ORDER : This petition was originally filed under section 19 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 before the erstwhile M.P. State Administrative Tribunal, Bhopal and after abolition of the Tribunal the matter was transferred to this Court and got registered as a writ petition. 2. In the instant petition, the petitioner has challenged the legal propriety of the order dated 7-4-1999 (Annexure-A/1) whereby he has been removed from the services from the post of Constable in the Police Department and has also challenged the order passed by the Appellate Authority (Annexure-A/2) whereby the appeal has been dismissed and the order of removal passed by the Superintendent of Police has been maintained. 3. The facts lying in a narrow compass, succinctly stated are that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable in the District Force on 22-12-1995. He was sent for training which was successfully completed. It is pleaded that while he was working as a Constable in the Police Station, Seoni Malwa, District Hoshangabad a departmental enquiry was initiated against him and the petitioner was charge-sheeted. 4. Reply to the said charge-sheet was filed by the petitioner refuting the charges levelled against him. The respondents had taken a decision to conduct a departmental enquiry against the petitioner and the Range Inspector was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. It is submitted that on the basis enquiry report, the disciplinary authority passed an order of removal taking into consideration the enquiry report and the past track record of the petitioner. The appellate Authority dismissed the appeal without proper appreciation of the facts and the evidence. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the enquiry officer, disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have acted in the present case in violation of the provisions of Rule 14 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules), 1966 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1966 Rules’] and also the provisions envisaged in the M.P. Police Regulations (for short ‘The Regulations’). It is submitted that in the present case the Enquiry Officer has failed to prepare the report as required under Sub-rule (23) of Rule 14 of the ‘1966 Rules’. It is submitted that in the present case the Enquiry Officer has failed to prepare the report as required under Sub-rule (23) of Rule 14 of the ‘1966 Rules’. The Enquiry Officer is required to assess the evidence in the light of the aforesaid provision as regards the article of charges, as the provisions of Rule 14 especially, Sub-rule (23) of the Rule is parimateria with the provisions of the Police Regulation 228 and the Enquiry Officer is under obligation to assess the evidence and to record reasons before coming to the conclusion in regard to the alleged charges. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the present case the enquiry officer had reproduced the charges and without assessing the evidence and ascribing any reason held that the charges No. 1 to 3 framed against the petitioner are proved. It is strenuously urged by him that in the present case the victim-girl has not supported the case of the department and there was no material to establish the charges. However, on the basis of surmises and conjectures the Enquiry Officer held the charges proved because the petitioner being a police constable had influenced the complainant who had turned hostile and did not corroborate the allegations. It is also submitted that the enquiry officer further mentioned in the report that the acts of the petitioner in the present case has tarnished the image of the Police and also created disturbance in law and order of the town. On the basis of the aforesaid illegal enquiry report the disciplinary authority without application of mind and appreciation of facts and evidence of the case in proper perspective, passed the impugned order on the basis of the past record. It is submitted by him that as per judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of the State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, AIR 1964 SC 506 and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88 the past record of a delinquent cannot be a basis to prove the charges and to pass an order of punishment. The report of Enquiry Officer is not as per requirement of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the Rules 1966. 6. The report of Enquiry Officer is not as per requirement of sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the Rules 1966. 6. To bolster his submissions in this regard he placed reliance on the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Dev Vrat Mishra (W.A. No. 43/2017) and also referred to the judgments passed by the Apex Court which have been referred by the learned Single Judge in the case of Dev Vrat Mishra (supra). It is apt to mention here that the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by Dev Vrat Mishra [W.P. No. 18465/2012/2002 (S)] by setting aside the order of punishment and directing that the petitioner shall get all consequential benefits. The said judgment passed by the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench while dismissing the Writ Appeal No. 43/2017 by its judgment dated 8-2-2017. 7. It is further contended that the appellate authority also without proper appreciation of the facts and evidence held that the charges are proved. It is contended by him that without there being sufficient evidence regarding consumption of alcohol by the petitioner, the finding has been recorded that the petitioner after consuming alcohol, in an inebriated condition had harassed the complaint. It is submitted by him that though blood sample of the petitioner was taken by the department but it failed to produce the FSL report to prove presence of alcohol in his blood sample hence, merely on clinical examination and on the basis of statement of the doctor, the prosecution could not establish alleged consumption of alcohol by the petitioner. Thus, the finding of the Enquiry Officer in this regard, is perverse and contrary to the record. The petitioner submitted that the appellate authority also did not appreciate the evidence available on record in proper perspective. 8. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the punishment of removal from service is highly disproportionate and shocking to the alleged charges levelled against the petitioner. He strenuously urged that the punishment of ‘removal’ is a last resort by virtue of the provisions envisaged in Regulation 226, and in the present case the same has been passed in violation of the provisions of Police Regulation 226 and settled principles of law. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the report of the Enquiry. He strenuously urged that the punishment of ‘removal’ is a last resort by virtue of the provisions envisaged in Regulation 226, and in the present case the same has been passed in violation of the provisions of Police Regulation 226 and settled principles of law. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the report of the Enquiry. Officer is based on preliminary enquiry and, therefore, the enquiry report as well consequential order of punishment and dismissal of appeal are vitiated in law. 9. Combating the aforesaid submissions, counsel for the State submitted that there is no illegality or impropriety in the departmental enquiry conducted and the same was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules 1966 and the Police Regulation 228. It is also submitted that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have passed the orders impugned after due consideration of the facts and evidence available on record. He further submitted that scope of interference in the departmental enquiry under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited. This Court cannot appreciate the facts and evidence as an appellate authority. It is submitted that the punishment is not disproportionate or shocking to the conscience of the Court, as the petitioner was working as a Constable in disciplinary force like police and high level character and conducts are expected from a member of disciplinary force. The charges levelled against the petitioner, which are proved, had certainly tarnished the image of the department. Hence, there is no illegality or perversity of approach in the impugned orders and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. Regard being had to the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, it is condign to refer the charges levelled against the delinquent-petitioner, they are reproduced hereunder:- ^^vkjksi ¼1½ fnŒ vkj{kd }kjk vius drZO; esa M~;wVh ls okilh u djuk vkSj 'kjkc ihdj yM+dh ds lkFk vi'kCn dgdj NsM+NkM+ djukA ¼2½ yM+dh ds NsM+NkM+ djus ds dkj.k dkuwu@O;oLFkk dh fLFkfr fufeZr gksuk rFkk iqfyl foHkkx dh Nfo /kwfey djukA ¼3½ iqfyl jsX;qys'ku ds iSjk 64 ds mi&iSjk 2 ,oa 3 dh vogsyuk dj ?kksj dnkpj.k Ánf'kZr djukA** 11. From a perusal of the record it is seen that the petitioner has been afforded full opportunity of adducing oral and documentary evidence and also cross-examination of the witnesses. From a perusal of the record it is seen that the petitioner has been afforded full opportunity of adducing oral and documentary evidence and also cross-examination of the witnesses. In regard to Charge No. 1 - that the delinquent employee did not report on duty after his return and also in an inebriated condition he uttered lewd and obscene words to harass the complainant and pulled her hand at a public place. The prosecution examined PW-1, A.S. Narbariya, Sub-Inspector, who deposed that on 15-11-1998 a written complaint was given by Ku. Rashmi Kaushal making the aforesaid allegations. The petitioner was caught at the spot and he was brought to the Police Station by the brothers of the complainant along with a mob. There was public agitation against the conduct of the petitioner, as a police personnel was alleged to have teased a girl in a public place. The application has been marked as Exhibit-1 and the statement of the complainant is marked as Exhibit-2 whereas the statements of the brothers of the victim Makhan, Gabbar Singh and Sunil Kaushal are marked as Exhibits-3, 4 and 5 respectively. The blood sample taken by the doctor was sealed and marked as Exhibit-6. The brothers of the victim-girl have supported the evidence of Shri A.S. Narbaria to the effect that the complainant had told them about the utterances of lewd and obscene words used by the petitioner and thereafter they had caught him and brought him to the Police Station concerned. They have also corroborated his statement that the written complaint was made to the Station House Officer. In the cross-examination they have stated that they did not know the petitioner personally and they did not hear the utterances of the alleged words. So far as consumption of alcohol by the delinquentpetitioner is concerned, his drunkenness was proved by the doctor. PW-3, Dr. G.R. Karode, who stated that on clinical examination of the delinquent-petitioner, he found that the petitioner was in an inebriated condition after consuming liquor. PW-4, Arjun Singh has stated that he was on duty and the report was recorded by him in ‘Rojnamcha’. The department witness - Ku. Rashmi Kaushal, the complainant changed her version and stated that there was some confusion out of which she had lodged the report but now, she did not want to initiate any action against the petitioner. PW-4, Arjun Singh has stated that he was on duty and the report was recorded by him in ‘Rojnamcha’. The department witness - Ku. Rashmi Kaushal, the complainant changed her version and stated that there was some confusion out of which she had lodged the report but now, she did not want to initiate any action against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer after taking into consideration the ocular and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that though the complainant turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution, but since the petitioner in drunken state harassed the victim-girl in a public place followed by a prompt report in writing by the brother and mob resulting into disturbance of law and order, therefore, the prosecution case cannot be disbelieved. He has taken note of the fact that at the spot itself the petitioner was caught by the public and was brought by them at the Police Station. He considered that the situation was so much panic and for medical examination the doctor was required to be called at the Police Station itself. On the basis of the aforesaid consideration and totality of the facts and circumstances, the Enquiry Officer found that all the three charges levelled against the delinquent-employee are proved. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the enquiry report. On the basis of the aforesaid consideration and totality of the facts and circumstances, the Enquiry Officer found that all the three charges levelled against the delinquent-employee are proved. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the enquiry report. The same is reproduced hereunder:- ^^mijksDr lEiw.kZ ?kVuk Øekad lkf{k;ksa ds dFkuksa] fpfdRld dk Áek.k i= vkfn ds vk/kkj ij eSa tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh bl fu"d"kZ ij igaqprk gaw fd vkjksih vkj{kd OghŒOghŒvkbZŒihŒ M~;wVh esa [kjxkSj x;k Fkk ogka ls ckn M~;wVh okil vkdj le; ls Fkkus esa vkdj viuh vken djkuk Fkk tcfd vkj{kd us ,slk us dj 'kjkc ds u'ks esa yM+dh ds lkFk lkoZtfud LFkku esa NsM+NkM+ dj iqfyl dh Nfo ?kwfey dj dkuwu@O;oLFkk dh fLFkfr fufeZr dh ftl dkj.k ls vkj{kd dk esfMdy ijh{k.k MkŒ }kjk Fkkus ij gh cqykdj djok;k x;kA vkosfndk ds }kjk dFkuksa esa vkjksih ds fo:} dksbZ Hkh dk;Zokgh u djus dk dkj.k yksdykt dk Hk; gSA mijksDr rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij bl foHkkxh; tkap esa yxk;s x;s vkjksi fuEukuqlkj :i ls Áekf.kr djrk gwa %& vkjksi Øekad %& 1- vkj{kd }kjk vius drZO; esa M~;wVh ls okilh u djuk vkSj 'kjkc ihdj yM+dh ds lkFk vi'kCn dgdj NsM+NkM+ djuk iw.kZr% Áekf.kr ikrk gawA 2- yM+dh ls NsM+NkM+ djus ds dkj.k dkuwu@O;oLFkk dh fLFkfr fufeZr gksuk rFkk iqfyl foHkkx dh Nfo /kwfey djuk iw.kZr% Áekf.kr ikrk gawA 3- iqŒjsŒ ds iSjk 64 ds mi&iSjk 2 ,oa 3 dh vogsyuk dj ?kksj dnkpj.k Ánf'kZr djuk iw.kZr% Áekf.kr ikrk gawA** 12. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority issued a notice to the petitioner and a reply to the said notice was submitted by the petitioner. The disciplinary authority after taking into consideration the enquiry report and also the fact that in the first report which was made by the complainant in writing it was stated that the petitioner had misbehaved with her and pulled her hands uttering the words ^^py esjs lkFk** The aforesaid utterance of the words with the physical action of pulling hands of the complainant in a public place has been considered sufficient to prove charges levelled against the delinquent-petitioner. The disciplinary authority had taken note of the facts that the incident had occurred at a public place, created nuisance and panic within public view, which ultimately tarnished the image of the Police Department. The disciplinary authority had taken note of the facts that the incident had occurred at a public place, created nuisance and panic within public view, which ultimately tarnished the image of the Police Department. The relevant portion of the discussion of the disciplinary authority, which is marked as Exhibit A-1, is reproduced hereunder:- ^^mijksDr vkjksiksa ij Ádj.k esa foHkkxh; tkap gsrq jf{kr fujhf{kr gks'kkaxkckn ds ,lŒdsŒ dUgkSvk dks tkap vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k tkdj foHkkxh; tkap iw.kZ djkbZ xbZA tkap vf/kdkjh vkjksih ds fo:} yxk;s x;s lHkh vkjksi iw.kZr% ÁHkkfor ik;s gSA tkap ds nkSjku ;|fi vkosfndk ftlds vkosnu i= vkj{kd :nziky dh foHkkxh; tkap gqbZ gS] }kjk vius c;ku esa ys[k fd;k gS fd ^^mls rqe esa dUQ~;wtu gks x;k Fkk] eSa bl laca/k esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha pkgrh gawA** fdUrq vkosfndk ds bl c;ku ls dksbZ [kkl QdZ ugha iM+rk D;ksafd vkosfndk us iwoZ esa vius c;ku esa fy[kk Fkk fd ^^vkj{kd :nziky us mlds lkFk cn~rehth djrs gq, rFkk mldk gkFk [khaprs gq, dgk & py esjs lkFkA** blls Li"V gksrk gS vc vkosfndk }kjk fdlh nckoo'k vius c;ku cny fn;s gSA ÁŒvkjŒ vtqZu flag] Fkkuk flouhekyok }kjk crk;k fd bl ?kVuk ls eksgYys ds yksxksa esa vc Hkh bruk vkØks'k Fkk fd vkj{kd :nziky dk esfMdy djkus gsrq MkDVj dks Fkkus cqykuk iM+kA tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk vkjksih ds fo:} mijksDr rhuksa vkjksi ÁHkkfor ik;s tkus ij bl dk;kZy; }kjk Hkkjrh; lafo/kku dh /kkjk 311@2 ds rgr dkj.k crkvks uksfVl tkjh fd;k tkdj vkjksih ds fo:} lsok ls i`Fkd dk n.M ÁLrkfor fd;k x;kA** 13. At this juncture before considering the assertions made by the counsel for the petitioner, I think it condign to survey the authority on the point of scope of judicial interference in the matter of departmental enquiry by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 the Apex Court in para 7 of the order held as under: “7… The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant; it is competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 of to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 14. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Apex Court considered the scope of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 and held as under: “A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” It was held that if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court or Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 15. The scope of judicial review in the matters of administrative action pertaining to disciplinary proceedings is no longer res Integra as it has been held in number of cases by the Apex Court that the judicial review in such matters has limited scope. In this regard it is useful to refer judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602 . In para 19 and 20 of the aforesaid judgment, the scope of judicial review has been crystallized in the following manner:— “19. In this regard it is useful to refer judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602 . In para 19 and 20 of the aforesaid judgment, the scope of judicial review has been crystallized in the following manner:— “19. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (1983) 4 SCC 392 : AIR 1984 SC 1182 , this Court held that various parameters of the court's power of judicial review of administrative or executive action on which the court can interfere had been well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions. The Court further held : “It is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the court would be justified in interfering with the same.” 20. The court can exercise the power of judicial review if there is a manifest error in the exercise of power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous. Such exercise of power would stand vitiated. The court may be justified in exercising the power of judicial review if the impugned order suffers from mala fide, dishonest or corrupt practices, for the reason, that the order had been passed by the authority beyond the limits conferred upon the authority by the legislature. Thus, the court has to be satisfied that the order had been passed by the authority only on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety before it interferes. The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. Therefore, the court itself may be fallible and interfering with the order of the authority may impose heavy administrative burden on the State or may lead to unbudgeted expenditure. The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. Therefore, the court itself may be fallible and interfering with the order of the authority may impose heavy administrative burden on the State or may lead to unbudgeted expenditure. (Vide : Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 : AIR 1996 SC 11 ; People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580 : AIR 2004 SC 456 ; and State of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, (2005) 5 SCC 181 : AIR 2005 SC 2080 ). “(Emphasis Supplied) 16. Further, after considering various judgments including the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, (2011) 13 SCC 553 and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 692 : AIR 2012 SC 1783 , relied upon by the learned Writ Court in para 28, the principle is so laid down:— “28. The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.” (Emphasis Supplied) Thus, it is trite law that the courts are not to act as an appellate authority and the scope of interference in the matter of departmental enquiry is limited, unless it is established that there is violation of the statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, or the findings are manifest perverse. 17. The contention of the petitioner that the enquiry report has not been submitted in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (23) of Rule 14 of the 1966 Rules which makes it obligatory for the enquiry officer to assess the evidence and give findings with cogent reasons therefor, in respect of each article of charges. 17. The contention of the petitioner that the enquiry report has not been submitted in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (23) of Rule 14 of the 1966 Rules which makes it obligatory for the enquiry officer to assess the evidence and give findings with cogent reasons therefor, in respect of each article of charges. Upon perusal of the enquiry report in the present case, as reproduced in the preceding paragraphs, it is evident that there was proper consideration of statements of prosecution witnesses and medical certificates and ultimately the conclusion was recorded. The enquiry report further reveals that for each charge there is consideration by the Enquiry Officer and it cannot be held that the enquiry report in the present case is not in conformity with the provisions of subrule (23) of Rule 14 of the 1966 Rules. 18. The next plank of submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the disciplinary authority has failed to discuss the charges and the material variable, before passing the order of removal from services. If the order passed by the disciplinary authority is scanned, it is manifest that there is due application of mind. He has taken into account the nature of charges, statement of the victim-complainant; the statement of the Head Constable, Arjun Singh; and the plight of the alleged charges committed by the petitioner within public domain, who is a police constable posted in a disciplined force. The contentions of the petitioner that the order of punishment was passed on the basis of past conduct; and the punishment of ‘removal’ is a last resort by virtue of the provisions envisaged in Regulation 226, have no merit. Before passing an order of removal, the disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the entire service record of the petitioner which is ostensible from the order of the disciplinary authority. Before passing an order of removal, the disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the entire service record of the petitioner which is ostensible from the order of the disciplinary authority. Relevant portion of the order passed by the disciplinary authority is reproduced hereunder: ^^esjs }kjk vkjksih ds lsok bfrgkl dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA vkjksih vkjŒ :nziky fnukad 22-12-1995 dks iqfyl foHkkx esa FkkA vkjksih dks mlds lkFk yxHkx lk<+s rhu o"kZ ds lsok esa flQZ 4 bZuke fn;s gS ftuls Li"V gksrk gS fd vkj{kd vius dk;Z ds Áfr vR;Ur mnklhu rFkk ykijokg jgrk gSA vkjksih vkj{kd :nziky }kjk 'kjkc dk lsou dj mijksDr dk;Z fd;k gS] ,sls vkjksih 'kkldh; lsok esa cus jguk foHkkx ds fy, ckss> lkfcr gksxkA vr% vkj{kd 331 :nziky jf{kr dsUnz gks'kaxkckn dks mijksDr d`R; ds fd;s vkns'k fnukad 7-4-1999 ds vijkUg ls lsok ls i`Fkd fd;k tkrk gSA vkjksih vkj{kd dh fuyEcu vof/k dks fuyEcu esa lq/kkj fd;k tkrk gS vFkkZr~ fuyEcu vof/k esa mls tks dqN ns; gqvk gS mlds vykok vkSj dqN ns; ugha gksxkA** 19. The delineation made by the disciplinary authority demonstrates that before passing the order of punishment the disciplinary authority had bestowed his anxious consideration on all the facts and evidence of the present case, therefore, the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority cannot be held to be passed only on account of past track record. The consideration of the past record in the case of a member of a disciplinary force like police cannot be held to be illegal or irrelevant. It is useful to refer the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Bishambher Das Dogra, (2009) 13 SCC 102 : AIR 2010 SC 3769 where the Apex Court declined to interfere with the punishment of removal passed in a case of a member of a disciplinary force and held that in the case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct and service record of the employee for adding weight to the decision of imposing the punishment. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “It is desirable that delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “It is desirable that delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in absence of statutory rules, the authority may taken into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts so require.” [quoted from the placitum] 20. In the present case the order passed by the appellate authority cannot be held to be a cryptic or unreasoned order. The appellate authority has taken into consideration each of the charges and the oral and documentary evidence available on record. After extensive consideration of the facts and evidence, the following conclusion has been recorded by the appellate authority while affirming the order of removal:- ^^vkjksih }kjk jf'e dkS'ky ds lkFk NsM+NkM djus ij Fkkus ij HkhM+ bdV~Bk gks xbZ Fkh rFkk vkjksih dh lqj{kk dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, esfMdy fpfdRlky; esa ys tkdj djkuk laHko ugha FkkA vr% jksŒlkŒ 829 fnukad 15-11-1998 ij fjiksVZ ntZ dj MkWDVj dks Fkkus cqykdj esfMdy djk;k x;k] tks vfHk;kstu Án'kZ&i= 10 gSA blh Ádkj HkhM+ }kjk Fkkus ds lkeus bdV~Bk gksus ij jksŒlkŒ 837 fnukad 15-11-1998 dks fjiksVZ ntZ xbZ gS] tks vfHk;kstu Án'kZ i= Øekad&13 gSA bu nksuksa jksŒlkŒ udy dh Áfr vkjksih dks nh xbZ gSA pawfd vkjksih 'kkldh; deZpkjh Fkk vkSj og Hkh iqfyl foHkkx tSls vuq'kkflr cy esa Fkk] ftldk nkf;Ro vke turk dks lqj{kk Ánku djuk gS tks Lo;a efgyk ds ekuo vf/kdkj dk guu djs ;g vkjksi {kek djus ;ksX; ugha gS vkSj foHkkxh; tkap esa vkjksi iw.kZr% Áekf.kr ik;s tkus ls vkjksih dks iqfyl v/kh{kd }kjk ÁnRr n.M mfpr gSA bl dkj.k HkwŒHkwŒ vkj{kd Øekad 331 :nziky flag ftyk gks'kaxkckn dh vksj ls ÁLrqr vihy fujLr djrs gq, iqfyl v/kh{kd dk vkns'k cgky j[kk tkrk gSA** 21. The next contention of the counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the prosecution could not establish that the petitioner had consumed alcohol and he was in an inebriated condition at the time of the alleged incident. He placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Prem Singh Jhala v. State of M.P., 2007 (4) M.P.L.J. 129 . 22. He placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Prem Singh Jhala v. State of M.P., 2007 (4) M.P.L.J. 129 . 22. This Court by order dated 2-3-2017 summoned the record pertaining to the departmental enquiry of the petitioner. On perusal of the record it is found that the petitioner was examined by Dr. G.P. Karode who has stated that he had examined the accused-petitioner clinically and there was smell of alcohol. Blood sample of the accused was taken and the same was sent for chemical examination. In the cross-examination a question was posed that as to whether the petitioner was drunk and smell of alcohol was there. PW-3, Dr. G.P. Karode affirmed his statement stating that the petitioner was in a drunken condition and there was smell of alcohol from his mouth. The relevant portion of deposition of Dr. G.P. Karode is reproduced hereunder: ^^fnukad 15-11-1998 le; 1%30 cts jkf= dks esjs }kjk Jh :nziky flag iq= bUnziky flag Øekad 331 Fkkuk flŒekŒ fuoklh flŒekŒ dh tkap dh x;h Fkh ¼ijh{k.k½ esfMdy ijh{k.k fjiksVZ fuEukuqlkj gSA Jh :nziky dh lk¡lksa esa ,oa eaqg ls 'kjkc dh cw vk jgh FkhA 1- ukM+h dh xfr 100 Áfr feuVA 2- jDr pki 140@88 feŒfeŒ vkQ ejdjhA 3- T;knk ckrphr dj jgk FkkA 4- lk¡l dh xfr c<+h gqbZ FkhA 5- islsUV gks'k esa FkkA vfHker & esjh jk; esa vkjŒ :nziky flag us dqN ,Ydksgy dk lsou fd;k FkkA :nziky flag ds 2 CyM lsaiy ¼[kwu ds½ fy, x, Fks ftUgsa dh lh/kk djds vkjŒ equs'k dqekj Øekad 353 Fkkuk flŒekŒ dks lkSai fn;s x;s FksA ftUgsa jklk;fud tkap ds fy, Hkstk tkuk FkkA esfMdy dk Áek.ki= fn;k x;k og esjs }kjk fn;k x;k gSA Án'kZ 8 gSA ftlds vfl;k Hkkx ij esjs gLrk{kj gSA ¼, ls ,½ rdA ;gh esjk dFku gSA Áfr ijh{k.k %& Á'u %& D;k eSa u'ks esa Fkk ,oa D;k cw vk jgh Fkh \ mRrj %& u'ks esa Fks ,oa cw vk jgh FkhA Á'u %& D;k vkius esjk eaqg law?kk Fkk \ mRrj % gka eSusa eaqg law?kk FkkA eq>s blds vykok dqN ugha iwNuk gSA** 23. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the ratio laid down by this Court in Prem Singh Jhala (supra) would not apply in the present case. Inebriation of the petitioner was proved by the doctor. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the ratio laid down by this Court in Prem Singh Jhala (supra) would not apply in the present case. Inebriation of the petitioner was proved by the doctor. It is established law that in the departmental enquiry the degree of proof as required in a criminal case where the prosecution has to prove the charge beyond doubt is not required to prove misconduct in a departmental enquiry. The doctrine of preponderance of probabilities is applied in such cases. The view of this Court gets fortified in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 . 24. In view of the obtaining factual matrix and taking into consideration nature of charges levelled against the petitioner, who is a member of disciplinary force. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. This Court does not find any illegality or perversity of approach in the impugned orders of the disciplinary authority and affirmation thereof by the appellate authority. Since the conduct of the petitioner uttering obscene and indecent words, causing physical and mental harassment to the victim-girl in public domain, has certainly impaired the image of the Police department, therefore, the order of imposition of punishment of his removal from service, cannot be held to be disproportionate and no interference is warranted on the quantum of the punishment. It is established law, that the courts can interfere in the quantum of punishment, only where the imposition of punishment is shockingly disproportionate, as propounded by the Apex Court in the judgments rendered in the cases of Commandant, 22th Battalion Central Reserve Police Force, Srinagar v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 ; Chandra Kumar Choupra v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 369 and Delhi Police through Commissioner of Police v. Sat Narayan Kaushik, (2016) 6 SCC 303 . 25. 25. Thus, in view of the aforesaid enunciation of law discussed in preceding paragraphs, I do not find any illegality and perversity of approach in the impugned order warranting interference of this Court in writ jurisdiction and the same being impregnable deserves stamp of approval of this Court. 26. Accordingly, the writ petition being sans merit, is dismissed.