JUDGMENT : ANAND PATHAK, J. 1. Present appeal has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs under Section 100 of CPC arising out of judgment and decree dated 06-03-2006 passed by learned Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No.6-A/2002 whereby the judgment and decree dated 30-11-2001 passed by learned 9th Civil Judge Class -I, Gwalior in Civil Suit No.30- A/1998 has been reversed and suit of plaintiff has been dismissed. 2. Facts of the case in brief are that predecessor of appellants (landlord) filed a civil suit on 08-07-1989 seeking eviction of respondents/tenants under Section 12(1)(a), 12(1) (b), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'). As per plaint allegations, the plaintiff was owner of a house situate at Chhapparwal Pul, Falka Bazaar, Lashkar Gwalior in which one shop rented out to defendant No.1 Mohd. Sharif Khan for the purpose of establishment of shop for repairing of bicycles. It was further pleaded that after some time defendant No.1 removed his possession and started his work of repairing of bicycles in other shop and without prior permission of plaintiff inducted defendant No.2, his brother Saleem Khan (as sub tenant). Grievance of the plaintiff was that he is Brahmin by caste and shop was taken by defendant No.1 for bicycle repairing but later on by subletting the shop to his brother, he started an abattoir (slaughter house) wherein, not only animals were cut down but their wings, feather, legs, neck and other remnants were spread out in front of shop where blood used to ooze out and create repulsive scene for a person who does not eat or like non-vegetarian food. Further pleading in the plaint was regarding bona fide requirement for his son Rajendra to start business of electric goods for which according to the plaintiff no other suitable alternative non-residential accommodation was available in the municipal limit of Gwalior. During pendency of the suit, original plaintiff had died, therefore, his L.Rs. (present appellants) were taken on record. 3. After service defendant No.1 remained ex parte and after his death his L.Rs. Preferred written statement and admitted the fact about sub tenancy. Defendant No.2 Mohd. Saleem Khan filed the written statement and rebutted the claim made by the plaintiff herein. During pendency of the suit, original plaintiff had died, therefore, his L.Rs. (present appellants) were taken on record. 3. After service defendant No.1 remained ex parte and after his death his L.Rs. Preferred written statement and admitted the fact about sub tenancy. Defendant No.2 Mohd. Saleem Khan filed the written statement and rebutted the claim made by the plaintiff herein. According to the written statement, defendant No.2 has taken the shop on rent which is still in his possession wherein an abattoir exists and he denied the allegations of nuisance. Bona fide requirement as pleaded by the plaintiff was also rebutted as according to defendant No.2 plaintiff had sufficient non residential accommodation to start business. He further denied the allegation of arrears of rent. 4. On the basis of pleadings, trial Court framed the issues inter alia regarding arrears of rent vide Section 12(1)(a), sub tenancy vide Section 12(1)(b), nuisance vide Section 12(1)(c) and bona fide requirement vide Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 5. After recording evidence, trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 30-11-2001 on the ground enumerated under Section 12(1)(b), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act. Against the judgment and decree, defendant No.2 who was held to be sub tenant filed first appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the first appellate Court and along with an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC seeking amendment in relation to availability of alternative accommodation becoming available to the plaintiff. The first appellate Court by allowing the said application, set aside the entire decree and remanded the matter to the trial Court. Challenging the said order of remand dated 06-03-2006 the present appellants challenged it before this Court vide M.A.No.846/2003. The same was allowed vide order dated 06-03-2010; whereby; while setting aside remand order and modifying it this Court directed the appellate Court to frame the issue in relation to the said amendment application which was already on record with further direction to record the finding after framing of additional issue. The said finding was to be given by the trial Court therefore, the matter was went to the trial Court in respect of finding regarding ground enumerated in Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Trial Court did not affirm the finding regarding Section 12(1)(f) of the Act in favour of appellants and negatived it. 6. The said finding was to be given by the trial Court therefore, the matter was went to the trial Court in respect of finding regarding ground enumerated in Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Trial Court did not affirm the finding regarding Section 12(1)(f) of the Act in favour of appellants and negatived it. 6. In first appeal, the appellants herein; filed cross objections challenging the finding in relation to Section 12(1)(f) of the Act and while considering rival submissions first appellate Court discussed the issue not only regarding Section 12(1)(f) of the Act but also regarding Section 12(1)(b) and 12(1)(c) and allowed the appeal preferred by defendant No.2 Mohd. Saleem Khan. Challenging the judgment and decree impugned herein; appellants have preferred this appeal under Section 100 of CPC. 7. Following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration: "1. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred in substantial error of law by holding that the ground of eviction as envisaged under Section 12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has not been proved when the tenant Mohammad Sharif Khan is not having control on the suit shop and the suit shop is in possession of his brother Mohammad Salim Khan? 2. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred in substantial error of law by ignoring and misreading the testimony of Shahzadi Begum who is the wife of tenant Mohammad Sharif Khan admitting that originally the suit shop was given for cycle repairs, and therefore, since now the defendant has changed the user of the suit shop into slaughter house, whether the ground as envisaged under Section 12(1)(c) of the said Act has been made out ? 3. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the suit under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, when garbage, flesh, hides etc. of slaughtered animals are lying in the suit shop? 4. Whether the two Courts below erred in substantial error of law in not granting decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the said Act for the need of plaintiff's son Rajendra, when it has been explained by the plaintiff that other five shops are not vacant and tenants are carrying on their business ? 5. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred in substantial error of law by misreading the evidence of Om Pathak (PW-3) holding that he is co-brother of the plaintiff ?" 8. 5. Whether the learned lower appellate Court erred in substantial error of law by misreading the evidence of Om Pathak (PW-3) holding that he is co-brother of the plaintiff ?" 8. According to counsel for the appellants, trial Court has considered the submission, pleadings and evidence led by the parties and after due vetting came to the conclusion regarding passing of decree under Section 12(1)(b), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act. While considering issue No.2, trial Court has held that defendant No.1 was tenant of original plaintiff and shop was taken for repairing of bicycles and after running for a while he placed possession of the shop to defendant No.2 his brother who started an abattoir there. Evidence led by the plaintiff Narayan Prasad Sharma (PW-1), his brother Rajendra (PW-2), independent witness Rajesh Kumar Sharma (PW-3) and Kailash Chandra (PW-4), all have specifically deposed that the shop in question has been taken by defendant No.1 Mohd. Sharif Khan on rent for repairing of bicycles and after running shop for a while he hand it over possession to defendant No.2. Said testimony of witnesses remained unrebutted. Appellants also relied upon the testimony of defendants' witness Shahzadi Begam W/o Mohd. Sharif Khan (DW-1). She admitted the fact regarding sub tenancy and further submitted that she is regularly paying money to defendant No.2 to give the said amount to plaintiff as rent, therefore, according to counsel for appellants; ground regarding Section 12(1)(b) was proved by the trial Court but the same has been over turned by the first appellate Court without any cogent findings and mis-appreciated the evidence and caused perversity. 9. It is further submitted that the ground regarding Section 12(1)(c) of the Act was apparent on record. The fact that defendant No.2 (Mohd. Saleem Khan) was admittedly running an abattoir and consequences of abattoir are not sale of product only. Animal organs and wastage/remnants of body part of animals are scattered everywhere in the vicinity. Just adjacent to the shop in question, appellants have their staircase to go on first floor for their residence and therefore, they have to encounter such repulsive scene every day. It is unhygienic, unorganized and creating nuisance every day. Said aspect has been properly dealt by the trial Court but the first appellate Court dealt the said issue in a slipshod manner. 10. It is unhygienic, unorganized and creating nuisance every day. Said aspect has been properly dealt by the trial Court but the first appellate Court dealt the said issue in a slipshod manner. 10. Regarding bona fide requirement of son of original plaintiff, Rajendra (now one of the appellants) has to start his own business of electric goods. Original plaintiff Shrikrishna Sharma and thereafter his son Rajendra wanted to start the business of electric good from the shop in question as according to them they had no other suitable alternative accommodation. Rajendra was running the business by going place to place and therefore, had no place to start business and therefore, he had bona fide requirement for the suit accommodation. The said aspect has been rightly considered by the trial Court while considering issue No.5(a) and (b). Grievance of the appellants is that the appellate Court has erred in misreading the bona fide requirement of the appellants. Appellate Court as well as trial Court have erred in not granting decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act because both the Courts have misread the evidence and came to the conclusion that Om Pathak is co-brother of one of appellants and on this count negatived the finding against appellants, whereas from the evidence this fact nowhere surfaced and established by the defendants. Similarly, even if relationship is assumed to be established even then plaintiff had bona fide requirement existing for suitable accommodation. 11. Further arguments were that sub tenant has no right to file first appeal as the same is not maintainable in view of the decision of this Court in the matter of Sant Kumar v. Ashok Kumar and others, 2007(2) MPLJ 472 . Even if the Courts below have arrived to the conclusion that shop of Om Pathak rendered vacant; even then; bona fide requirement of the plaintiff could not have been rendered nugatory because the landlord is best judge for his requirement; as per the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Siddalingamma & Anr. v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 431 , Deep Chandra Juneja v. Jalwanti Kathuria (2008) 8 SCC 497 . According to him, Courts below have erred in ignoring the bona fide requirement on the date of institution of suit. He referred judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Shakuntala and others v. Narayan Das and others, AIR 2004 SC 3484 . According to him, Courts below have erred in ignoring the bona fide requirement on the date of institution of suit. He referred judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Shakuntala and others v. Narayan Das and others, AIR 2004 SC 3484 . Counsel for the appellants also harped over deposition of Shahzadi Begam (DW-1) who categorically admitted the factum of sub tenancy. Even if the defendant No.2 was given right to cross-examine defendant No.1, still evidence of Shahzadi Begam cannot be wiped out altogether. He referred 2000 (1) JLJ 377 , Subhash Kharate v. State of M.P. 12. Per Contra, learned senior counsel for respondents/tenants opposed the submissions advanced by learned senior counsel for the appellants. According to learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/tenants, deposition of Shahzadi Begam cannot be taken into consideration in evidence and the first appellate Court has rightly rejected the deposition of Shahzadi Begam wife of defendant No.1. He relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sri Chand Gupta v. Gulzar Singh and another, 1991(2) (1992) 1 SCC 143 and judgment of Allahabad High Court in the matter of Phuljhari Devi v. Mithai Lal and others, AIR 1971 All. 494 . Admission of DW-1 does not bind Saleem Khan, the contesting defendant. His further submission is that for a minute if it is assumed that shop was given for repairing bicycles and thereafter an abattoir has started even then shop was given for non-residential purpose, therefore, in absence of any finding in support of subletting, if use of shop has been changed from bicycle repairing to abattoir then it is not illegal as per mandate of judgment of Gurdial Batra v. Raj Kumar Jain, (1989) 3 SCC 441 . He supported the impugned judgment and decree. 13. Further argument of learned senior counsel for the respondents is that scope of jurisdiction of this Court vis-a-vis reappreciation of evidence is limited. He also relied upon the judgment in the matter of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 and submits that the finding given by the first appellate Court cannot be interfered with by this Court in second appeal unless the finding of first appellate Court being mistake of law or based on no evidence or it is of the nature that a reasonable and prudent mind cannot reach at. According to him, the first appellate Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree because the appellants could not prove their case and concurrent finding of the Court below in respect of Section 12(1) (f) of the Act are well reasoned and not liable to be interfered with. 14. Present respondent No. 1 has also filed two amendment applications vide I.A. No. 4690/2011 and I.A.No.729/2013 in which he pleaded regarding two shops which have been made available to the appellants during pendency of this litigation and therefore, according to him, said pleadings need to be incorporated in the plaint wherein two shops have been rendered vacant by the other tenants. Now appellants can use those shops for their business purpose. Appellants duly replied the said contentions by filing reply to the said applications and submitted that respondent No.1 has filed the applications with concealment of facts as appellant No.1 has got vacant possession from Ottarnath under the decree of eviction passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior which was confirmed upto this Court in C.R.No.143/2005. Said order has been placed by the appellants with the reply. Further rebuttal of the appellants is that after obtaining vacant possession from Ottarnath, appellant No.1 Vidhya Bai is doing her business of Auto Parts in the name and style of M/s Vidhya Auto Parts with the help of his son Rahul Dandotiya. Similarly in respect of I.A.No.729/2013, the appellants have submitted that the appellants have rebutted the claim of respondent No.1 with further addition that shop in question is not suitable to the appellants for the need of Rajendra because of its small size in which business of electric goods cannot be carried out. Appellants even denied handing over of possession of said shop to the appellants. 15. In sum and substance, learned counsel for respondent No.1 supported impugned judgment passed by the first appellate Court. He prayed for dismissal of appeal. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 17. For better appreciation of controversy, substantial question of law No.3 is dealt with, at inception. Regarding substantial question of law No. 3: Trial Court in its judgment dated 30-11-2001 has made issue No.4 regarding ground enumerated under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 17. For better appreciation of controversy, substantial question of law No.3 is dealt with, at inception. Regarding substantial question of law No. 3: Trial Court in its judgment dated 30-11-2001 has made issue No.4 regarding ground enumerated under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. In the evidence led by the plaintiffs, it was established that appellants are members of Brahmin community and they have aversion for non-vegetarian food therefore, the person who do not eat non-veg food, not only has aversion for eating but also have repulsion to gory detail of slaughtering of animals. No doubt slaughtering of an animal entails blood; shedding spread of flash, garbage, wings, hide here and there in the vicinity as well as in the atmosphere. It not only creates unhygienic atmosphere but it is psychologically traumatic for those persons who are vegetarian in their culinary habits and where their cuisine does not include non-vegetarian food. Even family of non-vegetarian food habits cannot stand to repulsive scene of abattoir. Trial Court has considered this aspect logically as well as practically, whereas the appellate Court has totally ignored this aspect giving finding in a very slipshod manner. 18. The appellate Court tried to justify the finding by covering the fact regarding existence of said meat shops in the vicinity but that meat shops are 150 ft. away from the present shop and that is proved by oral evidence of parties. Even otherwise; meat shop existing in the vicinity (about 150 ft. distant) and meat shop just beneath the residence (or just adjacent to it) has different connotations which have to be palpably appreciated in the given facts situation of the case. Although defendant No.2 tried to cover up the story by saying that one of the appellants used to eat non-vegetarian food, some times took meat from their shop but the said fact was not proved in any manner and even if a member of family eats non-vegetarian food even then it does not mean that whole family is having that eating habit. Further; as discussed above even a person eating non-vegetarian food may dislike and feel repulsive about the actual scene of abattoir or meat shop. Further; as discussed above even a person eating non-vegetarian food may dislike and feel repulsive about the actual scene of abattoir or meat shop. In India in absence of any systematic regulation for abattoir/meat shop; problem of refuse and garbage of animal organs and their remnants including hide give rise to health hazards and nuisance. 19. Even otherwise; Gwalior is part of Madhya Bharat and State of Madhya Pradesh where normally eating habit of a common household specially Brahmin household are towards vegetarian food, therefore, this aspect gains substance in this area and it can be safely concluded that existence of abattoir or meat shop can create nuisance for the appellants therefore, the appellate Court erred in coming to the conclusion wherein discarded the finding given by the trial Court in respect of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act and ignored nuisance. Thus, substantial question of law No.3 is answered in favour of appellants herein while affirming the finding of trial Court and discarding the finding given by the first appellate Court. No prudent man can approach this finding as arrived by the appellate Court wherein evidence available on record was ignored by the first appellate Court. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1 & 2 20. The trial Court while deciding issue No. 2&3 has decided suit for eviction under the ground of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act. Trial Court has considered the evidence led by the plaintiff Narayan Prasad Sharma (PW-1) and his brother Rajendra Sharma (PW-2) both have categorically deposed on oath that defendant No.1 Sharif khan was given shop on rent for bicycle repairing. Said statement is further supported by other witness Rajesh Sharma (PW-3), Kailash Chand (PW-4), their statement remained uncontroverted and defendants could not prove that the shop in question was given to defendant No.2 directly. Therefore, on the basis of plaintiff evidence it was proved that shop was given initially to defendant No.1 as tenant. 21. Another important aspect in the matter is deposition of Shahzadi Begam (DW-1) wife of defendant No.1 Mohd. Sharif Khan. She categorically submitted on oath that the shop has been taken by her husband and till institution of suit her husband paid rent to the plaintiff as tenant and after institution of suit she gave rent to defendant No.2 who deposited in the Court. Sharif Khan. She categorically submitted on oath that the shop has been taken by her husband and till institution of suit her husband paid rent to the plaintiff as tenant and after institution of suit she gave rent to defendant No.2 who deposited in the Court. Defendant No.2 in his deposition never pleaded about any animosity and estranged relationship with Shahzadi Begam and her family. Therefore, deposition of Shahzadi Begam also assumes importance. The appellate Court has totally discarded the testimony of Shahzadi Begam contrary to the record and legal position because she was party defendant and her testimony cannot be discarded on the basis that said testimony is not binding over defendant No.2. She was not witness of defendant No.2 sub tenant, but she came in witness box on her own capacity and therefore, there was no occasion to defendant No.2 to cross-examine her. Even if he cross-examined her even then her testimony could not have been thrown out on the ground that she was not supporting the case of defendant No.2. As per judgment of this Court in the matter Subhash Khatare (supra) evidence of a hostile witness cannot be treated as washed off from the record. Part of his statement can still be considered and therefore, once the said testimony is independently established by the plaintiffs' witnesses thus, the first appellate Court should have considered the said aspect and in absence of such consideration erred in arriving to the conclusion in a slipshod manner. In para 26 of the impugned judgment, first appellate Court has disbelieved testimony of Shahzadi Begam on the ground that she has collusion with the plaintiff. Said finding is perverse and it is unnecessary conclusion drawn by the first appellate Court without any cogent evidence available on record. Said perverse finding becomes excruciating when it overlooks testimony of other witnesses because the plaintiffs proved independently also on the basis of other witnesses that shop in question was given to defendant No.1 but later on he gave possession to defendant No.2 for other purpose. 22. Said perverse finding becomes excruciating when it overlooks testimony of other witnesses because the plaintiffs proved independently also on the basis of other witnesses that shop in question was given to defendant No.1 but later on he gave possession to defendant No.2 for other purpose. 22. True, it is that purpose and use of shop could not had been changed; if from bicycle repairing purpose, the shop could have been used for spare parts of bicycles or sale of bicycle or for that matter sale of some related goods but use of shop changed altogether different when it is used as abattoir and same is not acceptable in law because if the use of shop is allowed to such extreme end then it extinguishes the right of landlord of seeking eviction of tenant on some other grounds like Section 12(1)(c). Change of use of shop can only be permitted to the extent wherein it does not eclipse any other ground for eviction. Here, in the present matter, change of use of shop is to such extent wherein said change of use has given additional ground of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act to the appellants, therefore, the appellate Court has ignored this legal position and caused illegality or perversity and made unnecessary attempt to dislodge the finding of trial Court. Trial Court has rightly came to the conclusion about nature of subletting and also change of use of shop. Therefore, this Court holds that the first appellate Court erred in coming to the conclusion and reversing findings of the trial Court in respect of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act. According to this Court, appellants have successfully established subletting under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act and proved it accordingly. Shop has been transferred to defendant No.2 without authority of plaintiff and constitutes subletting. Similarly, change to use of shop from bicycle repairing to abattoir is also a ground available to the appellants under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act and the plaintiffs have proved that change of use creates nuisance to them and therefore, this Court holds that in the given facts situation of the case use of shop changed from bicycle repairing to abattoir was illegal. Regarding substantial questions of law No. 4&5 23. Bona fide requirement of the plaintiff's son Rajendra had to be proved by the plaintiff whereas onus to prove availability of suitable accommodation lies over defendants. Regarding substantial questions of law No. 4&5 23. Bona fide requirement of the plaintiff's son Rajendra had to be proved by the plaintiff whereas onus to prove availability of suitable accommodation lies over defendants. Here, in the present case plaintiff categorically pleaded bona fide requirement of one of the appellants; Rajendra (son of original plaintiff). Trial Court as well as first appellate Court have erred in coming to the conclusion about bona fide requirement of starting business on three counts; One, is that the bona fide requirement (or need) of plaintiff is to be seen on the date of institution of suit and subsequent events are irrelevant in this regard (See; AIR 2004 SC 3484 , Shakuntala and others v. Narayan Das and others). Second reason is that the availability of suit shop of Om Pathak weighed in the minds of trial Court as well as appellate Court to the extent that both the Courts below ignored legal position that it is choice of the landlord regarding suitability of accommodation. Although both the Courts below did not appreciate the fact that appellants have proved their case in respect of bona fide requirement but both the Courts below have instead of pondering over the bona fide requirement, gave their findings in respect of alternative accommodation but ignored the legal position that availability of alternative accommodation was to be proved by the defendants wherein defendants could not prove that alternative accommodation is suitable or not, even if the shop of Om Pathak was available or lying vacant even then it was the choice of the plaintiff Rajendra to start business in that shop or not as landlord is best judge for his requirement {See: (2001) 8 SCC 431 Siddalingamma & Anr. v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2008) 8 SCC 497 Deep Chandra Juneja v. Jalwanti Kathuria, 2010 (2) MPLJ 243 Uday Shankar Upadhyay and others v. Naveen Maheshwari}. 24. Thirdly, from the evidence itself it is not proved that Om Pathak was co-brother of one of appellants and what was the true effect of such relationship over the controversy in question. 25. Similarly, two interlocutory applications vide I.A. No. 4690/2011 and I.A. No. 729/2013 as referred above filed by respondent No.1 move in realm of amendment wherein respondent No.1 wants to incorporate the pleadings regarding vacation of other shops, adjacent to the suit shop are of no avail as per the discussion made above. 25. Similarly, two interlocutory applications vide I.A. No. 4690/2011 and I.A. No. 729/2013 as referred above filed by respondent No.1 move in realm of amendment wherein respondent No.1 wants to incorporate the pleadings regarding vacation of other shops, adjacent to the suit shop are of no avail as per the discussion made above. Suit is pending since 1988 and has almost completed three decades, therefore, in the fact situation of the case as well as in the interest of justice coupled with the discussion made above, said applications are misconceived and attempted to protract the litigation and lead to an unending claim/counter claim, amendment and retrials. Every litigation must come to an end at some point of time. Here, the contentions of respondent No.1 through applications are not such, which evoke substance and credence enough to entertain the same. Even otherwise, rendering of the vacant possession of other shops does not further the cause of respondent No.1 because of the fact that it is the requirement of landlord for suitable accommodation which should be of paramount consideration while deciding such type of cases. Hence, the applications are hereby rejected. Incorporation of those pleadings are not material and does not affect the outcome of litigation. 26. Lower appellate Court strangely jumped to the conclusion holding that Om Pathak is co-brother of the plaintiff whereas evidence led by the parties did not have trappings of established relationship of Om Pathak with plaintiff. Even otherwise, relationship of Om Pathak with plaintiff does not change nature of controversy. Relatives can maintain a shop on rent as tenants. Trial Court as well as first appellate Court ignored core of the controversy and proceeded on insignificant aspect involved in the controversy. Thus, this Court holds that plaintiffs have proved their bona fide requirement for suitable accommodation for starting business of electric goods by the son of original plaintiff, Rajendra, one of the appellants and trial Court as well as appellate Court erred in ignoring bona fide requirements of the plaintiff Rajendra. Other shops might stood vacated during pendency of the litigation but bona fide requirement has to be seen at the time of institution of suit and suitability of accommodation is an import factor. 27. Other shops might stood vacated during pendency of the litigation but bona fide requirement has to be seen at the time of institution of suit and suitability of accommodation is an import factor. 27. Both the Courts below have erred in considering family composition of plaintiff which is a Joint Family, consisting of four brothers, therefore, bona fide requirement would have to be seen in the light of respective claims of each member of the family. This vital aspect of the controversy has been overlooked by both the Courts below. Vacation of any shop does not entail immediate remedy for plaintiff Rajendra. This aspect has been totally ignored by the Courts below and caused perversity. 28. This Court further holds that lower appellate Court erred in substantial error of law by misreading the evidence of Om Pathak while holding him as co-brother of plaintiff. On the basis of one or two stray remarks, finding can not be given. Even, over emphasis over relationship of Om Pathak with one of the appellants was over stressed by Courts below. 29. Thus, on the basis of above discussion and cumulative analysis, no other inference can be drawn except decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs under Section 12(1)(b), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act while upholding the finding of trial Court under Section 12(1)(b) and 12(1)(c) of the Act. Plaintiffs have succeeded in filing of the suit for eviction against the defendants under Section 12(1)(b), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act.