ORDER: This Criminal Revision Case is filed by petitioners accused Nos.3 and 4, under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., challenging the order, dated 11.08.2011 in Crl.M.P.No.81 of 2011 in Sessions Case No.43/S/2010 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge for Trial of Cases under S.Cs., & S.Ts., (PoA) Act, 1989 : Guntur, wherein and whereby the petition filed by the Prosecution under Section 319 Cr.P.C., was allowed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously submitted that the petition filed by the Prosecution does not disclose the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for short the Act) and 324 IPC against the petitioners. He further submitted that the trial Court allowed the petition without recording prima facie finding with regard to the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners. He further submitted that the trial Court misconstrued the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C., and allowed the petition in a routine manner. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State submitted that the testimony of P.W.1 prima facie reveals the role played by the petitioners in the commission of the offence. He further submitted that the trial Court considered the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C., in right perspective and allowed the petition. 3. The facts leading to filing of the present revision case are succinctly as follows: Basing on the complaint of Talluri Tirupathaiah, the Station House Officer, Sattenapalli Rural Police Station registered a case in Crime No.117 of 2009 for the offences punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 read with 34 IPC against the petitioners and two others. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sattenapalli (L.W.15) took up the investigation and after completion of the investigation, he laid charge sheet against A1 and A2 and deleted the names of the petitioners. The learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the offences and numbered the charge sheet as S.C.No.43/S/2010. The de facto complainant was examined as P.W.1. Basing on the chief-examination of P.W.1, the prosecution filed the above petition under Section 319 Cr.P.C., to include the names of the petitioners as A3 and A4. After affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties, the trial Court allowed the petition. Hence, this revision. 4. The de facto complainant was examined as P.W.1. Basing on the chief-examination of P.W.1, the prosecution filed the above petition under Section 319 Cr.P.C., to include the names of the petitioners as A3 and A4. After affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties, the trial Court allowed the petition. Hence, this revision. 4. The points that arise for consideration in this revision are: (1) Whether the trial Court has considered the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C in right perspective? And (2) Whether there is any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the order of the trial Court, which warrants interference of this Court, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C? 5. Since both the points are intertwined to each other, this Court is inclined to consider both points simultaneously in order to avoid recapitulation of facts. 6. Before adverting to the facts of the case on hand, it is apposite to refer the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. In Sarbjit Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 16 SCC 46 : AIR 2009 SC 2792 the Honble apex Court held at paragraph Nos.17 and 18 (of AIR) as follows: 17. The provision of Section 319 of the Code, on a plain reading, provides that such an extraordinary case has been made out must appear to the court. Has the criterion laid down by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Ram Kishan Rastogi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 , been satisfied is the question? Indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the court must also be such which would satisfy the court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. We may notice that in Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy, (2007) 4 SCC 773 , this Court opined: “11. Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. We may notice that in Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy, (2007) 4 SCC 773 , this Court opined: “11. Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. The word evidence in Section 319 contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in court.” An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should not be passed only because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other person(s). Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. For the aforementioned purpose, the courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned. 18. The observation of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) and other decisions following the same is that mere existence of a prima facie case may not serve the purpose. Different standards are required to be applied at different stages. Whereas the test of prima facie case may be sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of framing of charge, the court must be satisfied that there exists a strong suspicion. While framing charge in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the court must consider the entire materials on record to form an opinion that the evidence if unrebutted would lead to a judgment of conviction. Whether a higher standard be set up for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code is the question. The answer to these questions should be rendered in the affirmative. Unless a higher standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to summon a person as an additional accused is laid down, the ingredients thereof viz. (i) an extraordinary case, and (ii) a case for sparingly (sic sparing) exercise of jurisdiction, would not be satisfied. 8. The answer to these questions should be rendered in the affirmative. Unless a higher standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to summon a person as an additional accused is laid down, the ingredients thereof viz. (i) an extraordinary case, and (ii) a case for sparingly (sic sparing) exercise of jurisdiction, would not be satisfied. 8. In Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 a five Judge Bench of the Honble apex Court held at paragraph Nos.105 and 106 (of SCC) as follows: 105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross- examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence is clear from the words for which such person could be tried together with the accused. The words used are not for which such person could be convicted. There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused. 9. In Brijendra Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706 a larger Bench of the Hon’ble apex Court held at paragraph Nos.14 and 15 (of SCC) as follows: 14. There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused. 9. In Brijendra Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706 a larger Bench of the Hon’ble apex Court held at paragraph Nos.14 and 15 (of SCC) as follows: 14. When we translate the aforesaid principles with their application to the facts of this case, we gather an impression that the trial court acted in a casual and cavalier manner in passing the summoning order against the appellants. The appellants were named in the FIR. Investigation was carried out by the police. On the basis of material collected during investigation, which has been referred to by us above, the IO found that these appellants were in Jaipur city when the incident took place in Kanaur, at a distance of 175 kms. The complainant and others who supported the version in the FIR regarding alleged presence of the appellants at the place of incident had also made statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., to the same effect. Notwithstanding the same, the police investigation revealed that the statements of these persons regarding the presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence was doubtful and did not inspire confidence, in view of the documentary and other evidence collected during the investigation, which depicted another story and clinchingly showed that appellants plea of alibi was correct. 15. This record was before the trial Court. Notwithstanding the same, the trial Court went by the depositions of the complainant and some other persons in their examination-in-chief, with no other material to support their so-called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the evidence recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements which were already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C., would be competent to exercise its power even on the basis of such statements recorded before it in examination-in-chief. However, in a case like the present where a plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (i.e., appellants) complicity has come on record. There is no satisfaction of this nature. There is no satisfaction of this nature. Even if we presume that the trial court was not apprised of the same at the time when it passed the order (as the appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is more troubling is that even when this material on record was specifically brought to the notice of the High Court in the revision petition filed by the appellants, the High Court too blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing the discussion contained in the order of the trial Court and expressing the agreement therewith, nothing more has been done. Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny. 10. Let me consider the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the above legal principle. 11. The Inspector Police, after coming to conclusion that the evidence collected by him did not disclose prima facie case against the petitioners, laid the charge sheet against the other accused before the concerned Court by deleting the names of the petitioners. It is needless to say that whenever the name of a person, who is arrayed as accused in the F.I.R., is deleted from the charge sheet; the concerned Court will issue a notice to the de facto complainant. On receipt of such notice, the de facto complainant is entitled to file a protest petition. It is not the case of the prosecution that the trial Court has not issued any notice to the de facto complainant intimating the deletion of names of the petitioners from the charge sheet. For the reasons best known, the de facto complainant did not choose to file a protest petition as contemplated under Cr.P.C., when the charge sheet is filed against A1 and A2 only. Even though the de facto complainant did not file protest petition, this Court is inclined to decide the matter on merits. 12. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is not out of place to extract herein the relevant portion of the deposition of P.W.1, which reads as follows: “Then Mandalapu Srinu and Sambaiah also abused me in the name of my caste and they also beat me with sticks.” If really, the petitioners have insulted the de facto complainant by abusing in the name of his caste, he might have spoken the words, in the same verbatim, during the course of investigation. According to the prosecution version, on the date of the alleged incident, L.W.5 travelled in the auto of P.W.1 from Sattenpalli to Kattamuru and the alleged incident took place at Kattamuru. As per Section 161 Cr.P.C., statement of L.W.5, the de facto complainant stopped the 1st petitioner, who was proceeding towards the village on a motor cycle and asked him to settle the dispute between him and accused Nos.1 and 2. The statement further reveals that the de facto complainant himself has taken away the motor cycle key of the 1st petitioner. In order to consider the truthfulness or otherwise of the contents of Section 161 Cr.P.C., of L.W.5, this Court perused the statement of L.W.2, who is none other than the wife of the de facto complainant. As per the statement of L.W.2, her husband (de facto complainant) was in a drunken condition at the time of the alleged incident. Her testimony prima facie reveals that the de facto complainant himself stopped the motor cycle of the 1st petitioner and requested him to settle the dispute between him and accused Nos.1 and 2. Her statement further reveals that the de facto complainant has taken away the motor cycle key of the 1st petitioner as he told the de facto complainant that he will settle the issue on the next day. Even the wife of the de facto complainant did not support the version of the de facto complainant. The record reveals that as on the date of the incident, the auto of the de facto complainant turned turtle on the way from Sattenapalli to Kattamuru, which itself indicates the state of mind of the de facto complainant. The record reveals that the de facto complainant was in a drunken condition. The Investigating Officer investigated the case on correct lines and deleted the names of the petitioners as no prima facie case is made out against them. 13. There is no mention in the petition filed by the prosecution that the testimony of P.W.1 prima facie satisfies the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 IPC. The averments made in the petition are bereft of the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 IPC. 13. There is no mention in the petition filed by the prosecution that the testimony of P.W.1 prima facie satisfies the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 IPC. The averments made in the petition are bereft of the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 IPC. It is needless to say that while deciding the interlocutory applications, the Court has to record prima facie finding on the lis involved in the petition in order to allow or dismiss the same. This Court carefully perused the impugned order. The trial Court has not recorded any finding, much less, prima facie finding that the testimony of P.W.1 satisfies the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 IPC. The trial Court simply allowed the petition on the sole ground that the petitioners were present at the time of the alleged incident. The petitioners themselves are not disputing their presence at the time of the alleged incident. Mere physical presence of a person at the place of offence is not at all sufficient to array him as an accused. If the said principle is applied certainly the wife of the de facto complainant will also become an accused in this case. However, if such presence reveals the role of the said person in the commission of the offence, he should be shown as an accused. No finding was recorded by the trial Court as to the involvement of the petitioners in the commission of the alleged offence. As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, mere prima facie case is not sufficient to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C., sparingly in order to secure the ends of justice. The material placed before the Court is bereft of basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and Section 324 IPC leave apart prima facie case. The trial Court has not perused the charge sheet more particularly the statements of L.Ws.2 and 5. The facts of the case on hand are almost identical to the facts of the case Brijendra Singh, 3rd cited supra. The trial Court has not perused the charge sheet more particularly the statements of L.Ws.2 and 5. The facts of the case on hand are almost identical to the facts of the case Brijendra Singh, 3rd cited supra. The trial Court allowed the petition in a routine manner without taking into consideration the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C. If the order of the trial Court is allowed to stand, it would amount to miscarriage of justice. 14. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that it is a fit case to allow the revision. 15. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed setting aside the order, dated 11.08.2011 in Crl.M.P.No.81 of 2011 in Sessions Case No.43/S/2010 on the file of the Special Judge for Trial of cases under S.Cs & S.Ts. (PoA) Act, 1989, Guntur. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, in this revision shall stand closed.