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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 640 (MP)

Shree Singh v. Vivek Singh

2017-05-08

ANJULI PALO

body2017
JUDGMENT : This civil revision has been filed under section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act by the respondent/tenant, being aggrieved by order dated 19-2-2016, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Satna, in Case No. 22A-90/2012-13, whereby the respondent's application for eviction of non-applicant/petitioner from suit premises has been allowed, under section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 2. Petitioner submits that the Rent Controlling Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for eviction of premises, except the categories of persons specified in the provisions of section 23-J of the Act. The respondents do not fall under the same. The petitioner further contended that the Rent Controlling Authority completely overlooked the material placed before him by the parties and drew wrong findings on the fact and law. Therefore, the petitioner prayed to set aside the impugned order dated 19-2-2016 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. 3. On the other hand, respondents claimed that respondent No. 2 is retired employee of the Air-force. He is an aged person. Both the respondents are co-owners. The disputed house is required for residence of respondent No. 2 for his treatment at Satna. The suit premises is suitable for him. He has no other alternative accommodation at Satna. Further, it is submitted that, according to the rent agreement, the disputed house was rented only for one year. After completion of one year the petitioner has not vacated the same, therefore, application under section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act has been filed for eviction. 4. Learned Rent Controlling Authority found that the respondents are the landlords of the suit house and the petitioner is the tenant for residential purpose. According to the agreement dated 13-3-2012, after expiry of one year, the suit premises was not vacated by him. Therefore, the learned Rent Controlling Authority passed an eviction order against the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the record. 6. The point for determination of this revision is that “whether the respondents come under the special category of land lord as prescribed in section 23-J0 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act?” 7. In section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, a retired person is entitled to seek eviction of his house on the ground of bona fide requirement of residential purpose. That provision provides a special summary procedure for the hearing of application. In section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, a retired person is entitled to seek eviction of his house on the ground of bona fide requirement of residential purpose. That provision provides a special summary procedure for the hearing of application. From the impugned order, it is apparently clear that only the respondent No. 2 is a retired person. 8. To the contrary, the pleadings of the respondents are that they are co-owners, annexure R/1-3 indicates that the suit house was financed by Bank loan, in which respondent No. 1 is the borrower. Tenancy deed/agreement dated 15-3-2011 executed only by respondent No. 1, who is not covered under the definition of “landlord” as prescribed in section 23-J of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 9. In case of B. Johnson v. C.S. Naidu, 1985 M.P.LJ. 675 : AIR 1986 M.P. 72 , it is held that: “Section 23-J specifies the categories of landlords, who alone are entitled to the benefit of Chapter III-A. The test laid down by the Supreme Court in Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratanlal Bhargava, (1984) 2 SCC 75 : AIR 1984 SC 967 , for permissible classification amongst the landlords for conferral of the benefit of the special procedure is fully satisfied by section 23-J. These landlords specified in section 23-J belong to a special category distinct from the remaining landlords, who deserve the benefit of the special procedure on account of their need being more pressing and the handicap from which they suffer as compared to the remaining landlords, the object of the amendment being to provide for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. Confining this benefit only to these categories of the landlords specified in section 23-J, on account of the greater handicap from which they suffer as compared to other landlords, after taking into account the misuse of the special procedure by certain landlords not falling in these categories, indicates a reasonable nexus of the classification with the object sought to be achieved by the legislature.” 10. The respondent No. 1 is not the owner of the suit house. No document has been filed by the respondents which would prove that the respondent No. 2 is the co-owner of the suit house. Respondent No. 1 does not come under the special category of landlords even though his father was retired government employee. The respondent No. 1 is not the owner of the suit house. No document has been filed by the respondents which would prove that the respondent No. 2 is the co-owner of the suit house. Respondent No. 1 does not come under the special category of landlords even though his father was retired government employee. The only remedy available to the respondent No. 1 is to file civil suit under section 12(1)(e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. By filing an application under 23-A of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, respondent No. 1 is apparently misusing the provisions of the Accommodation Control Act to evacuate the tenant/applicant. 11. It is also apparently clear that, to get relief under 23-A(a) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, he has named his father as the borrower and then executed Power of Attorney in favour of his father, for looking after the matters relating to the suit house. 12. In the case of Dhannalal v. Kalawati Bai, 2000 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 10 : 2003 (1) JLJ 85 (SC), it is well settled that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of the tenant and this defence is not open to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit. 13. This principle is applicable when the property forming the subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners. Every co-owner owns every part and bit of the joint property, along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. 14. The situation in this case is different. In the present case, may be respondent No. 2 assists respondent No. 1 for clearing the house loan which actually obtained only by respondent No. 1. There is no document on record to show that respondent No. 2 is the co-owner. If the respondent No. 2 was the co-owner of the suit house, then he could have entitled to file application under section 23-A(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 15. There is no document on record to show that respondent No. 2 is the co-owner. If the respondent No. 2 was the co-owner of the suit house, then he could have entitled to file application under section 23-A(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the case of Suryanarayan v. Shyamlal Vyas, 2003 (4) M.P.L.J. 336 in which it is held that under section 23-A(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, the bona fide requirement in respect of family members of a landlord also extends to grand children. 16. In the present case, situation is different. Thus, this Court finds that the findings of Rent Controlling Authority is not according to law, which is contrary to law and perverse. Accordingly, this revision is allowed. The finding of the learned Rent Controlling Authority is hereby set aside.