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2017 DIGILAW 641 (PNJ)

Jasbir Singh v. Union of India

2017-03-06

SNEH PRASHAR

body2017
JUDGMENT : SNEH PRASHAR, J. 1. The petitioner is aggrieved of the order dated 29.11.2016 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur, by virtue of which the application filed by respondents-appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act of 1963') seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal was allowed. 2. The submissions made Mr. Rai Singh Chauhan, learned counsel representing the petitioner have been considered. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the appeal filed by respondent-Union of India against the judgment and decree dated 24.08.2015 passed in favour of the petitioner was barred by limitation on account of delay of 85/86 days in filing the same. No sufficient explanation for the delay could be stated by the respondents in the application filed by them invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 for condonation of delay. For the mere reason that the respondent was a State, delay was not to be condoned accepting the usual explanation that the file remained pending due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. They cannot sleep over the matter for an indefinite period. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government departments. To support his arguments, learned counsel relies upon State of Haryana vs. Kanshi Ram, 2012(6) R.C.R. (Civil) 2671 and Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr., 2012 AIR (SC) 1506. 4. A perusal of the impugned order shows that on the application filed for condonation of delay by the respondents and the objections raised by the petitioner, learned first appellate Court framed issues and accorded opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence in support of their rival contentions. The reasons for allowing the application by learned trial Court, in Para No.11 of the order, are as under:- “Impugned judgment and decree was passed by learned trial court on 24.08.2015. Perusal of certified copy placed on record shows that certified copy of impugned judgment and decree was applied on 25.08.2015 and same was supplied on 18.09.2015. Thereafter present appeal was filed on 13.01.2016 alongwith the present application. As such, there is delay of around 85/86 days in filing the appeal. Perusal of certified copy placed on record shows that certified copy of impugned judgment and decree was applied on 25.08.2015 and same was supplied on 18.09.2015. Thereafter present appeal was filed on 13.01.2016 alongwith the present application. As such, there is delay of around 85/86 days in filing the appeal. Perusal of certified copy of impugned judgment and decree on record also shows that same was marked and highlighted by officer of appellants department while going through the same. Accordingly, fresh certified copy of impugned judgment and decree was applied on 17.12.2015 and same was supplied on 11.01.2016. Thereafter present appeal was filed immediately after two days. Perusal of documents placed on record by appellants/ applicants Ex.A-1 to Ex.A6 show that approval to file the appeal was received from Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of law and Justice. In the process, file went through hands of Deputy Commandant, CIF Allahabad and Commandant CISF New Delhi. It was natural for the department to take a decision to file the appeal in such a procedure. Without doubt, case of a Government Department is not on a different footing while dealing with an application to condone the delay but at the same time, court can not ignore the processes being followed by Government Departments while filing the appeal. Moreover, in the case in hand, there is delay of only 85/86 days in filing the present appeal. It is cardinal principle of law that as far as possible, a matter should be decided on merits.” 5. There are no two thoughts on the proposition of law that the law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirlled for the benefit of few. The law of limitation applies equally to the cases relating to Government department as to any other individual. However, in G. Ramegowda, Major and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 , the principles enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 15 & 17 are as under:- "15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 17. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making." 6. Similarly, in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 , Hon'ble Supreme Court observed and laid down as follows:- "when the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand but more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay.” 7. The expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Act of 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. It is always in the interest of justice that the matter in dispute between the parties is decided on merits. It is always in the interest of justice that the matter in dispute between the parties is decided on merits. Learned counsel failed to demonstrate any illegality, misreading of evidence or mis-appreciation of facts on part of learned Additional District Judge. As such, there appears no ground for intervention in the order impugned by the petitioner and the petition is dismissed.