JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Ms. Thakore, the learned APP, waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent No. 1. Mr. Kuldeep D. Vaidya, the learned counsel, waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent No. 2. 2. By this application under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973, the applicants-original accused persons, seek to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the proceedings of the Sessions Case No. 21 of 2017 pending in the court of the learned 7th Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar arising from the first information report being C.R. No. I-87 of 2016 registered at the Shihor Police Station, Dist: Bhavnagar for the offence punishable under sections 395, 504, 506(2) read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The case of the prosecution may be summarized as under; 3.1 One Gagjibhai Popatbhai Madat, the respondent No. 2 herein, lodged a first information report with the allegations that on 16th September, 2016 at about 10:00 O' Clock, while he was present at the party plot, the accused persons came over there and insisted that they should be permitted to convene meeting. The first informant was serving as a security guard at the said party plot. Something went wrong and the applicants herein entered into an altercation with the first informant. It is alleged that the applicants herein fisticuffs and took away Rs. 1200/- from the pocket of the shirt. 3.2 In such circumstances, the first information report came to be registered. 4. It appears from the materials on record that while the first informant was about to apply lock on the main door of the party plot, the applicants herein came over there and asked him to arrange for chairs, some tea and snacks as they wanted to convene meeting. Such request was opposed by the first informant and the incident, as alleged, occurred. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the proceedings of the Sessions Case No. 21 of 2017 pending in the court of the learned 7th Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar should be quashed. 6. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the proceedings of the Sessions Case No. 21 of 2017 pending in the court of the learned 7th Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar should be quashed. 6. I am of the view that even if the entire case of the prosecution is believed or accepted to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of dacoity are spelt out. No offence punishable under section 395 could be said to have been made out. The law in this regard is well settled. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Himatsing Shivsing v. The State of Gujarat, reported in 1961 GLR 678 , has observed as under:- "Theft amounts to 'robbery' if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. Before theft can amount to 'robbery', the offender must have voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. The second necessary ingredient is that this must be in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. The third necessary ingredient is that the offender must voluntarily cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc., for that end, that is, in order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose of committing theft or for carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. It is not sufficient that in the transaction of committing theft hurt etc., had been caused. If hurt etc., is caused at the time of the commission of the theft but for an object other than the one referred to in sec. 390, I.P. Code, theft would not amount to robbery. It is not sufficient that in the transaction of committing theft hurt etc., had been caused. If hurt etc., is caused at the time of the commission of the theft but for an object other than the one referred to in sec. 390, I.P. Code, theft would not amount to robbery. It is also not sufficient that hurt had been caused in the course of the same transaction as commission of the theft. The three ingredients mentioned in sec. 390, I.P. Code, must always be satisfied before theft can amount to robbery, and this has been explained in Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1941 Oudh, 476, in the following words:- The words "for that end" in sec. 390 clearly mean that the hurt caused by the offender must be with the express object of facilitating the committing of the theft, or must be caused while the offender is committing the theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry away the property obtained by theft. It does not mean that the assault or the hurt must be caused in the same transaction or in the same circumstances. In Karuppa Gounden v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Madras 321, which followed two Calcutta cases of Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi, 5 C.W.N. 372, and Kind Emperor v. Mathura Thakur, 6 C.W.N. 72, it has been observed at page 824 as follows: Now it is our duty to give effect to the words "for that end". It would have been open to the legislature to have used other words which would not raise the difficulty that arises here. The Public Prosecutor has been forced to argue that "for that end" must be read as meaning 'in those circumstances'. In my opinion we cannot do that in construing a section in the Penal Code. Undoubtedly, words 'in those circumstances' would widen the application of the section and we are not permitted to do that. The matter has been considered in two judgments of the Calcutta High Court one of which is reported as Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi 5 C.W.N. 372. Their Lordships put the question in this way: It seems to us that the whole question turns upon the words "for that end". Was any hurt or fear of instant hurt, that was caused in the present case, caused for the end of the commission of the theft. We think not. Their Lordships put the question in this way: It seems to us that the whole question turns upon the words "for that end". Was any hurt or fear of instant hurt, that was caused in the present case, caused for the end of the commission of the theft. We think not. It seems to us that whatever violence was used for the purpose of dispossessing the persons who were already in possession of the premises in question and had no relation to the commission of theft, although theft was committed at the same time. The language used in another case reported as King Emperor v. Mathura Thakur, 6 C.W.N. 72, is as follows:- The question here arises whether Mathura Thakur when he attacked Soman Dhania, did so for the end referred to, namely, for the purpose of carrying away the paddy, which had been harvested. Those judgments in my opinion state the obvious intention of the section and we are bound to give effect to it and I, therefore, follow the decisions in those two cases." 7. In the last paragraph of the judgment, the Division Bench observed as under:- "Ordinarily, if violence or hurt etc. is caused at the time of theft, it would be reasonable to infer that violence or hurt was caused for facilitating the commission of theft or for facilitating the carrying away of the property stolen or for facilitating the attempt to do so. But, there may be something in the evidence to show that hurt or violence was caused not for this purpose but for a different purpose." 8. Having regard to the principles explained by the Division Bench of this Court, referred to above, the proceedings initiated against the applicants so far as the offence of dacoity is concerned, should be quashed. 9. This application is allowed in part. Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code is ordered to be deleted from the charge-sheet. The proceedings to that extent are quashed. So far as the other offences are concerned, i.e., sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, the trial shall proceed further in accordance with law. Since the applicants herein have been discharged so far as section 395 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the case will now have to be sent from the Sessions Court to the court of the learned Magistrate. Since the applicants herein have been discharged so far as section 395 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the case will now have to be sent from the Sessions Court to the court of the learned Magistrate. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.