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2017 DIGILAW 639 (UTT)

Bhagwan Singh Karki v. Union of India

2017-12-07

RAJIV SHARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. Since common question of law and facts are involved in all these petitions, therefore, same are being taken up together and adjudicated of by this common judgment. (Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1829 of 2017) 2. Key facts necessary for adjudication of the petition are that the petitioner no.1 has purchased a land measuring 0.161 hectare (two bighas eleven biswa) of Plot No. 569 situated at Village Haripur, Tularam, Tehsil-Haldwani, District Nainital vide registered sale deeds dated 22.03.2005. The petitioner no.1 moved an application for sanction of site plan before the Prescribed Authority on 07.10.2005. The site plan was sanctioned on 20.02.2006. The petitioner no.1 constructed a building for commercial purpose called as Sri Golju Tower, as per the sanctioned plan. The respondent no.1 issued notification on 04.07.2012, for acquiring the land of survey no. 569. It was duly published in daily newspaper on 15.08.2012. The petitioner, initially, filed objections and thereafter, supplementary objections were filed. The objections were rejected by the concerned authority on 03.05.2013. The notification was issued under Section 3D(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “N.H. Act” for sake and brevity) on 02.07.2013. The notification under Section 3G (3) was also issued on 22.08.2013. It was published on daily newspapers namely Amar Ujala and Times of India. (Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2253 of 2013) 3. The petitioner nos. 1 to 4 are the owners of the land measuring 6 hectares of Plot Nos. 120, 124, 126, 128, 131, 135 & 137 situated at Village Haripur, Purnanand, Tehsil Haldwani, District Nainital falling between Lalkuan and Haldwani in Bareilly Road earlier known as State Highway No.12. The petitioner nos. 5 to 10 are joint owner of land measuring 3,3780 hectares of different plots bearing nos. 71, 74, 75, 143, 144, 150, 151, 360 and 187/418 situated at Village Gaujajali (Bichli), Tehsil Haldwani, District Nainital. A notification was issued by the respondent no.1 on 04.07.2012, which was published on 15.08.2012 in the daily newspaper. The petitioners filed objections against the same. The objections were rejected by the Competent Authority on 03.05.2013. Thereafter, notification was issued under Section 3A (3) of the N.H. Act and was published in two daily newspapers namely Amar Ujala and Times of India on 15.08.2012. The notification under Section 3D(1) was published on 02.07.2013. (Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1563 of 2017) 4. The objections were rejected by the Competent Authority on 03.05.2013. Thereafter, notification was issued under Section 3A (3) of the N.H. Act and was published in two daily newspapers namely Amar Ujala and Times of India on 15.08.2012. The notification under Section 3D(1) was published on 02.07.2013. (Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1563 of 2017) 4. The petitioner has purchased the land measuring 0.171 hectare situated in Khata No. 37, Khasra No. 569 at Haripur Tula Ram, Tehsil Haldwani, District Nainital vide registered sale deed dated 30.03.2011. The petitioner’s husband submitted an application on 07.10.2005 for sanction of site plan. The site plan was sanctioned on 20.02.2006. The husband of the petitioner constructed the building for commercial purpose called as Sri Golju Tower. The notification was issued on 04.07.2012. It was published on 15.08.2012. The objections were heard and rejected on 03.05.2013. The petitioner has referred to letters dated 04.02.2014 and 07.03.2014 as well as 11.07.2014 and 11.03.2015. 5. Counter affidavits were filed by the respondents. 6. The case of the petitioners, precisely, is that the notification issued on 04.07.2012 was vague and sketchy. The exact description of the land and property has not been given. Public purpose is not mentioned in the notification. According to them, there is violation of Section 2 (2) of the National Highways Act, 1956. Their further contention is that there was no existing highway from the land of the petitioners. Only 20 meters land was required to be acquired. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents have supported the issuance of notification dated 04.07.2012 and the notification issued under Sections 3D (1) and 3G (3) of the Act. According to them, the land was acquired for widening the national highway. They further pleaded that all the codal formalities were completed. The objections raised by the petitioners were dealt with in accordance with law and competent authority has passed the reasoned order. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings very carefully. 9. Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of the National Highways Act, 1956 reads as under:- “(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any other highway to be a national highway and on the publication of such notification such highway shall be deemed to be specified in the Schedule.” 10. 9. Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of the National Highways Act, 1956 reads as under:- “(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any other highway to be a national highway and on the publication of such notification such highway shall be deemed to be specified in the Schedule.” 10. It is evident from the language employed in Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, that Central Government is authorized to declare any highway to be a national highway on the publication of notification and such highway is deemed to be specified in the Schedule. The road has already been declared as national highway 87. It is from Rampur to Nainital. The road was required to be widened as per the requirements. 11. Section 3A of the Act, provides that where the Central Government is satisfied that for a public purpose any land is required for he building , maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part thereof, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to acquire such land. In the present case, the notification has been issued under Section 3A of the Act on 04.07.2012. The Court has gone through the notification. The exact description of the land along with survey numbers, type of land, nature of land and area have been mentioned. Thus, it cannot be said that the notification dated 04.07.2012 is sketchy or vague. The Competent Authority has strictly complied with Section 3A of the Act. 12. Section 3C of the Act, provides for hearing of objections. In the present case, the petitioners have preferred objections. These objections were dealt with by the concerned authority and speaking/detailed order has been passed after taking into consideration all the contentions raised in the objections. Thereafter, the Central Government has issued notifications under Section 3D (1) and Section 3G of the Act. The notification under Section 3D(1) was issued on 02.07.2013 and 3G (3) dated 22.08.2013 and published in the daily edition of two newspapers namely Amar Ujala and Times of India. 13. In Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1829 of 2013, the notification under Section 3A(3) was issued and published in two newspaper Amar Ujala and Times of India on 15.08.2012 and the notification under Section 3D(1) was issued on 02.07.2013 and published in one local newspaper Amar Ujala. 14. 13. In Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1829 of 2013, the notification under Section 3A(3) was issued and published in two newspaper Amar Ujala and Times of India on 15.08.2012 and the notification under Section 3D(1) was issued on 02.07.2013 and published in one local newspaper Amar Ujala. 14. The contention put forth in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1829 of 2013 and 1563 of 2017 is that construction was raised by them after getting due sanction from the Competent Authority. There is no law which prohibits the acquisition of land or building. The grant of permission for construction of building is subject to the conditions imposed therein. The parties have not placed on record the map. The site plan was sanctioned on 20.02.2006 and present notification was issued on 04.07.2012. The reference to letters dated 04.02.2014, 07.03.2014, 11.07.2014 and 11.03.2015 in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1563 has no bearing for the purpose of acquisition of land. 15. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India vide its letter dated 22.12.2003 has informed the National Highways Authority of India that the Ministry has decided to acquire land for Right of Way (ROW) of a minimum of 60 meters to be done for all projects under NHDP. The National Highway reaches where the work of 4/6 laning has already been completed or is in progress and the ROW is less than 60 meters. The land was acquired for construction and widening of National Highway No. 87 emanating from Kilometer 64.00 to 93.600 from Rampur, Uttar Pradesh to Kathgodam in District Nainital. 16. Sections 13 and 16 of the National Highway Authority of India Act, 1988 are reproduced as under:- “13. Compulsory Acquisition of land for the Authority:- Any land required by the Authority for discharging its functions under this Act shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose and such land may be acquired for the Authority under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. 16. Functions of the Authority:- (1) Subject to the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority to development maintain and manage the national highways and any other highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government. 16. Functions of the Authority:- (1) Subject to the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf, it shall be the function of the Authority to development maintain and manage the national highways and any other highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the Authority may, for the discharge of its functions- (a) survey, develop, maintain and manage highways vested in, or entrusted to; (b) construct offices or workshops and establish and maintain hotels, motels, restaurants and rest-rooms at or near the highways vested in, or entrusted to, it; (c) construct residential building and townships for its employees; (d) regulate and control and plying of vehicles on the highways vested in, or entrusted to, it for the proper management therefore; (e) develop and provide consultancy and construction services in India and abroad and carry on research activities in relation to the development, maintenance and management of highways or any facilities thereat; (f) provide such facilities and amenities for the users of the highways vested in, or entrusted to, it as are, in the opinion of the Authority, necessary for the smooth flow of traffic on such highways; (g) form one or more companies under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) to further the efficient discharge of the functions imposed on it by this Act; (h) engage, or entrust any of its functions to, any person on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed;] (i) advise the Central Government on matters relating to highways; (j) assist, on such terms and conditions, as may be mutually agreed upon, any State Government in the formulation and implementation of schemes for highway development; (k) collect fees on behalf of the Central Government for services or benefits rendered under section 7 of the National Act, 1956 (48 of 1956) as amended from time to time, and such terms and conditions as may be specified by such State Governments; and (l) take all such steps as may be necessary or convenient for, or any be incidental to, the exercise of any power or the discharge of any function conferred or imposed on it by this Act. (3) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as- (a) authorizing the disregard by the authority of any law for the time being in force; or (b) authorising any person to institute any proceeding in respect of duty or liability to which the Authority or its officers or the other employees would not otherwise be subject under this Act.” 17. There is no merit in the contention of the petitioners that only 20 meters of land was required since as per the observations made hereinabove, 60 meters of land was required for maintaining “Right of Way”. The acquisition of land is for public purpose. The public purpose is mentioned in all the notifications issued from time to time including the notification dated 04.07.2012. The construction of roads is essential for country’s economy. Construction of road is a technical matter. This Court would not substitute its own wisdom for the wisdom of respondents. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that elaborate exercise is undertaken before the finalization of the alignment of road. The acquisition of land, thus causes inconvenience to public at large but still in larger public interest land is required for construction of National Highways and also for widening of National Highways to bring it to the international standards. 18. The Central Government has already declared the road starting from Rampur, Uttar Pradesh to Kathgodam, Nainital, the National Highway No. 87, under Section 2 (2) of the Act. There is urgent requirement of construction of four-lane road from Lalkuan to Kathgodam. The road is being constructed as per the prescribed manual. The Competent Authority has also sought report qua the construction already raised by the petitioner vide letter dated 12.03.2013 and 22.03.2013 whereby it was proposed that the land is acquired for eccentric widening. The respondents have issued notification on 15.08.2012 followed by the notification under Section 3D(1) on 02.07.2013 within a period of one year. 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 69 in the case of Union of India Vs. Kushala Shetty and others have held that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in field of development and maintenance of national highways. Courts on other hand are not equipped to decide viability and feasibility of particular project and whether particular alignment would subserve larger public interest. Kushala Shetty and others have held that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in field of development and maintenance of national highways. Courts on other hand are not equipped to decide viability and feasibility of particular project and whether particular alignment would subserve larger public interest. Thus, scope of judicial review is limited in such a situation. Their Lordships have held that notification had given description of land proposed to be acquired, names of villages in which it was situated, survey numbers including sub-survey numbers, nature, type and area of land. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under:- “20. The scheme of acquisition enshrined in the above reproduced provisions makes it clear that once the Central Government is satisfied that any land is required for the building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part thereof, then, it shall declare its intention to acquire such land by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette giving brief description of the land. The substance of the notification is also required to be published in two local newspapers of which one has to be in a vernacular language. Any person interested in the land can file objection within 21 days from the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette. Such objection is required to be made to the competent authority in writing. Thereafter, the competent authority is required to give the objector an opportunity of hearing either in person or through a legal practitioner. This exercise is to be followed by an order of the competent authority either allowing or rejecting the objections. 21. Where no objection is made to the competent authority in terms of Section 3-C(1) or where the objection made by the interested persons have been disallowed, the competent authority is required to submit a report to the Central Government, which shall then issue a notification in the Official Gazette that the land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in Section 3-A(1). On publication of declaration under Section 3-D(1), the land vests absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3) of Section 3-D provides that where no declaration under sub-Section (1) is published within a period of one year from the date of publication of notification under section 3-A(1), the said notification shall cease to have any effect. On publication of declaration under Section 3-D(1), the land vests absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (3) of Section 3-D provides that where no declaration under sub-Section (1) is published within a period of one year from the date of publication of notification under section 3-A(1), the said notification shall cease to have any effect. By virtue of the proviso to Section 3-D (3), the period during which any action or proceeding taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 2-A(1) remains stayed by a court shall be excluded while computing the period of one year specified in Section 3-D (3). 22. In this case, the Notification dated 10-8-2005, which was published in the Official Gazette of the same date and of which substance was published in two local newspapers, contained in full description of the land proposed to be acquired for widening three national highways. The names of the villages in which the land proposed to be acquired was situated, the survey numbers including sub-survey numbers, the nature, type and area of the land were also given in the schedule appended to the notification. Not only this, it was clearly mentioned that land plans and other details of the land are available in the office of the competent authority. This is the reason why none of the landowners (including the respondents) made any grievance that the notification issued under Section 3-A(1) of the 1956 Act was vague or that due to lack of particulars/details, they were prevented from effectively exercising their right to file objections in terms of Section 3-C(1). Of course, a grievance on this score was made in the objections dated 16.10.2006 filed by some of the landowners of Padavu Village, but that was clearly an afterthought and, in any case, the same did not require consideration because of non-adherence to the time schedule specified in Section2-C(1) of the 1956 Act. 25. Of course, a grievance on this score was made in the objections dated 16.10.2006 filed by some of the landowners of Padavu Village, but that was clearly an afterthought and, in any case, the same did not require consideration because of non-adherence to the time schedule specified in Section2-C(1) of the 1956 Act. 25. The plea of the respondents that alignment of the proposed widening of the national highways was manipulated to suit the vested interests sounds attractive but lacks substance and merits rejection because except making a bald assertion, the respondents have neither given particulars of the persons sought to be favoured nor placed any material to prima facie prove that the execution of the project of widening the national highways is actuated by mala fides and, in the absence of proper pleadings and material, neither the High Court could nor this Court can made a roving enquiry to fish out some material and draw a dubious conclusion that the decision and actions of the appellants are tainted by mala fides. 26. A some what similar question was considered in Girias Investment (P) Ltd. V. State of Karnataka. In that case, the acquisition of the land under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 was challenged on various grounds including the one that the acquisition was vitiated due to mala fides. While rejecting the plea of mala fides, the Court referred to S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, State of Punjab V. Gudial Singh and Collector Vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal and observed: (Girias Investment Case, SCC P.63, para 14) “14. It is obvious from a reading of the pleadings quoted above that only vague allegations of mala fides have been leveled and that too without any basis. There can be two ways by which a case of mala fides can be made out; one that the action which is impugned has been taken with the specific object of damaging the interest of the party and, secondly, such action is aimed at helping some party which results in damage to the party alleging mala fides. There can be two ways by which a case of mala fides can be made out; one that the action which is impugned has been taken with the specific object of damaging the interest of the party and, secondly, such action is aimed at helping some party which results in damage to the party alleging mala fides. It would be seen that there is no allegation whatsoever in the pleadings that the case falls within the first category but an inference of mala fides has been sought to be drawn in the course of a vague pleading that the change had been made to help certain important persons who would have lost their land under the original acquisition. These allegations have been replied to in the paragraph quoted above the reveal that the land which had been denotified belonged to those who had absolutely no position or power. In this view of the matter, the judgments cited by Mr Dave have absolutely no bearing on the facts of the case.” 27. We may also refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. In that case, the petitioner, who was transferred from the post of Chief Secretary and posted as Officer on Special Duty, challenged the action of the Government on various grounds including the one that the decision of the Government eas vitiated due to mala fides of the Chief Minister. This Court rejected the plea of mala fides by making the following observations: “90……The petitioner set out in the petition various incidents in the course of administration where he crossed the path of the second respondent and incurred his wrath by inconvenient and up-compromising acts and nothings and contended that the second respondent, therefore, nursed hostility and malus animus against the petitioner and it was for this reason and not on account of exigencies of administration that the petitioner was transferred from the post of Chief Secretary. The incidents referred to by the petitioner, if true, constituted gross acts of maladministration and the charge leveled against the second respondent was that because the petitioner in the course of his duties obstructed and thwarted the second respondent in these acts of maladministration, that the second respondent was annoyed with him and it was with a view to putting him out of the way and at the same time deflating him that the second respondent transferred him from the post of Chief Secretary. The transfer of the petitioner was, therefore, in mala fide exercise of power and accordingly invalid. 91. Now, when we examine this contention we must bear in mind two important considerations. In the first place, we must make it clear, despite a very strenuous argument to the contrary, that we are not called upon to investigate into acts of maladministration by the political Government headed by the second respondent. It is not within out province to embark on a far-flung inquiry into acts of commission and omission charged against the second respondent in the administration of the affairs of Tamil Nadu. That is not the scope of the inquiry before us and we must decline to enter upon any such inquiry. It is one thing to say that the second respondent was guilty of misrule and another to say that he had malus animus against the petitioner from the post of chief Secretary. We are concerned only with the latter limited issue, not with the former popular issue. We cannot permit the petitioner to sidetrack the issue and escape the burden of establishing hostility and malus animus on the part of the second respondent by diverting our attention to incidents of suspicious exercise of executive power. That would be nothing short of drawing a red herring across the trail. The only question before us is whether the action taken by the respondents includes any component of mala fides: whether hostility and malus animus against the petitioner were the operational cause of the petitioner from the post of Chief Secretary. 92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegation of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. 92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegation of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up-these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach- but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent. 28. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of national highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for the development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for the development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of national highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in the rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In the case in hand, neither has nay violation of mandate of the 1956 Act been established nor has the charge of malice in fact been proved. Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained.” 20. The delay in execution of government projects, more particularly, construction of roads unnecessarily escalates the cost due to inflation. The construction of roads must be undertaken and completed within the time frame. 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1986) 2 Supreme Court Cases 68 in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh & another Vs. Umed Ram Sharma and others have held that poor resident of hilly area has the right under Article 21 to his life which embraces not only physical existence of life but the quality of life and for residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life itself. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have further held that the residents of the hilly areas as far as feasible and possible society has constitutional obligation to provide roads for communication in reasonable conditions. Denial of that right would be denial of the life as understood in its richness and fullness by the ambit of the Constitution. Their Lordships have also held that the petitioner-respondents’ access by communication, indeed to life outside is obstructed and/or prevented by the absence of road. Denial of that right would be denial of the life as understood in its richness and fullness by the ambit of the Constitution. Their Lordships have also held that the petitioner-respondents’ access by communication, indeed to life outside is obstructed and/or prevented by the absence of road. Their Lordships have held as under:- 11. It appears to us that in the facts of this case, the controversy lies within a short compass. It is well settled that the persons who have applied to the High Court by the letter are persons affected by the absence of usable road because they are poor Harijan residents of the area, their access by communication, indeed to life outside is obstructed and/or prevented by the absence of road. The entire State of Himachal Pradesh is in hills and without workable roads, no communication is possible. Every person is entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution and in the facts of this case read in conjunction with Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution and in the background of Article 38(2) of the Constitution every person has right under Article 19(1)(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India and he has also the right under Article 21 to his life and that right under Article 21 embraces not only physical existence of life but the quality of life and for residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life itself. These propositions are well settled. We accept the proposition that there should be road for communication in reasonable conditions in view of our constitutional imperatives and denial of that right would be denial of the life as understood in its richness and fullness by the ambit of the Constitution. To the residents of the hilly areas as far as feasible and possible society has constitutional obligation to provide roads for communication. 13. The persons who have complained about the non-availability of road are the persons who have been affected by the denial of proper roads in a hilly State. Therefore, there is no dispute as to their locus. There is also no dispute that the State Government was willing and has indeed sanctioned money for the construction of the road. Constitutional and legal imperative on the part of the State to provide roads for residents of hilly State is not in issue. Therefore, there is no dispute as to their locus. There is also no dispute that the State Government was willing and has indeed sanctioned money for the construction of the road. Constitutional and legal imperative on the part of the State to provide roads for residents of hilly State is not in issue. So in this petition we need not examine how far is the obligation to provide roads.” 22. In the instant case, the mandatory notifications were issued in the year 2012 but till date, the road has not been widened four laned, as per parameters. The State of Uttarakhand is a border State. All the roads in the State of Uttarakhand have a strategic importance. The projects of national highways should not be delayed unnecessarily. The state of art infrastructure brings more investment. The State of Uttarkhand has a hilly terrain and without roads, the communication is not possible. 23. The residents of Uttarakhand have a fundamental right under Article 21 to access to roads. The State has constitutional obligation to provide roads for communication. 24. Accordingly, in view of the discussion and observations made hereinabove, there is no merit in the writ petitions and the same are hereby dismissed. Interim orders are vacated. 25. However, before parting with the judgment, it would be necessary now in the interest of justice to direct the National Highway Authority of India/Ministry of Road Transport and Highways to build, (widen/four lane etc.), maintain, manage and make operational National Highway No.-87 within a period of two years, subject to availability of funds.