordingly." 22. The person who was served with the warrant was a person taking care of property in question. The decree which had been passed in the year 1996 could not be executed in view of pendency of the appeal although the plaintiff could have insisted for the issuance of possession warrant on an earlier occasion in absence of any stay granted by the appellate forum. The decree which had been passed in the year 1996 could not be executed in view of pendency of the appeal although the plaintiff could have insisted for the issuance of possession warrant on an earlier occasion in absence of any stay granted by the appellate forum. Be that as it may, when the possession warrant came to be issued in the year 2016 after nearly 20 years, when there is an unequivocal document indicating service to the concerned person present at the place for and on behalf of defendant who also had passed on the receipt of having accepted the same and when notice came to be pasted or affixed at the very sight, with the beating of drums in presence of panchas, the possession had been handed over, this Court finds no fault or any reason for interference in the revision is desirable. This Court also cannot be oblivious as also indicated in the discussion above that the sale effected to the petitioner being absolutely in contravention of law and after the decree having been passed by competent Court and panchnama was drawn on 22.10.1969, it is more the possession of a trespasser from 1969. 23. So far as request of production of additional documents on record is concerned, these documents never formed part of record of lower court. Such production of document is barred by provision of Order 41 Rule 27(1)(aa) of the CPC Order XLI Rule 27(1)(aa) provides for production of additional evidence in Appellate Court where the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. The appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. The Apex Court also in case of A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A Subburaj Chettiar reported in AIR 2016 SC 79 has held that it is against the spirit of the code to allow a party to adduce additional evidence without fulfillment of either of three conditions mentioned in Rule 27. The Apex Court has referred to various decisions on this issue rendered by it in different matters over the period of time. 24. The Apex Court has referred to various decisions on this issue rendered by it in different matters over the period of time. 24. Having gone through the factual matrix detailed above and also on carefully considering the request, this Court is of the opinion that none of the grounds mentioned in the Order XLI Rule 27 (1) (aa) of the Code exist for this Court to allow placing on record the additional evidence, such a request deserves not to be entertained. It is not the case of petitioner that on any of the grounds referred to in the said provision exist for such a request to be sustained. 25. It is to be reiterated that this Court, while deciding in revisional jurisdiction is not to exercise the appellate powers. What is needed to be seen is as to whether the Court below in hierarchy failed to exercise jurisdiction vested or exercised jurisdiction not vested in it or has acted in illegal manner or with material irregularity. When none of these aspects emerge on record, the revision obviously deserves no entertainment and needs to be rejected. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the present Revision Application fails and the same is accordingly rejected. 27. In view of the facts and reasons noted above, the applicant is directed to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/- to the opponents, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Application Dismissed.