JUDGMENT By the Court.—The petitioner, who was a Constable in the U.P. Police, was dismissed from service by order dated 28 January 1994 for the reason that he had unauthorisedly remained absent for a long period of 503 days from 8 May 1992. The appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected by order dated 27 July 1994 and the Claim Petition No. 1287 of 1995 filed by the petitioner before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal (the Tribunal), was also dismissed by order dated 1 December 2009. This petition has been filed to assail the aforesaid orders. 2. The facts reveal that while the petitioner was posted as a Constable in Saharanpur, he was directed to take part in the Refresher Course in the Police Training Centre at Moradabad. He was relieved on 3 May 1992 by the Authority to undertake the Course. The petitioner, however, did not report at the Training Centre and went to Deoband where he was admitted in a Government Hospital. It is stated that he was asked to take rest for 2 days on 4 and 5 May 1992. The petitioner thereafter proceeded to the Training Centre where again fell ill and was admitted to a Government Hospital at Muzaffarnagar where he was advised to take rest for two days on 6 and 7 May 1992. It is stated that the petitioner thereafter went to the Police Training Centre at Moradabad on 8 May 1992 but he was not permitted to join the Refresher Course as he reached late. The petitioner claims that while returning from Moradabad he had some kidney problem and, therefore, could join his duties at Saharanpur and he went to his residence at Muzaffarnagar and stayed there for treatment of his disease. 3. As the petitioner unauthorizedly remained absent for a long period of 503 days without leave or permission, a charge-sheet dated 1 June 1993 was issued to the petitioner. The inquiry was conducted against the petitioner under the provisions of U.P. Police Regulations, 1861 and an inquiry report dated 5 January 1994 was submitted. The Inquiry Officer found as a fact that the petitioner had remained unauthorizedly absent for a long period of 503 days. The medical reports of a private doctor were not believed. The Enquiry Officer noted that the petitioner did not get himself examined in a District Hospital as was the requirement under the Regulations. The Inquiry Officer found as a fact that the petitioner had remained unauthorizedly absent for a long period of 503 days. The medical reports of a private doctor were not believed. The Enquiry Officer noted that the petitioner did not get himself examined in a District Hospital as was the requirement under the Regulations. The petitioner was provided an opportunity to submit his objections to the inquiry report which opportunity was availed. Subsequently a detailed order dated 20 January 1994 was passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur for dismissal of the petitioner from service for having remained unauthorizedly absent for a long period of 503 days. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the Tribunal also dismissed the claim petition filed by the petitioner. 4. The only submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing of the petition is that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge that was levelled against the petitioner. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 , as also the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Harpal Singh v. State Public Insurance Corporation Services Tribunal. 5. Ms. Meenakshi Singh, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has, however, submitted that the punishment of dismissal imposed upon a Constable for having unauthorisedly remained absent for a long period of 503 days cannot be said to be disproportionate. Learned Standing Counsel placed before the Court judgments of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Ashok Kumar Singh and another, AIR 1996 SC 736 , Commissioner of Police and others v. Syed Hussain, (2006) 3 SCC 173 and S.R. Tewari v. Union of India and another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 and on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Shiv Vir Singh v. State of U.P. and another, 1998(1) AWC 42 , as also a judgment of this Court in Markandey Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10022 of 1983, decided on 19 March, 2004 and has submitted that the scope of judicial review of punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority is extremely limited and the Courts would interfere with the quantum of punishment only when the punishment is found to be shockingly or strikingly disproportionate to gravity of misconduct. 6. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. 7. The sole contention that is required to be considered is whether the punishment of dismissal from service can be said to be disproportionate if a Constable in the Police Department remains absent unathorisedly for a period of 503 days. 8. The Supreme Court has time and again examined the scope of interference by Courts on the quantum of punishment. 9. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court held that it is within the jurisdiction of the competent authority to decide what punishment is to be imposed and the question of punishment is outside the purview of interference unless it is so disproportionate to the proved misconduct as to shock the conscience of the Court. It has been held that reduction of sentence by the High Court would have a demoralising effect and would be a retrograde step. 10. In Union of India and others v. Datta Linga Toshatwad, (2005) 13 SCC 709 , the Supreme Court observed : “8. The present case is not a case of a constable merely overstaying his leave by 12 days. The respondent took leave from 16.6.1997 and never reported for duty thereafter. Instead he filed a writ petition before the High Court in which the impugned order has been passed. Members of the uniformed forces cannot absent themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature of the duties enjoined on these forces. Such indiscipline, if it goes unpunished, will greatly affect the discipline of the forces. In such forces desertion is a serious matter. Cases of this nature, in whatever manner described, are cases of desertion particularly when there is apprehension of the member of the force being called upon to perform onerous duties in difficult terrains or an order of deputation which he finds inconvenient, is passed. We cannot take such matters lightly, particularly when it relates to uniformed forces of this country. Cases of this nature, in whatever manner described, are cases of desertion particularly when there is apprehension of the member of the force being called upon to perform onerous duties in difficult terrains or an order of deputation which he finds inconvenient, is passed. We cannot take such matters lightly, particularly when it relates to uniformed forces of this country. A member of a uniformed force who overstays his leave by a few days must be able to give a satisfactory explanation. However, a member of the force who goes on leave and never reports for duties thereafter, cannot be said to be one merely overstaying his leave. He must be treated as a deserter. He appears on the scene for the first time when he files a writ petition before the High Court, rather than reporting to his Commanding Officer. We are satisfied that in cases of this nature, dismissal from the force is a justified disciplinary action and cannot be described as disproportionate to the misconduct alleged.” 11. In Ex-Constable Ramvir Singh v. Union of India and others, (2009) 3 SCC 97 , the appellant who was a constable in Border Security Force, was dismissed from service for having absented from duty. The Supreme Court held that the punishment of dismissal from service was not disproportionate. 12. In S.R. Tewari, the Supreme Court while placing reliance on a number of earlier decisions observed : “The question of interference on the quantum of punishment, has been considered by this Court in a catena of judgments, and it was held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary, and thus, would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. ............... In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 SC 484 , this Court after examining various its earlier decisions observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial review, the Court cannot “normally” substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority “shocks the conscience” of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority “shocks the conscience” of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. While examining the issue of proportionality, Court can also consider the circumstances under which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced the accused to act in a certain manner though he had not intended to do so. The Court may further examine the effect, if the order is set aside or substituted by some other penalty. However, it is only in very rare cases that the Court might, to shorten the litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the Competent Authority. 20. In V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. and others, AIR 2005 SC 3417 , this Court considered the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the charges and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found to be “shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.” In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. However, in order to shorten the litigation, in exceptional and rare cases, the Court itself can impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. 21. In State of Meghalaya and others v. Mecken Singh N. Marak, AIR 2008 SC 2862 , this Court observed that a Court or a Tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocks the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. 22. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocks the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. 22. The role of the Court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very limited and the Court cannot substitute its own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference by the Court is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The Court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 23. In Union of India and others v. R.K. Sharma, AIR 2001 SC 3053 , this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit Thakur (supra) observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warrant interference. However, the said observations in Ranjit Thakur (supra) are not to be taken to mean that a Court can, while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and Courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds”. (emphasis supplied) 13. In Commissioner of Police, the Supreme Court, in the case of a Constable, examined whether the punishment of removal from service was disproportionate and observed that though it is beyond doubt that the doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in appropriate cases as the depth of the judicial review will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but refused to interfere with the punishment of dismissal from service since the misconduct was committed by a person who held a position of trust and on whom society looked forward as a protector of law. The observations are : “The respondent herein was a Constable. He was to uphold the Rule of Law. The observations are : “The respondent herein was a Constable. He was to uphold the Rule of Law. It was his duty to aid the prosecution in getting the guilty punished. It was not his duty to aid or abet the accused in fleeing from justice. The accused in question Ahmed Qureshi, in view of the finding of fact arrived at by the disciplinary authority, was a hardened criminal. He had been involved in a series of snatching cases. Not only that, the respondent was also helping the other accused persons in obtaining bails from the Courts. It has been pointed out that in the case in which the respondent stood surety for the said Ahmed Qureshi, he had jumped bail. Presumably because the respondent - a Constable had stood as his surety, he was enlarged on bail by the Court. In a situation of this nature, keeping in view the nature of duties that a protector of law is required to perform, we are firmly of the opinion that the disciplinary authority cannot be said to have committed an error in imposing the punishment of removal from service upon the respondent, particularly when on earlier two occasions also he had been found guilty of commission of misconduct and punished therefor. The High Court thus committed a manifest error in arriving at a finding that the respondent had unblemished record for 28 years. We are not sure whether the High Court’s attention was drawn to the statements made either Counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants herein before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal which showed contra but on the basis of the materials on record which was before the High Court such finding could not have been arrived at. Furthermore, the punishment of removal from service is not imposed only in the case of fraud or defalcation of Government funds but even where a misconduct is committed by a person who holds a position of trust and on whom the society looks forward as a protector of law and in such cases punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be wholly disproportionate, and thus the same was not even violative of doctrine of proportionality.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In Ashok Kumar Singh, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider whether the removal from service of a Police Constable who had absented from duty without leave was proportionate to the charge and in this connection observed : “We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying the punishment while concurring with the findings of the Tribunal on facts. The High Court failed to bear in mind that the first respondent was a police constable and was serving in a disciplined force demanding strict adherence to the rules and procedures more than any other department. Having noticed the fact that the first respondent has absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, we are unable to appreciate the High Court’s observation that ‘’his absence from duty would not amount to such a grave charge’. Even otherwise on the facts of this case, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the punishment holding that ‘’the punishment does not commensurate with the gravity of the charge’ especially when the High Court concurred with the findings of the Tribunal on facts. No case for interference with the punishment is made out.” (emphasis supplied) 15. This judgment of the Supreme Court was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Vir Singh. In this case a Sub-Inspector of GRP absented himself from duty unauthorisedly for 26 days. The punishment of dismissal was found not to be disproportionate to the gravity of charges levelled against him and the observations of the Division Bench are : “The petitioner was a member of a disciplined force. As a responsible official of the department manning the post of Sub-Inspector, he could not have afforded the luxury of remaining absent in an unauthorised manner. It was grossest misconduct on the part of the petitioner to have absented himself on two occasions totaling to a period of 26 days in an unauthorised manner. The order of punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the delinquency committed by the petitioner. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Singh’s case (supra) clearly covers the point in hand.” 16. The order of punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the delinquency committed by the petitioner. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Singh’s case (supra) clearly covers the point in hand.” 16. In Markandey Mishra, a learned Judge of this Court also examined whether the punishment of dismissal imposed upon a Police Constable for unauthorisedly remained absent was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges and the observations are : “Examining the matter in the light of the principle of law laid down in the abovementioned cases, I find that the petitioner, who was a police constable, had continued to remain absent in an unauthorised manner initially for a period of 11 days and then after rejoining he again continued to remain absent in an unauthorised manner for a long period when the disciplinary proceedings were taken against him and he was dismissed from service. The observations of the Supreme Court clearly apply to the facts of the present case. The petitioner was a police constable service in a Disciplined Force requiring strict adherence to the Rules and procedure and it cannot be said that the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed in appeal and revision can be said to be disproportionate to the charges leveled against the petitioner.” 17. The aforesaid decisions emphasize that doctrine of proportionality has to be applied in exceptional cases. It is when the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards or perverse or irrational that the Courts would interfere with the imposition of sentence. It has also been observed that normally the Court would not substitute penalty of their own. 18. In the instant case, the petitioner was a Police Constable, who had unauthorisedly remained absent for 503 days. There is nothing on the record to indicate that he ever got himself admitted in a Government Hospital. Rules 381 and 382 of the Police Regulations provide : “381. It is incumbent on all applicants for medical leave or extension of leave on medical certificates to apprise the Superintendent of Police in writing of their intention to apply for a medical certificate. Rules 381 and 382 of the Police Regulations provide : “381. It is incumbent on all applicants for medical leave or extension of leave on medical certificates to apprise the Superintendent of Police in writing of their intention to apply for a medical certificate. Any failure to do so may result in a decision that the medical certificate has been obtained by misrepresentation and may thereby entail serious consequences. 382. Under-officers and constables who fall ill when on duty or who are ill when due to return to duty, must apply for admission to the district police hospital or for treatment at the nearest dispensary, if the police hospital is out of easy reach. The fact of their admission or treatment must be reported to the local Superintendent of Police who unless they are his own subordinates will take immediate steps to communicate the fact to the Superintendent of Police whose subordinates they are. Officers of higher rank are not compelled to apply for admission to police hospitals, but are not relieved of the responsibility, while on leave of intimating their intention of obtaining medical certificate to the Superintendent of Police as prescribed above.” 19. The provisions of Regulations 381 and 382 have been blatantly violated by the petitioner. The petitioner had got himself examined by private doctors only. The Inquiry Officer did not accept the medical certificates produced by the petitioner. It was not a short absence for about a week or 10 days but it was an absence for 503 days. As a member of a disciplined force, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to have followed the Regulations and to have taken the required steps but that was not done. 20. We are, in such circumstances, unable to persuade ourselves to hold that the punishment of dismissal was arbitrary or that it would shock the conscience. 21. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner do not come to his aid. 22. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd., the respondent was a System Officer in the Eastern Coal Fields. He had proceeded on sanctioned leave upto 9 September 1998. However, after expiry of the sanctioned leave, he did not report for duty and remained absent for six months without any authorization. He was removed from service by an order dated 29 November 2000. He had proceeded on sanctioned leave upto 9 September 1998. However, after expiry of the sanctioned leave, he did not report for duty and remained absent for six months without any authorization. He was removed from service by an order dated 29 November 2000. A learned Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned orders and directed reinstatement. The appeal filed before the Division Bench was dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether the punishment of removal was grossly disproportionate to the proved charge of unauthorised absence of more than 6 months and observed as follows: The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in access to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be : would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the Respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months. (emphasis supplied) 23. The Supreme Court noticed that the absence of the petitioner was purely personal and beyond his control and he had sent his resignation, which was not accepted. It is for these reasons that the order was held to be not justified since no reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of removal in such circumstances. 24. In Harpal Singh, a Division Bench of this Court interfered with the quantum of punishment holding that at best it was a case of negligence on the part of the petitioner and not a case where he indulged in any financial irregularity or committed serious misconduct : “It is not necessary to go into the merits of the incident in question and examine whether the finding of guilt against the petitioner was justified or not. In our opinion, the punishment given to the petitioner is disproportionate to the offence. At best it was a case of negligence on the part of the petitioner and not a case where he indulged in any financial irregularity or committed serious misconduct. Hence on the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the dismissal order was disproportionate to the offence. Hence the petition is allowed. We quash the order dated 23.1.1987 as well as the appellate order and the impugned order of Tribunal, and direct that the petitioner shall be reinstated within two months of production of a certified copy of this order before the authority concerned but he will be given a severe warning and he shall be given only half of his back salary for the period from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. However, he will be given continuity of service and all other consequential benefits.” 25. However, he will be given continuity of service and all other consequential benefits.” 25. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was disproportionate to the charge levelled against him. The impugned orders, therefore, do not call for any interference. 26. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.