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2017 DIGILAW 64 (RAJ)

Laxmi Narayan Meena S/o Narayan Meena v. State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor

2017-01-05

M.N.BHANDARI

body2017
JUDGMENT : Mr. M.N. Bhandari, J. 1. By this writ petition, a challenge is made to the order dated 12.07.2014. By the aforesaid order, a direction has been given to open history-sheet of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that a direction to open history-sheet has been given in ignorance of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965 (in short "the Rules of 1965"). As per Rule 4.4, history-sheet cannot be opened unless one is convicted on two or more occasions. In view of above, a direction to open history-sheet is illegal. It is more so when conviction on two occasions can attract opening of history-sheet only when offence provided under Rule 8.22 of the Rules of 1965 has been committed. The petitioner has been convicted only on one occasion. 3. It is further stated that petitioner cannot otherwise be reckoned to be a habitual offender. The definition of "habitual offender" has been provided under the Rajasthan Habitual Offenders Act, 1953 (for short "the Act of 1953"). As per definition given therein, one can be considered to be a habitual offender, if sentenced or convicted on not less than three occasions and has attained the age of 18 years. In view of above, impugned order deserves to be set aside. 4. Learned Deputy Government Counsel has opposed the petition. He submits that a direction to open history-sheet has rightly been given against the petitioner. He is a threat to the society. 20 cases have been registered against him thus he is involved in commissioning of offence habitually and his effort is even not to get trial completed. In one case, he has been convicted. His case falls under Rule 4.4(3)(b) of the Rules of 1965. The history-sheet can be opened, if persons are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property, whether they have been convicted or not. In case of habitual offender or receiver of stolen property, conviction is not a precondition. If the definition of "habitual offender" given under the Act of 1953 is applied then Rule 4.4(3)(a) and (b) would become redundant thus it cannot be applied. In view of above, a direction for opening history-sheet against the petitioner has rightly been given thus this court may not interfere in the impugned order. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. In view of above, a direction for opening history-sheet against the petitioner has rightly been given thus this court may not interfere in the impugned order. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. It is not in dispute that number of cases exist against the petitioner. The Deputy Government Counsel submitted that 20 cases have been registered against the petitioner for different offences. It is however a fact that only in one case, conviction has been recorded. In view of above, question comes as to whether history-sheet can be opened in reference to the Rules of 1965. For appreciation of the rival arguments, reference of Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965 is relevant and is quoted thus: "4.4. Surveillance Register No., 8 - (1) In every police station, other than those of the railway police, a Surveillance Register shall be maintained in form 4.4. (1). (2) In part I of such register shall be entered the names of persons commonly resident within or commonly frequenting the local jurisdiction of the police station concerned, who belong to one or more of the following classes:- (a) All persons who have been proclaimed under Section 87, Code of Criminal Procedure. (b) All released convicts in regard to whom, an order under Section 565, Criminal Procedure Code, has been made. (c) All convicts the execution of whose sentence as suspended in the whole, or any part of whose punishment has been remitted conditionally under Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code. (3) In part II of such register may be entered at the discretion of the Superintendent. (a) Persons who have been convicted twice, or more than twice, of offences mentioned in rule 8.22; (b) persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not; (c) persons under security under sections 109 or 110, Code of Criminal Procedure; (d) convicts released before the expiration of their sentences under the Prisons Act and Remission Rules without imposition of any conditions. Note :- This rule must be strictly constued, and entries must be confined to the names of persons falling in the four classes named therein". 7. Rule 4.4(3)(a) & (b) has been referred by both the parties. Note :- This rule must be strictly constued, and entries must be confined to the names of persons falling in the four classes named therein". 7. Rule 4.4(3)(a) & (b) has been referred by both the parties. As per Clause (a) of Sub-rule (3), name can be entered in the surveillance register, if one has been convicted twice or more than twice for the offences mentioned in Rule 8.22. Clause (b) of Sub rule (3) however provides for entering name in the surveillance register, if person is a habitual offender or receiver of stolen property, whether they have been convicted or not. The aforesaid clause does not require conviction for entering the name of accused in the surveillance register. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner has made bifurcation of sub-clause (b). It is stated that in a case of habitual offender, the subsequent provision about "conviction or not" is not attached, rather, it is only for receiver of stolen property. To support the argument, a reference of the judgment of this court in the case of Ramgopal Jain v. The State of Rajasthan & ors., S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.3916/2012, decided on 4th April, 2013 has been given. 9. The reference of definition of "habitual offender" has also been given by referring Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953. As per the definition of habitual offender given therein means a person convicted not less than three occasions after attaining the age of 18 years to substantive terms of imprisonment for any one or more of the scheduled offences committed on different occasions and not so connected together as to form parts of the same transaction. It is submitted that if definition of "habitual offender" referred to is applied then also the petitioner's name cannot be entered in the surveillance register as he has not been convicted on three or more occasions, that too, for imprisonment of one or more of the scheduled offences committed on different occasions. 10. I have appreciated the arguments but do not find any force therein. The Rules of 1965 does not provide definition of "habitual offender". It does not make reference or give direction to import the definition of "habitual offender" given under the Act of 1953. In absence of definition of "habitual offender" under the Rules of 1965, it can be taken from dictionary and not from the Act of 1953. The Rules of 1965 does not provide definition of "habitual offender". It does not make reference or give direction to import the definition of "habitual offender" given under the Act of 1953. In absence of definition of "habitual offender" under the Rules of 1965, it can be taken from dictionary and not from the Act of 1953. If intention of the legislature would have been to apply the definition of "habitual offender", as provided under the Act of 1953 then it could have been referred specifically under the Rules of 1965 itself. It is missing therein and contrary to the intent of legislature, this court cannot apply the definition given under any other Act. It is more so when word "habitual" has been defined differently in various Acts. For illustration under the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 (for short "PASA Act"), the definition of "habitual" has been given differently than provided under the Act of 1953. For ready reference, definition of "habitual" given under the PASA Act is quoted for ready reference: "'habitual', with all its grammatical variations, includes acts or omissions committed repeatedly, persistently and frequently having a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts or omission but shall not include isolated, individual and dissimilar acts or omissions." 11. The perusal of definition given therein shows it to be different than under the Act of 1953. In fact, the definition of "habitual" has been given in various legislation and it is not similar to what is provided in any other legislation. In view of above, if definition of "habitual offender" given under the Act of 1953 alone is applied, the question would be about justification as to why definition of "habitual" given under the PASA Act is not applied. In view of above, I am unable to accept argument of learned counsel for petitioner to apply the definition of "habitual offender" given under the Act of 1953. 12. The definition of "habitual offender" given in the Law Lexicon (Second Edition) by Whytes & Co. seems to have taken into consideration by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma v. Superintendent of Police, North Dist., Delhi Police and Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 1766 . 12. The definition of "habitual offender" given in the Law Lexicon (Second Edition) by Whytes & Co. seems to have taken into consideration by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma v. Superintendent of Police, North Dist., Delhi Police and Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 1766 . For ready reference, definition of "habitual offender" given under the Law Lexicon is quoted hereunder: "Habitual offender.-A habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime is one who is a criminal by habit or by disposition formed by repetition of crimes. Reasonable belief of the Police officer that the suspect is a habitual offender or is a person habitually addicted to crime is sufficient to justify action. Mere belief is not sufficient. The belief must be reasonable. It must be based on reasonable ground." 13. As per definition quoted above, habitual offender does not require conviction on three or more occasions but a person who is habitually involved to committ the offences or crime. The same definition was given by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra). It was also the case of entering name in the surveillance register. Paras 2 and 6 to 8 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder: "2. Rules 23. 4 to 23.7 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 deal with police register No. 10, Rule 23.4 (3) (b) empowers the Superintendent of Police to enter in his discretion in Part II of the register the names of "persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not." Rule 23.5 provides that the names of persons who have never been convicted or placed on security for good behaviour shall not be so entered until the Superintendent has recorded definite reasons for doing so. The records of such reasons are treated as confidential. Under Rule 23.7, the suspect is subjected to police surveillance comprising such close watch over his movements by police officers, village headmen, village watchmen as may be practicable without any Illegal interference. Rules 23. 8 to 23.12 and 23.14 deal with history sheets. The records of such reasons are treated as confidential. Under Rule 23.7, the suspect is subjected to police surveillance comprising such close watch over his movements by police officers, village headmen, village watchmen as may be practicable without any Illegal interference. Rules 23. 8 to 23.12 and 23.14 deal with history sheets. Under Rule 23.9 (2), a history sheet may be "opened by or under the written orders of a police officer not below the rank of inspector for any person not entered in police register No. 10 "who is reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of such persons". The history sheet is in Form No. 23.9 and contains the description of the suspect, particulars of his property and mode of earning livelihood, his relations, connections and associates, the crimes to which he is believed to be addicted, his convictions, if any, and his movements, and details of the written and oral suspicions including the names and residences of the complainants. Under Rule 23.10, history sheets are kept in three separate bundles. Bundle 'A' contains the history sheets of persons whose names are entered in police register No. 10. The validity of the rules is not challenged before us. 6. Under Section 23 of the Police Act, 1861, the police is under a duty to prevent commission of offences and to collect intelligence affecting the public peace. For the efficient discharge of their duties, the police officers are empowered by the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 to open the history sheets of suspects and to enter their names in police register No. 10. These powers must be exercised with caution and in strict conformity with the rules. The condition precedent to the opening of history sheet under Rule 23.9 (2) is that the suspect is a person "reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of such person". Similarly, the condition precedent to the entry of the names of the suspects in Part II of police register No. 10 under Rule 23.4 (3) (b) is that they are "persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not". If the action of the police officers is challenged, they must justify their action and must show that the condition precedent has been satisfied. 7. If the action of the police officers is challenged, they must justify their action and must show that the condition precedent has been satisfied. 7. A habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime is one who is criminal by habit or by disposition formed by repetition of crimes. Reasonable belief of the police officer that the suspect is a habitual offender or is a person habitually addicted to crime is sufficient to justify action under Rules 23.4 (3) (b) and 23.9 (2). Mere belief is not sufficient. The belief must be reasonable, it must be based on reasonable grounds. The suspect may or may not have been convicted of any crime. Even apart from any conviction, there may be reasonable grounds for believing that he is a habitual offender. 8. The question, therefore, is whether the respondents had reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant was a habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime. The appellant was charged with crime on three occasions for the offence of forging railway tickets and receipts. In the first case, he was discharged for want of evidence. In the second case, he was convicted by the trial Court, but the conviction was set aside by the High Court. In the third case, the appellant was discharged by the Court on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case. So far, the appellant has not been convicted of any crime. But the second respondent filed an affidavit stating that the police administration has definite information about the unlawful activities of the appellant and on such information the respondents reasonably believed that he was a habitual offender indulging in the nefarious trade of forging railway tickets and receipts. The first respondent filed a supporting affidavit adopting this statement. The grounds of this belief are to be found in the information collected in the history sheet of the appellant. The history sheet was referred to in the affidavits, and the respondents swore that from the information at their disposal they reasonably believed the appellant to be a habitual offender. On the special facts of this case, the High Court accepted this statement and did not think it necessary to call upon the respondents to supply the details of their information or to produce the history sheet. On the special facts of this case, the High Court accepted this statement and did not think it necessary to call upon the respondents to supply the details of their information or to produce the history sheet. We are unable to say that the High Court erred in the appreciation of evidence, or that its judgment should be reversed." 14. The word "habitual offender" has been considered in Para 7 of the said judgment. The judgment aforesaid was not brought to the notice of the court in the case of Ramgopal Jain (supra). The definition of "habitual offender" was given while considering pari materia provisions. It was also held that suspect may or may not have been convicted. The petitioner therein was acquitted in all the cases yet Apex Court did not interfere in the judgment of this court. The conviction was not taken as a condition for habitual offender while considering the pari materia provisions. 15. The other judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Malak Singh & Ors. v. State of P & H and Ors., reported in AIR 1981 SC 760 is also in reference to pari materia provisions to Rules of 1965. In the aforesaid case, without conviction in any case, name was entered in the surveillance register and had been questioned. The Apex Court refused to interfere therein. The requirement of conviction for habitual offender was not accepted. In the case of Ramgopal Jain (supra), the judgment aforesaid was also not brought to the notice of the court otherwise Rule 4.4(3) (b) would have been considered in the light of the judgment in the case of Malak Singh (supra). Paras 2, 4 to 7, 8 and 10 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder for ready reference: "2. In the High Court, counter affidavits on behalf of the respondents were filed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, who claimed that the appellants were opium smugglers and habitual offenders and receivers of stolen property and therefore, their names were entered in the surveillance register. It was, however, denied that their photographs had been displayed at the Police Station. It was pleaded that the reasons for entering their names in the surveillance register were to be found in the history sheets which were confidential documents and which, therefore, could not be disclosed. It was, however, denied that their photographs had been displayed at the Police Station. It was pleaded that the reasons for entering their names in the surveillance register were to be found in the history sheets which were confidential documents and which, therefore, could not be disclosed. It was also pleaded that one of the appellants had been convicted in a criminal case but it transpires from the rejoinder filed by the appellants that the conviction was set aside on appeal. As the Writ Petitions were dismissed by the High Court, the appellants have preferred these two appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court. 4. Chapter 23 of the Punjab Police rules deals with prevention of offences. Rule 23.4 which provides for the maintenance of a surveillance register in every Police Station is in the following terms : 23.4(1) In every police station, other than those of the railway police, a Surveillance Register shall be maintained in Form 23.4(1). (2) In part I of such register shall be entered the names of persons commonly resident within or commonly frequenting the local jurisdiction of the police station concerned, who belong to one or more of the following classes :- (a) All persons who have been proclaimed under Section 87, CrPC (Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973). (b) All released convicts in regard to whom an order under Section 565, Criminal Procedure Code, has been made (Section 356 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973). (c) All convicts the execution of whose sentence is suspended in the whole, or any part of whose punishment has been remitted conditionally under Section 401, Criminal Procedure Code (Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973) (d) All persons restricted under Rules of Government made under Section 16 of the Restriction of Habitual Offenders (Punjab) Act, 1918. (3) In Part II of such register may be entered at the discretion of the Superintendent- (a) persons who have been convicted twice, or more than twice, of offences mentioned in Rule 27.29; (b) persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not; (c) persons under security under Sections 109 or 110, CrPC; (d) convicts, released before the expiration of their sentences under the Prisons Act and Remission Rules without the imposition of any conditions. Note. Note. - This rule must be strictly construed, and entries must be confined to the names of persons falling in the four classes named therein. Rule 23.5 provides that the surveillance register shall be written up by the officer incharge of the Police Station personally or by an Assistant Sub Inspector. No entry in Part II is to be made except by the order of the Superintendent of Police and no entry in Part I is to be made except by the order of a Gazetted Officer. It is also provided that ordinarily a history sheet shall be opened for a person before his name is entered in Part II of the Surveillance Register. If from the entries in the history sheet the Superintendent is of opinion that such person should be subjected to surveillance he shall enter his name in Part II of the register. In the case of persons who have never been convicted or placed on security for good behaviour their names shall not be entered until the Superintendent has recorded definite reasons for doing so. The recording of reasons is to be treated as confidential. Rule 23.7 prescribes that Police surveillance shall comprise such close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance, by Police Officers, Village headmen and village watchmen as may be applicable without any illegal interference. Rule 23.8 provides that the initial preparation of a history sheet is to be done with great care and invariably, by the officer incharge of the Police Station or by a thoroughly experienced Sub Inspector. Detailed provision is made in the Rules with regard to the preparation, maintenance and custody of history sheets. Rule 23.31 provides that all records connected with Police surveillance are confidential and nothing contained in them may be communicated to any person and that inspection may not be allowed or copies given. The District Magistrate and the Illaqa Magistrate are, however, entitled to examine the records in accordance with Rules 1. 15 and 1.21. 5. As mentioned by us, earlier, the vires of the Punjab Police Rules which provide for the maintenance of the surveillance register was not questioned before us, perhaps, because of Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1963 CriLJ 329 and Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., 1975 Cri LJ 1111. 15 and 1.21. 5. As mentioned by us, earlier, the vires of the Punjab Police Rules which provide for the maintenance of the surveillance register was not questioned before us, perhaps, because of Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1963 CriLJ 329 and Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., 1975 Cri LJ 1111. The two principal questions which were raised for our consideration were whether a person was entitled to be given an opportunity to show cause before his name was included in the surveillance register and whether, in the instant case, their names were included in the register without any grounds for reasonably believing them to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property, as required by Rule 23.4(3)(b). The second submission was based on the circumstance that the appellants have not been previously convicted or placed on security for good behaviour under Section 109 or 110 CrPC or proclaimed as offenders. So, their names could be entered in the surveillance register only if they fitted into the category of persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property, whether they have been convicted of not". 6. Prevention of crime is one of the prime purposes of the Constitution of a police force. The preamble to the Police Act 1861 says : Whereas it is expedient to reorganise the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime. Section 23 of the Police Act prescribes it as the duty of police officers "to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace, to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances". In connection with these duties it will be necessary to keep discreet surveillance over reputed bad characters, habitual offenders and other potential offenders. Organised crime cannot be successfully fought without close watch of suspects. But, surveillance may be intrusive and it may so seriously encroach on the privacy of a citizen as to infringe his fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and the freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d). That cannot be permitted. This is recognised by the Punjab Police Rules themselves. Rule 23.7, which prescribes the mode of surveillance, permits that the close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance but without any illegal interference. That cannot be permitted. This is recognised by the Punjab Police Rules themselves. Rule 23.7, which prescribes the mode of surveillance, permits that the close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance but without any illegal interference. Permissible surveillance is only to the extent of a close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance and no more. So long as surveillance is for the purpose of preventing crime and is confined to the limits prescribed by Rule 23.7 we do not think a person whose name is included in the surveillance register can have a genuine cause for complaint. We may notice here that interference in accordance with law and for the prevention of disorder and crime is an exception recognised even by European Convention of Human Rights to the right to respect for a person's private and family life. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows : (1) Everyone's right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence shall be recognised. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right, except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime or for the protection of health or morals. 7. As we said, discreet surveillance of suspects, habitual and potential offenders, may be necessary and so the maintenance of history sheet and surveillance register may be necessary too, for the purpose of prevention of crime. History sheets and surveillance registers have to be and are confidential documents. Neither the person whose name is entered in the register nor any other member of the public can have access to the surveillance register. The nature and character of the function involved in the making of an entry in the surveillance register is so utterly administrative and non-judicial, that it is difficult to conceive of the application of the rule of audi altrem partem. Such enquiry as may be made has necessarily to be confidential and it appears to us to necessarily exclude the application of that principle. In fact observance of the principles of natural justice may defeat the very object of the rule providing for surveillance. There is every possibility of the ends of justice being defeated instead of being served. Such enquiry as may be made has necessarily to be confidential and it appears to us to necessarily exclude the application of that principle. In fact observance of the principles of natural justice may defeat the very object of the rule providing for surveillance. There is every possibility of the ends of justice being defeated instead of being served. It was well observed in Re : K(Infants) [1965] AC 201 But a principle of judicial inquiry, whether fundamental or not, is only a means to an end. If it can be shown in any particular class of case that the observance of a principle of this sort does not serve the ends of justice, it must be dismissed; otherwise it would become the master instead of the servant of justice. 8. The entry in the surveillance register is to be made on the basis of the material provided by the history sheet whose contents, by their very nature have to be confidential. It would be contrary to the public interest to reveal the information in the history sheet, particularly the source of information. Revelation of the source of information may put the informant in jeopardy. The observance of the principle of natural justice, apart from not serving the ends of justice may thus lead to undesirable results. We accordingly held that the rule audi altrem partem is not attracted. 10. Ordinarily the names of persons with previous criminal record alone are entered in the surveillance register. They must be proclaimed offenders, previous convicts, or persons who have already been placed on security for good behaviour. In addition, names of persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not may be entered. It is only in the case of this category of persons that there may be occasion for abuse of the power of the police officer to make entries in the surveillance register. But, here, the entry can only be made by the order of the Superintendent of Police who is prohibited from delegating his authority under Rule 23.5. Further it is necessary that the Superintendent of Police must entertain a reasonable belief that persons whose names are to be entered in Part II are habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property. But, here, the entry can only be made by the order of the Superintendent of Police who is prohibited from delegating his authority under Rule 23.5. Further it is necessary that the Superintendent of Police must entertain a reasonable belief that persons whose names are to be entered in Part II are habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property. While it may not be necessary to supply the grounds of belief to the persons whose names are entered in the surveillance register it may become necessary in some cases to satisfy the Court when an entry is challenged that there are grounds to entertain such reasonable belief. In fact in the present case we sent for the relevant records and we have satisfied ourselves that there were sufficient grounds for the Superintendent of Police to entertain a reasonable belief. In the result we reject both the appeals subject to our observations regarding the mode of surveillance. There is no order as to costs." 16. Para 2 of the judgment gives fact of the case. Therein, appellant was convicted in a criminal case but order of conviction was set aside on appeal. The Apex Court, however, refused to interfere in the action of the Police for entering name in the surveillance register. The only direction given by the Apex Court in the case of Malak Singh (supra) and also in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra) is to take a cautious decision before entering the name in the surveillance register. The Apex Court found that challenge to the provision was not accepted and the reference of those judgments has also been given. The challenge to the provision was made in reference to Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In the light of judgments of the Apex Court, I am unable to take view expressed by this court in the case of Ramgopal Jain (supra) and other cases. The interpretation to the Rule 4.4(3)(b) has been given requiring conviction even for a habitual offender. It is by dividing the said provision in two parts otherwise if entire provision is read then for habitual offender and receiver of stolen property, conviction may or may not be there. The interpretation to the Rule 4.4(3)(b) has been given requiring conviction even for a habitual offender. It is by dividing the said provision in two parts otherwise if entire provision is read then for habitual offender and receiver of stolen property, conviction may or may not be there. The pari materia provision was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra) with a finding that in a case of habitual offender, conviction may or may not be there. 17. It is also a fact that if the definition of "habitual offender" is taken from the Act of 1953 then it would even affect Rule 4.4(3) (a). Therein, requirement is only of two convictions. If intention of the legislature would have been to import the definition of "habitual offender" from the Act of 1953 requiring three convictions then provision of Rule 4.4(3)(a) and (b) would have been provided differently. If a case of habitual offender requires three convictions then in case of a person convicted twice and even if not a habitual offender, name can be entered in the surveillance register by invoking Rule 4.4(3)(a) of the Rules of 1965 making Rule 4.4(3)(b) to be redundant. The Apex Court has refused to interfere in the judgment of the High Court in the similar cases where name of habitual offender was entered in the surveillance register despite no conviction. The provisions considered therein are pari materia to the Rules of 1965. 18. This court has come through other judgment of this court in the case of Shyam Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2012(3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1325. Therein, requirement of conviction was emphasised to enter name in the surveillance register. Therein, counsel did not refer Rule 4.4(3)(b) despite registration of cases thus to be covered by the aforesaid provision. The consideration of the case therein was made only in reference to Rule 4.4(3)(a), whereas, Rule 4.4(3)(b) allows entry of name in the surveillance register if one is habitual offender requiring no conviction. The judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Malak Singh (supra) and in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra) were not brought to the notice of the court. The word "habitual offender" defined under Law Lexicon is also given by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra) and would be applicable to the present case. 19. The word "habitual offender" defined under Law Lexicon is also given by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra) and would be applicable to the present case. 19. In the light of the discussion made above, I am unable to accept the argument raised by learned counsel for petitioner, rather, present case is covered by the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Malak Singh (supra) and Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra). It is no doubt true that if name is to be recorded in the surveillance register in reference to Rule 4.4(3)(a), conviction on two or more occasions would be pre-condition. In the instant case, impugned order does not make reference of Rule 4.4(1)(a) of the Rules of 1965. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.