Kailash Chand Meena S/o Shri Kanhaiya Lal Meena v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation through its Managing Director, Chomu House, Jaipur
2017-03-01
SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. Admitted facts which have culled out from the petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of driver on 11.04.1994. He was regularised on the said post on 18.07.1998, the charge sheet was issued to him on 14.06.2007 alleging that he had remained absent from duty for a certain period. Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the enquiry who submitted his report on 03.07.2007 holding that the charge does not stand proved and exonerated the petitioner. Copy of the enquiry report was sent to the petitioner by the respondent vide their notice dated 19.12.2007 as well as on 31.12.2007, wherein it was mentioned that the petitioner may submit his reply to the enquiry report. When a copy of the said notice was not received, a paper publication was also issued asking the petitioner to appear in person. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although the petitioner had been exonerated of the charges by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to punish him vide Order dated 09.04.2008 and has removed him from service. He preferred an appeal against the said order pointing out that there is no disagreement notice given to him. However, the appeal was also rejected on 21.05.2008. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is now settled law that a person cannot be punished by the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of an enquiry report for which he has been exonerated, unless the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and sends a disagreement note informing the delinquent for the reasons and basis on which he disagrees with the Enquiry Officer's report. In the present case, however no such disagreement notice was given by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, the punishment is vitiated in law. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that because the show cause notice was given to the petitioner and was also published in the news paper, it would be presumed that the Disciplinary Authority had informed the petitioner of having not agreed with the Enquiry Officer's Report. Having heard Counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the submissions made by the Counsel for the petitioner deserve to be accepted. 5.
Having heard Counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the submissions made by the Counsel for the petitioner deserve to be accepted. 5. Admittedly, there is no disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority hence, a presumption cannot be drawn merely because a show-cause notice was sent wherein there is no mentioning by the Disciplinary Authority that he does not agree with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. At this juncture, it is also necessary to mention that not only the Disciplinary Authority is required to mention but Enquiry Officer also mentioned the reasons why he is not agreeing with the Enquiry Officer's Report and gives an opportunity to the delinquent to reply to such reasons. The proceedings thus, suffer from being not in consonance with the provisions of law. 6. In this regard, my view is fortified by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Bihari Misra (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 84 wherein Supreme Court has held as under:- "18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds and enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. 19.
In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." 7. In view of above the punishment order dated 09.04.2008 is quashed and set aside. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner Kailash Chand Meena has already expired and his LRs have been taken on record. In view thereof, the case cannot be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, while setting aside Order dated 09.04.2008 our all time quietus is maintained. All consequential benefits are granted to the LRs of the deceased petitioner Kailash Chand Meena. The benefits shall be calculated by the respondents on the basis of treating the petitioner to be reinstated till the date of his death i.e. 30.09.2012. The said benefits shall be released to the LRs of the deceased within a period of three months from the date of submission of certified copy of this order. 9. It goes without saying that if the order is not complied with within the stipulated period then the LRs of the deceased petitioner shall be free to initiate contempt proceedings against the Managing Director and concerned officers of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. 10.
9. It goes without saying that if the order is not complied with within the stipulated period then the LRs of the deceased petitioner shall be free to initiate contempt proceedings against the Managing Director and concerned officers of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.