JUDGMENT : U.C. DHYANI, J. 1. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner seeks to issue a writ or order to set aside/quash the impugned orders dated 20.08.2011 (contained as Annexure no. 9 to the writ petition) and 06.11.2017 (contained as Annexure no. 14 to the writ petition). 2. Facts giving rise to present writ petition are that in the year 1949, an allotment order was issued in the name of Mr. A.F. Buck by the then R.C.E.O./D.S.O. Nainital, vide order dated 08.04.1949. The landlord of the disputed premise was Sri Param Shah. Mr. A.F. Buck expired in 1961 and thereafter his wife Mrs. C.E. Buck applied for regularization of allotment dated 08.04.1949 by moving an application dated 15.05.1963, stating therein that the Buck Preparatory School (here-in-after referred to as ‘BPS’) is running in the allotted premises for the last 12 years. The tenancy was regularized vide order dated 15.05.1963 by then R.C.E.O. / S.D.O., Nainital. Rent of allotted premises was deposited by BPS which was running therein. The preparatory school was being run by Mrs. C.E. Buck, wife of late A.F. Buck, as Principal / President of the school. 3. The landlord of the disputed premises received the rent from BPS. The rent was being continuously deposited by the school from the time of original allotment till the death of Smt. Leelawati on 29.05.1990 and nobody ever objected about the receiving of rent. The name of school finds place in assessment record of Nagar Palika Parishad, Nainital, as tenant. The tenancy of said school was established with the consent of landlord before issuance of regularization of tenancy order dated 15.05.1963. The order of regularization was never challenged by any landlord in their life time and it remains unchallenged. The regularization order has not been cancelled till now. 4. Late Chandra Lal Shah and Mathura Prasad were real sons of late Parma Lal Shah @ Parma Shib Lal Shah and late Leelawati was widow of late Chandra Lal Shah and Mathura Prasad Shah had also issued rent receipts and late Leelawati received the rent from the school. The rent was enhanced from time to time. Tara Prasad claimed himself to be the adopted son of late Chandra Lal Shah and Leelawati on the basis of registered adoption deed dated 30.07.1959. The rent was enhanced from time to time. Tara Prasad claimed himself to be the adopted son of late Chandra Lal Shah and Leelawati on the basis of registered adoption deed dated 30.07.1959. Tara Prasad claimed through power of attorney holder Jagdish Lal Shah, who was the husband of rambha Shah, the sole daughter of Leelawati Shah, and filed a mutation case through his power of attorney holder. There is no detail of the immovable property in the alleged power of attorney dated 31.05.1990, through which Tara Prasad moved the mutation application being the adopted son of Chandra Lal and Leelawati in disputed property as legal heir. The original file of mutation case of Smt. Leelawati was not available and even though the mutation order was passed illegally in favour of Tara Prasad vide proposal 41 dated 21.04.1992, issued by the Nagar Palika, Nainital. Under the RTI Act, it has been informed that the file of mutation of Smt. Leelawati has lost. 5. According to the petitioner, the details of properties have not been given in the power of attorney dated 31.05.1990 but during the mutation proceedings the power of attorney holder moved an application dated 21.02.1992 mentioning some immovable properties without area and boundaries and claimed the property to be known as Sun Beam Cottage. Surprisingly, the mutation order was passed on the basis of some non-existent property because the mutation file of Smt. Leelawati was lost and there is no mention of immovable property in power of attorney dated 31.05.1990 and, therefore, the mutation order is per se illegal due to the concealment of facts by Jagdish Lal Shah with collusion of Tara Prasad Shah to grab the disputed premises. The mutation order does not confer any title on the person in whose favour it is made. 6. An application dated 18.07.2001 was moved by respondent no. 1 Smt. Beena Stephen under Section 16(1)(b) read with Section 12(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 [here-in-after referred to as ‘U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972’] to release the disputed property mentioning it as Sun Beam Cottage. The boundaries and area of the disputed property have not been mentioned in the release application. The title in the disputed property has been claimed by respondent no. 13 of 1972’] to release the disputed property mentioning it as Sun Beam Cottage. The boundaries and area of the disputed property have not been mentioned in the release application. The title in the disputed property has been claimed by respondent no. 1 on the basis of sale deed dated 05.12.2000 claimed to be executed by Tara Prasad Shah through power of attorney holder Sri Ashok Kumar Shah in her favour. The respondent no. 1 is claiming herself to be the landlady of the disputed property on the basis of aforesaid sale deed. Mrs. C.E. Buck was impleaded as opposite party, but knowingly, the petitioner who is running the school, as Principal, has not been impleaded as a party before the learned Addl. District Magistrate in Rent Control Case no. 51 of 2001. Later on, the petitioner herself moved an application in the case and she was impleaded therein. The petitioner filed her detailed objection dated 14.03.2002, stating therein that learned Prescribed Authority / A.D.M. has no power to entertain the application due to lack of jurisdiction because the matter is of the civil nature as the alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 is under dispute. In civil suit no. 53/1992, an order dated 28.07.2000 has been passed by learned court of Munsif, Nainital, directing Tara Prasad to present his suit no. 53/1992 before proper court of competent pecuniary jurisdiction. 7. In said suit, Tara Prasad was plaintiff and the petitioner was, in personal capacity, impleaded as defendant and Mrs. C.E. Buck was also impleaded as defendant, who also filed written statement, stating that she is not tenant but said school is tenant which is paying the rent through principal to landlord but Tara Prasad never received the rent from the school, and Tara Prasad, i.e., plaintiff claimed mandatory injunction to recover the possession from the petitioner. In aforesaid suit, it is admitted by plaintiff Tara Prasad through power of attorney that he (plaintiff) is out of possession of property in question and demanded the possession from the petitioner in personal capacity and in compliance of direction dated 20.08.2000, never filed said suit before proper court after return of plaint, hence the rights of Tara Prasad raised in his suit no. 53/1992 has not been decided till now. 8. Mr. Tara Prasad Shah, admittedly, was not in possession of the disputed property as stated in original suit no. 53/1992 has not been decided till now. 8. Mr. Tara Prasad Shah, admittedly, was not in possession of the disputed property as stated in original suit no. 53/1992, which was returned vide order dated 20.08.2000, to be filed before proper court on the basis of pecuniary jurisdiction. Mr. Tara Prasad executed the alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 with false averments that possession has been handed over to respondent no. 1. The aforesaid suit for mandatory injunction was returned and was never filed before the competent court. The alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 has been executed in the name of trust through its President, respondent no. 1. 9. Mr. Tara Prasad treated the possession of petitioner as hostile in the disputed property and did not prosecute his suit to evict her and even after getting the alleged sale deed executed in her favour by respondent no. 1, she never preferred to file a suit for recovery of possession against the petitioner. The release application before the Prescribed Authority was not maintainable because the disputed premise was not vacant and a regular suit for recovery of possession filed on behalf of Mr. Tara Prasad, has failed. 10. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned P.A. / A.D.M. failed to examine this important aspect of the case and passed the impugned release order dated 20.08.2011 exercising his limited jurisdiction without ascertaining who is the real landlord of the disputed property. It is also submitted that on refusal to receive rent by Mr. Tara Prasad and Rambha Shah, a misc. case no. 06 / 1994, Buck Preparatory School vs. Tara Prasad Shah & another, by the petitioner being the principal / president of the school. The application under Section 30(1) of the Act was filed which was allowed vide order dated 03.02.1996, permitting the school to deposit the rent in future. The petitioner complied the order dated 03.02.1996 in its letter and spirit. 11. Order dated 03.02.1996 was challenged by Tara Prasad Shah and Rambha Shah by filing a revision no. 28/1996 before learned District Judge, Nainital, admitting the existence of school, as tenant, through petitioner being its president/principal. The petitioner complied the order dated 03.02.1996 in its letter and spirit. 11. Order dated 03.02.1996 was challenged by Tara Prasad Shah and Rambha Shah by filing a revision no. 28/1996 before learned District Judge, Nainital, admitting the existence of school, as tenant, through petitioner being its president/principal. It has been held by the revisional court that the ejectment suit has not been filed against the school / tenant by the revisionist and a complicated question of title would be decided only by way of a regular suit and in the light of aforesaid observation, the revision was dismissed vide order dated 15.02.1997. Sri Tara Prasad and Smt. Rambha Shah were very much aware of the fact that a complicated question of title is involved in respect of the disputed property and, therefore, Mr. Tara Prasad filed aforesaid suit no. 53/1992 for recovery of possession against the petitioner and Mrs. C.E. Buck as well which was returned and was never filed again. Having known the dispute of title, Tara Prasad executed alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 and, therefore, he could not transfer the better title in the disputed property as he had himself therein to respondent no. 1 Smt. Beena Stephen. 12. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that it was incumbent upon Beena Stephen to obtain the possession of disputed premises by filing a regular civil suit as observed by learned revisional court in revision no. 28/1996 by observing the legal course as adopted by Tara Prasad by filing original suit no. 53/1992 from which she claimed her title through sale deed dated 05.12.2000. By concealing all these facts, the release application was filed. The petitioner raised all these objections before the learned PA/ADM but unfortunately the same were not considered and the learned PA assumed the jurisdiction of regular civil court by exercising whole powers of civil court and decided the validity of alleged sale deed indirectly and passed the impugned release order dated 20.08.2011. 13. Again, a misc. application no. 11/2003 was filed under Section 30(1) of the Act against Durga Prasad and Smt. Rambha Shah to deposit the rent of disputed property wherein it has been observed by the learned Civil Judge (J.D.) that the dispute of title is still involved regarding the disputed premises and an original suit no. 57/2003 has been filed by Durga Prasad / O.P. no. 57/2003 has been filed by Durga Prasad / O.P. no. 1 and, as such, the petitioner was allowed to deposit the rent on behalf of school and the order is being complied by depositing the rent continuously by the petitioner. The impugned release order dated 20.08.2011 was challenged by the petitioner by filing a revision no. 67/2011, Smt. Shenaz Begum vs Beena Stephen and others, under Section 18 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Nainital, mainly on the ground that the release application was not maintainable as the question of title is still awaiting adjudication between the rival landlords claiming themselves on different basis and the respondent no. 1 is not the landlord. In absence of relationship of tenancy between the petitioner / school and respondent no. 1, the release application under the Act is not maintainable. The rent of the disputed property is being deposited continuously by the petitioner in compliance of final order dated 03.09.2004, passed in misc. case no. 11/2003 under Section 30(1) of the Act, now, and earlier, it was being deposited in compliance of earlier order. The learned PA/ADM has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title and he illegally decided the validity of alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 and the alleged adoption upon which the seller Mr. Tara Prasad is claiming inheritance in the disputed property and executed the alleged sale deed in favour of respondent no. 1. 14. Learned District Judge, vide impugned order dated 06.11.2017, dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner by exceeding the jurisdiction vested in it and failed to consider that the question of title may not be decided under the summary proceedings of release application. The question of regularly depositing rent may not be reviewed in the proceedings of release application and further in its revision. The regular suit of recovery of possession was returned and thereafter has not been filed and, therefore, the learned revisional court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and illegally upheld the impugned order dated 20.08.2011 passed by Prescribed Authority and learned revisional court further failed to discharge its duty while exercising the revisional jurisdiction properly. 15. It is submitted that from a bare perusal of the sale deed it is apparent that alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 is executed in favour of a Trust, hence, provisions of U.P. Act no. 15. It is submitted that from a bare perusal of the sale deed it is apparent that alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000 is executed in favour of a Trust, hence, provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 are not applicable and this point has not been considered by Prescribed Authority or the revisional court while passing the orders impugned. It is admitted by Tara Prasad that the physical possession of the rented portion is in favour of said tenant / school, in papers filed in mutation proceedings and he never claimed rent from tenant. Tara Prasad through attorney dated 31.05.1990, for the first time, before Municipal Board Nainital in mutation proceedings, with concealment of facts as adopted son, after expiration of more than 40 years claimed the inheritance of late Chandra Lal Shah and Mrs. Leelawati Shah, while alleged adoption deed appears to be registered in 1959, hence alleged claim regarding property in question is time barred and rights of Tara Prasad are unfounded, as he is a foreigner and not an Indian citizen. 16. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that learned District Judge / revisional court has not decided the issue, i.e., the validity of the alleged power of attorney dated 29.10.1996 and it is observed in order in question that attorney will have to be decided by Civil Court and, at the same time, wrongly presumed that the sale deed dated 05.12.2000 is a legal document, which has been allegedly registered on the strength of power of attorney dated 29.10.1996 though the validity of alleged attorney is still pending for disposal by civil court. It is further submitted that service upon the O.P./C.E. Buck, in compliance of mandatory provision under Rule 28 of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, has not been made. Order sheet of proceedings pending before PA shows that presumption of service has been inferred on the basis of fake A.D. (paper no. 46), on 09.11.2001. An application was moved by the petitioner before the revisional court / A.D.J. 2nd Nainital. Said application was allowed with direction to call the report from the concerned post office regarding genuineness of A.D. (paper no. 46). 46), on 09.11.2001. An application was moved by the petitioner before the revisional court / A.D.J. 2nd Nainital. Said application was allowed with direction to call the report from the concerned post office regarding genuineness of A.D. (paper no. 46). Learned District Judge, on 07.09.2017, directed concerned postmaster to submit the report through special messenger and the petitioner deposited the charge of the special messenger but in compliance of said order, no report regarding the genuineness of fake A.D. has been submitted to revisional court. Without submission of such report by postmaster for service, in compliance of Rule 28 of Rules 1972, the revision has been finally decided. Hence, orders in question are beyond jurisdiction and are illegal. The revisional court vide order dated 18.03.2017 directed to examine the validity of service by calling the explanation from the postmaster of the concerned post office regarding the genuineness of A.D. (paper no. 46). 17. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in release application, O.P./C.E. Buck was never served notice in compliance of circular of Central Government. When petitioner received the information through computerized Net System and after filing death certificate of Mrs. C.E. Buck in revision no. 66/2011, an application no. 87C was moved by the petitioner in her revision to delete the name of C.E. Buck from the memo of revision, who had died on 26.12.2008, prior to the date of filing the revision. Having relied on these facts, the learned revisional court vide its order dated 30.04.2016, allowed the application for deletion of name of C.E. Buck from the memo of revision. Vide order dated 23.09.2017, the revisional court directed learned counsel Mr. M.B. Singh, appearing on behalf of Tara Prasad, through power of attorney holder Sri Ashok Shah, to file the Vakalatnama and the power of attorney of Tara Prasad in favour of Ashok Shah. But without filing Vakalatnama and power of attorney, learned revisional court proceeded further to decide the revision on merit without having proceeded ex parte against Tara Prasad. 18. On the basis of facts mentioned here-in-above, it is submitted that the impugned order dated 20.08.2011 was passed against the dead person Mrs. C.E. Buck, who was opposite party no. 1, before the learned PA/ADM Nainital, which is not sustainable in the eye of law. It was the duty of respondent no. 18. On the basis of facts mentioned here-in-above, it is submitted that the impugned order dated 20.08.2011 was passed against the dead person Mrs. C.E. Buck, who was opposite party no. 1, before the learned PA/ADM Nainital, which is not sustainable in the eye of law. It was the duty of respondent no. 1 to substitute the legal heirs of Smt. C.E. Buck before the PA and she failed to do so and, therefore, the impugned order dated 20.08.2011 is per se illegal and revisional court failed to appreciate this important fact and legal issue while passing the impugned order dated 06.11.2017 and, therefore, both the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that impugned orders have been passed by learned courts below in utter disregard of Rule 25 of the Rules, wherein it is mandatory to bring on record the legal heirs of deceased / O.P. within one month from the date of death of party concerned. Both the courts below failed to comply with this mandatory rule, the trial court due to non action on behalf of respondent no. 1, and the learned revisional court despite the knowledge of death of Mrs. C.E. Buck overlooked the compliance of mandatory provision of Rule 25 resulting in miscarriage of justice. Order dated 15.03.1963 is the regularization order of the allotment and both the courts below have illegally treated the same as new allotment in favour of the school. Fact of the matter is that the said school was in possession of the disputed premises prior to the date of regularization as tenant with the consent of landlord who was receiving the rent from school and issued the receipts accordingly. The validity of regularization order dated 15.03.1963 may not be looked into while deciding the release application by PA/ADM by way of the impugned order and this fact has been overlooked and not considered by the learned revisional court while passing the impugned order. The applicant of release application, respondent no. The validity of regularization order dated 15.03.1963 may not be looked into while deciding the release application by PA/ADM by way of the impugned order and this fact has been overlooked and not considered by the learned revisional court while passing the impugned order. The applicant of release application, respondent no. 1 Smt. Beena Stephen, herself admitted that she purchased the disputed premises as President of registered Trust, namely, Jehovah Nissi Social, Educational and Spiritual Development Ministries Trust and, therefore, the release application is barred by provisions of Section 2(bb) of the Act but this legal aspect has not been decided by either of the courts below and the release application has been filed by respondent no. 1 in her personal capacity, which is not maintainable, as it has been concealed that the disputed property has been purchased in the name of Trust. 20. Lastly, it is submitted that BPS is a registered society since 1993. The Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Nainital has granted recognition to the school under Section 18 of the Nishulk Evam Aniwarya Bal Shiksha Ka Adhikar Adhiniyam, 2009 and Rule 17(6) made thereunder, vide letter dated 30.04.2016. Tara Prasad Shah has not been impleaded as O.P. in release application and even though he has been shown to be party in the impugned orders and the same have been passed against him without impleading him and, as such, the impugned orders are bad in the eye of law due to the non-joinder of necessary parties. The factum of tenancy of the school has not been mentioned in the alleged sale deed dated 05.12.2000. Mr. Tara Prasad Shah was very much aware of the fact that the school is in possession of the disputed premises as tenant. These facts were concealed from the learned courts below and, therefore, the impugned orders are illegal and beyond jurisdiction, as the release application was not maintainable on behalf of respondent no. 1. The provisions of the Act are not applicable to the disputed premises, as the same is a registered society discharging the charitable function and registered under the Right to Education Act. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his petition argued that trespasser, tenant or licensee can be evicted only by obtaining a decree for eviction from a competent civil court. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his petition argued that trespasser, tenant or licensee can be evicted only by obtaining a decree for eviction from a competent civil court. Instead of filing a release application, the respondent ought to have filed a civil suit in the civil court, if the respondents termed the petitioner as trespasser. The respondents ought to have obtained a decree for eviction from a competent civil court [Nitin Gunwant Shah vs Indian Bank and others, 2012 (3) Apex Court Judgments 402 (S.C.)]. When lower courts had no jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties and decide the dispute between them for disputed property, then they have also no right to give any finding regarding merits of the rights of plaintiffs or defendants. It is submitted that in summary proceedings gift deed / sale deed have been held to be valid [Radhawar (since deceased) through LRS vs Devata (since deceased) through LRS, 2016 (3) Civil Court Cases 599 (ALLAHABAD)]. An erroneous determination of a pure question of law in a previous judgment will not operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings for different property though between the same parties [Satyendra Kumar & others vs Raj Nath Dubey & others, (2016) 14 SCC 49 ]. 22. Decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings [Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs Director Health Services, Haryana & others, 2013 (3) Apex Court Judgments 001 (S.C.)] 23. Only relief sought in the application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act was for release of the accommodation in dispute. No relief was sought in respect of allotment order. It was held by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Govind Prasad vs III Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others, (1989) 1 ARC 93 that unless the allotment order in favour of the respondent is set aside, the question of considering the release does not arise. The decree passed by a court for or against a dead person is a nullity [Gurnam Singh (D) thr. LRS & others vs Gurbachan Kaur (D) by LRS & others, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 511]. 24. It is submitted that Buck’s legal representatives had no been represented after her death. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in Nutan Kumar vs II Addl. LRS & others vs Gurbachan Kaur (D) by LRS & others, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 511]. 24. It is submitted that Buck’s legal representatives had no been represented after her death. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in Nutan Kumar vs II Addl. District Judge, 2002 AIR (SC) 3456; Ganesh Trivedi vs Sundar Devi, 2002 (2) SCC 329 ; Ram Narayan Sharma vs Shakuntala Gaur, (2002) 5 SCC 184 , on behalf of the petitioner. 25. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon a decision rendered by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Mani Rao and another vs Addl. District Magistrate (Supply), Varanasi and others, 1993 (2) ARC 125, wherein it was observed that the fact that the rent receipts and other documents on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner describe Dr. Krishna Mohan Gupta as Sanchalak of Maharshi M.P. Gupta, Bharti Vidyalaya, would not make the institute the ‘tenant’ of the building. The tenancy was, in fact, created in favour of Dr. Krishna Mohan Gupta. It is another thing that he was the Sanchalak and founder of the so-called institution. 26. Attention of this Court is drawn towards a decision rendered by Allahabad High Court in Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. vs Vinod Kumar Agarwal, 1997 (1) ARC 396, wherein it was observed that it is evident from the definition of ‘landlord’ contained in Section 3(j) of the Act that the landlord means a person to whom its rent is payable. It is not necessary that such a person should also be owner of the building which is let out. But an owner, if rent is payable to him, may also be a landlord. Except for the purpose of clause (g), the agent or attorney of a landlord authorized to receive the rent also comes within the definition of the landlord. A Full Bench of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Talib Hussain vs I Addl. District Judge, Nainital, 1986 (1) ARC 1, ruled that the prospective allottee has got no right to intervene in the release proceedings. The decision of the Full Bench was approved by the Supreme Court in Vijai Kumar Sonkar vs Incharge District Judge and others, 1995 (2) ARC 1. 27. In Mohd. District Judge, Nainital, 1986 (1) ARC 1, ruled that the prospective allottee has got no right to intervene in the release proceedings. The decision of the Full Bench was approved by the Supreme Court in Vijai Kumar Sonkar vs Incharge District Judge and others, 1995 (2) ARC 1. 27. In Mohd. Bashir vs State of U.P. and others, 2017 (2) ARC 591, it was held that release application by landlord cannot be treated to be barred by limitation even if the same is presented after more than 12 years from the date person has entered into an unauthorised occupation of the premises covered by the Act. In absence of any limitation being provided under the Act for initiation of release proceedings in respect of deemed vacancy, no period of limitation can be read in the statutory provisions only on the principle that a power vested in an authority must be exercised within a reasonable time. 28. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of Narayani Devi vs Mahendra Kumar Tripathi and others, decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 19.12.1997, in Special Leave to Appeal (C) no. 4968 of 1997; Shab-Uddin vs Addl. District and Sessions Judge and others, 2017 (2) ARC 595; Prem Singh Negi vs A.D.J. (UMC), Dehradun & others and Ram Shankar Singh vs District Judge Mirzapur & others, both decided by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 29297 of 1997 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 14856 of 1983 vide orders dated 02.09.1997 & 29.01.1997, respectively. Reliance is also placed upon decisions rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Kumar Sonkar vs In-charge District Judge and others, (1994) 1 SCC 646 ; Shri Malaprabha Coop., Sugar Factory Ltd. vs Union of India and another, (1994) 1 SCC 648 , on behalf of the respondents. 29. Learned Prescribed Authority/A.D.M., Nainital, by a reasoned order dated 20.08.2011, released the property in suit, viz., Buck Preparatory School, admeasuring 1079 sq. mtr. in favour of landlady Smt. Bina Stephen. When rent control revisions were filed against the same, learned revisional court did not find favour with the case of the revisionists and, therefore, dismissed the same while affirming the order passed by learned Prescribed Authority, on 06.11.2017. Present writ petition has been filed against both the orders. 30. So far as the applicability of U.P. Act no. When rent control revisions were filed against the same, learned revisional court did not find favour with the case of the revisionists and, therefore, dismissed the same while affirming the order passed by learned Prescribed Authority, on 06.11.2017. Present writ petition has been filed against both the orders. 30. So far as the applicability of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 is concerned, petitioner is estopped from contenting that the said Act is not applicable. Once the petitioner has conceded the applicability of provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, she is estopped from contending otherwise. 31. The petitioner having admitted that the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 were applicable to the building in question, petitioner is, thus estopped from contending to the contrary and to assert that the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 were not applicable to the present case. This issue has been dealt with by learned revisional court in paras no. 6 to 9 of the impugned order. 32. An application under Section 16(1)(b) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 was moved by Smt. Bina Stephen before Prescribed Authority on the basis of sale deed, claiming herself to be the owner of the property. Durga Prasad, on the other hand, claimed himself to be the owner of the property on the basis of Will executed in his favour on behalf of Smt. Leelawati Shah. No competent court has passed any order for the cancellation of sale deed. Till such time the sale deed has been held otherwise, it shall be presumed to be valid and enforceable. Sale deed dated 05.12.2000 was executed through Power of Attorney holder Ashok Kumar Shah of the seller Tara Prasad Shah. 33. It is not a suit for cancellation of sale deed and the actual owner Tara Prasad did not dispute the execution of Power of Attorney in favour of Ashok Kumar Shah. Ashok Kumar (Power of Attorney holder), in the instant case, has transferred the possession of the disputed property to the purchaser Smt. Bina Stephen. 34. The sale deed indicated that Smt. Bina Stephen has purchased the property in her personal capacity and not as a trustee and, therefore, no permission under Section 92 CPC was required. 35. The property was initially allotted by the District Supply Officer, Nainital for the business purposes to late A.F. Buck and not to Mrs. 34. The sale deed indicated that Smt. Bina Stephen has purchased the property in her personal capacity and not as a trustee and, therefore, no permission under Section 92 CPC was required. 35. The property was initially allotted by the District Supply Officer, Nainital for the business purposes to late A.F. Buck and not to Mrs. C.E. Buck. The property was initially allotted to the husband of Mrs. C.E. Buck in his private capacity to run a business. 36. An institution, which is not a registered body, cannot be regarded as a juristic person or legal entity and, therefore, tenancy could not have been created in its favour. The allotment order in favour of the school does not appear to be a valid allotment order. No tenancy was created in favour of the school on the basis of said allotment order. Status of the school was, therefore, not of a tenant. 37. Learned revisional court, in para 23 of its judgment, has prima facie found the Will executed in favour of Durga Prasad by late Smt. Leelawati Shah to be a fake one. 38. Learned revisional court has also found that the registered adoption deed appears to be a genuine document. Tara Prasad shah was adopted son of Smt. Leelawati Shah in respect of which adoption deed was executed. 39. Much emphasis has been laid on the service of summons on Mrs. C.E. Buck, who was living in U.S.A. It is contended that no proper service can be presumed upon Mrs. C.E. Buck. In rent control revision no. 63 of 2011 and rent control revision no. 67 of 2011, Mrs. C.E. Buck was party respondent. Notices were dispatched to Mrs. C.E. Buck by the Court through Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. As per letter dated 27.09.2012, Ministry of External Affairs requested the court to directly approach the appropriate authority for assistance. According to the note recorded by learned revisional court, summons upon Mrs. C.E. Buck was dispatched through the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, New Delhi, vide letter dated 11.01.2013. The summons was returned to the court by the Department of Legal Affairs, Judicial System, with a report to send it directly to process forwarding international along with required fee. The court, vide order dated 15.05.2013, passed in rent control revision no. 67 of 2011, directed that the notice to Mrs. The summons was returned to the court by the Department of Legal Affairs, Judicial System, with a report to send it directly to process forwarding international along with required fee. The court, vide order dated 15.05.2013, passed in rent control revision no. 67 of 2011, directed that the notice to Mrs. C.E. Buck be dispatched directly on her address at U.S.A. The notices were, therefore, issued. This Court does not find any perversity in the said finding of learned revisional court. 40. Emphasis has also been laid that the order passed by Prescribed Authority is an order passed against a dead person and, hence, a nullity. The fact which would be relevant in such a submission is that no information was given by any of the parties that Mrs. C.E. Buck has passed away. Smt. Bina Stephen had no knowledge about the death of Mrs. C.E. Buck since the date of filing of the petition till the date of decision and no information was given in writing by any of the parties about the death of Mrs. C.E. Buck, therefore, it cannot be said that judgment was passed against a dead person. When the parties came to know about the death of Mrs. C.E. Buck, her name was deleted, by moving amendment application in the revisions. When Mrs. C.E. Buck ceased to be a party, service upon her, as also a plea of judgment rendered being nullity, are not relevant. 41. Emphasis is also laid on Rule 8 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, to say that while making an inspection for release, the facts were not elicited from two respectable persons of the locality. This submission is also devoid of merits, inasmuch as Rule 8 only says that ‘the facts mentioned in the report should wherever practicable, be elicited from at least two respectable persons in locality and the conclusion of the inspection report shall be pasted in the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public….’. It is thus clear that the observance of such Rule is not mandatory and depends upon the feasibility of securing presence of at least two respectable persons of the locality. 42. WPMS no. 649 of 2011 was filed on behalf of Buck Preparatory School, Tallital, Nainital against Mrs. Bina Stephen and others. It is thus clear that the observance of such Rule is not mandatory and depends upon the feasibility of securing presence of at least two respectable persons of the locality. 42. WPMS no. 649 of 2011 was filed on behalf of Buck Preparatory School, Tallital, Nainital against Mrs. Bina Stephen and others. The same was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh writ petition, vide order dated 27.05.2011. It is stated that fresh writ petition was never filed. 43. The next question which arises for consideration is–what is perversity? A perverse finding is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. A wrong finding is not necessarily a perverse finding. A finding cannot be said to be perverse merely because it is possible to take a different view on the evidence. 44. The following are the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Joginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 SC & FB, Rent Cases 288: “In Maope Vishwanath Acharya and others Vs State of Maharashtra and another (1988) 2 SCC 1 , this court has emphasized the need of social legislation like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society”. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and un-reasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity.” [Emphasis supplied] 45. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and un-reasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity.” [Emphasis supplied] 45. In Indian Overseas Bank vs. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers’ Union (2000) 4 SCC 245 , the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to re-appreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose, no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 46. Likewise, in Prakash Chandra and others vs. XII A.D.J. and another, 2013 (2) ARC 91 , it was observed that in supervisory jurisdiction of this Court over subordinate Courts, the scope of judicial review is very limited and narrow. It is not to correct the errors in the orders of the court below but to remove manifest and patent errors of law and jurisdiction without acting as an appellate authority. 47. Thus there are concurrent findings of two authorities below. Prescribed Authority as well as Revisional Authority have given cogent reasons in support of findings arrived at by them. 48. This Court does not find any perversity in the decisions of two authorities below. 49. It will be apt to quote para 4 of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh vs Ravi Prakash, (2004) 3 SCC 682 , as under: “4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The High Court has set aside the judgment of the appellate court and restored that of the trial court. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the judgment of the appellate court. Though not specifically stated, the phraseology employed by the High Court in its judgment goes to show that the High Court has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction for correcting the judgment of the appellate court. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the court or authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev’s case (supra) that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that–“considering the evidence on the record carefully” it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. On its own showing, the High Court has acted like an appellate court which was not permissible for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution.” 50. It will also be apt to quote paras 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and others vs Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and others, (2010) 1 SCC 217 , as under: “29. It will also be apt to quote paras 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and others vs Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and others, (2010) 1 SCC 217 , as under: “29. The High Court, as the discussion in impugned judgment shows, has been too technical in construing the pleadings of the case overlooking the fact that plea of sub-letting has been set up by landlord in the plaint and there has been full and critical examination of the evidence by the Additional Rent Controller as well as the Administrative Tribunal. The Additional Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal cannot be said to have misdirected themselves either on law or on facts. Both Authorities found as a fact that Mandovi Tours and Travels was not a genuine partnership and it was formed to cover up the subletting of the suit premises. They also found as a fact that the partnership having not been found to be genuine partnership, it was difficult to hold that the tenant continued to have a control over the suit premises. These findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal as well as the Additional Rent Controller are based on the consideration of evidence on record. In any case, it cannot be said that the aforesaid view of the Rent Control Authorities is not a possible view. 30. In Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta, (1975) 1 SCC 858 , this Court held : "7. ….The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts." 31. In State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 , this Court explained the power of the High Court under Article 227 thus : "28. Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such (1975) 1 SCC 858 (2003) 6 SCC 641 discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised ‘as the cloak of an appeal in disguise’.” 32. The aforesaid two decisions and few other decisions, namely, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 ; State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 and Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, (2004) 3 SCC 682 , came to be considered by this Court in Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1 and this Court held : "38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The (1986) 4 SCC 447 (2001) 1 SCC 4 (2004) 3 SCC 682 (2008) 9 SCC 1 powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law." 33. In light of the aforesaid legal position concerning jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227, which the High Court failed to keep in mind, it must be held that in the facts and circumstances of the case and the findings recorded by the Additional Rent Controller as well as the Administrative Tribunal, High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent orders of eviction based on the ground of sub-letting in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.” 51. The interference by the Court should be on error which is self evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or other, cannot be called a patent error. Jurisdiction is not available to be exercised for indulging in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal. 52. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. Power of judicial superintendence should be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. The High Court can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of inferior court or tribunal. The High Court can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of inferior court or tribunal. This Court, therefore, would not be justified in interfering with the concurrent orders of release, merely because, another possible view could be taken. 53. No interference is called for in the concurrent findings of two authorities below. 54. Writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed at the admission stage.