JUDGMENT : K.M. Joseph, J. 1. These three Appeals relate to common subject matter. Special Appeal No. 191 of 2017 is directed against the judgment in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2921 of 2016. Special Appeal No. 423 of 2017, which is filed by the very same appellants as in Special Appeal No. 191 of 2017, is directed against the order passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1291 of 2017. Special Appeal No. 437 of 2017, which is filed by other appellants, is directed against the order passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1566 of 2017. 2. Reliefs sought in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2921 of 2016 are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the tender notice issued online on 15.10.2016 (Annexure No. 8) by respondent no. 2 being against the Rules 2015. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding respondent no. 2 to issue fresh tender as per the Gazeett Notification of relevant Rules 2015 issued by the State of Uttarakhand.” 3. Reliefs sought in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1291 of 2017 are as follows: “1. To summon the complete record pertaining to the case. 2. To issue the Writ, Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus setting aside and declaring the entire tender process right from the floating of illegal e-tender dated 6-5-17 (annexure no. 7) uptill the award of tender in favour of respondent no. 3 to be void ab-initio and vitiated due to illegalities and irregularities committed therein. 3. To issue the Writ, Order or Direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent no. 2 to issue fresh tender as per the Gazette Notification of Relevant Rules 2015 issued by the State of Uttarakhand after permitting the Proprietor ship firm like that of the petitioners herein to participate in the same.” 4. Reliefs sought in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1566 of 2017 are as follows: “(a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the tender floated by the respondent No. 1 dated 3.05.2017, thereby inviting bids for the grant of advertisement rights in respect of 126 Unipoles and 700 pole kiosks within the Nagar Nigam Limits of District Haridwar. (b) To restrain the respondent No. 1 to execute any agreement with respondent No. 2 for the grant of advertisement rights in respect of 126 Unipoles and 700 pole kiosks within the Nagar Nigam Limits of District Haridwar.” 5. The question, which is raised in all these cases, relates to legality & validity of two clauses in the advertisement issued by the respondent-Local Body in the matter of settling their right to advertise on public land. The two conditions, which have been taken exception to by the appellants, are, in substance, as follows: The condition, which is stipulated, is found to be in Clause 21, 22 & 48, which read as under: “Clause 21. The bidder shall be a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or a Partnership registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 for the last three years, and inter-alia should be in the business of outdoor advertising in India and should have at atleast average turnover of; Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crore only) or more during last three financial year viz. 2013-14, 2014-15 & 2015-16. In this connection bidders are required to submit the audited balance sheet and profit and loss account for last three financial years certified by a Chartered Accountant. Clause 22. The bidder should be recognized for outdoor advertisement services. Copy of the valid certification of registration as advertising agency should be attached. Clause 48. BID DOCUMENTS FOR EVALUATION PROCESS A. (ii) Copy of incorporation/registration of company under Company Act 1956. (iii) PAN Card together with copy of trade licence, registration of service tax etc. (iv) Copy of duly Audited Balance Sheet and profit and loss A/c for last three Financial Year with an average turnover of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crore only) or more during last three financial year viz 2013-14 & 2014-15.” 6. It should be noted that the appellants are not Partnership Firms or Companies. Thus, they take exception to the condition that the bidder should be a Company registered under the Companies Act or a Partnership registered under the Indian Partnership Act. The next condition, which is apparently taken exception to, is that they should have at least an average turnover of Rs. 3 Crores during the last three financial years, namely, 2013-14, 2014-15 & 2015-16. The next condition, which is apparently taken exception to, is that they should have at least an average turnover of Rs. 3 Crores during the last three financial years, namely, 2013-14, 2014-15 & 2015-16. The bidders were to submit the audited balance sheet and profit & loss account for last three financial years certified by a Chartered Accountant. In Special Appeal No. 191 of 2017, which arises out of Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2921 of 2016, as can be noted, the claim of the appellants/petitioners was rejected by the learned Single Judge vide judgment in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2921 of 2016. The learned Single Judge did not find favour with their contentions in relation to three conditions, which are seemingly taken from the perusal of the judgment. In the first place, contention was taken that the various sites available could not be clubbed together and the rights are to be separately sold in respect of the sites. The second contention, as already noticed, that the Natural Persons or Proprietorship Firm being excluded also did not find favour with the learned Single Judge. The following is the reasoning: “8. On this, the case of the Municipal Corporation is that their past experience shows that they did not get bid offers for the sites which were less profitable. The bidders only make their bid for the most profitable sites and, therefore, the Corporation incurs a loss of revenue, as there were no bidders for less profitable sites. Learned counsel for the Corporation has further drawn attention of this Court, by means of supplementary counter affidavit, to the amount the Corporation has been receiving for the last five years, details of which are reproduced below: Sl. No. Financial Year Total Income 1 2011-12 Rs. 21,02,725.00/- 2 2012-13 Rs. 16,36,900.00/- 3 2013-14 Rs. 2,07,000.00/- 4 2014-15 Rs. 1,00,000.00/- 5 2015-16 Rs. 29,19,295.00/- 9. In the last financial year i.e. 2015-16, the bids were for only Rupees Twenty Nine Lakhs odd. This time the minimum reserve price fixed is Rupees One Crore Seventy Two Lakhs and the Corporation expects to get anything higher than the said amount. Therefore, there are clear cut financial implications as well. The Corporation is well within its rights to fix the financial capacity of a bidder. This argument of the petitioners thus also fails.” 7. This time the minimum reserve price fixed is Rupees One Crore Seventy Two Lakhs and the Corporation expects to get anything higher than the said amount. Therefore, there are clear cut financial implications as well. The Corporation is well within its rights to fix the financial capacity of a bidder. This argument of the petitioners thus also fails.” 7. Thereafter, an argument was raised that the conditions have been tailor-made to suit the sole bidder, who has come forward. It was found that, as a response to the bid, only the party respondent has so far applied and there was no other applicant; naturally, the bid is responsive and, being above the reserve price, it will go to the third respondent. 8. The case of the Corporation is set out in Paragraph No. 11. It reads as follows: “11. In reply to this, the learned counsel for the Corporation would argue that prior to the present tender notice earlier the advertisements were given thrice but none responded and it is only after the fourth advertisement that respondent no. 3 has made a responsive bid. Moreover, as per Rule 33 (g) of the Uttarakhand Procurement (Amendment) Rules, 2015, which is applicable in the present case, in case of e-tendering contract can be given to the sole bidder. Moreover, it has been categorically submitted by the learned counsel for the Corporation that the amount which would be received by the Corporation would not be less that the reserved price.” 9. Finding no merit, the writ petition came to be dismissed. 10. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge proceeded to hold as follows: “13. Having made the above determination, though there is actually no legal infirmity with the conditions, yet considering that respondent no. 3 is the lone responsive bidder, it is better if the Municipal Corporation gives a fresh advertisement, in order to remove all apprehensions. The respondent Corporation shall, therefore, give a fresh advertisement inviting bids. However, in the advertisement it would be open for the respondents to clarify that such persons who have already made a bid would be at liberty either to make fresh bid or continue with the earlier tender notice. The respondent Corporation shall, therefore, give a fresh advertisement inviting bids. However, in the advertisement it would be open for the respondents to clarify that such persons who have already made a bid would be at liberty either to make fresh bid or continue with the earlier tender notice. In case of any practical difficulty with the respondents from starting the process de novo as it may lead to constituting new committees, the liberty is given to the Corporation to invite bids either through fresh tender notice or by issuing a corrigendum in continuation of the earlier tender notice dated 15.10.2016, by giving the prospective bidders enough time for making fresh bids. The invitation of fresh bid must be widely circulated in at least two local newspapers of the locality which have a wide circulation.” 11. It is pursuant to the direction contained in Paragraph No. 13 that the matter was again re-tendered. After the matter was re-tendered, fresh petition was filed as Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1291 of 2017 with the reliefs, which we have already noticed. The learned Single Judge passed the following order: “The petitioners are all proprietorship firms, which are into advertising business. The petitioners applied in pursuance of E-Tender notice dated 03.05.2017 published by the Municipal Corporation, Haridwar for grant of advertising rights within the Municipal limits of Corporation. The main grounds for challenge are primarily two. Firstly, as per the condition of the advertisement, only a company registered under the Indian Companies Act or a registered partnership firm can apply. Secondly, as per the impugned tender notice, a partnership firm must have a turn over of at least Rupees Three Crores and a prospective bidder has to deposit 10% of the proposed premium of the bid amount with the Corporation. The petitioners contend that since the condition for depositing 10% of the proposed premium by a prospective bidder is already there, therefore, imposition of an additional condition of having Rupees Three Crores turn over is violative of the Statute itself. 2. All the same, the petitioners had earlier filed a writ petition being WPMS No. 2921 of 2016 as well, challenging the same advertisement process, which was issued for the first time on 15.10.2016, under the same conditions. 2. All the same, the petitioners had earlier filed a writ petition being WPMS No. 2921 of 2016 as well, challenging the same advertisement process, which was issued for the first time on 15.10.2016, under the same conditions. As far as the issue regarding the eligibility condition of Rupees Three Crores turnover is concerned that have already been decided by this Court vide its judgment and order dated 10.04.2017, and it has been held that there is nothing improper about it considering the facts and circumstances of the case, whereby in the last few years considering the amount of revenue to be generated by the Government and for the reasons already given by this Court in its judgment and order dated 10.04.2017. 3. The first argument of the petitioners that the eligibility is restricted to a Company or a Firm cannot be dealt with now as an objection has been raised by the respondents that this is barred by res judicata or at least constructive res judicata, as the same conditions existed at the earlier time as well, when the petitioners had filed a writ petition before this Court. Moreover, the petitioners have already filed a special appeal which is presently pending consideration before the Division Bench of this Court. Further, this Court has been informed that the Division Bench of this Court is ceased with the matter and the proposition which has come from the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the issue whether an individual can be totally barred from participating in the bid process has not been dealt with in an elaborated manner in the earlier judgment and the same aspect is under consideration before the Division Bench of this Court. It would be better in the interest of justice that no interference be made by this Court in the present matter as the petitioners are already pursuing the matter before the Division Bench of this Court. 4. Interim order dated 02.06.2017 is hereby vacated. 5. List this case after eight weeks in the daily cause list.” 12. In the writ petition filed by the other appellants, namely, the appellants in Special Appeal No. 437 of 2017, the Court passed the following order: “The petitioners before this Court have challenged the advertisement dated 03.05.2017. 4. Interim order dated 02.06.2017 is hereby vacated. 5. List this case after eight weeks in the daily cause list.” 12. In the writ petition filed by the other appellants, namely, the appellants in Special Appeal No. 437 of 2017, the Court passed the following order: “The petitioners before this Court have challenged the advertisement dated 03.05.2017. This Court has already adjourned the similar matter for eight weeks by passing the following order:- “The petitioners are all proprietorship firms, which are into advertising business. The petitioners applied in pursuance of E-Tender notice dated 03.05.2017 published by the Municipal Corporation, Haridwar for grant of advertising rights within the Municipal limits of Corporation. The main grounds for challenge are primarily two. Firstly, as per the condition of the advertisement, only a company registered under the Indian Companies Act or a registered partnership firm can apply. Secondly, as per the impugned tender notice, a partnership firm must have a turn over of at least Rupees Three Crores and a prospective bidder has to deposit 10% of the proposed premium of the bid amount with the Corporation. The petitioners contend that since the condition for depositing 10% of the proposed premium by a prospective bidder is already there, therefore, imposition of an additional condition of having Rupees Three Crores turn over is violative of the Statute itself. All the same, the petitioners had earlier filed a writ petition being WPMS No. 2921 of 2016 as well, challenging the same advertisement process, which was issued for the first time on 15.10.2016, under the same conditions. As far as the issue regarding the eligibility condition of Rupees Three Crores turnover is concerned that have already been decided by this Court vide its judgment and order dated 10.04.2017, and it has been held that there is nothing improper about it considering the facts and circumstances of the case, whereby in the last few years considering the amount of revenue to be generated by the Government and for the reasons already given by this Court in its judgment and order dated 10.04.2017. The first argument of the petitioners that the eligibility is restricted to a Company or a Firm cannot be dealt with now as an objection has been raised by the respondents that this is barred by res judicata or at least constructive res judicata, as the same conditions existed at the earlier time as well, when the petitioners had filed a writ petition before this Court. Moreover, the petitioners have already filed a special appeal which is presently pending consideration before the Division Bench of this Court. Further, this Court has been informed that the Division Bench of this Court is ceased with the matter and the proposition which has come from the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the issue whether an individual can be totally barred from participating in the bid process has not been dealt with in an elaborated manner in the earlier judgment and the same aspect is under consideration before the Division Bench of this Court. It would be better in the interest of justice that no interference be made by this Court in the present matter as the petitioners are already pursuing the matter before the Division Bench of this Court.” 2. However, there is an additional fact brought before this Court by the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 that for the same relief, petitioners have already filed a civil suit which is pending before the court below being Suit No. 266 of 2016, and therefore, the petitioners are pursuing the same remedy at two Forums. 3. List this case after eight weeks in the daily cause list.” 13. We heard Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Special Appeal No. 437 of 2017. We also heard Mr. Arvind Vashisht, learned Senior Counsel, who appeared on behalf of the appellants in Special Appeal No. 191 of 2017 and Special Appeal No. 423 of 2017. Besides the same, we also heard Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the Local Body and also Mr. Subhash Upadhyay, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the successful tenderer to whom the work has been awarded during the pendency of the proceedings. 14. The contention, which has been raised by Mr. Besides the same, we also heard Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the Local Body and also Mr. Subhash Upadhyay, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the successful tenderer to whom the work has been awarded during the pendency of the proceedings. 14. The contention, which has been raised by Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is as follows: The matter is governed by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred as “the Act”). He would submit that the Rules have been framed in regard to the advertisement, which is called the Uttarakhand Nagar Nigam (Advertising License and Fixation of Tax on Advertisement and Recovery) Rules, 2015. Neither in the Act nor in the Rules, there is a provision for excluding the Proprietorship Firm or Natural Person or for fixing the condition relating to the turnover, as has been done. He would submit that the conditions to which exception is taken contained no logic. They are without any rationale. They are not reasonable. He would, in fact, submit that, as can be noticed in the facts of this case, the party respondent to whom the contract has been awarded hails from another State and the Court may consider the impact, not only with reference to the facts of this case or the destiny of the appellants; but, the plight of the contractors from Uttarakhand, as they will be pitted against competitors from all over India (it may be noticed that the present tender is an e-tender, which is floated on All India basis). He would submit that it may have been different that the Local Body though it fit to insist upon a bank guarantee even in a sum of Rs. 3 Crores; but, to insist upon a turnover for the past three years and, that too, to the tune of Rs. 3 Crores cannot be sustained. He referred us to Section 305 of the Act. It comes under heading “Sky-signs and Advertisements”. It reads as follows: “305. Regulation as to sky-signs.- (1) No person shall, without the written permission of the [Municipal Commissioner], erect, fix or retain any sky-sign of the kind prescribed by rules whether existing on the appointed day or not. He referred us to Section 305 of the Act. It comes under heading “Sky-signs and Advertisements”. It reads as follows: “305. Regulation as to sky-signs.- (1) No person shall, without the written permission of the [Municipal Commissioner], erect, fix or retain any sky-sign of the kind prescribed by rules whether existing on the appointed day or not. Such written permission shall be granted, or renewed, for any period not exceeding two years from the date of each such permission or renewal, subject to the condition that such permission shall be deemed to be void if – (a) any addition is made to the sky-sign except for the purpose of making it secure under the direction of the [Municipal Commissioner]; (b) any change is made in the sky-sign or any part thereof; (c) the sky-sign or any part thereof fall either through accident, decay or any other cause; (d) any addition or alteration is made, to or in, the building or structure upon or over which the sky-sign is erected, fixed or retained, involving the disturbance of the sky-sign or any part thereof; (e) the building or structure upon or over which the sky-sign is erected, fixed or retained becomes unoccupied or be demolished or destroyed. (2) Where any sky-sign shall be erected, fixed or retained after the appointed day upon or over any land, building or structure, save and except as permitted as hereinbefore provided the owner or person in occupation of such land, building or structure shall be deemed to be the person who has erected, fixed or retained such sky-sign in contravention of the provisions of this section, unless he proves that such contravention was committed by a person not in his employment or under his control, or was committed without his connivance. (3) If any sky-sign be erected, fixed or retained contrary to the provisions of this section, or after permission for the erection, fixing or retention thereof for any period shall have expired or become void, the Municipal Commissioner may, by written notice, require the owner or occupier of the land, building or structure upon or over which the sky-sign is erected, fixed or retained, to take down and remove such sky-sign.” 15. He would, therefore, attempt to draw the conclusion that the Act provides for an interdiction against any person using a Sky-sign without the written permission of the Municipal Commissioner. He would, therefore, attempt to draw the conclusion that the Act provides for an interdiction against any person using a Sky-sign without the written permission of the Municipal Commissioner. The word “any person” would, undoubtedly, comprehend within itself a Natural Person or a Proprietorship Firm. 16. Mr. Arvind Vashistha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, in the other two appeals, would submit that the Rules were made in the year 2012. They were not published. This Court ruled that, being not published, action could not be taken on the basis of the said Rules. The matter was earlier governed by the Rules, which prevailed earlier, and the attempt of the Local Body to rake up the issue relating to cartels being found or the amounts being low in the previous years cannot be accepted. In this regard, he would also along with Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel point out that the advertising rights were being settled site-wise and some of the sites would be more profitable than the other. This is for the first time that the sites are all put together and rights auctioned. Therefore, the claim of the respondents that the offer for an amount running to about Rs. 2 crores and that too for a period of two years has been received will not hold good. It is pointed out that when the right is settled site-wise and it is calculated accordingly, the claim of the respondents must be discountenanced accordingly. 17. Next, Mr. Arvind Vashistha, learned Senior Counsel would draw our attention to Rule 2(1)(b) of the Rules of 2015. The translation of the same reads as follows: “Rule 2 (1) ( [k )Advertiser, an advertiser means any person/advertising agency who has been granted permission under this manual to erect, advertise, paste, display or hang any advertisement or bill board.” 18. It provides for the definition of Advertiser. Thereafter, he would submit that the word “Advertiser” is intended to include any person/advertising agency and that would certainly take in persons other than the Proprietorship Firm or Company. 19. Next, he would point out Rule 3 of Uttarakhand Nagar Nigam (Advertisement License and Fixation of Tax on Advertisement and Recovery) Rules, 2015. It reads as follows: Rule 3:-(1) Constitution of Committee for selection of sites. 19. Next, he would point out Rule 3 of Uttarakhand Nagar Nigam (Advertisement License and Fixation of Tax on Advertisement and Recovery) Rules, 2015. It reads as follows: Rule 3:-(1) Constitution of Committee for selection of sites. A Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Municipal Commissioner would select appropriate sites situated at the sides of public road, which are fit as per security and free flow of traffic for installation of advertisement boards. Such identified sites would be endorsed on the map. On these selected sites license for installing Advertising boards would be granted as per auction proceedings on the basis of highest received premium including advertising tax. (2) Constitution of Committee would be as follows: (a) Municipal Commissioner-Chairman (b) Incharge of traffic in city a gazetted officer (traffic Police department)-Member (c) Executive Engineer, PWD-Member (d) Executive Engineer/Assistant Engineer, Nagar Nigam-Member (e) a representative nominated by District Magistrate (not below the rank of SDM) Member (f) a nominated representative from Development Authority-Member (g) Additional Municipal Commissioner/(Deputy Municipal Commissioner) Member Secretary (3) For the grant of license on the sites identified by the Committee constituted under Rule-3 sub rule (2), the Municipal Commissioner by way of auction proceedings would invite tenders for advertisement tax including premium. The tender proceedings would be held as per the Uttarakhand State Procurement Rules 2008 on the basis of complete competition.” 20. He would submit that the Committee under Rule 3 can only earmark the sites. It does not have the authority to stipulate any conditions, as have been fixed in this case, which are impugned. He would further submit that no decision, in fact, has been taken by a Committee within the Rules so as to affect the rights of the appellants as is contended. No specific pleading is there it is pointed out in the counter affidavit regarding the decision taken to stipulate for the impugned conditions. He would further submit that as far as the fixation of turnover is concerned, it has nothing to do with the fulfillment of the obligations by the successful tenderer if at all. The result will be the stifling of competition. 21. Per contra, Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation would point out that the Local Body was actually faced with the problem that, under the earlier Rules, only the persons, who were registered under the Procurement Rules, could participate in the tender. The result will be the stifling of competition. 21. Per contra, Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation would point out that the Local Body was actually faced with the problem that, under the earlier Rules, only the persons, who were registered under the Procurement Rules, could participate in the tender. They formed the cartel. Very low amounts were being fixed. In fact, it is specifically stated that three times attempts were made to settle the right; but, it did not yield the necessary result. Thereafter, it is the case of the Local Body that an expert Committee went into the matter. They recommended inclusion of the impugned conditions and the council accepted the same and that is how the conditions came into being. It is necessary, at this juncture, to notice the relevant portions of the counter affidavit in this regard. It is in the counter affidavit, inter alia, stated as follows: “9. That it is relevant to mention herein that the averments put forth by the petitioners with respect to the conditions of the financial capacity and further the same are required to be a registered company or a partnership firm are absolutely misconceived and are not sustainable, inasmuch as the Hon’ble Apex Court in a series of judgments has held that if expert committee has formulated such conditions, the same were treated to be absolutely justified, inasmuch as the answering respondent corporation is interested in the quality and standard of the work so that the maximum amount from grant of such rights can be fetched. Further the committee which has taken the decisions having the members well versed with the ground realities and practical situations. 11. That it is relevant to mention herein that the answering respondent corporation has also learnt from the experiences of the other Municipal Corporations in which practical difficulties have been observed in calling separate tenders for each site. Further it is most respectfully submitted that there is possibility of bidders for making cartels and hence considering all over aspect of the matter in the larger interest of the Municipal Corporation, the tender in issue has been issued which is well justified in the eyes of law. Further section 540 r/w 192 and 219 of the Municipal Corporation Act provides the powers to the Municipal Corporation to grant such rights. 12. Further section 540 r/w 192 and 219 of the Municipal Corporation Act provides the powers to the Municipal Corporation to grant such rights. 12. That it is most respectfully submitted that granting of advertisement rights is one of the effective source of income after rents and house tax for the Municipal Corporation and the stay of tender process regarding grant of advertisement rights causes irreparable loss and injuries to the Municipal Corporation on day to day basis. Further the respondent corporation is itself saddled with the financial liability of Rs. 25 crores approximately. 14. That the financial condition of the Municipal Corporation Haridwar itself is bad situation and it has already been saddled that the liability of approximately Rs. 25 Crores. The Municipal Corporation had already issued the tenders thrice earlier, however, the same could not be finalized and no effective income has been received for the last four years i.e. when the Nagar Palika Parishad Haridwar was given the status of the Municipal Corporation. It is also relevant to mention herein that it has been observed that the petitioners and likewise advertisers were making cartel and were offering the rates very less than the markets rates and hence considering the overall aspect of the matters conditions of tenders have been finalized.” 22. It is contended that Proprietorship Firms and other persons are excluded having regard to the need to deal with the persons, who are having professional experience & efficiency and it was, accordingly, decided that only Partnership Firms and Companies, as they would have a better manner of governing their businesses, were to be given the right. It is also pointed out in regard to the stipulation as to turnover that the selected person has obligation under the contract; it is, in fact, submitted that maintenance has to be done and infrastructure work has to be done; Unipoles have to be erected. Therefore, the Local Body thought that it should be dealing with the persons having experience in the line of business with a certain turnover and the same cannot be interfered with. 23. Mr. Subhash Upadhyaya, learned counsel would submit that no interference is called for. In fact, Mr. Subhash Upadhyaya would invite our attention to the Procurement Rules, which are applicable in terms of Rule 3 of 2015 Rules. He would point out Rule 3(3) of the Uttarakhand Procurement Rules, 2008. It reads as follows: “3. 23. Mr. Subhash Upadhyaya, learned counsel would submit that no interference is called for. In fact, Mr. Subhash Upadhyaya would invite our attention to the Procurement Rules, which are applicable in terms of Rule 3 of 2015 Rules. He would point out Rule 3(3) of the Uttarakhand Procurement Rules, 2008. It reads as follows: “3. Fundamental Principles of Procurement. (3) Invitation of competitive bids shall be open to all participants, unless otherwise specified under the rules or specially restricted by the Competent Authority.” 24. He would, therefore, submit that it is open to the competent authority, namely, the council to exclude the persons or stipulate for conditions, as it is provided that invitation of competitive bids can be specially restricted by the competent authority. It is submitted that such restriction was there and it is not challenged. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Mr. Arvind Vashisht would point out, in fact, that a perusal of the pleadings would show that a decision, which is allegedly taken by the competent authority within the meaning of Rule 3(3) of the Procurement Rules, is not made available. It has not been produced before the Court. Therefore, there is no such decision. 26. In answer to this, Mr. Subhash Upadhyay would, in fact, point out Paragraph No. 9 of the rejoinder affidavit. It reads as under: “9. That the contents of para 9 of counter affidavit are not admitted as averred and are denied. The expert committee of Nagar Nigam Haridwar cannot impose arbitrary conditions over and above the Rules 2015. There is no arrangement in the Rules 2015 authorizing the expert committee to impose unreasonable conditions and to issue one tender for different distinct locations/sites.” 27. Therefore, it is not as if the appellants have set up such a case in the pleadings. 28. Even though two Appeals are arising from interim orders, learned Senior Counsel agreed that the issue itself can be decided, though it is pointed out that the writ petitions, two in number, namely, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1291 of 2017 and Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1566 of 2017 are still pending. 29. Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel for the Corporation pointed out that the appellants in Special Appeal No. 437 of 2017, actually, approached the Civil Court. Thereafter, they did not get an order and filed a writ petition. That was withdrawn. 29. Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel for the Corporation pointed out that the appellants in Special Appeal No. 437 of 2017, actually, approached the Civil Court. Thereafter, they did not get an order and filed a writ petition. That was withdrawn. Thereafter, they filed another writ petition, which is the writ petition, from which the Appeal arises, and, thereafter, withdrew the suit and this conduct may be considered. 30. Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would submit that it is not correct, as the Civil Suit was filed in respect of an earlier tender and the suit was also withdrawn subsequently and the Civil Court took the view that it has no jurisdiction in the matter, and, therefore, it will not afflict the case of the appellants. 31. In this case, we are called upon to decide the validity of two conditions in a contract. There can be no doubt that a Local Body is free to enter into a commercial transaction. State and the Authorities falling under Article 12 and the Local Body in this case, an Authority under Article 12, are free as any other private body to enter into a commercial transaction. However, this freedom can stand restrained and controlled by the provisions of any enactment, be it plenary enactment or any subordinate legislation in the form of Rules or Bye-Laws. Subject to the same, a Local Body is free like a private body, just as the Government is free, to enter into a commercial transaction. In the making of the terms of the contract, there is indeed much free-play in the joints as is available to a private individual. Undoubtedly, this is always subject to, however, another supreme consideration, namely, the constitutional guarantee available under Article 14, namely, that the State cannot act arbitrarily in any domain. It is also subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, the chapter relating to the Fundamental Rights. Subject to the State acting within the four corners of the authority under the Constitution and the Laws, its freedom cannot be called into question. 32. In the matter of considering, whether a condition is vulnerable to judicial scrutiny and invalidation, the matter is no longer res-integra, as the Hon’ble Apex Court has spoken on a number of occasions in this regard. 32. In the matter of considering, whether a condition is vulnerable to judicial scrutiny and invalidation, the matter is no longer res-integra, as the Hon’ble Apex Court has spoken on a number of occasions in this regard. This Court had occasion, in fact, recently to deal with a case which related to the grant of rights to carry on fishing in respect of areas covered by certain Dams within the State in Special Appeal No. 977 of 2017 & Special Appeal No. 980 of 2017. Therein, we had occasion to refer to various conditions and we had held, inter alia, as follows: “23. In this case, on the other hand, the contract is spread over for a period of five years; the relationship is to last for a period of five years. Secondly, the nature of the work that is to be done by the contractor is also to be seen. While it is settling of the right to fish for a period of five years, it is brought to our notice that the scope of the work involved is to sow the seeds in a vast expanse of land and, it is here, we must notice that the work in respect of these dams is spread over by 1295 hectares for Dhaura and 2995 hectares for Begul. The maintenance work also has to be done. In such circumstances, if the State felt that in case there has been a premature closure of the agreement, as a result of the contractor walking out of the contract by not fulfilling its obligations, resulting in prejudice to the public interest, loss to the State Exchequer and also to the coffers of the society, the persons should have sufficient financial stability, which is reflected in the business activity reaching a particular level consistently in the immediate recent past, namely, the past 3 years, we cannot possibly think that, that is a Clause which would brook interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Though, it may be true that this is not a civil work like the construction of a road where such conditions relating to turnover are ordinarily fixed; but, at the same time, this is not an outright one time sale and it is a sale of a right, which is to last for a long period of time. The argument of Mr. The argument of Mr. Arvind Vashishta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the apprehensions of the State are best allayed and taken care of by the other conditions, including the provisions for bank guarantee and, therefore, the Court should strike down this Clause, do not appeal to us. It is here again that we must remind ourselves of the four walls of our jurisdiction in interfering with a commercial transaction. The Court does not make the terms for the Government. It is the Government like a private employer, which makes its own terms. The interference is premised only when it is found that the clause is so arbitrary or it is found to be made to suit the interest of a particular person or it is in transgression of a statutory provision. It may be true, as Mr. Arvind Vashishta, learned senior counsel points out in his rejoinder affidavit, that in the case of the appellant, the appellant did carry out the contract in the dam for which he was given the rights. But, that again is a value judgment of the employer, having regard to its experience for the past several years in the three dams, which are mentioned in paragraph no. 12 of the counter affidavit.” 33. We must first deal with the case relating to the conditions stipulated that only Firms and Companies can bid in the tender. We may notice Section 305 of the Act. Section 305 of the Act relates to the Regulation as to Sky-sign. Sky-sign in turn has been defined as follows: “2. 12 of the counter affidavit.” 33. We must first deal with the case relating to the conditions stipulated that only Firms and Companies can bid in the tender. We may notice Section 305 of the Act. Section 305 of the Act relates to the Regulation as to Sky-sign. Sky-sign in turn has been defined as follows: “2. Definitions.–In this Act unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context – (71) “sky-sign” means any word, letter, model, sign, device or other representation, in the nature of an advertisement, announcement or direction, which is supported on or attached to any post, pole, standard, framework or other support wholly or in part upon, over or above any building or structure and which is wholly or in part visible against the sky from any point in any street or public place, and includes – (a) every part of support, and (b) any balloon, parachute or similar device employed wholly or in part for the purpose of any advertisement or announcement, on, over or above any building, structure or erection of any kind, or on or over any street or public place; but shall not be deemed to include – (i) any flagstaff, pole, vane or weathercock unless adapted or used wholly or in part for the purposes of any advertisement or announcement; (ii) any sign on any board, frame or other contrivance securely fixed to or on the top of the wall or parapet of any building, on the cornice or blocking course of any wall or to the ridge or a roof, if such contrivance be of one continuous face and not open work and does not extend in height more than three feet above any part of such wall, parapet or ridge; or (iii) any representation which relates exclusively to the business of a railway administration as defined in the Indian Railway Act, 1890, and which is placed wholly upon or over any railway station yard, platform or station approach, or premises belonging to such railway administration, and which is also so placed that it could not fall into any street or public place;” 34. Therefore, it appears to be that actually a Sky-sign is in the nature of an advertisement essentially which is supported on or attached to any post, pole, standard, framework or other support wholly or in part upon, over or above any building or structure and which is wholly or in part visible against the sky from any point in any street or public place. In fact, the word “advertisement” has been separately defined in Section 2(1) of the Act, which reads as follows: “2. Definitions. – In this Act unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context – (1) “advertisement” means any word, letter, model, sign, placard, board, notice, device, or representation whether illuminated or not, in the nature of and employed wholly or in part for the purpose of advertisement, announcement or direction and includes any hoarding or similar structures used or adapted to be used for the display of advertisement;” 35. We would think that the purport of Section 305 of the Act is to declare that, except without the permission of the Municipal Commissioner, no person is to erect or retain any Sky-sign. In this context, certainly the word “person” will include any person, namely, a Natural Person, a Firm or any other species of persons as defined in the General Clauses Act. We would not think that Section 305 of the Act can assist the appellants in contending that exclusion of persons like the appellants is tabooed by Section 305 as such. In fact, Section 306 regulates and controls advertisement. It is, no doubt, true that, under the Rules made in the year 2015, which we have referred to, the word “advertiser” is again defined as any person. It is, no doubt, true that the word “person” is broad enough to take in persons like the appellants; but, there is a definite case for the respondents that acting under Section 3(3) of the Procurement Rules read with Rule 3(3) of 2015 Rules, decision has been taken by the competent authority to place a restriction in regard to the persons who can participate in the tender process, thereby meaning that the wide ambit of word “person” has been abridged and it is restricted only to the Partnership Firm and Company. That relates to the question, whether there is a legal basis for doing so. That relates to the question, whether there is a legal basis for doing so. The question, however, is whether the act of restricting the right to participate in the tender to Partnership Firms and Companies is actually called for. The appellants would complain that it is irrational and without logic to exclude the persons like the appellants, who are Proprietorship Firms. If the idea is to garner more revenue for Local Body, the question can indeed be posed as to how excluding Natural Persons or Proprietorship concerns from participating at all can lead to greater revenue being generated. On the other hand, could it not be said that such a restriction would end up resulting in loss of revenue for the Local Body, as if the other restrictions are retained and if the individuals or Proprietorship Firms are also allowed to put their bids, it is possible that, complying with all conditions there could be Natural Persons or Proprietorship Firms, which could successfully fulfill the obligations under the contract and also bring greater revenue. 36. Having regard to the course we intend to adopt, we do not wish to say anything more. We intend to leave open this question for the reason that we feel that, even without this condition being put to test and the question answered, the appellants are bound to fail in our view on our answer to the other question relating to turnover. The requirement is that a person must have carried out business in advertising and have a turnover of Rs. 3 Crores for the past three years. Here, at once, we must notice the argument by Mr. Arvind Vashishth, learned Senior Counsel that Clause 21 cannot be understood that the revenue of Rs. 3 Crores for the past three years must be exclusively derived from advertising alone. We do not think that this argument appears to be well founded; but, at the same time, even for a moment, assuming that it is so, there is no case for the appellants that they have turnover for the past three years amounting to Rs. 3 Crores. The question then arises as to the validity of the said term. Therefore, Mr. 3 Crores. The question then arises as to the validity of the said term. Therefore, Mr. Arvind Vashishth would seek to distinguish the judgment, which we rendered in the fisheries matter (Supra), by pointing out that it was a case where the obligation was spread over for a period of five years; whereas, in this case, it is a one time affair. This is countered by Mr. Subhash Upadhyaya by pointing out that it is actually spread over for a period of two years. We have also noticed the case of Mr. Sandeep Kothari that there are obligations to be fulfilled by the contractor like putting up Unipoles and, therefore, providing for turnover was justified. We would think that, having regard to the limited scope of judicial review in the matters of this nature, as has been settled by a catena of decisions by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the challenge to the condition providing for Rs. 3 Crores turnover cannot be accepted. 37. In this regard, we must deal with each of the contentions raised by the parties. The first contention raised by Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel is that the Act and the Rules do not provide for such conditions. When we queried the learned Senior Counsel, as to whether there is any such provision which discountenances such a condition, no such provision, as such, was brought to our notice. Where the law is silent, we cannot assume that the condition is prohibited. We cannot deny the power to the employer, even if it is a Local Body, when it enters into the commercial arena, to be free as a private party, subject, no doubt, to what we observe as constitutional limitations and statutory injunctions. No such statutory injunction is established before us. As to whether the constitutional inhibition is violated, what could possibly be said is that the condition is arbitrary. The Hon’ble Apex Court has, in fact, laid down the principle that interference with the conditions can be successfully premised on the clause being one meant to favour a particular individual. In this case, there does not appear to be a specific plea that the condition has been tailor-made to grant the right in favour of the party respondent. The Hon’ble Apex Court has, in fact, laid down the principle that interference with the conditions can be successfully premised on the clause being one meant to favour a particular individual. In this case, there does not appear to be a specific plea that the condition has been tailor-made to grant the right in favour of the party respondent. It is, no doubt, pointed out that, in the original tender, only one company came forward and when the matter was re-tendered, another company came forward, which is only a sister concern, as can be seen from the fact that there are common Directors. This is refuted by Mr. Subhash Upadhyay by pointing out that there is nothing in law which forbids such an activity. We do not think that this is a case, where the appellants can invoke the doctrine that a condition is bad as it is meant to favour a particular person. There is no violation of any statute as we can see. 38. As far as the presence of logic or absence of rationale or it being unreasonable as Mr. V.K. Kohli would put it, we must appreciate this aspect from the point of view of a Court sitting in judicial review. We are not doing appellate review. We are also to bear in mind the law as declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court in this regard. There is a case for the respondent that imposing the condition relating to turnover may have a nexus with the quality. It is also to be borne in mind that the condition stipulates that person must be in the field of advertising for the past three years and with regard to turnover, even if we accept the case of Mr. Arvind Vashisht, learned Senior Counsel, that it is not to be exclusively made up of the revenue from advertisement, we can safely presume that lion share would have to be from the advertising business. This is besides recording our disagreement with his contention in this regard. When a person with the large experience in advertising is chosen to carryout the contract, which, as it is noted, is to spread over for a period of two years and is not a one time affair as was the case in the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Sharma Vs. When a person with the large experience in advertising is chosen to carryout the contract, which, as it is noted, is to spread over for a period of two years and is not a one time affair as was the case in the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash Sharma Vs. Ramesh Chand Prashar and others, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 632 , the assurance that the employer would get that the work it intends to give to the successful bidder being fulfilled in a better way, is certainly a matter, which we cannot ignore. There is reference to an Expert Committee, which went into the matter. There is also the aspect relating to the attempts made to give the right being unsuccessful on three occasions. There is also a reference to a cartel found in the local level. When we have mentioned the local revenue; we must touch upon an argument of Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel that the contractors of Uttarakhand will suffer and the people from Mumbai and other cities will come and conquer all the rights. 39. We would think that there are two aspects to the matter. The purpose of the Local Body going in for an e-tender, inviting tender from all over India, would be to garner the maximum revenue. The Court must not lose sight of the purpose and the context in which the e-tender was floated. In fact, the appellants also don’t take exception to the e-tender, as such. In matters of this nature, we may not be justified in entertaining a plea which is almost parochial in nature. Any Indian can participate, as there is no local restriction to be found either in the Statute or in the Rules. Equally, when the right is made available to anyone in India, it will go a long way to ensure participation from any corner of India. The resultant position would be, a Local Body being deficient with funds, as the respondent has a definite case that there is scarcity so far as the revenue of the Local Body is concerned would be better positioned. The resultant position would be, a Local Body being deficient with funds, as the respondent has a definite case that there is scarcity so far as the revenue of the Local Body is concerned would be better positioned. At any rate, we would think that when the nature of the contract involves obligations spread over for a period of two years and there are obligations to be performed by the successful tenderer and quality is a consideration, as for instance, it is pointed out that with an experienced person, accidents can be avoided, the capability of the contractors assessed on the basis of the turnover for the just previous period of three years cannot be faulted with. 40. In such circumstances, we would think that the Appeals are to be dismissed on the ground that the appellants, admittedly, do not have the turnover requirement as provided in Clause 21, which we are not inclined to interfere with. But in respect to the condition, which is put, namely, that only a Firm and Company can participate, we do not wish to pronounce on the same and we leave the said question open. 41. The Appeals are dismissed subject to leaving open the question relating to person as aforesaid. 42. There will be no order as to costs. 43. Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1291 of 2017 and Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1566 of 2017 will stand disposed of in the light of the aforesaid judgment in the Appeals.