JUDGMENT : Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. 1. The present Regular Second Appeal is maintained by the appellants against the judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge, Shimla, H.P, in Civil Appeal No.20-S/13 of 2003, dated 9.6.2005, Where by the learned District Judge, Shimla, H.P, had set aside the judgment and decree passed by the then learned Senior Sub Judge, Shimla, H.P, in Civil Case No.16/1 of 2000, dated 31.12.2002. 2. Briefly stating facts giving rise to the present appeal are that appellant/plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as ‘plaintiff’) filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 49,854/- against the respondents/defendants (here in after referred to as ‘defendants’) alleging that plaintiff being a contractor allotted the work by the defendants for construction of flats at Strawberry Hill, Shimla. Agreement No.19 of 1989-90, was entered into between them. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, security amount of Rs. 17,805/-, was deposited by the plaintiff on 25.9.1989. Thereafter, the matter was referred to learned Arbitrator and the learned Arbitrator decided the same on 27.11.1997. Receipt of security from the plaintiff was admitted by the defendants, but they refused to refund the same on the ground that the amount being adjusted against amount of penalty of the agreement. The claim of the plaintiff was not dealt by the learned Arbitrator on account of jurisdiction, so the amount of security was not adjusted against the claim. The amount of Rs. 47,717/- ordered to be paid by the learned Arbitrator to the plaintiff from the defendants, but the security amount was not refunded. Hence, the plaintiff is entitled for refund of security amount of Rs. 17,805/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the said amount i.e. Rs. 32,049/-. 3. Defendants contested the suit by raising preliminary objections inter alia that suit is time barred, suit is bad for want of notice under Section 50 of the H.P. Housing Board Act, plaintiff has no cause of action, estoppel and suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction. On merits, the agreement with the plaintiff and deposit of security amount Rs. 17,805/- was admitted. It is averred that security was forfeited by defendant No.2 on 26.12.1990, when the plaintiff had failed to execute and complete the work within the stipulated period. The plaintiff never sought claim for refund of security amount of Rs. On merits, the agreement with the plaintiff and deposit of security amount Rs. 17,805/- was admitted. It is averred that security was forfeited by defendant No.2 on 26.12.1990, when the plaintiff had failed to execute and complete the work within the stipulated period. The plaintiff never sought claim for refund of security amount of Rs. 17,805/-, before the learned Arbitrator. The security was duly forfeited after rescinding the contract, vide letter dated 26.12.1990. So, the plaintiff is not entitled for refund of the security amount. 4. The learned trial Court framed following issues : “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether this suit is time barred? OPD. 3. Whether this suit is liable to be dismissed for want of notice under Section 50 of H.P. Housing Board Act? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing this suit by his act and conduct? OPD. 5. Relief.” 5. The learned trial Court after deciding Issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff, Issue No.2 to 4 against the defendants, decreed the suit. 6. Feeling aggrieved thereby the defendants maintained first appeal before the learned District Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P, assailing the findings of learned trial Court below being against the law and without appreciating the evidence and pleading of the parties to its true perspective. The learned lower Appellate Court set aside the findings of the learned Court below. Now, the appellant has maintained the present Regular Second Appeal, which was admitted for hearing on 6.10.2005 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the learned first Appellate Court erred in law in holding that the suit was beyond the period of limitation?” 7. Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has argued that the suit was within limitation, but the learned lower Appellate Court has not taken into consideration this fact. He has argued that till the time the matter was pending before the learned Arbitrator, the period was required to be excluded, while calculating the limitation. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant has vehemently argued that the cause of action, if any, accrued to the plaintiff in the year 1990, the plaintiff should have filed the suit within three years, but he filed the suit in the year 2000 i.e. after ten years. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant has vehemently argued that the cause of action, if any, accrued to the plaintiff in the year 1990, the plaintiff should have filed the suit within three years, but he filed the suit in the year 2000 i.e. after ten years. He has further argued that arbitration started at the instance of defendants on 10.12.1996, meaning thereby the limitation from 1990 to 1996 could not have been condoned in any manner, as cause was never agitated by the plaintiff during these years. 8. In rebuttal learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has argued that when the learned Arbitrator has held lack of jurisdiction with respect to the security amount lying deposited with the defendants, the cause of action accrued after the award. 9. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the record in detail. 10. It is clear that the plaintiff was given contract for the construction of flats at Strawberry Hill, Shimla, vide agreement No.19 of 1989-90, Ex.P-5. A sum of Rs. 17,805/-, was deposited by the plaintiff with the defendants as security amount. The agreement Ex.P-5, was rescinded by the defendants, vide letter dated 26.12.1990, Ex.DY. The plaintiff was communicated through letter regarding cancellation of the contract, due to not completing the work within the stipulated period. However, he was intimated that the security amount has been forfeited for not completing the work within the stipulated period. The security of the plaintiff was forfeited by the defendants on 26.12.1990, meaning thereby the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff in the year 1990. The plaintiff did not lodge any protest with the defendants qua forfeiture of the security amount nor he took any measure to get refund his security. Even, as per clause in agreement Ex.P-5, plaintiff did not move the learned Arbitrator for refund of the security for the reason that the agreement an arbitration clause was added, making mandatory for the parties to get any dispute arising or relating to the agreement decided by the learned Arbitrator. Had the plaintiff with respect to rescinding of the contract and forfeiture of the security amount, he was having limitation from 1990. Had the plaintiff with respect to rescinding of the contract and forfeiture of the security amount, he was having limitation from 1990. The learned trial Court below though concluded that the period spent by the plaintiff in good faith prosecuting the claim before the learned Arbitrator deserves to be deducted from the period of limitation and as such held the claim within limitation. Even, if such plea is held to be valid, the period spent before the learned Arbitrator need to be deducted from limitation, suit of the plaintiff still would be time barred, as the learned Arbitrator was approached by defendant No.2 on 10.12.1996 and award was given on 27.11.1997, whereas right to sue or approach the learned Arbitrator had accrued to the plaintiff on 26.12.1990, when was intimated with regard to forfeiture of the security. Thus, the limitation of three years has already expired, when the proceedings were taken up by the learned Arbitrator. The limitation was only three years from 1990, but neither any dispute was raised nor any suit was filed by the plaintiff till 2000 and the dispute, if any, was raised by the defendants only in the year 1997, the suit of the plaintiff was highly time barred. In these circumstances, substantial question of law is answered accordingly holding that the learned lower Appellate Court has not erred in holding that the suit is beyond the period of limitation, so the learned lower Appellate Court has committed no illegality. 11. From the above, it is clear that the findings arrived at by the learned lower Appellate Court are just, reasoned and after appreciating the evidence, which has come on record to its true perspective and law has been applied correctly. Hence, needs no interference by this Court. 12. In view of the above discussion, the appeal of the appellant is without merit and deserves dismissal, hence the same is dismissed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, parties are left to bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, shall also stands disposed of.