SURESH RAJ PUROHIT I. P. S. , S/O. LATE SRI. SHANKER LALJI PUROHIT v. DIRECTOR, VIGILANCE & ANTI CORRUPTION BUREAU, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
2017-04-05
P.UBAID
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The petitioner in O.P. (Crl.) No.126 of 2016 and O.P. (Crl.) 154 of 2016 is the same person. He is a Senior I.P.S Officer in the Kerala Police Force. The petitioner in O.P. (Crl.) No. 132 of 2016 is a Sub Inspector of Police. They are the two accused arraigned in a complaint made by the 3rd respondent in O.P.(Crl.) No.126 of 2016 (one Benny), before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance), Thrissur. The complaint was received by the learned trial Judge as C.M.P.325 of 2016, and it was forwarded for investigation to the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Thrissur, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Before the VACB could register a crime on the said complaint, all further proceedings pursuant to the order of the learned trial Judge were stayed by this Court as per the interim order passed in these proceedings on 11.3.2016. So, presently there is no crime against the petitioners. 2. The complainant in O.P.(Crl.) No.154 of 2016 is one P.D. Joseph. He did not contest the matter before this Court. He filed complaint before the Juvenile Justice Board, Thrissur, against the I.P.S. Officer, alleging offences under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act (for short 'the JJ Act'). The said complaint was also forwarded by the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation to the Police. By the time crime could be registered by the Police on the said complaint, the further proceedings pursuant to the said order were also stayed by this Court as the per order dated 22.03.2016. The prosecution ordered to be initiated on those two complaints; one by the Special Court, and the other by the Juvenile Justice Board, is sought to be quashed in these proceedings brought under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indian. A preliminary question of law came up at the initial stage as to whether an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be maintained, in view of Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short 'the PC Act'). The law is settled in Moideenkutty v. State of Kerala (2003 (1) KLJ 728), that when jurisdictional lapse is noticed, or when the High Court notices any such jurisdictional error in any proceeding under the PC Act, the High Court will have to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The law is settled in Moideenkutty v. State of Kerala (2003 (1) KLJ 728), that when jurisdictional lapse is noticed, or when the High Court notices any such jurisdictional error in any proceeding under the PC Act, the High Court will have to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of the settled position, this aspect need not be further discussed. 3. The prominent allegation in the complaint made before the Special Court is that the I.P.S. Officer allowed his minor son to drive his official vehicle at the compound of the Police Academy, Thrissur. The complaint of Benny does not show when the said incident occurred, or at what time, or on what date, the Police Officer allowed his son to drive the official vehicle. The complainant does not have any direct knowledge about the said incident. He brought complaint on the basis of some paper reports and TV channel reports. In the said complaint, he has alleged offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Motor Vehicles Act (for short 'the MV Act'), and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. 4. Practically, the offences alleged by the complainant in his complaint are (a) an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (b) an offence punishable under Section 180 read with Sections 3 and 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and (c) an offence punishable under Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. 5. A Special Court functioning under the PC Act can act on a complaint received by the court under Section 190 Cr.P.C., only if the complaint contains definite materials and allegations, either within the direct knowledge of the complainant, or by way of other materials and sources, revealing a definite offence under the PC Act. If the complaint does not involve or allege such an offence under the PC Act, the Special Court acting under the PC Act cannot have jurisdiction to proceed on the said complaint, either under Section 200 Cr.P.C. or under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. This is the jurisdictional issue involved here. 6. Now, let me see whether a prosecution is possible under the PC Act or under the JJ Act or under the MV Act on the allegations given in the complaint made by Sri. Benny or Sri. Joseph.
6. Now, let me see whether a prosecution is possible under the PC Act or under the JJ Act or under the MV Act on the allegations given in the complaint made by Sri. Benny or Sri. Joseph. Factually, the allegation practically is that a Senior Police Officer allowed his minor son to drive his official car at the compound of the Police Academy. Let me see whether this will constitute any offence as the complainant would allege. 7. Section 3 of the MV Act provides that no person shall drive a vehicle in any "public place" unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to him, authorising him to drive the vehicle, and Section 4 of the MV Act provides that no person under the age of eighteen years shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place. Section 5 of the Act provides that no owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 to drive the vehicle. "Public place" is defined in Section 2(34) of the MV Act, that it means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by stage carriages. In this case, the place of incident is admittedly not a place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by stage carriages. It is the ground of the Police Academy where members of the public cannot have right of access. Only a place where the members of the pubic will have access as of right can be called a public place as meant under Section 2(34) of the MV Act. A First Information Report and a final report that follows under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is not possible when the offence is not cognizable. If at all the complaint or any other material reveals an offence under Section 180 read with Section 3 of the MV Act against the minor, or under Section 180 read with Section 5 of the Act against the father, appropriate criminal action will have to be taken by the concerned Police. It is not something to be entertained by a Special Court functioning under the PC Act. 8.
It is not something to be entertained by a Special Court functioning under the PC Act. 8. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2015 came into force on 15.01.2016. Of course, Benny's complaint does not show when exactly or on what date the alleged incident happened. If it was prior to the coming into force of the 2015 JJ Act, the offence must come under the JJ Act, 2000. The offence alleged in para 5 of the complaint is under Section 23 of the JJ Act of 2000 which provides that whoever, having the actual charge of, or control over a juvenile or the child, assaults, abandons, exposes or wilfully neglects the juvenile or causes or procures him to be assaulted, abandoned, exposed, or neglected in a manner likely to cause such juvenile or the child unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both. It is not known how the given allegations will come under Section 23 of the JJ Act of 2000. For such an offence, there must be a situation of a juvenile or a child being assaulted, or abandoned, or exposed, or wilfully neglected by the person having the actual charge or control over the juvenile. There is no such factual situation here. A minor just driving a vehicle, will never come under Section 23 of the JJ Act, 2000. If the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 is applicable to the facts of the case, the relevant Section must be Section 75 of the said JJ Act. This Section provides that whoever, having the actual charge of or control over a child, assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes or wilfully neglects the child, or causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned, abused, exposed, or neglected in a manner likely to cause such child being subjected to unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine of Rs. 1 lakh, or with both.
1 lakh, or with both. Thus, for a prosecution under Section 75 of the JJ Act, 2015 also, there must be a situation of abandonment or abuse or exposure or neglect of a child or a juvenile by the person having actual charge of or control over the child, in a manner likely to cause such juvenile being subjected to unnecessary mental or physical suffering. A mere assault on the juvenile by such person may also come under Section 75 of the JJ Act. This is not at all a case of any sort of mental or physical torture. The learned counsel submitted that this is a case of "abuse" of the juvenile. It is not known how simply allowing a minor boy aged 14 or 15 years to drive a vehicle without licence, and that too at a ground where pedestrians or vehicles are not expected, will constitute abuse of a juvenile as meant under Section 75 of the JJ Act, 2015. Thus, I find that the present case does not come under Section 75 of the JJ Act, 2015 also. The complaint made by Joseph gives an indication that the alleged incident was on 28.02.2016. Anyway, a prosecution under Section 75 of the JJ Act, 2015, is not possible on the given allegations, when there is no situation of any sort of mental or physical suffering caused to the minor boy. 9. Now, let me see whether the complaint can be entertained under the PC Act. Prominently, the offences made punishable under the PC Act, 1988 are (a) acceptance of illegal gratification, (b) instances of criminal misconduct as defined under Section 13(1) of the PC Act in the different clauses (a) to (e), or abetment or attempt to commit such substantive offences. It appears that the present complaint is on Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. For such a prosecution, there must be a situation where a public servant or somebody else is benefited, or has made some pecuniary advantage or monetary gain, or has received any valuable thing, due to the unlawful acts committed by the public servant, or due to the abuse of powers made by the public servant. Here, I do not know, how allowing a minor to drive a vehicle will come under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 10.
Here, I do not know, how allowing a minor to drive a vehicle will come under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 10. The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the Government has lost some fuel due to the driving of the vehicle by the minor. But the statement of objection filed by the State shows that for whatever use made personally by the Police officer, he has paid the required rent fixed by the Government. What is excusable as "trifle" in civil law is contained in Section 95 of the IPC. Another contention is that a Subordinate officer was seen sitting on the seat of the vehicle helping the minor. It is not known under what imagination the complainant would say that this also would come under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. For a prosecution under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, there must be a situation of a public servant having misused or abused his official position, and thereby, either himself or somebody else made some gain. This gain must be either pecuniary advantage or valuable thing. There is no such factual situation here. If at all the Police Officer had in any manner misused his official vehicle without payment of the rent fixed by the Government, appropriate departmental action can be taken by the Government. 11. On a perusal of the materials, I find that the complaint in this case was mechanically forwarded by the learned Trial Judge to the VACB for necessary action. The Juvenile Justice Board also did the very same wrong. In Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarath ( AIR 2015 SC 1742 ), the Honourable Supreme Court has cautioned that complaints shall not be mechanically forwarded for investigation. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015 (2) KLT 451 (SC)), while insisting on the filing of affidavit in support of a complaint brought under Section 190 Cr.P.C., the Honourable Supreme Court cautioned that the Judicial Magistrates authorised to act under Section 190 Cr.P.C. will have to be vigilant with regard to the allegations made, and the nature of the allegations, and not issue directions without proper application of mind. In Biju Purushothaman v. State of Kerala ( 2008 (3) KLT 85 ), a learned Single Judge of this Court has beautifully explained the procedure and the different options possible on a complaint received by a Judicial Magistrate.
In Biju Purushothaman v. State of Kerala ( 2008 (3) KLT 85 ), a learned Single Judge of this Court has beautifully explained the procedure and the different options possible on a complaint received by a Judicial Magistrate. This applies to Special Judges functioning under the PC Act also. Every Judicial Officer authorized to act on complaint must carefully read and understand the procedure and the options beautifully described in Biju Purushothaman's case. In this case, the learned Trial Judge quite mechanically and even with the knowledge that the complaint does not actually reveal any offence under the PC Act, forwarded the complaint for action to the VACB. Anyway, the VACB has fairly conceded that there is no scope at all in this case to proceed under the PC Act. It is really strange imagination that just a minor driving a vehicle of his father, who is a public servant, will constitute an offence under 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. It is not known who prompted the complainants Benny and Joseph to make such a complaint, or who advised them to make such a complaint. 12. This sort of complaints will have to be dealt with appropriately. This is a clear and typical case of abuse of legal process and judicial process. Both the complainants knew very well that the allegations made in the complaint, bringing the incident under the MV Act, or under the PC Act, or under the JJ Act will never stand the test of law. Still they made complaint, and got it forwarded for investigation. The trauma undergone by a Senior Police Officer and the Sub Inspector due to such a vexatious complaint can well be imagined by the Court. Now, I pause for a moment, and direct the learned counsel for the complainant to explain why the complainant should not be directed to pay cost to the petitioners. 13. I heard both sides on the issue of cost. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that this is clearly a vexatious complaint brought either with the object of publicity, or for personal ends. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the complainant is a social activist, and he has brought so many complaints against various persons. It is not known what are those complaints, or what is the nature of those complaints, or against whom those complaints are made.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the complainant is a social activist, and he has brought so many complaints against various persons. It is not known what are those complaints, or what is the nature of those complaints, or against whom those complaints are made. If those complaints are also complaints like this, of course, it will have to be dealt with. Anyway, the learned counsel submits that most of the complaints are for environmental protection. I do not know, because, the details are not available. Let me again come to the complaint in this case. 14. As already observed, every common man, especially, a social activist, who has brought so many complaints for environmental protection, must know, or is expected to know, that a complaint like this, which does not contain the essentials or materials for a prosecution, would not stand the test of law anywhere. Every court acting on complaints brought under Section 190 Cr.P.C. must be able to identify genuine complaints brought for honest prosecution, and false or vexatious complaints brought for publicity or for political or personal ends. Unfortunately, the courts below failed to identify the complaint properly. Anyway, by the time the VACB or the local police could register a crime, and proceed for investigation, all further proceedings were stayed by this Court. The damage and injury caused to the Police Officers will have to be considered by the court in deciding the quantum of cost. I am well satisfied that the complaint in this case is a vexatious one, and it is not at all a genuine one brought for honest prosecution. If the Police Officer has in any manner misused his official vehicle, without making payment of the rent due from him under the rules, let him be appropriately dealt with by the Government. 15. In the above circumstances, I feel it appropriate to direct the complainants to make payment of a cost of Rs.10,000/- each to the I.P.S. Officer and the Sub Inspector. In the result, the three original petitions are disposed of as follows: (a) All further actions and proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the courts below (the Special Court and the Juvenile Justice Board) on C.M.P. No. 325 of 2016 and C.M.P. No. 37 of 2016 will stand dropped.
In the result, the three original petitions are disposed of as follows: (a) All further actions and proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the courts below (the Special Court and the Juvenile Justice Board) on C.M.P. No. 325 of 2016 and C.M.P. No. 37 of 2016 will stand dropped. (b) The third respondent in O.P.No. 126 of 2016 and O.P.No. 154 of 2016 will pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- each to the two petitioners in the applications. (c) The third respondent in O.P.No. 154 of 2016 will also pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner therein. (d) The amount of cost ordered by the court shall be paid within a month from this date. If the cost is not paid, appropriate measures can be taken by the petitioners to enforce the order, and to realize the amount. The learned counsel for the complainant submits that the complainant must be given liberty to approach the Government for appropriate disciplinary action in the matter. Such liberty need not be granted or declared by the court. Such liberty cannot also be curtailed or restricted by the court. Everything will have to be decided appropriately by the Government, in case any complaint is made. P. UBAID, J. O.P.(Crl.) Nos. 126 & 132 of 2016 Decided On : 10-01-2017 ORDER : The learned Public Prosecutor, representing the VACB, seeks some time to file statement of objection. The learned counsel for the second respondent also seeks time to file statement of objection. Post after two weeks.