Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 66 (MP)

Prem Chand Chaturvedi v. State of M. P.

2017-01-12

SUJOY PAUL

body2017
ORDER : Sujoy Paul, J. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution takes exception to the order dated 18.8.2010 Annexure P/1 whereby the State Government by invoking Rule 9 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short 'Pension Rules') stopped the entire pension of the petitioner permanently. 2. Brief facts as stated by Shri Parag Chaturvedi are that the petitioner was working as Drug Inspector. He retired on attaining the age of superannuation in the year 1985. Since retiral dues have not been paid to the petitioner, he filed OA No.194/89 before the Tribunal. The petitioner has not filed the said order. However, the order passed in MA No.114/97 Annexure P/6 shows that the petitioner filed a review application seeking review of order passed in OA No.194/1989. The review petition was allowed by the Tribunal and the respondents were directed to grant anticipatory pension to the petitioner. The Tribunal made it clear that entitlement of the petitioner to receive the pension in future will remain subject to general conditions stated in the Pension Rules. 3. Shri Chaturvedi submits that the impugned order dated 18.8.2010 Annexure P/1 came as a bolt from blue to the petitioner. Without affording any opportunity of hearing respondents have passed the impugned order whereby complete pension of the petitioner is permanently stopped. Criticising this order, Shri Chaturvedi raised following points: (i) The impugned order is passed without following the principles of natural justice; (ii) As per Rule 9 of the Pension Rules, before stopping the pension, the respondents were required to take consent of Public Service Commission which has not been obtained. (iii) The petitioner was convicted by the Special Court on 28.5.1988. The respondents passed this order after few decades which is totally impermissible. 4. Shri Santosh Yadav, learned Panel Lawyer supported the impugned order. He submits that the petitioner was convicted by Special Court on 28.5.1988. The conduct of the petitioner which led to conviction is very grave and therefore pension of the petitioner is rightly stopped. More so when the judgment of Special Court dated 28.5.1988 was unsuccessfully challenged by the petitioner by filing Criminal Appeal No.576/88 before the High Court which was dismissed on 29.4.1999 and this judgment of High Court was not disturbed so far conviction part is concerned by the Supreme Court in SLP No.2121/99 (Criminal). The SLP was decided on 15.7.2004. More so when the judgment of Special Court dated 28.5.1988 was unsuccessfully challenged by the petitioner by filing Criminal Appeal No.576/88 before the High Court which was dismissed on 29.4.1999 and this judgment of High Court was not disturbed so far conviction part is concerned by the Supreme Court in SLP No.2121/99 (Criminal). The SLP was decided on 15.7.2004. Shri Yadav submits that after decision of the SLP, the matter was examined and a conscious decision was taken by the State Cabinet. While dealing with the second contention of Shri Chaturvedi, it is submitted that the petitioner was holding the post of Drug Inspector which is a non-gazetted post. He was not appointed through Public Service Commission. This aspect was clarified by the Government by issuing circular dated 18.2.1999 Annexure P/1 which shows that the consent of PSC is required only in cases of such government servants who were appointed through PSC. Thus, no fault can be found if approval is not obtained from the PSC. He submits that the factual basis for stopping the pension is not in dispute and; therefore, principles of natural justice were not required to be followed. Lastly, it is submitted that in view of gravity of offence committed by the petitioner and his conviction which is upheld upto Supreme Court, no interference may be made on the ground of delay in issuing the impugned order. 5. Shri Arvind Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent bank submits that he has a limited role. By the time, the order dated 18.8.2010 was communicated to the bank, the petitioner drew certain amount of regular pension. Beyond 18.8.2010, petitioner had no right to receive the pension. Such payment of pension for want of knowledge of the order dated 18.8.2010, amounts to over payment which can be recovered as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 2012 (8) SCC 417 (Chandi Prasad Uniyal and others v. State of Uttarakhand and others). He also relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in WP No.21844/2011(S) (Vaidhyanath Shukla v. State of M.P. and others) and in WP No.21848/2011(S) (Rajkaran Singh v. State of M.P. And others) to bolster his submission that after conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction in relation to a serious offence, petitioner is not entitled to get pension. 6. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in WP No.21844/2011(S) (Vaidhyanath Shukla v. State of M.P. and others) and in WP No.21848/2011(S) (Rajkaran Singh v. State of M.P. And others) to bolster his submission that after conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction in relation to a serious offence, petitioner is not entitled to get pension. 6. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The first contention of the petitioner is based on principles of natural justice and the order passed by the Tribunal. A plain reading of the order of Tribunal makes it clear that the Tribunal, in no uncertain terms, held that the order for grant of pension will depend upon and subject to the conditions mentioned in the Pension Rules. Rule 9 of the Pension Rules gives ample power to the State to stop the pension in cases where pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct/offence in a departmental enquiry or judicial proceedings. The only requirement is that if such conduct of an employee should be related to the period when he was in service. Admittedly, the conviction of the petitioner is founded upon his conduct as an employee. Thus, it is clear that the Government is empowered to stop the pension under Rule 9. 9. Nothing is pointed out to show that after conviction also a notice or opportunity of hearing was required to be given. Even if it would have been given, petitioner would not have been in a position to improve his case because his conviction which is upheld by this court and by Supreme Court is not in dispute. In cases falling within the ambit of Rule 19 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules/Article 311 of the Constitution, a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan Haryaran v. State of M.P. and another, 2004 (4) MPHT 343 (FB) opined that after conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction, no opportunity of hearing is required to be given. Thus, this point raised by Shri Chaturvedi cannot cut any ice. 10. This is settled in law that statutory provisions can be supplemented by issuing executive instructions. Thus, this point raised by Shri Chaturvedi cannot cut any ice. 10. This is settled in law that statutory provisions can be supplemented by issuing executive instructions. By way of executive instruction dated 8.2.1999 Annexure R/1, the State Government clarified that approval of PSC for stopping pension is required in such cases where employee is appointed through PSC. The Executive Instruction dated 8.2.1999 is not called in question. In this view of the matter, I am unable to hold that the impugned order is bad in law for not obtaining prior consent from the PSC. So far delay in issuing the impugned order is concerned, it is clear that the SLP was decided on 15.7.2004. In the SLP, the conviction of the petitioner was not disturbed, only sentence imposed on him was modified. Thereafter, no doubt, the Government has taken six more years to pass this order. However, these six years were to the benefit of the petitioner and not to his detriment because during these years petitioner enjoyed the benefit of pension. There is no provision in the Pension Rules nor any other legal authority is pointed by the petitioner which puts any embargo on the State Government in passing the order after few years. In other words, on the ground of delay alone, no interference can be made when it is proved that petitioner was found guilty of serious offence by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The judgments cited by Shri Pandey are on the same point. I find no reason to interfere in equity and discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Petition being meritless is hereby dismissed. Needless to mention that the petitioner was not entitled to get any pension beyond the date of passing of the impugned order. The bank will be within its right to recover/adjust said excess payment of pension from the petitioner. Petition dismissed.