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2017 DIGILAW 645 (HP)

Ranvijay Singh v. State of H. P.

2017-06-12

SANJAY KAROL, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. By medium of this petition under Section 114 read-with Order 47 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the petitioner has sought review of the judgment passed by this Court on 08.01.2016 in CWP No. 4831 of 2015. 2. The petitioner herein was one of the original applicants in OA No. 3854 of 2015 filed before the learned H.P. State Administrative Tribunal (for short ‘Tribunal’) and had assailed therein the ‘NOC’ granted to respondents No. 3 to 8 herein as being arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal and claimed the following reliefs:- “1. Quash the impugned order Annexure A-3 bearing No. HFW-H(IV) (12)-4/2006-15 (NOC) qua the respondents No. 3 to 8, being arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal. 2. Direct the respondents to withhold sponsorship of respondents No. 3 to 8 for pursuing higher course in MD/MCH at AIIMS, New Delhi. 3. Direct the respondents to follow the guidelines as laid in Annexure A-1. Besides this directing the respondent to widely circulate list of tentative sponsored candidates which only be finalised after affording due opportunity to candidates to object to same.” 3. The Original Application was allowed vide judgment dated 23.12.2015 and it was held that the private respondents No. 3 to 8 did not fulfill the eligibility criteria as laid down in Clause 1.4 of the policy dated 02.04.2013 and accordingly ‘NOC’ granted in their favour was ordered to be quashed. 4. The order passed by the learned Tribunal came to be assailed by respondents No. 3 and 5 before this Court by filing CWP No. 4831 of 2015 wherein the main thrust of their arguments was that the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition which was in the nature of Public Interest Litigation. 5. Though, this petition was vehemently contested, however, this Court vide judgment dated 08.01.2016 upheld the contention of the private respondents and allowed the petition so filed by them by holding that the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the petitioners as they could not be said to be the “persons aggrieved” and, therefore, the petition filed by them being in the nature of Public Interest Litigation in a “service matter” was not maintainable. 6. 6. The review petitioner laid challenge to the aforesaid judgment by filing SLP No. 8982 of 2016 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same was disposed of on the first date of hearing itself in the following terms:- “Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDER The petitioner submits and points out that the case before the High Court was not a Public Interest Litigation; it was a case where the petitioner, along with some others, was actually affected on account of sponsorship of the contesting respondents. The petitioner may point out this aspect before the High Court by way of an application for review of the impugned order. Subject to the above liberty, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed. However, we make it clear that in case the application, as aforesaid, is filed by the petitioner in the High Court within 30 days from today, the same may not be dismissed on the ground of delay. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of.” (Underlying supplied by us) 7. It is vehemently argued by Shri Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the review petitioner that since the petitioner was directly affected by the grant of ‘NOC’ to the respondent Preyander Thakur in the same stream against the policy framed by the Government, therefore, he was an aggrieved party. It is further averred that this Court should not have confined the judgment to the jurisdictional aspect of the case and should have decided the case on merits, particularly, when the State Government had flouted its own policy for grant of ‘NOC’ and granted the same to the ineligible candidates. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed on record. 9. At the outset, it would be noticed that a specific contention was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to point out that the case before this Court was not a Public Interest Litigation and it was a case where the petitioner along with some other was actually affected on account of sponsorship of the contesting respondents (petitioners in CWP No. 4831 of 2015). The above was clearly a misstatement as the proceedings before this Court in CWP No. 4831 of 2015 were not original proceedings, but emanated from the judgment passed by the learned Tribunal in OA No. 3854 of 2015 which as observed above was held to be not maintainable for the reasons already set out hereinabove. 10. Notably, in the Original Application filed by the petitioner alongwith proforma respondents herein, no relief whatsoever had been claimed by them for themselves as would be evidently clear from the relief which is extracted above. 11. Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, reads thus:- “19. Applications to Tribunals: 1. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, personal aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, order means an order made: (a) by the Government or a local or other authority, within the territory of Indian or under the control of the Government of India or by any Corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government; (b) by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or Corporation [or society] referred to in clause (a). (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee (if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) [in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes, as may be prescribed by the Central Government]. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a fit case for adjudication on trial by it admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons. (4) Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules.” 12. A person can be said to be aggrieved only if he has suffered a legal grievance in the sense i.e. interest recognized by law, has been directly and prejudicially affected. A person who is disappointed with the result of a case is not a “person aggrieved.” He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something or must have a tendency of infringing some interest inhering in him and be violative of his legal right. The “person aggrieved” means a person, who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment of personal inconvenience. “Person aggrieved” means a person, who is injured or who is adversely affected in a legal sense. 13. Whether a person is injured in strict legal sense, has to be determined by the nature of the injury considering the facts and circumstances involving each case. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a standi to sue upon the individual. There must be an injuria or a legal grievance, as the law can appreciate and not a stet pro ratione voluntas reasons. The person aggrieved must have a right to maintain the writ which postulates a subsisting personal right in the claim which the petitioner makes and in the protection of which he is personally interested. 14. Once, the petitioner alongwith proforma respondents had not sought any relief for themselves or any of them, then obviously, they could not be held to be the “persons aggrieved” and, therefore, the petition filed by them was in the nature of Public Interest Litigation in the service matters and, therefore, rightly dismissed by this Court. 15. We find no error much less error apparent on the face of the record so as to call for interference by this Court. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.